CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1954/12/18

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03009185
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: August 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2019
• Publication Date: December 18, 1954

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18 December 1954
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
0 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS CHANGED TO: TS 8 C
NEXT REVIEW DATE- ?0 /0
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: REVIEWER
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
Comment on Molotov 's statement on Soviet-Japanese relations
(page 3).
2. Pakistan may recognize Indochinese states, including North Viet-
nam (page 3).
FAR EAST
3,
4. South Korea may be violating armistice (page 4).
5. Comment on Chou En-lai's cables to Hammarskjold (page 5).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
Recto believed seeking supporters among Philippine armed forces
(page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
7. Comment on resignation of Finnish cabinet (page 7).
LATE ITEM
8. USSR allegedly promises post-ratification closing of West Berlin
borders (page 7).
* * * *
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IMO
GENERAL
1. Comment on Molotov's statement on Soviet-Japanese relations:
Molotov's comment on 16 December on
the stated intentions of the new Japanese
government to normalize relations with
the Communist world gives a more restrained official position
than the Soviet propaganda broadcast on 14 December. The latest
statement fits the present Soviet pattern of making it easier for
the Japanese to approach the USSR. It is designed to exploit the
increasing demand in Japan for the resumption of relations but
makes it clear that Moscow has not altered its previous position
that it will wait for Japanese public opinion to force this approach.
2. Pakistan may recognize Indochinese states, including North Viet-
n.am:
Comment: Pakistan apparently is plan-
ning to go further in its recognition of the Associated States than
India, which granted "modified" recognition to Cambodia on
13 December, and on 15 December announced its intention to ex-
tend de facto recognition to Laos "within the next few months."
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FAR EAST
3,
4. South Korea may be violating armistice:
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Comment Durinv the last twn mnnths
at
least three incidents which suggest South Korean raids�in vio-
lation of the armistice--to obtain prisoners and promote tension.
Most of this activity has occurred along the west coast, and tends
to confirm a South Korean
army G-2 plan to capture enemy personnel on the west coast
of North Korea.
South Korean activity of this type, in
areas under control of Korean forces, probably cannot be effec-
tively detected or prevented by the UN Command. Although Rhee
may not dare to undertake an open attack to resume hostilities,
he may intend to create tension and obstruct diplomatic efforts
to settle the Korean problem through such small-scale clandes-
tine provocations.
5. Comment on Chou En-lai's cables to Hammarskjold:
Chou En-lab's two cables to UN secretary
general Hammarskjoid on 17 December
support earlier indications that Peiping
will employ Hammarskjold's visit as an occasion for making a
more effective presentation of the "American spies" case and for
airing several allegedly related grievances. Chou's cables also
suggest that the prospects are still poor for an early release of
the 11 convicted airmen on acceptable terms.
Chou agreed to receive Hammarskjold
to "discuss pertinent questions." Peiping propaganda and Chou's
private remarks have already indicated that "pertinent questions,"
in addition to alleged American intelligence operations in China,
Include China's seat in the UN, the disposition of Korean and Chi-
nese prisoners of the Korean war who were released by Rhee or
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*or
rejected repatriation, the recently signed mutual security pact
between the United States and Nationalist China, Nationalist air
and naval harassment of the China coastal areas, Taipei's inter -
ceptions of merchant shipping, and detention of some Chinese
students in the United States.
Chou's other cable, setting forth for
Hammarskjold Peiping's position on the "American spies," states
that "to convict foreign spies caught in China is China's internal
affair. There is no justification at all for the UN to try to inter-
fere... " Peiping's main point in the airmen's case has been that,,
while all were uniformed, they were picked up in a special type
of aircraft over Chinese territory and thus are not prisoners of
the Korean war.
Peiping will certainly show Hammarskj old
its exhibit of thousands of items allegedly used in "American espio-
nage" in China. It may also produce some of the captured airmen.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
. Recto believed seeking supporters among Philippine armed forces:
Philippine senator Recto's recent concilia-
tory moves toward the armed forces may
represent an attempt to reduce President
Magsaysay's influence and prestige within
the army through promises of congressional
favor,' according to a report from the American army attach ii
Manila,. Recto has recently been conspicuous in attending armed
forces functions, and a member of the general staff has expressed
enthusiasm for the senator's changed attitude of greater support
for military requests in congress.
Comment: The Recto-Magsaysay conflict
is likely to break into the open again when congress reconvenes in
January. Senator Recto's obstructionism has served to block vir-
tually all major progress in Magsaysay's proposed program. As
chairman of the Senate Committee on National Defense, Recto may
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try to increase his prestige at the expense of Magsaysay, whose
great popularity in the army has been his principal source of
strength.
WESTERN EUROPE
Comment on resignation of Finnish cabinet:
The resignation on 17 December of the
Agrarian-Social Democratic coalition
cabinet headed by Premier Kekkonen
followed the Finnish parliament's refusal to grant the government
special economic powers.
The Agrarians and Social Democrats,
the two largest parties in Finland, represent diametrically op-
posed economic interests, and their inability to agree on domes-
tic economic policy has been mainly responsible for the many
changes of government since the end of World War II. Members
of both these parties had been pessimistic over the stability of
the latest cabinet ever since it was formed two months ago.
In attempts which will now be made to
form a new government, one or more of the other non-Communist
parties will probably be included in addition to the Agrarians and
Social Democrats. This would tend to blur the more obvious points
of conflict between the two major parties. The Communist-front
party, which has been excluded from the government since 1948,
will almost certainly not be invited to participate, and no change
in Finland's foreign policy is likely, The USSR is not expected to
exert effective pressure in the formation of the new government.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
LATE ITEM
8. USSR allegedly promises post ratification closing of West Berlin
borders:
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Comment: A strengthening of controls
along the border between East and West Berlin is one of the most
likely "hard" Soviet measures following ratification of the Paris
agreements. Interzonal controls along the border between East
and West Germany might also be increased, These measures are
more likely than any interference with Alliedpassenger or freight
movements between West Berlin and West Germany.
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