CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/11/08

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03003735
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: November 8, 1953

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8 November 1953
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Copy No. 84
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO ...5?)
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
Li DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: r319 09
ALITH: HR 70-2
DATE: /2/..r_g. REVIEWER
Office of Current Intelligence
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
N GENERAL
X" Allies Allies hope to terminate Soviet note exchange (page 3).
SOVIET UNION
2. Comment on Soviet celebration of the 36th anniversary of the
October Revolution (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
French military position in Tonkin reportedly serious (page 4).
'Viet Minh apparently has considerable autonomy (page 5).
. US embassy comments on Philippine elections (page 5).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
',British maintain position on Iranian oil (page 6).
7. Tudeh reorganization well advanced (page 7).
8. Arab League specifies sanctions demanded against Israel (page 7).
EASTERN EUROPE
Comment on Tito% message to Moscow (page 8).
WESTERN EUROPE
10. Italy alerts troops for move to Trieste area (page 8).
LATIN AMERICA
11. Comment on suspension of Chilean-US copper negotiations
(page 9).
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GENERAL
1. Allies hope to terminate Soviet note exchange:
American officials in Paris report that
the British and French governments agree
with the United States that the forthcoming
Allied reply to the 3 November Soviet note
should be short, terminating the present exchange and offering a
standing invitation to a four-power conference. They believe it pos-
sible to secure tripartite approval to a draft reply by 12 November.
Comment: A spokesman for the Bonn
foreign office, who appeared pleased that the Soviet note's "clumsy
and negative" approach confirmed Chancellor Adenauer's position,
concurrently recommended that the Allied reply should attempt to
end the exchange.
SOVIET UNION
2. Comment on Soviet celebration of the 36th anniversary of the October
evir7rtnt on
The principal address this year at the
celebration of the October Revolution anniversary was an uninspired
recapitulation by Voroshilov of stereotyped propaganda themes and
recent economic pronouncements.
Voroshilov's remarks reflected the rigidity
of the Kremlin's position on international problems, and clearly indi-
cated that the USSR would not attend any conference on European or
Far Eastern problems on terms proposed by the West.
In discussing Soviet economic policy,
Voroshilov confirmed that the Soviet Union is still considerably
below planned production of consumer goods, one of the principal
current preoccupations of the Soviet regime.
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The choice of 72-year-old Voroshilov,
a comparatively noncontroversial figure who holds the position of
chairman of the Supreme Soviet, suggests a desire to continue the
emphasis on the collectivity of the present leadership. The Moscow
radio noted the presence at the celebration of all top Soviet leaders
in the usual order, and Voroshilov balanced a reference to Malenkov's
Supreme Soviet speech in August with a compliment to Khrushchev's
agricultural report to a Central Committee plenum in September.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. French military position in Tonkin reportedly serious:
Despite publicity to the contrary, French
forces in Tonkin do not hold the initiative
and their military position is "grave,"
The French have only four battalions in their mobile reserves and a
Viet Minh offensive at this time would force them to call off "Operation
Mouette" and to draw reinforcements from quiet areas.
Comment: General Navarre admitted on
23 October that his forces were not yet strong enough to counter strong
Viet Minh pressure inside the delta and simultaneously to conduct large-
scale operations against enemy strong points outside the French defense
perimeter. His current tactics are intended only to delay the Viet Minh
fall offensive.
It is possible that Viet Minh infiltration of
the delta has been much heavier than heretofore admitted by the French,
and that French reserves have been seriously taxed to maintain security
in the delta.
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4. Viet Minh apparently has considerable autonomy:
Comment:
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Although Viet Minh leadership is ideologically
orthodox, the relationships between Moscow, Peiping and Ho Chi Minh's
headauarters has never been clearly determined.
the Viet Minh has been exercising a considerable degree of
autonomy, similar to that of the Chinese Communists relative to the USSR
during the "liberation" struggle in China.
5. US embassy comments on Philippine elections:
The American embassy in Manila says Ramo13.3(h)(2)
Magsaysay will win the Philippine presidency
by a substantial margin if the public desire
for clean elections can outweigh the despera-
tion oi locaLparty Leapers. All agencies of the embassy, however, be-
lieve that there will be widespread fraud, violence and intimidation,
particularly in the central islands.
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Comment: A recent report received by
the American army attache from
quotes President Quirino as threatening to discharge the army
chief of staff unless the latter supported the administration "100 per-
cent" in the elections. Heretofore, the army has remained aloof from
the political campaign and has generally been regarded as the main
hope for an honest election.
Last-minute charges and countercharges
have brought a rapid rise in tension throughout the Philippines, and
scattered incidents of violence have already been reported.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
6. British maintain position on Iranian oil:
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In discussions with Herbert Hoover, Jr.. 3.3(h)(2)
officials of the British government and of
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company stated that
the Iranian memorandum on oil was entirely
unacceptable, and expressed their complete approbation of the former
conduct of the AIOC in Iran. They opposed the.Euggestton that the British
be given a minority role in any arrangement for marketing Iranian oil.
Britain also rejected the Iranian suggestion
that diplomatic relations be resumed simultaneously with agreement in
principle of an oil settlement. The British proposals currently being
drafted contain a conciliatory message from Foreign Secretary Eden to
Prime Minister Zahedi, but reiterate that diplomatic relations must be
resumed prior to negotiations.
Comment: Despite some improvement in
British and Iranian attitudes, this report offers little prospect that
diplomatic relations can be resumed or preliminary oil talks started
in the foreseeable future. Each side still insists on principles un-
acceptable to the other.
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7. Tudeh reorganization well advanced:
The Tudeh in Iran is planning to resume
"normal" activities in the near future,
Its
structure is being revised and members
are being assigned to cells in areas of the city distant from their
homes in order to make identification more difficult.
Some evidence of successful Tudeh pene-
tration of the Military Governor's Office appears in the report that
all local units have been given lists of members marked for future
arrest or whose homes are scheduled for search.
Comment: The need for rebuilding of
Tudeh shows the success of Prime Minister Zahedi's attack on the
party. However, the penetration of the Military Governor's Office
and the developing strategy of attack suggest that the party may soon
become a much more positive element in the anti- Zahedi movement.
8. Arab League specifies sanctions demanded against Israel:
invoke against Israel,
Prohibition of financial assistance to
Israel, an embargo on arms shipments,
and a ban on immigration are among the
sanctions which the Arab League has de-
cided to demand that the Security Council
These sanctions would be imposed in
accordance with Article 41 of the UN charter after the Security
Council had declared Israel an aggressor under Article 39.
Comment: specifying
the sanctions against Israel which the Arabs aim to promote in the
UN, furnishes additional evidence of the unrealistic Arab ambition
to use the Security Council to extend the League's economic blockade.
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EASTERN EUROPE
9. Comment on Tito's message to Moscow:
Belgrade radio announced on 6 November
that Marshal Tito has sent a telegram to Chairman Voroshilov of the
Supreme Soviet, offering "congratulations and best wishes for the
prosperity of the Soviet peoples" on the 36th anniversary of the
Bolshevik Revolution.
Although Yugoslavia has offered no such
greetings to the USSR during the past several years, this message
does not indicate a basic change in Belgrade's policy toward the USSR.
Recent Yugoslav radio broadcasts have asserted that this year's October
Revolution slogans were "formulated by Kremlin bureaucrats," and have
been particularly derisive of those regarding Soviet foreign policy.
The Yugoslav greeting reflects the recent
"normalization" of diplomatic relations with the Soviet government.
It may also be linked to the Trieste issue as a timely warning to the
West that Belgrade intends to retain its independence and initiative in
International affairs.
WESTERN EUROPE
10. Italy alerts troops for move to Trieste area:
The Italian general staff informed the
American military attache in Rome on
6 November that the Legnano and Trieste
divisions had been alerted for movement
o e a o- 'ugo av rontier area. The general staff representative
stated that the Trieste division and certain police detachments were
being prepared for the occupation of Zone A, but that the exact number
of troops to enter the zone would depend on Britain and the United
States.
On the same day, other Italian officials
in the Ministry of Defense approached the American and British
military attaches in an evident attempt to sound out Allied intentions
on leaving Zone A.
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Comment: These prospective troop
movements are probably designed mainly to maintain public support
for the Pella government by demonstrating that it is taking concrete
steps to safeguard Italian interests.
The statements to the military attaches
seem intended as a reminder that Italy expects the United States
and Britain to implement the 8 October decision at an early date.
LATIN AMERICA
11. Comment on suspension of Chilean-US copper negotiations:
The Chilean government announced on
6 November its decision to terminate the current copper negotia-
tions in Washington, but indicated the next day its willingness to
engage in new negotiations.
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tions for the disposal of Chile's large unsold copper stocks broke
down because of the Ibanez government's refusal to sponsor as a
prior condition legislation providing for more favorable conditions
for the American-owned producing companies, including the return
to a free exchange bank rate and elimination of government price
fixing. The Chilean position is that such legislation should not be
adopted until the copper is sold.
The Ibanez government has been under
increasing domestic pressure to dispose of Chile's unsold copper,
which now amounts to approximately 150, 000 tons, or 35 percent
of annual production, to any purchaser willing to pay the govern-
ment's price. Up to 100,000 tons of this copper, however lave
already been shipped to the United States in anticipation of sale.
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