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August 14, 2020
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August 27, 2020
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February 24, 1961
PDF icon CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15815770].pdf607.91 KB
ZZ Z/Z/Z/ZIWZMMZZIWZ/ZZIWZ/ZZIWZ/Z/ZZ/ZZI Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007376 I yr- *OlhAinialm NNW 24 February 1961 Copy No. C CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007376 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007376 -TIJI'r5EVKFIF Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007376 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007376 24 February 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1. USSR: 11 coniirms boviet claims. (Page i) 2. Congo: UN representative Dayal reportedly suppressed information on political executions by Gizenga regime. (Page i) 3. Laos: Pravda again calls for enlarged international conference;-15eiping publicly attacks neutral nations proposal. (Page ii) 4. Nationalist China: Chiang Kai-shek opposes evacuation of irregulars from Laos. (Page it) 5, Sudan: Pro-Lurnumba demonstrations strengthen civilian opposition to Abboud's military regime. (Page tt) 6. UAR-Jordan: Cairo charges Jordan with attempting to foment revolution in Syria, probably in effort to bolster Egyptian-Syrian unity, (Page iii) 7. Morocco: New Soviet aid agreement reported possibly Includes $120,000,000 credit, (Page iit) SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007376 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007376 %110 TOP SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 24 February 1961 DAILY BRIEF USSR: Preliminary cal- culations indicate that the probe will arrive in the vicinity of Venus about 20 May, passing within 97,000 nautical miles of the center of Venus if the probe continues on its present path. The probe is of sufficient size--weighing about 1,400 pounds�to include a control system with a propulsion unit which could provide correction in mid-course in order to achieve a much closer pass or even an impact on Venus. , Congo UN Representative Dayal's mission in the Congo has deliberately suppressed information that the Gizenga regime recently executed 15 political prisoners, Ambassador Tim- berlake comments that the conclusion is inescapable this in= formation was deliberately withheld since its release would have counteracted the effect of the recent political killings in South Kasai by anti=Lumumba Congolese and would have af- fected the Security Council debale3, the Czech ambas- sador to the UAR requested clearance for an IL-14 flight to Stanleyville between 22 February and 3 March. already granted clearance in be- half of the Stanleyville regime, and added, "We hope after a time to get clearance from the Sudan." The aircraft allegedly would carry the "representative of the Republic of Czecho- slovakia to Stanleyville," The ambassador reportedly stated Lft Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007376 r Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007376' %tiof 101" SECRET Nmor that previous efforts in early February to obtain flight clear- ance from Sudan had failed. Sudan apparently remains unwill- ing to permit such transit, despite continuing requests from the bloc and neutralist nations as well as developing internal pressures. (Backup, Page 1) Laos: A Pravda article of 23 February, the first author- itative commentary in over a month on Moscow's conditions for reaching a settlement in Laos, stressed the need to con- vene an international conference before the International Control Commission resumes its activity in Laos. Carefully fej, pevz-4 avoiding direct criticism of present US policy in Laos, the article reiterated the USSR's contention that any such commis- sion could deal only with Souvanna Phouma since the King of Laos did not have executive authority. Communist China's in Laos. exp foreign minister on 22 February became the first bloc spokes-, man to attack the neutral nations proposal publicly. Chen Yi termed the plan the "start of a new US scheme. . .so that it can conveniently perpetuate its aggression and interference" sup- plies continue to De moved into the pro-Communist stronghold of the Plaine des Jarres by truck over Route 7. Two convoys-- one of 12 trucks and another of 15 to 20�were sighted between the North Vietnamese border and this (Backup, Page 3) Nationalist China: Chiang Kai-shek is strongly opposed to the evacuation of the'Uhinese irregulars who have been driven from Burma into Laos, ciK Taipei is considering unaertaiting negotiations with Vientiane to rnennitIthem to remain and retain their arm s3 (Backup, Page 5) Sudan: 1pposition to the Abboud regime's pro-UN stand in le Congo appears to be forcing the government into negotia- .0K ons with the group of politicians which has been pressing f2!) 24 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF ii TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007376 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007376 '.JTOJ 5 -E. e E-T- a return to civilian government in the Sudan. Public reac- tion to Lumumba's death, which at first took the form of small pro-Lumumba street demonstrations, has assumed an antigovernment character. Although the government be- lieves the demonstrations were planned by the Sudanese Communist party and pro-UAR elements, it apparently fears that basically conservative civilian politicians will use the rlisnrrIprA 1-n try tn hrincr tinum 1-hch mil}tary regim_g (Backup, Page 6) UAR-Jordan: The UAR announced at an official press 0 e conference in Damascus on 23 February the uncovering of a new Jordanian plot, allegedly supported by the British, to foment a revolution in Syria. Cairo has probably had evidence tr of Jordanian plotting for some time but chose to make the ex- posure now while Nasir is in Damascus trying to generate lo- cal enthusiasm for Egyptian-Syrian unity, This action ends a brief and uneasy propaganda truce between the two governments and could be a prelude to stepped-up UAR subversive activity against Jordan, alleged UAR plans for terrorist action in Jorian, inchidine_a nlot to assassinate King Hiisavn USSR-Morocco: qn agreement providing for Soviet eco- nomic aid to Morocco�possibly including a $120,000,000 credit-- reportedly was initialed by Moroccan Crown Prince Moulay Has- san and Soviet President Brezhnev during the latter's recent visit to Rabat. This would be the first time Morocco has accepted So- viet economic aidialthough Moscow has in the past two years made offers ranging from a $100,000,000 line of credit to smaller amounts for specific projects, Morocco's decision last Novem- ber to accept a gift of Soviet jet aircraft--which arrived in Morocco during Brezhnev's visit �probably Daved the way for the conclusion of this nact-7 24 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF iii Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007376 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007376 -,C7L-1GitE. 1 441 Situation in the Congo Gustave Duran, the chief UN represent- ative there, knew on 19 February that the 15 opponents of Lumumba--including ten legislators and five soldiers--had been killed but that this information had not been transmitted to New York. UN spokesmen in the Congo have so far failed to provide public confirmation for the reports. On 23 Feb- ruary Dayal sent a plea to Sta,nleyville, urging that the "truth be made knowl0 EDayal, a high-ranking and capable Indian official who has the confidence of Hammarskjold and has been given an almost completely free rein in running the UN Congo operation, has displayed considerable anti-American bias and often appears to have worked to further the cause of Lumumba'S supporters. He has occasionally intervened personally with the UN military command, often to try to forestall military moves by Mobutu. At the same time he apparently has suppressed information con- cerning movements by pro-Lumumba forces. He also seems to be attempting to undermine Joseph Ileo's efforts to form a broadly based government. Recently he severely criticized the United States at a gathering of newsmen and foreign offi- cers, charging that American policy was responsible for the chaotic situation in the Cong g.Iammarskjold has repeatedly refused to remove Dayal, although Dayal is on extremely poor terms with the Congolese authorities in Leopoldville. However, his contract expires in three weeks, and Hammarskjold has indicated that it will not be renewed. Dayal himself reportedly has twice asked Nehru to recall him, but Nehru refused on the ground that the Indian "commitment" to the UN must be honor/ In Katanga, a standoff apparently exists between UN offi- cials and members of Tshombe's government. Although Tshombe announced on 22 February that he had agreed with the UN not to undertake any troop movements, his associates seem to be re- iterating their demands that UN recognition of Katanga's sover- eignty is a prerequisite for the complete cooperation of the -SECRET 24 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007376 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007376 id., I %MO Elisabethville regime. The UN representative in Elisabeth- ville is not hopeful that even the present degree of stability can be maintained in the province; he has recommended that additional UN troops be dispatched in case a show of force should be necessary. an entire division would be needed to pacify the dissident Baluba area. 24 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007376 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007376 -efortrIDENTIAL� Nero Communist Bloc Reaction to Laotian King's Declaration Of 19 February The initial reaction of Communist bloc governments to King Savang's declaration of 19 February suggests concern lest the King's move deprive them of the diplomatic initiative In the Laotian crisis and make it more difficult for them to Insist that any settlement be based on the 1954 Geneva agree- ments. Following broadcasts by Hanoi, Peiping, and Moscow of Souphannouvong's bitter denunciation of the neutral nations commission proposal, Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chen Yi, in a speech on 22 February, said the US had de- clared its support for Savang's proposal and he attacked this as the beginning of an American "scheme" to "bury" the Geneva accords and er etuate 'US " Laos. Soviet puty oreigi s er obo ev argued that any neutrality arrangements for Laos should be based on the solid legal foundation of the Geneva agreements. Sobolev said he feared that the sort of neutrality envisaged in Savang's declara- tion might lead "only one waij The bloc's insistence that any Laotian negotiation or set- tlement be based on the 1954 agreements stems from its con- viction that this approach would guarantee a major bloc voice in any solution and provide the best device for obtaining strong Pathet Lao participation in any expanded government of "na- tional unity" that might be recommended by an international conference. In his remarks on Wednesday, Chen Yi took the position that the "sole, correct way to peacefully solve the Laotian question and to ensure the peace and neutrality of Laos lies in convening an enlarged Geneva conference, as proposed by Prince Sihanouk, with the Geneva agreements as its basis...." He also renewed the call for reactivation of the ICC in Laos and recognition of "the lawful government of Laos headed by Prince Phouma." Pravda; in an article yesterday, commented obliquely on King Savang's declaration by charging that the Boun Oum govern- ment is "flouting the Geneva agreements, which provide the only CONFIDENTIAL 24 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007376 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007376 ftore CO WEIVIIAL foundation for peace and security in the Indochina area." The article claimed that the USSR's proposals for dealing with the crisis have "met with widespread international response," and contended that Britain, �which together with the USSR co- chaired the 1954 Geneva Conference, has agreed in principle that any settlement should be based on the Geneva agreements. Pravda also welcomed Britain's proposal of 21 January for re- activating the ICC in Laos as a "move toward a realistic ap- proach." The article went even further, than Moscow's official reply of 18 February to the British proposal by saying that �the ICC "must meet at once." It repeated, however, the stand- ard position that the ICC must have new instructions and au- thority to deal with the present situation, that only an inter- national conference could provide these, and that the ICC must deal only with Souvanna Phouma as head of the lawful govern- ment since the King of Laos "does not, under the Laotian constitution, have the Dowers of executive au ority." -CONFIDENTIAL- 24 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007376 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007376 Chinese Nationalist Irregulars in Southeast Asia was willing to withdraw any oi tne uninese military torces remaining in Burma who are willing to leave, and to cease re-supply of those who choose to remain. He predicted, however, that most of the irregulars would move to Laos rather than choose evacuation to Taiwan. Chiang Kai-shek has often maintained that the irregulars are not a part of the armed forces and will not take instructions from Taiwan. He probably hopes events will develop in Laos which would justify the use of these irregulars or enable them to establish a new ba.s2D, glhe Chinese Nationalist Government during 1960 attempted to reorganize and train the Nationalist irregulars in the Burma border area into an effective military force capable of tactical missions. By December Taipei had transferred from Taiwan to the irregulars' base approximately 1,000 junior officers and en- listed personnel who had received special-forces and paratroop training. The flow of weapons, ammunition, and other supplies was increased. Some of the special forces are believed to be among the 2,000 to 3,000 irregulars recently driven into Laos. Besides these, about 7,O00 including both irregulars and their dependents--were forced by a Chinese Communist - Burmese offensive to cross the Mekong River into Laos in late January. Chiang has asked for United States help to resettle these ref- ugees in Taiwan or in civilian communities in Thailand] [Burma, meanwhile, has sent a letter to the UN secretary general protesting Taiwan's overflight of its airspace and its violation of the United Nations resolution of 1953 in supplying the irregulars. Rangoon asked that all countries stop supplying the irregulars in Burma but is not now planning to call for for- mal UN action on the issue. The only significant force of irregu- lars still in Burma--possibly 3,000 to 4,000 troops�is near the Thai border, elements of these irregulars have been under re- peated attacks from the Burmese Armk7 -SECRET 24 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007376 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007376 cTtt� vmpid Sudanese Government Considering Conepgsinns To Opposition Group ffhe Sudanese military regime ignored a petition pre- sented last November by a coalition of politicians calling for a return to civilian government. Since then the leaders of this group have been touring the provinces attempting to win support, but they have lacked a clear-cut issue with which to arouse public enthusiasm. Government leaders, concerned over the appearance of antiregime slogans in the pro- Lumumba demonstrations, apparently now are willing to consider concessions to the opposition group in hopes of bolstering their popularqj Eon 16 February representatives of the Supreme Council, the Sudan's top ruling body, met with Siddiq al Mandi, the pro- Western leader of the opposition group, in an attempt to reach a compromise. It appears that the only agreement reached was "to continue talking." The group leaders are reportedly optimistic as a result of the meeting, and some have expressed the opinion that a compromise will eventually be reached which will increase civilian participation in the government and pro- vide for return to complete civilian control sometime in the futuul although the coalition group includes Communist and pro- UAR elements., it is predominantly conservative. If included in the Sudanese Government, therefore, it would not be likely to press for a change in the Sudan's policy toward the UN in the Cong_g 24 Feb Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007376 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007376 i. ALLA � A AZ-1.1-, THE PRESIDENT � The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor The Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director CONFIDENTIAL Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007376 TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007376