CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1954/07/23

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
03017423
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
U
Document Page Count: 
6
Document Creation Date: 
August 20, 2019
Document Release Date: 
August 30, 2019
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
July 23, 1954
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PDF icon CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15706604].pdf214.98 KB
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pproved for Release: 2019/08/13 CO3017425,, dr, .1 L., ' 11-i-0 z 0 0 0 II 23 July 1954 Copy No. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS. LI DECLASSIFIED 'CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C NEXT REVIEW DATE: e 0 / 0 AUTH: HR 70-2 DATE: --TitML? REVIEWER: Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY TOP CRET 3.3(h)(2) 0,04 80 3.5(c) / Approved for Release: 2019/08/13 C03017423 Approved for Release: 2019/08/13 C03017423 Niro� SUMMARY GENERAL 1. Comment on Vyshinsky's remarks to Japanese delegation in Moscow (page 3). 2. COCOM agrees on major relaxation of strategic trade controls (page 3). FAR EAST 3. Japanese fishing interests threaten to challenge Rhee line (page 4). 4. Chinese Communist bombers and fighters may be moving to Suichi In South China (page 5). SOUTH ASIA 5. Ceylon unlikely to join Southeast Asian security pact (page 5). NEAR EAST - AFRICA 6. Oil consortium agreement with Iran appears near (page 6). - 2 - T 1113 C "'Dr'T Approved for Release: 2019/08/13 C03017423 23 July 54 rry ���� " Approved for Release: 2019/08/13 C03017423 GENERAL 1. Comment on Vyshinsky's remarks to Japanese delegation in Moscow: Soviet deputy foreign minister Vyshinsky's statement to a Japanese Diet delegation that the USSR hopes to establish formal diplomatic relations with Japan "as soon as possible" is the most specific high-level Soviet pronounce- ment of Moscow's intentions to improve rela- tions with Japan. Since Stalin's death, the Soviet Union has returned more than 1,400 of an estimated 14,500 Japanese prisoners, thereby making a gesture toward improved relations. It has recently been using economic and cultural approaches as means of gradually en- couraging the Japanese to move toward an accommodation with the Orbit. Japanese Foreign Ministry officials, when advised of Vyshinsky's remarks, reiterated that a peace treaty was a prerequisite for expanding relations. There are indications, however, that japan is reappraising its foreign policy in the light of general Asian developments and that sentiment for loosening ties with the United States is growing. 2. COCOM agrees on major relaxation of strategic trade controls: Revisions in the international export control lists agreed on in the COCOM review of the past three months will go into effect on 16 August. The controls on trade with Commu- anged at this time, but will be discussed at an early Consultative Group meeting. Controls over exports of merchant ships could not be agreed on by the Consultative Group and will be considered again on 7 September. Although all COCOM countries are committed to improved transit trade controls, a definite deadline for adoption has not been set. Several delegates stressed that their governments would be reluctant to adopt such controls unless they were applied to all COCOM members. TirlD CENE'T Approved for Release: 2019/08/13 C03017423 23 July 54 ir-ot Tier% rry Approved for Release: 2019/08/13 C03017423 Comment: The decisions of the Consulta- tive Group will reduce the number of items on the export control lists by about 50 percent. In addition several items will be subject to less stringent controls. The adoption of improved transit trade controls has long been blocked by several COCOM countries, and their commitment to adopt them is apparently not firm. FAR EAST 3. Japanese fishing interests threaten to challenge Rhee line: Japanese fishing interests warned the Ameri- can embassy in Tokyo on 20 July that some- thing must be done quickly to settle the dispute with South Korea over the Rhee line, ey poin e out a resident Rhee's visit to Washington was an oppor- tune time for the United States to intervene in their behalf. At the same time, they are planning to launch full-scale operations within the Rhee line, despite the risks, and will call on Japanese naval forces for protection. Comment: This appears to be primarily a threatAdesigned to hasten American mediation. The Japanese govern- ment opposes any resort to force, preferring to wait until Japanese military power is sufficient to impress the Koreans with the desira- bility of finding a solution. The Japanese Foreign Ministry, meanwhile, speculates that General Hull's return to Washington during Rhee's visit may indicate among other things an American attempt to improve Japanese-Korean relations. 4 23 July 54 Tr) P rEloc'T Approved for Release: 2019/08/13 C03017423 Approved for Release: 2019/08/13 C03017423 4. Chinese Communist bombers and fighters may be moving to Suichi in�S-o-uth China: as many as 23 Chinese Communist piston-engine bombers, believed to be light TU-2 types, and an undisclosed number of LA-11 con- ventional fighters have moved south to the n on area from bass in East China between 17 and 20 .July. A transport aircraft, apparently one which accompanied the movement, flew on 20 July from Canton to an airfield on the Leichou Peninsula opposite Hainan Island, possibly the one at Suichi. This suggests that the ultimate destination of the bombers and fighters may be Suichi. Comment: Construction of the airfield at Suichi, reported to be one oiTH-j-largest in China, may now have been completed. The runway, between 8,000 and 10,000 feet in length, was not paved in May, however. It is possible the pl nes now believed moving to Suichi are naval aircraft. The base at Suichi would be ideal for . naval air units. They could be expected to conduct patrols in the South China Sea and the Gulf of Tonkin, and to participate in air-sea exer- cises with Chinese Communist naval units at Canton and Hainan. SOUTH ASIA 5. Ceylon unlikely to join Southeast Asian security pact: The present temper of the Ceylonese press, parliament and public opinion makes it un- likely that Ceylon would join a collective security pact for Southeast Asia at this time, according o Ambassador Crowe. Moreover, Ceylon's attitude toward the pact would probably be neutral rather than favorable, and the possi- bility that it might join later would depend largely on the attitudes of the other Colombo powers. The government itself, however, is "not un- sympathetic." 5 11, Ael Irl Approved for Release: 2019/08/13 C03017423 23 July 54 D c r 1-14cr Approved for Release: 2019/08/13 C03017423 sari Z Comment: Of the five Colombo powers�India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma al7d-Indonesia--only Pakistan can be expected to adhere initially to a Western-sponsored collective security pact. NEAR EAST - AFRICA 6. Oil consortium agreement with Iran appears near: The British Foreign Office understands that chief consortium negotiator Page hopes shortly to take to London an aide me moire embodying the points of agreement between the consortium and the Iranian government, according to Ambassador Aldrich. If approval by the principals of the eight companies involved is forthcoming, Page will return to Tehran to initial the document. Announcement of the consortium-Iran agree- ment will be made after Page's return to Tehran. Following that, the agreement will be put in proper form for signing and presentation to the Majlis after it reconvenes on 24 August. Comment: All phases of the oil agreement appear to be on the verge of completion except for the separate British- Iranian compensation negotiations. 6 1'11P CRFT Approved for Release: 2019/08/13 C03017423 23 July 54