CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/11/29

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03004641
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: November 29, 1960

eiZAWZMZ/ZZOWMIWZ/Z7Z/ZtefiZIWIWZZ/Z/ZZZZZZZZZf
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03004641
I %IV 016%�11�K I Nor (
jVC,S
3.3(h)(2)
II
29 November 1960
Copy No. C 74
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
2 S-
WIM M E ND,
NO MANDE IN CLASS. X
D DECLASSMED
CLASS. CHANGED 1-411 VS S
NEXT REVIEW DATE: a e.
AtITK; KR 10-2
1_0 JUN iSPri AEVIEWER:
DAVE:
-T-O-P-SEC-RE-T-
..#.0A.rpArproArv.red.oic.no74,6re'L.::c0.5.6.7.05,A.rcnoro..46.r417
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03004641
'fallo-SEeRET-
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03004641
cFPlitT"r
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03004641
�are Noir
29 NOVEMBER 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Iranian prime minister discouraged at
Shah's continued interference in govern-
ment operations.
Indonesian President reportedly planning
to bring Communists into government
despite army opposition.
UAR President Nasir offers jet aircraft
and military vehicles to Sudan; Sudanese
Army also has acquired military person-
nel carriers from USSR.
Congo�Lumumba's flight to Stanleyville
may initiate new phase in Congo power
struggle.
The situation in Laos.
III. THE WEST
Honduran Government exhibits new tend-
ency to speak out against Cuban agitation
in Honduras.
0E1 Salvador--Communist-dominated la-
bor federation announces it is proceed-
ing with plans to organize peasant com-
mittees throughout country; peasant
organization would give Communists po-
tent political weapon.
�Venezuelan President decrees partial
suspension of constitutional guarantees
in effort to control rioting in Caracas.
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03004641
Ar
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03004641
�4001, I 1.4'1 a.11-0,,zat, I I Nor
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
29 November 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Iran :dranian Prime Minister Sharif-Emami is dis-
couraged at the Shah's continued interference in government
operations and fears that the Shah isiilanning to rig the new
parliamentary elections as blatantly as those of last August,
which the Shah canceled following widespread protests.
Former Prime Minister Ecibal is working hard, according
to Sharif-Emami, to persuade the Shah that the last elections
were actually satisfactory and that the same procedures
should be followed again. The prime minister also expects
the Shah to schedule elections before the new American ad-
ministration takes office in the belief that this would avoid
American pressure for freer electiong3
ate Shah appears unwilling to give up his day-to-day
concern with governmental affairs�although he has insisted
several times that he would do so--and Sharif-Emami is
facing the same situation which reduced the former Prime
Minister virtually to the status of a "yes man" for the Shah2
(Page 1)
Indonesia: President Sukarno is pursuing plans to
bring Communists into the Cabinet despite opposition from
army officials. Communist appointments to the national
government have so far been limited to rubber-stamp legisla-
tive bodies and advisory groups which have not effectively
challenged the army's political power. EArmy Chief of Staff
General Nasution and his deputies profess to be confident
that they can resist Sukarno on the issue, althoug-13 lower rank-
ing staff officers feel the army is losing ground vis-a-vis the
President. ) (Page 2)
0
VA
�TOP-SEGREZ_
A;;;"-;Z"fWiiai6ifirCiiiii"666646"4"T
A
A
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03004641
Viarl-1-jr OLJLItL. 1'mole
UAR-Sudan: Before returning to Cairo on 25 November
from a cordial ten-day state visit to the Sudan, President
Nasir proffered a gift of six jet aircraft and twenty UAR-man-
ufactured military vehicles.
the planes Nasir planned to present
were six obsolete British jets which could be spared by the
UAR.
The Sudanese Army now has its first Soviet-made equip-
ment--a gift from the USSR of five BTR-152 armored person-
nel carriers, and Prime Minister Abboua has announced that
ment is purchasing 25 more.
Conga: Lumumba's 27 November escape from house
arrest in Leopoldville resulted primarily from a desire to
return to political activity. Since early November,
Lumumba's preoccupation
with a shift of base to Stanleyville in his home Orientale
Province, and Lumumba.'s public statement that he will return
to Leopoldville following the funeral of his daughter in Stanley-
ville appears designed to avoid an impression of retreat. The
arrival in Stanleyville of Lumumba and his chief lieutenants
may initiate a new phase of the Congolese power struggle.
Lumumba may eventually proclaim a rival Congolese govern-
ment. (Page 3)
Laos: A government good-will mission, possibly led
by Premier Souvarma Phouma himself, is scheduled to visit
Hanoi and Peiping in early December. The dispatch of such
a mission was one of the major points of agreement between
Souvanna and the Pathet Lao in their mid-November accords.
EA National Assembly delegation, headed by assembly
president Tiao Somsanith, apparently will fly to Savarmalchet
on 30 November in an effort to find some basis of negotiation
with General Phoumi. The' iSomsanith delegation will probably
be unable to bridge the chasm between Phoumi and Souvanna4-3
29 Nov 60
DAILY BRIEF ii
TOP SECRET
//Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C030046419' A
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03004641
Niftf7-1-1:11'--364:714CA-4.�
�
ghere is even some possibility that it may be convinced by
the Savannakhet group of the necessity for assembly,action
aimed at Souvanna's ouster.
(C,
III. THE WEST
Honduras-Cuba President Villeda Morales' open
rebuke of the dctively pro-Castro Mexican ambassador il-
lustrates the new tendency of his moderately leftist govern-
ment to speak out against the well-organized Cuban agitation 0
in Honduras. At the President's birthday reception on 26
November, the Honduran foreign minister criticized the cel-
ebration of pro-Cuba. week, and, when the Mexican ambas-
sador made an intemperate pro-Castro speech, Villeda de-
nounced the ambassador and Mexico for being "two-faced"
in its attitude toward Cuba. Villeda has an influential pro-
Castro wing in his party and has hitherto been chary of
taking any position critical of the Cuban regime.
(Page 4)
El Salvador: The Communist-dominated labor federa-
tion of El Salvador has announced it is proceeding with plans
to organize peasant committees throughout the country.
Should the junta, contrary to the practice of previous govern-
ments, permit the organization of the peasants, this would
provide the Communists with a potent political weapon.
Salvadoran peasants, a generally depressed group with real
socio-economic grievances, can easily be manipulated polit-
ically. More than any other development, this Communist
tactic would probably strengthen the resolve of anti-Commu-
nists, particularly among the military, who are giving seri-
ous consideration to staging a countercoup.
(Page 5)
Venezuela: President Betancourt decreed a partial
suspension of constitutional guarantees on 28 November and
called in the army to reinforce other government security
29 Nov 60
DAILY BRIEF
iii
(
�TOP�SEC�REF
4Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03004641/
A
r
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03004641
*pa" 1 1.1'1 41..,
forces in an effort to control four consecutive days of
rioting in Caracas. The disturbances, which may be a
decisive phase in the contest for power, are almost cer-
tainly being promoted by pro-Castro leftists as part of a
campaign of violence initiated in October to undermine
Betancourt. The long-widening rift in Cuban-Venezuelan
relations seems to be nearing an open break. Betancourt
is believed still to have the backing of most of the armed
forces; moderate political elements and much of organized
labor are likely to rally to his support.
29 Nov 60
DAILY BRIEF iv
TOP SECRET
/AApproved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03004641r
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03004641
al;a4.0111.14 I
Nue
Iranian Premier Dissatisfied With Shah's
Continuing Interference
anian Prime Minister. Sharif-Emami is discour-
aged over the Shah's failure to consult with him on pol-
icies and key appointments and by the monarch's con-
tinued involvement in day-to-day government operations.
Sharif-Emami has claimed several times recently that
the military in particular are bypassing him and going to
the Shah for support. The prime minister also fears that
the Shah has not learned from the elections last August--
which the Shah canceled after widespread protest over bla-
tant rigging--and will again use government pressure to
ensure the election of his chosen deputies. Sharif-Emami
expected the Shah to schedule elections before the new Amer-
ican administration takes office in the belief that this would
avoid American pressure for freer elections]
/According to Sharif-Emami, former Premier Eqbal is
attempting to persuade the Shah that the August elections
were actually satisfactory and that similar procedures
should be followed in new elections,
the elections were probably better than past ones and that
any "complications" were the fault of interference by the
intelligence and police chiefs in favor of their. friends. A
repetition of rigging would be likely to precipitate the most
serious crisis in Iran since the Mossadeq perio
8'he Shah, despite his assurances on several occasions
that he would withdraw from day-to-day personal control of
governmental affairs, is unwilling to do so. Sharif-Emami
now finds himself in the same situation which has reduced
previous prime ministers to impotence. He must accept the
role of a virtual "yes man" to the Shah, as Eqbal chose to do,
or resign
:j
29 Nov 60 CrAITD A I ikITCI I iticker.e bill.rfiwi Page 1
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03004641
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03004641
his..06.416/...
Nee
Indonesian President Plans to Include Communists in Cabinet
President Sukarno is pursuing plans to bring Communists
into the cabinet despite opposition from the army. Commu-
nist appointments to the government so far have been limited
to rubber-stamp legislative bodies and advisory groups which
have not effectively challenged the army's political power.
Suka,rno's concept of "guided democracy" calls ultimately :for
an amalgam of nationalist, religious, and Communist ele-
ments from which government leaders will be selected and
from which all party lines eventually will disappear.
[Army Chief of Staff General Nasution, who is concurrent-
ly minister for national security, succeeded in postponing a
conference scheduled for 20 November which would have dis-
cussed a cabinet reshuffle to include Communists. The chief
,of staff and his deputies are relatively confident that they can
resist Sukarno on the issue; Nasution is reported unconcerned
over reports that Sukarno is planning to move against him
personally-)
Lower ranking staff officers, however, fear that the army
Is losing ground vis-a-vis Sukarno. The Indonesian army
intelligence chief fears that a cabinet reshuffle, which Nasu-
tion will be unable to obstruct, will take place in the fairly
near future. The two large non-Communist parties--the
National party and the Nandatul Ulama�support Sukarno on
the inclusion of Communists in the government.
Sukarno apparently will press his efforts to overcome
army objections on the inclusion of Communists in the cabi-
net. Should the army remain adamant, however, he is
likely to shelve his plan until a more favorable opportunity
arises.
29 Nov 60
00-4nk mi.% A I 111.1.71 I lhiI hill Iin1111.1
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03004641
Page .2
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03004641
Ur .3Lit...ruz: I
New Noe
The Situation in the Congo
Lumumba's 27 November escape from house arrest
in Leopoldville resulted primarily from a desire to re-
turn to political activity.
"Lumumba sent a letter today
requesting his early transfer to Stanleyville" in view of the
delayed arrival of the UN Conciliation Commission "and the
attitude of the UN to Kasavubu." The exact mode of Lumumba's
escape is unclear; without air transport he would probably
not reach Stanleyville, in Orientale Province, for several
days.
Although Lumurnloa has stated that he would be willing
to return to Leopoldville to meet with the UN commission,
he probably plans to make Stanleyville the base for his polit-
ical operations for the foreseeable future. There are indica-
tions that he plans first to consolidate his position in Orien-
tale and then to "reconquer" other provinces of the Congo in-
terior.
Lumumba lieutenant Antoine Gizenga as "still in control
of the situation in Stanleyville "Lumumba's
arrival there would strengthen the position."
"The movement there should be encouraged and
similar movements started in Kasai, North Katanga, and
Kivu."
In Leopoldville, where President Kasavubu received a
popular welcome just prior to Lumumba's departure, the Bel-
gian news agency reported on 28 November that the expulsion
of the UAR ambassador was imminent. Such reports, follow-
ing the UN's seating of Kasavubuts delegation and Mobutu's ex-
pulsion of the Ghanaian representative in the Congo, may have
influenced the timing of Lumumba's flight.
TOP SECRET
29 Nov 60 A"kyrr".�%rki""" n1111"."1"
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03004641
Page 3
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03004641
HonduradV6vernment Concerned Over Prbirtastro Activity
Officials of Honduras' moderately leftist government
evidently are becoming alarmed by the extent of pro-Castro
agitation in their country and are no longer reluctant to
speak out against it. President Villeda Morales, who often
feels he must cater to the influential pro-Castro left wing
of his Liberal party, has been chary of criticizing the Cuban
regime or of interfering with the increasingly well-organized
Cuban activities throughout Honduras. Reassured by the
International Court of Justice award of 18 November favoring
Honduran territorial claims on the Nicaraguan border and by
orderly local elections earlier this month, Villeda now may
feel strong enough to take a firmer stand against a reported
campaign to manipulate his government from within for Cuban
purposes.
At Villecla's birthday reception on 26 November, Foreign
Minister Alvarado Puerto--who is often sympathetic to the
left-wing Liberals--questioned the loyalty of Hondurans who
were dedicating that week to "defense of Cuba" rather than
to celebration of the territorial award. He was challenged
by the Mexican ambassador in Tegucigalpa, Cesar Garizurieta,
whose cooperation with Cuban Embassy activities in Honduras
has enhanced the respectability and representation of local
pro-Castro and pro-Communist groups. Rebuffed by other
guests, Garizurieta reportedly boasted he could arouse
greater response among the Honduran people than anyone
present.
This open challenge aroused Villeda to strongly abusive
language against Garizurieta. The President is also reported
to have accused Mexico of having two faces in foreign policy,
one for the US and one for Cuba�evidently referring to pro-
Castro statements by high legislative officials of Mexico's
ruling party. Villecla's outburst was wildly applauded by
the other guests. Garizurieta reportedly will leave for Mexico
on 2 December with no plans for return.
If Villeda can better control the leftists within his party
and administration without threatening his own position, he
will be able to move ahead with planned economic and social
reforms which would lessen the popular appeal of the Castro
revolution in Honduras. However, he is also faced with high
unemnlovrient and labor unrest on the banana plantations.
SECRET-
29 Nov 60 r . � 41.1 irk ����21k I
Approved for'Release:2020/03/13 C03004641
Page 4
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03004641
k....ixra I
vaire Noe
Salvadoran Communists to Organize Peasant Committees
The ComMunist-dominated labor federation of El Sal-
vador (CGTS) has announced it is proceeding with plans to
organize peasant committees throughout the country. Should
the junta, contrary to the practice of previous governments,
permit the organization of the peasants, this would provide
the Communists with a potent political weapon. Salvadoran
peasants, a generally depressed group with real socio-
economic grievances, can easily be manipulated politically.
The organization of peasant committees could also be the
first step by the Communists toward organizing a peasant
militia with which to defy any attempt by the armed forces
to dislodge the Communists from the provisional government,
where they and their supporters have become entrenched at
all levels.
The CGTS, which has operated virtually without govern-
ment restrictions since the ouster of the Lemus regime last
month, reportedly invited peasants to a meeting on 6 Novem-
ber, where they heard a Salvadoran Communist recently re-
turned from Peiping and Cuba speak on methods used in dis-
arming an army and in organizing a civilian militia. On 20
November peasants were brought from outlying towns to San
Salvador where they participated in a mass meeting spon-
sored by the CGTS and pro-Communist and pro-Castro stu-
dents. Dr. Roberto Carias Delgado, secretary general of the
Communist-front April and May Revolutionary party, told the
crowd, estimated at 7,000 to 10,000, that "a foreign country"�
meaning the United States�NTasusing ships and planes" as a
means of interfering with their fight to rid themselves of "dic-
tators and oppressors."
The Communist tactic of organizing the peasants, more than
any other development, would probably strengthen the resolve of
anti-Communists, particularly among the military, who have
been giving serious consideration to staging a countercoup. The
army and the wealthy landowners have long feared that the large
peasant population might revolt, as in 1932, when a Communist
led insurrection was suppressed by the army only after thous-
ands had been killed. Ii
29 Nov 60 (....Prrt A I ek Irr�I �����.. ���� �I �������k �
'Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03004641
Page 5
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03004641
CONFIDENTIAL 'Noe
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03004641
TOP SECRET .
TOP SECRET
drzyrdrzzmmApproved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03004641wmmmiezm