CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/04/11

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03003306
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: April 11, 1959

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Copy No. C
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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NEXT nEvicw DATE:
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11 APRIL 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Ambassador Thompson comments on
Soviet policy as foreign ministers'
conference approaches.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
British concerned over reports that
Iraq preparing to take military ac-
tion against Kuwait about 15 April.
More military supplies sent from Egypt
to Syria, probably for guerrilla opera-
tions against Iraq.
UAR furnishing additional military
ment to Libya.
Pakistani Air Force shoots down In-
dian aircraft over Pakistani territory. 0
III. THE WEST
US Embassy in Bonn comments on
Menauer's decision to relinquish
chancellorship.
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0 Czech ship seized this week by
French Navy was carrying arms
to Indonesia and Morocco.
Uruguay considers breaking diplo-
matic relations with USSR.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
11 April 1959
DAILY BRIEF
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
AA
USSR: In assessing Soviet policy as the foreign min-
isters' conference approaches, Ambassador Thompson
concludes that Moscow's principal objective is to gain West-
ern acceptance of the Eastern European status quo, to be
symbolized by some sort of recognition of East Germany.
As for Adenauer's decision to assume the presidency,
Thompson suggests that Soviet leaders will see this as pro-
viding opportunities for exploitation of those West German
political forces willing to "dicker" with Moscow and the East
German regime. (Page 1)
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Iraq-Kuwait:
owing to the irrfptIrtance of Kuwait they are obliged to ,
"take seriously" reports, admittedly of the "rumor varieW'
that Iraq intends to take over Kuwait by military action about
15 April. the British military posi-
tion in the area is "woefully weak," and that unless there were
sufficient advance warning to enable British forces to be flown
to the rea, they would be unable to counter such an Iraqi move.
C_While the bulk of Iraq's forces are in the north and cen-
tral portions of the country, and there has been no indication
of a deployment preparatory to a move against Kuwait, the
Iraqi forces near Basra probably could undertake this opera-
tion alone. Additional Iraqi forces presumably would be moved
Into the area, however, in anticipation of a British countermove.
(Page 3) (Map)
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UAR-Iraq: An additional UAR shipment of 1,750 rifles,
3,000,00b rounds of ammunition, and a quantity of explosives
was scheduled to be sent from Egvto Syria on 9 April,
These munitions,
like a shipment of 3,000,000 rounds of small-arms ammuni-
tion last week, are probably destined for use in guerrilla op-
erations against Iraq. Iraqi security forces were instructed
on 7 April to strengthen protection of the northern Iraq oil
pipelines against saboteurs who allegedly had infiltrated from
Syria. (Page 5)
UAR-Libya: The trend toward closer relations between
the two countries has continued with a UAR agreement in late
March to furnish additional military equipment, including three
Sherman tanks and a few mortars and antiaircraft guns,
Egyptian military instruc-
tors are to go to Libya to train Libyan personnel in the use of
these arms.
At the end of February, the UAR presented Libya with
two training planes and a small quantitj of light arms. (CON-
Pakistan -India: The Pakistani Air Force on iv April
shot down an Indian Canberra jet bomber near Rawalpindi in
northern West Pakistan. Karachi states the aircraft was inter-
cepted well inside Pakistani territory and ignored several
warnings to land. The two-man Indian crew reportedly es-
caped with injuries. The action is likely to produce sharp
political repercussions, including mutual recrimination and
heated press comment. The incident probably will retard cur-
rent efforts to negotiate a settlement of the canal waters dis-
pute. (Page 6)
III. THE WEST
West Germany: American officials in Bonn feel it is an
i\ open question how great Adenauer's influence will be after he
0,� leaves the chancellorship, despite statements by Christian
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Democratic party (CDU) leaders that he will continue to dom-
inate policy from the presidency. CDU Deputy Chairman Krone
has ruled out any attempts to change the constitution in a "De
Gaulle-like fashion." The embapsy also believes that external
developments may have influenced Adenauer's final decision.
The Foreign Ministry has announced that Adenauer will meet
the French premier in Bonn on 6 May, and hinted that he may
visit London and the United States. (Page 7)
Bloc-France-Morocco: The Czech freighter Lidice
seized by the French off Casa anca on 7 April and taken to
Oran was carrying Czech military aircraft e ui ment for Indo-
nesia as art of its cargo,
The seizure stemmed from the French belief that
the arms cargo was for the Algerian rebels. The vessels.
also carried some nil
itary materiel purchased by Rabat tor its own military defense
forces. The FrensN seizure has further strained French-
Moroccan relations.I
Uruguay: The governing execu
ing breaking diplomatic relations with the USSR. Leaders
suppprting a break point to Argentina and Mexico's recent oust-
er a Soviet diplomats accused of promoting Communist agita-
tion� and they cite similar activities in Uruguay. The death
on 8 April of majority party chief Herrera who feared a break
v would prejudice Uruguay's increasingly important trade with the
Sino-Soviet bloc, will probably lessen opposition to such a move.
(Page 9)
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
ompson's Views on Soviet Position in Negotiations
ambassador Thompson believes the USSR's principal objec-
tive in forthcoming negotiations will be to achieve a result which
will amount to Western acceptance of the status quo in Eastern
Europe, to be symbolized by some sort of recognition of East
Germany. He suggests the USSR, in trying to accomplish this,
will seek to inflict as much damage as possible on Western pres-
tige and unitiol
In Thompson's view, the USSR precipitated the Berlin crisis
in order to overcome Western resistance to top-level conferences
and to exert pressure on a very vulnerable Western position. He
suggests that if the Soviet leaders succeed in obtaining Western
acceptance of the status quo in Eastern Europe and East Germany,
they may agree to a new Berlin arrangement which will provide
the West with an "improved title" for remaining in West Berlin
and with better defined access rights.
'ffhe ambassador warns that failure to reach agreement on
Berlin will lead, at a minimum, to more active Soviet probing
and pressures on Allied and, eventually, West German access to
Berlin. While Thompson does not believe Khrushchev is under
any compelling domestic pressure to produce a victory, he em-
phasizes that the Soviet premier is in "deadly earnest" in "aim-
ing a fatal blow at Western pretensions to challenging the exist-
ing boundaries of the Soviet empire." At the same time, the
ambassador continues to believe there will be a strong Soviet de-
sire to avoid letting matters get out of hand.
for Soviet tactics at the foreign ministers' conference,
Thompson suggests that the Soviet representative, after stating
Moscow's established positions on a German peace treaty and
Berlin, may put forward "fall-back" positions on individual ar-
ticles of the Soviet draft treaty, the specifics of the free-city
plan, and the temporary or provisional exclusion of Czechoslo-
vakia and Poland from the conference. Moscow's essentie
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6sticking point," however/ will be over agreement to any West-
ern proposals which do not give substantial de facto recognition
to East German39
LTjiompson feels the Soviet leaders believe Adenauer's
decision to seek the presidency has injected new elements of
fluidity into the situation which will provide opportunities for
Soviet exploitation of West German groups which may be will-
ing to abandon the West's long-standing policy on reunification
and "dicker" with the USSR and East Germann,
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IRAQ
Basra area - 15th Inf Brigade & transport company (3u00)
7th Field Artillery Regt (600./
' Nasiriya - 14th Inf Brigade (3000)
0kASIRIYA
IRAQ
BASRA
NEUTRAL
ZONES
KUWAIT
Frontier force a
Security force 15
Police 1000
Oil company guards 600
Secret police 803
Al Mans
SAUDI ARABIA
Riyadh,,
Ahwaz
Abadan
j MILES j
300
24419
IRAN
UK
BAHREIN
i infBn
1 Armored Car Cu
ADEN
3 Inf Bn
1 Armored Car Bn (minus
company at Bahrein)
NAVAL
3 Frigates in Persian Gulf
AIR
18 Venom jet fighters at Aden
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Plans For Iraqi Military Occupation of Kuwait Rumored
Gritish Foreign Office officials are "taking seriously"
rumors that Iraq intends to occupy Kuwait by military ac-
tion in mid-April, according to the American ambassador
to Saudi Arabia who is consulting with British officials in
London.
Gie British reportedly feel that the Iraqis might consid-
er that any move to nationalize the Iraq Petroleum Company
should be accompanied by seizure of Kuwait, the largest Mid-
dle Eastern producer, in orlr to gain a strong bargaining po-
sition with consumer nations.
6-ritish officials state that their military position in the
area is very weak with only one infantry battalion and an
armored car company (about 800-900 men) based on Bahrein.
Three more infantry battalions and an armored car battalion
are based at Aden, and an infantry brigade is located in Kenya.
Facilities for rapid movement of troops from these points to
Kuwait by air are very limited at preserig.
G;itain has a military defense treaty with Kuwait, but no
British troops are stationed there. Members of Kuwait's rul-
ing Subah family have shown increasing awareness of their
total dependence on British military protection, as a result
of developments in Iraq and recent manifestations of Kuwaiti
nationalist hostility to Subah rule. The British military ad-
viser's relations with the Kuwaitis have improved markedly
in recent weeks, and he has been given the additional title of
"liaison officer with British forces.
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e principal element of Kuwait's armed forces is the
Frontier Force of 900-1,000 men organized into six infantry
companies, one armored car company, one field artillery
battery, an armored personnel company, and a support
company. The 1,500-man security force a d the 1,000-man
police force are equipped only with rifles
Licere has been no indication of a deployment of Iraqi
forces preparatory to a move against Kuwait. Iraqi forces
In the Basra area consist of an infantry brigade and a field
artillery battalion. These forces are capable of occupying
Kuwait. Another infantry brigacie is stationed at Nasiriya,
about 100 miles northeast of Basra, while the 2nd Division
headquarters is farther north at Diwaniya. The main Iraqi
troop concentration of three divisions, including most of the
armor, is in central Iraq, while the 1st Division is in the
north. The northern forces have been increasingly occupied
with growing tension on the Syrian-Iraqi border. All division-
al security units and most Iraqi tank units were alerted on 4
April, presumably because of indications that UAR-supported
tribesmen will step up their forays into Iraqi territory, and
persistent rumors of impending internal disturbances.
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UAR-Iraqi Tensions
The UAR is making further propaganda efforts to promote an
internal uprising in Iraq, and is sending large additional quantities
of arms to equip the Shammar tribesmen on the Syrian side of the
Iraqi border. On 9 April the UAR's "Voice of Free Iraq" broad-
cast slogans for "a great revolution" which "will be unleashed
tomorrow" by "our struggling peoples and our valiant army...
against the hated Communists and the despised sole leader."
This follows a barrage of unfounded UAR claims that major
uprisings and army mutinies were already taking place. While
it is doubtful that the UAR now has the capability to induce revo-
lution inside Iraq, there is some possibility of disturbances in
connection with a rally of the Communist-front Peace Partisans,
scheduled for 14 April in Baghdad.
More intensive raids into Iraa by Shammar tribesmen are
be expected.
since 2 April, 1,750 rifles, 6,000,000 rounds of ammunition, and
a quantity of explosives have been dispatched from Egypt for use
by the Shammar and that additional shipments may be forthcom-
ing.
The Iraqi Government, believing that Syrian saboteurs have
already infiltrated, on 7 April ordered a series of new police and
army patrolling activities to protect the oil pipelines in northern
Iraq.
On 9 April, the Iraqi press headlined the creation of five new
economic ministries and the abolition of the Ministry of Develop-
ment. The new ministers have not yet been identified. Reports
of this impending change indicated, however, that its purpose is
to increase the proportion of Communist ministers in the cabinet.
The assignment to the post of Iraqi ambassador in Iran of Minis-
ter of Guidance Husayn Jamil, who was actually displaced from
control of his ministry several weeks ago, leaves governmental
supervision_of_oress_ancLrarlia_c_ompletely in pro-Communist
hands.
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Itrie
Possible Repercussions of Indo-Pakistani Airplane Incident
The shooting down of an Indian Canberra jet bomber over
West Pakistan on 10 April will almost certainly renew the mu-
tual mistrust and suspicion which both Karachi and New Delhi
have shown a desire in recent months to diminish. The major
immediate result of the incident may be to make more diffi-
cult the settlement of the Indo-Pakistani canal waters dispute,
which is under negotiation with the assistance of the World
Bank.
The press in Pakistan seems likely to play up the "ag-
gressive" attitude shown by Indian military forces in flying
over Pakistan, while the Indian press will note Pakistan's
"aggressive" attitude in shooting down an unarmed plane. Po-
litical leaders may also try to capitalize on the issue to secure
tactical advantages or maintain a propaganda position.
If the Pakistani Air Force used American-supplied jet
fighters to shobt down the Canberra, New Delhi's long-standing
claim that American military aid to Pakistan might well be
used against India will be strengthened. Similarly, Pakistan
may also claim that the incident shows its continued need for
strong armed forces with up-to-date equipment. Both govern-
ments, however, may try to prevent the incident from inter-
fering seriously with over-all relations.
The incident is also likely temporarily to draw the atten-
tion of the Indian public and government away from Communist
China's suppression of the Tibetan revolt. Without it, feeling
might have been maintained at a higher pitch as the Dalai Lama
makes his way toward New Delhi.
-CONFIDENTIAL-
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IIL THE WEST
Adenauer's Future Influence on Policy Seen as Uncertain
erican Embassy officials in Bonn feel that it is still
an open question how great Adenauer's influence on policy will
be after he leaves the chancellorship. Christian Democratic
Union (CDU) Deputy Chairman Heinrich Krone informed Amer-
ican officials that the whole point of Adenauer's move was to
exert long-range political influence and remain a ruling force
in West German politics. He said, however, there was no
question of altering the constitution in a "De Gaulle-like fash-
ion-E
arrone also flatly denied that foreign policy questions were
involved in Adenauer's decision and declared the chancellor's
policies would be continued "as far as humanly possible." He
explained that "for some time" Adenauer's cicise associates
had been "urging" him to reconsider his decision against mov-
ing into the presidency, and after discussing the matter for a
week with them he decided to accept on 6 April, the day before
the CDU committee meeting2
CAlierican officials, however, feel that Adenauer was in-
fluenca by recent foreign policy developments. They cite as
possible motives his impression that the trend of Western pol-
icy was against certain of his basic positions following Mac-
millan's trip to Moscow and the increasing German press at-
tacks on him as the only obstacle to East-West negotiations.
Secretary Dulles' illness and Adenauer's assessment of Bonn's
differences with other NATO countries on a phased unification
plan are mentioned as other possible contributing factorS7.1
Bonn Foreign Ministry official credited Khrushchev's
threat to Berlin as having secured Adenauer's "abdication."
He believes that Adenauer's influence will not be brought to
bear in a possible summit conference, and mentioned tftql
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6x;aportant German political circles were advocating a "new flex-
ibility" in Bonn foreign poliCE,
FIciost press speculation on a new chancellor agrees that
Economics Minister Erhard would be the party's choicel, al-
though Aden iir i c inannrtorl 1117 fhc fe favrir rinnnriP Min-
ister Etz.
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-4.001
Uruguay Considers Breaking Relations With USSR
Uruguay's governing executive council is considering
breaking diplomatic relations with the UW,
Councilor Nar done
had introduced the proposal and had accused the country's
Communists of fomenting a strike to gain a political advan-
tage. Another councilor, he said, called attention to the re-
cent expulsions of Soviet diplomats from Argentina and
Mexico and suggested that the council reconsider the ques-
tion of Uruguay's own relations with the USSR.
Some officials of the National party, which came to
power on 1 March, have expressed concern over the extent
of Communist influence in Uruguay and over the large staffs
in the five bloc diplomatic missions in Montevideo. The Com-
munists thrived under the lengthy incumbency of the last ruling
party.
The view previously voiced by some National party mem-
bers of the coincil that Uruguay's serious financial problems
make bloc trade necessary for the short run may have lost
some support with the death on 8 April of the ruling party
chief, Dr. Herrera, who reportedly feared a break would
prejudice the increasingly important Sino-Soviet bloc trade.
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Noe
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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