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April 11, 1959
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� Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03003306 �%dr *C�KIC I or 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 11 April 1959 Copy No. C CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN f)ocl IMENT NO. NO CHANGF, IN CLS. DIJ;LA3:3IFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS NEXT nEvicw DATE: AUTH: /97 DATE. _76 TOP SECRET .. ZApProved rorlease:2020/02/21 C03003306W A Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03003306 Trip d&rnesicir Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03003306 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03003306 ���� .1111w. ���� Ams� 11 APRIL 1959 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Ambassador Thompson comments on Soviet policy as foreign ministers' conference approaches. II. ASIA-AFRICA British concerned over reports that Iraq preparing to take military ac- tion against Kuwait about 15 April. More military supplies sent from Egypt to Syria, probably for guerrilla opera- tions against Iraq. UAR furnishing additional military ment to Libya. Pakistani Air Force shoots down In- dian aircraft over Pakistani territory. 0 III. THE WEST US Embassy in Bonn comments on Menauer's decision to relinquish chancellorship. 0 = 1.4 _ 0 Czech ship seized this week by French Navy was carrying arms to Indonesia and Morocco. Uruguay considers breaking diplo- matic relations with USSR. Approved for lieles-e-:-2-020/02/21 C03003306 z Approved for Release: ---020/-02/21 C03003306 male CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 11 April 1959 DAILY BRIEF L THE COMMUNIST BLOC AA USSR: In assessing Soviet policy as the foreign min- isters' conference approaches, Ambassador Thompson concludes that Moscow's principal objective is to gain West- ern acceptance of the Eastern European status quo, to be symbolized by some sort of recognition of East Germany. As for Adenauer's decision to assume the presidency, Thompson suggests that Soviet leaders will see this as pro- viding opportunities for exploitation of those West German political forces willing to "dicker" with Moscow and the East German regime. (Page 1) IL ASIA-AFRICA Iraq-Kuwait: owing to the irrfptIrtance of Kuwait they are obliged to , "take seriously" reports, admittedly of the "rumor varieW' that Iraq intends to take over Kuwait by military action about 15 April. the British military posi- tion in the area is "woefully weak," and that unless there were sufficient advance warning to enable British forces to be flown to the rea, they would be unable to counter such an Iraqi move. C_While the bulk of Iraq's forces are in the north and cen- tral portions of the country, and there has been no indication of a deployment preparatory to a move against Kuwait, the Iraqi forces near Basra probably could undertake this opera- tion alone. Additional Iraqi forces presumably would be moved Into the area, however, in anticipation of a British countermove. (Page 3) (Map) AApproved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03063366 A ree 44 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03003306 '1110 tftgo, te- UAR-Iraq: An additional UAR shipment of 1,750 rifles, 3,000,00b rounds of ammunition, and a quantity of explosives was scheduled to be sent from Egvto Syria on 9 April, These munitions, like a shipment of 3,000,000 rounds of small-arms ammuni- tion last week, are probably destined for use in guerrilla op- erations against Iraq. Iraqi security forces were instructed on 7 April to strengthen protection of the northern Iraq oil pipelines against saboteurs who allegedly had infiltrated from Syria. (Page 5) UAR-Libya: The trend toward closer relations between the two countries has continued with a UAR agreement in late March to furnish additional military equipment, including three Sherman tanks and a few mortars and antiaircraft guns, Egyptian military instruc- tors are to go to Libya to train Libyan personnel in the use of these arms. At the end of February, the UAR presented Libya with two training planes and a small quantitj of light arms. (CON- Pakistan -India: The Pakistani Air Force on iv April shot down an Indian Canberra jet bomber near Rawalpindi in northern West Pakistan. Karachi states the aircraft was inter- cepted well inside Pakistani territory and ignored several warnings to land. The two-man Indian crew reportedly es- caped with injuries. The action is likely to produce sharp political repercussions, including mutual recrimination and heated press comment. The incident probably will retard cur- rent efforts to negotiate a settlement of the canal waters dis- pute. (Page 6) III. THE WEST West Germany: American officials in Bonn feel it is an i\ open question how great Adenauer's influence will be after he 0,� leaves the chancellorship, despite statements by Christian 11 Apr 59 DAILY BRIEF ii V TOP SECRET AApproved for Release: 2020/02/21 C0300330F /.f / A Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03003306 _ New 'Nue Democratic party (CDU) leaders that he will continue to dom- inate policy from the presidency. CDU Deputy Chairman Krone has ruled out any attempts to change the constitution in a "De Gaulle-like fashion." The embapsy also believes that external developments may have influenced Adenauer's final decision. The Foreign Ministry has announced that Adenauer will meet the French premier in Bonn on 6 May, and hinted that he may visit London and the United States. (Page 7) Bloc-France-Morocco: The Czech freighter Lidice seized by the French off Casa anca on 7 April and taken to Oran was carrying Czech military aircraft e ui ment for Indo- nesia as art of its cargo, The seizure stemmed from the French belief that the arms cargo was for the Algerian rebels. The vessels. also carried some nil itary materiel purchased by Rabat tor its own military defense forces. The FrensN seizure has further strained French- Moroccan relations.I Uruguay: The governing execu ing breaking diplomatic relations with the USSR. Leaders suppprting a break point to Argentina and Mexico's recent oust- er a Soviet diplomats accused of promoting Communist agita- tion� and they cite similar activities in Uruguay. The death on 8 April of majority party chief Herrera who feared a break v would prejudice Uruguay's increasingly important trade with the Sino-Soviet bloc, will probably lessen opposition to such a move. (Page 9) II Apr 59 DAILY BRIEF iii �SLUE, v ,Azp5roved for Release: 2020/u2/21 CO3003306/ A Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03003306 Nue %owl I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC ompson's Views on Soviet Position in Negotiations ambassador Thompson believes the USSR's principal objec- tive in forthcoming negotiations will be to achieve a result which will amount to Western acceptance of the status quo in Eastern Europe, to be symbolized by some sort of recognition of East Germany. He suggests the USSR, in trying to accomplish this, will seek to inflict as much damage as possible on Western pres- tige and unitiol In Thompson's view, the USSR precipitated the Berlin crisis in order to overcome Western resistance to top-level conferences and to exert pressure on a very vulnerable Western position. He suggests that if the Soviet leaders succeed in obtaining Western acceptance of the status quo in Eastern Europe and East Germany, they may agree to a new Berlin arrangement which will provide the West with an "improved title" for remaining in West Berlin and with better defined access rights. 'ffhe ambassador warns that failure to reach agreement on Berlin will lead, at a minimum, to more active Soviet probing and pressures on Allied and, eventually, West German access to Berlin. While Thompson does not believe Khrushchev is under any compelling domestic pressure to produce a victory, he em- phasizes that the Soviet premier is in "deadly earnest" in "aim- ing a fatal blow at Western pretensions to challenging the exist- ing boundaries of the Soviet empire." At the same time, the ambassador continues to believe there will be a strong Soviet de- sire to avoid letting matters get out of hand. for Soviet tactics at the foreign ministers' conference, Thompson suggests that the Soviet representative, after stating Moscow's established positions on a German peace treaty and Berlin, may put forward "fall-back" positions on individual ar- ticles of the Soviet draft treaty, the specifics of the free-city plan, and the temporary or provisional exclusion of Czechoslo- vakia and Poland from the conference. Moscow's essentie SECRET- 11 Apr 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03003306 Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/E/21 C03003306 *-00, 6sticking point," however/ will be over agreement to any West- ern proposals which do not give substantial de facto recognition to East German39 LTjiompson feels the Soviet leaders believe Adenauer's decision to seek the presidency has injected new elements of fluidity into the situation which will provide opportunities for Soviet exploitation of West German groups which may be will- ing to abandon the West's long-standing policy on reunification and "dicker" with the USSR and East Germann, SECRET 11 Apr 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03003306 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03003306 IRAQ Basra area - 15th Inf Brigade & transport company (3u00) 7th Field Artillery Regt (600./ ' Nasiriya - 14th Inf Brigade (3000) 0kASIRIYA IRAQ BASRA NEUTRAL ZONES KUWAIT Frontier force a Security force 15 Police 1000 Oil company guards 600 Secret police 803 Al Mans SAUDI ARABIA Riyadh,, Ahwaz Abadan j MILES j 300 24419 IRAN UK BAHREIN i infBn 1 Armored Car Cu ADEN 3 Inf Bn 1 Armored Car Bn (minus company at Bahrein) NAVAL 3 Frigates in Persian Gulf AIR 18 Venom jet fighters at Aden 4c� Burairm ,41) ,A Oasis . � . Nh� .� S TRUCI's� �'. � �.. ��� ��� '" 90411 SULTA N ATE � OF MUSCAT AND OMAN �. Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03003306 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03003306 II. ASIA-AFRICA Plans For Iraqi Military Occupation of Kuwait Rumored Gritish Foreign Office officials are "taking seriously" rumors that Iraq intends to occupy Kuwait by military ac- tion in mid-April, according to the American ambassador to Saudi Arabia who is consulting with British officials in London. Gie British reportedly feel that the Iraqis might consid- er that any move to nationalize the Iraq Petroleum Company should be accompanied by seizure of Kuwait, the largest Mid- dle Eastern producer, in orlr to gain a strong bargaining po- sition with consumer nations. 6-ritish officials state that their military position in the area is very weak with only one infantry battalion and an armored car company (about 800-900 men) based on Bahrein. Three more infantry battalions and an armored car battalion are based at Aden, and an infantry brigade is located in Kenya. Facilities for rapid movement of troops from these points to Kuwait by air are very limited at preserig. G;itain has a military defense treaty with Kuwait, but no British troops are stationed there. Members of Kuwait's rul- ing Subah family have shown increasing awareness of their total dependence on British military protection, as a result of developments in Iraq and recent manifestations of Kuwaiti nationalist hostility to Subah rule. The British military ad- viser's relations with the Kuwaitis have improved markedly in recent weeks, and he has been given the additional title of "liaison officer with British forces. 11 Apr 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03003306 ef Ty," PT7 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03003306 %we No, e principal element of Kuwait's armed forces is the Frontier Force of 900-1,000 men organized into six infantry companies, one armored car company, one field artillery battery, an armored personnel company, and a support company. The 1,500-man security force a d the 1,000-man police force are equipped only with rifles Licere has been no indication of a deployment of Iraqi forces preparatory to a move against Kuwait. Iraqi forces In the Basra area consist of an infantry brigade and a field artillery battalion. These forces are capable of occupying Kuwait. Another infantry brigacie is stationed at Nasiriya, about 100 miles northeast of Basra, while the 2nd Division headquarters is farther north at Diwaniya. The main Iraqi troop concentration of three divisions, including most of the armor, is in central Iraq, while the 1st Division is in the north. The northern forces have been increasingly occupied with growing tension on the Syrian-Iraqi border. All division- al security units and most Iraqi tank units were alerted on 4 April, presumably because of indications that UAR-supported tribesmen will step up their forays into Iraqi territory, and persistent rumors of impending internal disturbances. 11 Apr Apr 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03003306 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03003306 Nre UAR-Iraqi Tensions The UAR is making further propaganda efforts to promote an internal uprising in Iraq, and is sending large additional quantities of arms to equip the Shammar tribesmen on the Syrian side of the Iraqi border. On 9 April the UAR's "Voice of Free Iraq" broad- cast slogans for "a great revolution" which "will be unleashed tomorrow" by "our struggling peoples and our valiant army... against the hated Communists and the despised sole leader." This follows a barrage of unfounded UAR claims that major uprisings and army mutinies were already taking place. While it is doubtful that the UAR now has the capability to induce revo- lution inside Iraq, there is some possibility of disturbances in connection with a rally of the Communist-front Peace Partisans, scheduled for 14 April in Baghdad. More intensive raids into Iraa by Shammar tribesmen are be expected. since 2 April, 1,750 rifles, 6,000,000 rounds of ammunition, and a quantity of explosives have been dispatched from Egypt for use by the Shammar and that additional shipments may be forthcom- ing. The Iraqi Government, believing that Syrian saboteurs have already infiltrated, on 7 April ordered a series of new police and army patrolling activities to protect the oil pipelines in northern Iraq. On 9 April, the Iraqi press headlined the creation of five new economic ministries and the abolition of the Ministry of Develop- ment. The new ministers have not yet been identified. Reports of this impending change indicated, however, that its purpose is to increase the proportion of Communist ministers in the cabinet. The assignment to the post of Iraqi ambassador in Iran of Minis- ter of Guidance Husayn Jamil, who was actually displaced from control of his ministry several weeks ago, leaves governmental supervision_of_oress_ancLrarlia_c_ompletely in pro-Communist hands. --TOP-SEGRET- 11 Apr 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03003306 �1�����ft.maam eam� a a� Approved for-R�elease: 2020/02/21 C03003306 Itrie Possible Repercussions of Indo-Pakistani Airplane Incident The shooting down of an Indian Canberra jet bomber over West Pakistan on 10 April will almost certainly renew the mu- tual mistrust and suspicion which both Karachi and New Delhi have shown a desire in recent months to diminish. The major immediate result of the incident may be to make more diffi- cult the settlement of the Indo-Pakistani canal waters dispute, which is under negotiation with the assistance of the World Bank. The press in Pakistan seems likely to play up the "ag- gressive" attitude shown by Indian military forces in flying over Pakistan, while the Indian press will note Pakistan's "aggressive" attitude in shooting down an unarmed plane. Po- litical leaders may also try to capitalize on the issue to secure tactical advantages or maintain a propaganda position. If the Pakistani Air Force used American-supplied jet fighters to shobt down the Canberra, New Delhi's long-standing claim that American military aid to Pakistan might well be used against India will be strengthened. Similarly, Pakistan may also claim that the incident shows its continued need for strong armed forces with up-to-date equipment. Both govern- ments, however, may try to prevent the incident from inter- fering seriously with over-all relations. The incident is also likely temporarily to draw the atten- tion of the Indian public and government away from Communist China's suppression of the Tibetan revolt. Without it, feeling might have been maintained at a higher pitch as the Dalai Lama makes his way toward New Delhi. -CONFIDENTIAL- 11 Apr 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03003306 Page 6 v. a rev.. IT Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03003306 IIL THE WEST Adenauer's Future Influence on Policy Seen as Uncertain erican Embassy officials in Bonn feel that it is still an open question how great Adenauer's influence on policy will be after he leaves the chancellorship. Christian Democratic Union (CDU) Deputy Chairman Heinrich Krone informed Amer- ican officials that the whole point of Adenauer's move was to exert long-range political influence and remain a ruling force in West German politics. He said, however, there was no question of altering the constitution in a "De Gaulle-like fash- ion-E arrone also flatly denied that foreign policy questions were involved in Adenauer's decision and declared the chancellor's policies would be continued "as far as humanly possible." He explained that "for some time" Adenauer's cicise associates had been "urging" him to reconsider his decision against mov- ing into the presidency, and after discussing the matter for a week with them he decided to accept on 6 April, the day before the CDU committee meeting2 CAlierican officials, however, feel that Adenauer was in- fluenca by recent foreign policy developments. They cite as possible motives his impression that the trend of Western pol- icy was against certain of his basic positions following Mac- millan's trip to Moscow and the increasing German press at- tacks on him as the only obstacle to East-West negotiations. Secretary Dulles' illness and Adenauer's assessment of Bonn's differences with other NATO countries on a phased unification plan are mentioned as other possible contributing factorS7.1 Bonn Foreign Ministry official credited Khrushchev's threat to Berlin as having secured Adenauer's "abdication." He believes that Adenauer's influence will not be brought to bear in a possible summit conference, and mentioned tftql 11 Apr 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03003306 Approved for -R-e-leZe72(TIO/F272'1 C03003306 woe .14.01 6x;aportant German political circles were advocating a "new flex- ibility" in Bonn foreign poliCE, FIciost press speculation on a new chancellor agrees that Economics Minister Erhard would be the party's choicel, al- though Aden iir i c inannrtorl 1117 fhc fe favrir rinnnriP Min- ister Etz. 11 Apr 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03003306 Page 8 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03003306 -4.001 Uruguay Considers Breaking Relations With USSR Uruguay's governing executive council is considering breaking diplomatic relations with the UW, Councilor Nar done had introduced the proposal and had accused the country's Communists of fomenting a strike to gain a political advan- tage. Another councilor, he said, called attention to the re- cent expulsions of Soviet diplomats from Argentina and Mexico and suggested that the council reconsider the ques- tion of Uruguay's own relations with the USSR. Some officials of the National party, which came to power on 1 March, have expressed concern over the extent of Communist influence in Uruguay and over the large staffs in the five bloc diplomatic missions in Montevideo. The Com- munists thrived under the lengthy incumbency of the last ruling party. The view previously voiced by some National party mem- bers of the coincil that Uruguay's serious financial problems make bloc trade necessary for the short run may have lost some support with the death on 8 April of the ruling party chief, Dr. Herrera, who reportedly feared a break would prejudice the increasingly important Sino-Soviet bloc trade. -SECRET- ii Apr 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03003306 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03003306 Noe THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of the Interior The Secretary of the Interior The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director United States Information Agency The Director 1 1 Approved fo.r'hlierlawswe7 702072/1 T 1 C03003306 �