THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03010093
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: April 26, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: November 28, 1967

fit e__ e
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010093
%of �rild To et
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010093
Top ret
28 November 1967
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010093
*iv lop�Sem!
*re
WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national security
of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code
Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.
10
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010093
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010093
%NO 1 ksi Kt', 1
Information as of 1600
28 November 1967
HIGHLIGHTS
South Vietnamese Police Director Loan has agreed
to postpone his resignation for several months.
I. Military Situation in South Vietnam: No
large-scale engagements between allied and Communist
forces were reported on 27-28 November; only small-
scale attacks and harassing fire were reported from
widespread sections of the country (Paras. 1-3). Com-
munications intelligence continues to reflect the with-
drawal of enemy units from the Dak To area (Paras. 4-7).
Enemy troops are improving their supply route through
the A Shau Valley (Para. 8). Viet Cong units in Phuoc
Tuy Province are having supply problems and losing
control of the population, according to a captured
document (Paras. 9-11).
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
III. Military Develo?ments in North Vietnam:
There is nothing of significance to report.
IV. Other, Military Developments: One of the five
major Chinese engineer units in North Vietnam may be
moving to another location in North Vietnam or back
to China (Paras. 1-2).
V. Communist Political Developments: There is
nothing of significance to report.
TO-P-SEGRET
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010093
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010093
-ifu0 '*141
NORTH
\ VIETNAM
Demilitarized Zone
UANG TRIJI
Hue
0 HUA THIE
Q16�
A Shau Valley-C.
(f)
THAILAND
QUANG
C AMB ODI
DARLAC
KHANH
HOA c
QUANG DUC
PHNOM
PENH
INH
;LONG
H
,OUONG
KILN
T U ON G
PH UOC
LONG
TL/YEN
DatrO
LAM DONG
NINH
THUAN
LONG
2K1-1 AN H
BINH
TU
BINH
THUA
OA�
'PHU QUOI Rach Gia
Airfield,
DINH, ON
NYC
.H
PON,. N HOA
V IN H
BINH
Trahg Airfield
-
\�
CORPS
EN '
W CORPS
SOUTH VIETNAM
8 NOVEMBER
� o 25 .55'0 7*? 160 Ki71arneter,
o 2 5 100 M es
3.5
68783 11-67 CIA
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010093
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010093-
Noe T P3`t--CR E T
I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. No large-scale enagements between allied
and Communist forces were reported on 27-28 November.
There were small-scale attacks and guerrilla activi-
ties in much of South Vietnam.
2. The latest flurry of hit-and-run actions
included mortar attacks on two US - South Vietnamese
air bases in the delta. The airfields at Soc Trang
in southern Ba Xuyen Province and at Rach Gia about
100 miles southwest of Saigon were hit early on 28
November. Damage to helicopters and observation
planes was moderate. One American was killed and two
others were wounded at Soc Trang, and three Americans
were wounded at Rach Gia.
3. The increase in harassment, in the wake of
the three-week battle at Dak To began with a series of
14 mortar attacks on allied targets in the delta provinces
on 25-26 November. During the two-day period, the Com-
munists also shelled two Special Forces camps, the US
base at Nha Trang, and several US positions in the cen-
tral highlands. These apparently coordinated attacks
are probably designed to shift attention 'from the main
force units, many of which are recovering from severe
losses on several fronts.
Enemy Troops Maneuver in the Western Highlands
3.3(h)(2) 4. ele-
ments of or Vietnamese 1st Division withdraw-
ing from the Dak To area of southwestern Kontum Prov-
ince. The division headquarters and its military
intelligence section were located on 26 November in
Cambodia near the Laos-Cambodia-Kontum Province bor-
der area. Another subordinate of the headquarters--
the forward tactical element--had previously moved
into the same area.
28 November 1967
I-1
10-P-SEMET
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 003010093
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010093
*so TOP' SEUKE
5. the regi-
mental subordinates of the 1.-t Division suggest
that they also may be moving from the Dak To area.
These units--the 32nd, 66th, and the 174th Regiment,
which is believed to be under the division's control
during the Dak To operation--suffered heavy casual-
ties at Dak To. The units may be withdrawing to re-
group, resupply, and prepare for future activity in
the western highlands.
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
6. The North Vietnamese 24th Regiment, however,
is still a threat to allied forces northeast of Dak
To. Enemy reconnaissance patrols continue intensive
surveillance of allied positions 3.3(h)(2)
Ele-
ments of the North Vietnamese 95B Regiment, together
with local forces units also are a threat to strategic
positions in northern Pleiku Province.
7. The casualty count in the Dak To area since
3 November now stands at 1,502 enemy killed in con-
trast to friendly casualties of 344 killed (287 US)
and 1,240 wounded (1,015 US). No enemy action has
been reported since the series of mortar attacks on
Kontum city and vicinity early on 27 November.
EnemActivity in the A Shau Valley
8. Enemy troops are working on several bypasses 3.3(h)(2)
around damaged sections of the road through the A Shau
Valley.
at least one new bridge has been constructed
just north of A Shau. In addition, vehicle tracks have
been noted in the valley, indicating that the North
Vietnamese have succeeded in trucking supplies from
Laos into this region. The A Shau Valley is the most
direct supply route from the Laotian infiltration
corridor into the area south of Da Nang. The Commu-
nists are believed to have supply trails extending
from A Shau down into the Quang Nam - Quang Tin Prov-
ince border area where the North Vietnamese 2nd Divi-
sion has been extremely active in recent months.
28 November 1967
1-2
11.1P-S�hettrl'
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010093
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010093
141.1 vesi
Communist Problems in Phuoc Tuy Province
9. A Communist document, captured on 1 Novem-
ber in central Phuoc Tuy Province some 50 miles east
of Saigon, provides information on the impact of recent
allied operations on Viet Cong logistics and population
control. The undated paper was prepared by a provin-
cial supply authority and contains a complete recapitu-
lation of allied activities throughout the southeastern
area of III Corps from January to September of this
year.
10. The document admitted that, as a result
of allied sweep operations, especially along strategic
highways, a great part of the population in Viet Cong -
controlled areas has been resettled by allied forces.
Listed in the study are 11 villages where the Commu-
nists lost control as well as a number of depots and
transportation facilities which were destroyed.
11. The document speaks of a "critical situa-
tion" resulting from the tight allied control on the
manpower and economic resources of the area and calls
for an increased covert effort within government-con-
trolled areas to compensate for allied pressure on the
Communist logistics network. This is the second re-
cent captured document which has emphasized development
of Viet Cong installations in territory not under their
control in order to meet the logistical demands of
their forces in the area.
28 November 1967
1-3
_T-CLP-SE-eltEr
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010093
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010093
Nremov K t, 1
28 November 1967
1-4
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010093
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
3 5(c)
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010093
NIpie
TO-P�WCTUrr
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
28 November 1967
No Foreign Disse ck7m-dise Only
TO CRFX
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010093
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010093
**a.' TOFS.P.tliaT
3.5(c)
28 November 1967
11-2
TO-P-SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010093
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010093 3.5(c)
Nue '][_.1-!�;1
III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
28 November 1967
T,9122_,SEGRET
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010093
3.5(c)
.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010093
*Ilme
I
C INA
Lao Cai
CHINA
Cao ant.
NANO
LAOS
.110~��
THAILAND1
NORTH VIETNAM I
28 NOVEMBER
I I
0 25 5,0 - 75 Miles
0 25 50 75 Kilometers
P:L P
f"
Dong Hoi
k DEMARCATION LINE
LAOS
_
SOUTH
VIETNAM
S AND BOUNOARY .PPESENTATION k
NOT NECESSAR.1, AUTHOIMATIVE
68781 11-67 CIA
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010093
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010093 _
�fter 1UIFCK11
3.5(c)
IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. One of the five major Chinese engineer units
in North Vietnam may be moving to a new location in
North Vietnam or returning to China.
it is leaving its normal
base in the Cao Bang area. An intercepted message
from Kun-ming military region headquarters on 26 Novem-
ber indicates that the unit may be moving to the north-
west.
2. It is possible that the unit has completed
its mission in the Cao Bang area. It may be reassigned
to higher priority work elsewhere in North Vietnam or
in China. Less is known about the engineering activ-
ities of this unit than of the similar Chinese units
elsewhere in North Vietnam.
28 November 1967
IV-1
TOraCRET
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010093
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 CO3010093
10404 SIS
,p-Eficret
Top cret
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010093