CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/11/24

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03003746
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: November 24, 1953

1 ------".1 Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO3003746 ,,
111" / ../.4 SEC
TOP S ET
INFORMATION 41
Irj
/i
ej
24 November 1953
ej,
7) ei
e/ 3.5(cr)/
Copy No.
4,7 84 /", �
,J
,J
eJ
,eJ
"j
, , I
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. . ry
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. /4
44
- j
/2
.,Z P..,
rf
�A
ri-A
7
7
i
CI DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO; TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: ,CC 9
ALITH: HR 70-2
DATE:40/2/7Y REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
3.5(c)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP SE T
SECURI FORMATION
/7,7,iff/A
Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 C03003746
Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 C03003746
U=, 1 1.-) CKti
Nue'
ECURITY INFORMATION
3.5(c)
SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Possible Yugoslav demands for Trieste settlement (page 3).
2. Britain recommends drastic change in East-West trade controls
(page 3).
FAR EAST
3. Comment on Chinese Communist-North Korean pact (page 5).
4. New Chinese railroad planned near Indochina border (page 6).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
5. French paratroop drop connected with defense of Lai Chau
(page 6).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
6. Nasr criticizes lack of US assistance to Egypt (page 8).
* * * *
-2
TOPS ET
24 Nov 53
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 C03003746
Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 C03003746
1 lir itcti
Now
ECURITY INFORMATION
3.5(c)
GENERAL
1. Possible Yugoslav demands for Trieste settlement:
that Yugoslavia believes it should receive
a corridor to the sea at Servola-Zaule in return for an Italian corridor
along the coast through the "Yugoslav territory of Duino-Aurisina" (see
map, p. 4). ugoslavia could not be satisfied with free
port facilities in the city of Trieste, since Italy might revoke such an
arrangement at some future date.
3.
(h)(2)
In order to facilitate the movement of
Italians through any Yugoslav corridor and to encourage the commerce
of those coastal cities which may come under Italian control, Yugoslavia
would be willing to permit Italian natitonals carrying only identity cards
to travel into nearby Yugoslav territory.
Comment: Members of the Yugoslav delega-
tion in Trieste have been used in the past to present official Belgrade
thinking on the Trieste question. This proposal may be the position
Yugoslavia will uphold in any conference, in contrast to its public claims
to all of Zone A except the city of Trieste.
Italy has consistently opposed giving up the
economically valuable port and industrial facilities in the Servola-Zaule
area, which has been mentioned several times by Yugoslavia as a de-
sirable corridor site. Italy has demanded port towns on the north coast
of Zone B in return for cession of a fringe of Zone A bordering Yugoslavia
and free port facilities in Trieste.
The reference to coastal cities coming under
Italian control may be a hint that Yugoslavia might be willing to give up
certain towns in Zone B.
2. Britain recommends drastic change in East-West trade controls:
TOP
A British statement calling for replacement 3.3(h)(2)
of International List I and II by a very short
embargo list from which virtually no exceptions
- 3 -
1
24 Nov 53
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 C03003746
Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 C03003746
SE T Nor
Secud.tf Information
Isola D'Istria
Capodistria
Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 C03003746
Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 C03003746
vale 1 ..ii-' N.r,
CURITY INFORMATION
3.5(c)
will be authorized indicates the United Kingdom's desire for a funda-
mental change in strategic trade controls, according to the United
States delegation attending bilateral talks in London on East-West
trade.
Britain argues that such a change would
facilitate maintenance of a control system for an extended cold war,
and would satisfy the need for expanded export markets arising from
�the growth of a buyers' market, the competition of German and
Japanese trade, and further reductions in American aid.
There is a basic difference between the
American and British views on decontrolling items not of a "near
military" nature, and the British have agreed that a COCOM meeting
on this subject should not be held until the divergencies are resolved.
Comment: Britain appears to be recom-
mending an embargo list similar to the one passed by the UN on 18
May 1951. This prohibited shipments of arms, ammunition, and
implements of war to Communist China and North Korea.
FAR EAST
3. Comment on Chinese Communist-North Korean pact:
The ten-year economic and cultural pact
between Communist China and North Korea signed on 23 Ndember
is in line with previous Sino-Soviet professions of military and eco-
nomic support for North Korea and ensures the continuation of a
major Chinese role in North Korea.
The Soviet-North Korean negotiations of
September 1953 resulted in a Soviet grant of about $250,000,000 for
Korean reconstruction and the "deferred payment" of previous Soviet
credits. Pyongyang's newest pact calls for Peiping to provide recon-
struction materials worth $350,000,000 over a four-year period and
for cancellation of all Korean war debts to China. Peiping's propaganda
has indicated an intention to guarantee North Korea's military security
by retaining some part of its forces in Korea indefinitely.
- 5 -
T C3 SE-CI
24 Nov 53 3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 C03003746
Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 C03003746
v.011 1
SECURITY INFORMATION
3.5(c)
This pact runs counter to the apparent
trend in North Korean internal affairs in recent months, which had
suggested a possible return to the prewar status with the USSR in-
disputedly dominant. Communist China's own military and economic
dependence on Moscow makes it unlikely, however, that Peiping is
challenging Soviet leadership.
4. New Chinese railroad planned near Indochina border:
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2
Comment: Such a line would give Kwangsi
Province its first rail outlet to the sea. It would improve Chinese Com-
munist capabilities for moving troops and supplies between the Indochina
border and bases on Hainan Island and the Leichou Peninsula,
This would be the first railroad construction
in the Indochina border area since the line through Nanning to the border
was completed in November 1951.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
5. French paratroop drop connected with defense of Lai Chau:
General Navarre told Ambassador Heath
on 20 November that the three-battalion
paratroop drop on Dien Bien Phu in northwest
Tonkin is part of a plan to defend Lai Chau,
French outpost 50 miles to the north which is
important for the expansion of guerrilla opera-
tions. Navarre believes that defense of Lai
Chau itself would require 12 battalions, but
24 Nov 53
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 C03003746
HAIPHONG
31123
0
Ning-ming
Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 003003746
Nan-fling
Liu-chou
Proposed
New
Railroad
Chin en
Pei- ha
. San-ya
Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 003003746
Wuchow
Canto
Selected Roads
Railroads Operable
Railroads Partially Operable
Active Chinese Communist
Airfields
French Perimeter
50 100 1b0
�T�
Statute Miles
Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 C03003746
1 tj tSJ I6"1
ECUR1TY INFORMATION
3.5(c)
that he can thwart an expected Viet Minh attempt to take it with the
help of friendly guerrillas and by holding Dien Bien Phu.
According to the American army attache
in Saigon, the French dropped two more battalions on 21 November.
The objectives of the operation, according to French briefing officers,
were to destroy large enemy rice stocks reportedly in the area and to
harass Viet Minh units preparing for offensive operations.
Comment: Prior to 20 November Lai
Chau was defended by three battalions plus 19 companies of Thai
auxiliaries. It is not clear how long the French intend to remain
in Dien Bien Phu. Temporary retention of this communications
point might well disrupt reported Viet Minh preparations for an
offensive against pro-French guerrillas and against Lai Chau.
Indefinite retention, however, would probably require additional
reinforcements and would constitute a departure from the general
policy of withdrawal from isolated outposts.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
6. Nasr criticizes lack of US assistance to Egypt:
Ambassador Caffery comments that
Colonel Nasr's criticism of American
aid as empty promises in his speech of
20 November reflects the latter's "brood-
ing on tne tailure outn United States to grant the Egyptian military
regime any positive support.
Nasr told Caffery that his regime had made
important concessions in its negotiations with Britain on the Suez base
under pressure from the United States in the expectation of receiving
military and economic assistance, which has not materialized. Were
it not for the United States, Nasr claimed, ggypt would have broken
off negotiations long ago.
8
TOSECITI
24 Nov 53
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 C03003746