CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/12/11

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03003758
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: December 11, 1953

Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 C03003758.
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11 December
1953
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Copy No. 84
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO 76
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
El DECLASSIFIED
CLASS, CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 200 9
AUTFI. HR 70-2
DATE:eV/ter-2_ REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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2.
3.
SUMMARY
GENERAL
3.3(h)(2)
FAR EAST
Rhpe apparently determined to sabotage political conference (page 3).
3.3(h)(2)
SOUTHEAST ASIA
4. Dejean sees no cause for concern over Viet Minh peace feeler
(page 4).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. Egypt believed preparing campaign to spread neutralism among
Arab states (page 5).
6. Eden feels further concessions to Egypt impossible (page 6).
7. Political crisis again threatens Libya (page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
8. Adenauer marks time on Saar settlement (page 6).
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1.
GENERAL
3.
3(h)(2)
FAR EAST
2. Rhee apparently determined to sabotage political conference:
Ambassador Briggs believes that President
Rhee has made up his mind to sabotage a
Korean political conference unless the United
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4110, A
States assures him it will resume the fighting if the conference
fails to achieve withdrawal of the Chinese Communists from Korea
after 90 days. Rhee implied, however, that he might settle for a
promise of logistic and materiel support if the United States were
unwilling to fight.
Briggs believes Rhee is motivated by a
deep-rooted suspicion of attempts to secure unification through
negotiations, a belief that the Communists have no intention of
relinquishing North Korea, and concern over increasing Chinese
influence there. Rhee apparently believes that the talks would
merely give the Chinese time to consolidate in North Korea.
Comment: On his return on 29 November
from talks with Chinese leaders in Taipei, Rhee repudiated an agree-
ment made three days before to invite nonvoting observers to the
conference.
3.
3.
3(h)(2)
SOUTHEAST ASIA.
4. Dejean sees no cause for concern over Viet Minh peace feeler:
Commissioner, General Dejean told Ambas-
sador Heath in Saigon on 9 December that
there is no reason for concern over the clamor
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in Paris for truce negotiations with the Viet Minh. Dejean said
that at a ministerial meeting in Paris, no one challenged his view
that an armistice is impossible except on terms which would allow
the Communists to take over Vietnam. He added that in view of
this fact, any future French government, even one headed by Pierre
Mendes-France, would have to continue the fight on the basis of the
�Navarre plan.
Comment: Despite French desires to
end the Indochina war, the government is unwilling to follow up Ho's
"offer" at least until the results of the Navarre plan become evident
and until the possibility of five-power talks has been explored.
The Mendes-France program, as outlined
to an American embassy official in Paris on 17 June, would not be
incompatible with continued prosecution of the war.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. Egypt believed preparing campaign to spread neutralism among Arab
states:
The Iraqi ambassador in Cairo believes
that Egypt requested the postponement of
an Arab League meeting until 9 January
in order to prepare a campaign to pressure
the Arab states into a neutralist position. He told Ambassador Caffery
of his concern over the present neutralist trend in Egypt's foreign policy.
Caffery in reporting this also notes that the
Egyptian press hints at possible recognition of Communist China and
Albania.
Comment: Egypt will push its neutralism,
which has grown since mid-November and was particularly publicized
on the eve of the Bermuda conference, if it becomes convinced that
there is no hope for an Anglo-Egyptian settlement on the Suez issue.
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6. Eden feels further concessions to Egypt impossible:
Foreign Secretary Eden during the Bermuda
conference stated that for domestic political
reasons Britain can make no further conces-
sions to Egypt on the Suez issue. He said
that some compromise might be possible regarding future availability
of the base, but not over the issue of uniforms for British technicians.
Eden also said that early extension of Ameri-
can financial aid to Egypt would be "extremely serious" in its effect on
Anglo-American relations.
Comment: Eden was referring to his diffi-
culties with the group of about 35 Conservative "rebels" in Parliament
whose leader has stated that the Churchill government is doomed if it
yields on the uniform issue.
7. Political crisis again threatens Libya:
American minister Villard reported on
9 December that Prime Minister Muntasser
left Benghazi on the eve of the opening of
Parliament after King Idriss failed to grant
a written commitment at he would reduce "palace meddling" in politics.
Villard commented that Muntasser's departure has left the federal govern-
ment in complete confusion, but that Parliament is expected to open as
scheduled on 10 December without the prime minister.
Comment: Muntasser's sudden departure
from Benghazi suggests that relations between King Idriss and his prime
minister have again reached a critical stage.
WESTERN EUROPE
8. Adenauer marks time on Saar settlement:
3.3(h)(2)
According According to information reaching American 3.3(h)(2)
officials in Bonn, Chancellor Adenauer "meekly"
accepted the majority view of his cabinet on
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8 December that no significant concessions should be made to France
on the Saar until the results of the prospective four-power conference
are known and the French position on EDC is clarified. One top Bonn
government official has stated that Adenauer cannot afford unpopular
Saar concessions until he has concrete assurance on French EDC rati-
fication.
Comment German willingness to negotiate
on Europeanization of the Saar has always been premised on the assump-
tion that European integration, and thus EDC, would succeed.
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