CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1954/07/23
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
03017423
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
6
Document Creation Date:
August 20, 2019
Document Release Date:
August 30, 2019
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
July 23, 1954
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15706604].pdf | 214.98 KB |
Body:
pproved for Release: 2019/08/13 CO3017425,, dr,
.1 L., ' 11-i-0
z
0
0
0
II
23 July 1954
Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
LI DECLASSIFIED
'CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: e 0 / 0
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: --TitML? REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP CRET
3.3(h)(2) 0,04
80 3.5(c)
/
Approved for Release: 2019/08/13 C03017423
Approved for Release: 2019/08/13 C03017423
Niro�
SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Comment on Vyshinsky's remarks to Japanese delegation in
Moscow (page 3).
2. COCOM agrees on major relaxation of strategic trade controls
(page 3).
FAR EAST
3. Japanese fishing interests threaten to challenge Rhee line (page 4).
4. Chinese Communist bombers and fighters may be moving to Suichi
In South China (page 5).
SOUTH ASIA
5. Ceylon unlikely to join Southeast Asian security pact (page 5).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
6. Oil consortium agreement with Iran appears near (page 6).
- 2 -
T 1113 C "'Dr'T
Approved for Release: 2019/08/13 C03017423
23 July 54
rry ���� "
Approved for Release: 2019/08/13 C03017423
GENERAL
1. Comment on Vyshinsky's remarks to Japanese delegation in Moscow:
Soviet deputy foreign minister Vyshinsky's
statement to a Japanese Diet delegation that
the USSR hopes to establish formal diplomatic
relations with Japan "as soon as possible" is
the most specific high-level Soviet pronounce-
ment of Moscow's intentions to improve rela-
tions with Japan.
Since Stalin's death, the Soviet Union has
returned more than 1,400 of an estimated 14,500 Japanese prisoners,
thereby making a gesture toward improved relations. It has recently
been using economic and cultural approaches as means of gradually en-
couraging the Japanese to move toward an accommodation with the Orbit.
Japanese Foreign Ministry officials, when
advised of Vyshinsky's remarks, reiterated that a peace treaty was a
prerequisite for expanding relations. There are indications, however,
that japan is reappraising its foreign policy in the light of general Asian
developments and that sentiment for loosening ties with the United States
is growing.
2. COCOM agrees on major relaxation of strategic trade controls:
Revisions in the international export control
lists agreed on in the COCOM review of the
past three months will go into effect on 16
August. The controls on trade with Commu-
anged at this time, but will be discussed at an
early Consultative Group meeting.
Controls over exports of merchant ships
could not be agreed on by the Consultative Group and will be considered
again on 7 September. Although all COCOM countries are committed
to improved transit trade controls, a definite deadline for adoption has
not been set. Several delegates stressed that their governments would
be reluctant to adopt such controls unless they were applied to all
COCOM members.
TirlD CENE'T
Approved for Release: 2019/08/13 C03017423
23 July 54
ir-ot Tier% rry
Approved for Release: 2019/08/13 C03017423
Comment: The decisions of the Consulta-
tive Group will reduce the number of items on the export control lists
by about 50 percent. In addition several items will be subject to less
stringent controls.
The adoption of improved transit trade
controls has long been blocked by several COCOM countries, and their
commitment to adopt them is apparently not firm.
FAR EAST
3. Japanese fishing interests threaten to challenge Rhee line:
Japanese fishing interests warned the Ameri-
can embassy in Tokyo on 20 July that some-
thing must be done quickly to settle the
dispute with South Korea over the Rhee line,
ey poin e out a resident Rhee's visit to Washington was an oppor-
tune time for the United States to intervene in their behalf. At the
same time, they are planning to launch full-scale operations within the
Rhee line, despite the risks, and will call on Japanese naval forces for
protection.
Comment: This appears to be primarily a
threatAdesigned to hasten American mediation. The Japanese govern-
ment opposes any resort to force, preferring to wait until Japanese
military power is sufficient to impress the Koreans with the desira-
bility of finding a solution.
The Japanese Foreign Ministry, meanwhile,
speculates that General Hull's return to Washington during Rhee's
visit may indicate among other things an American attempt to improve
Japanese-Korean relations.
4
23 July 54
Tr) P rEloc'T
Approved for Release: 2019/08/13 C03017423
Approved for Release: 2019/08/13 C03017423
4. Chinese Communist bombers and fighters may be moving to Suichi
in�S-o-uth China:
as many
as 23 Chinese Communist piston-engine
bombers, believed to be light TU-2 types,
and an undisclosed number of LA-11 con-
ventional fighters have moved south to the
n on area from bass in East China between 17 and 20 .July. A
transport aircraft, apparently one which accompanied the movement,
flew on 20 July from Canton to an airfield on the Leichou Peninsula
opposite Hainan Island, possibly the one at Suichi. This suggests
that the ultimate destination of the bombers and fighters may be Suichi.
Comment: Construction of the airfield
at Suichi, reported to be one oiTH-j-largest in China, may now have
been completed. The runway, between 8,000 and 10,000 feet in length,
was not paved in May, however.
It is possible the pl nes now believed moving
to Suichi are naval aircraft. The base at Suichi would be ideal for .
naval air units. They could be expected to conduct patrols in the South
China Sea and the Gulf of Tonkin, and to participate in air-sea exer-
cises with Chinese Communist naval units at Canton and Hainan.
SOUTH ASIA
5. Ceylon unlikely to join Southeast Asian security pact:
The present temper of the Ceylonese press,
parliament and public opinion makes it un-
likely that Ceylon would join a collective
security pact for Southeast Asia at this time,
according o Ambassador Crowe. Moreover, Ceylon's attitude toward
the pact would probably be neutral rather than favorable, and the possi-
bility that it might join later would depend largely on the attitudes of the
other Colombo powers. The government itself, however, is "not un-
sympathetic."
5
11, Ael Irl
Approved for Release: 2019/08/13 C03017423
23 July 54
D c r 1-14cr
Approved for Release: 2019/08/13 C03017423
sari Z
Comment: Of the five Colombo powers�India,
Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma al7d-Indonesia--only Pakistan can be expected
to adhere initially to a Western-sponsored collective security pact.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
6. Oil consortium agreement with Iran appears near:
The British Foreign Office understands
that chief consortium negotiator Page hopes
shortly to take to London an aide me moire
embodying the points of agreement between
the consortium and the Iranian government, according to Ambassador
Aldrich. If approval by the principals of the eight companies involved
is forthcoming, Page will return to Tehran to initial the document.
Announcement of the consortium-Iran agree-
ment will be made after Page's return to Tehran. Following that, the
agreement will be put in proper form for signing and presentation to
the Majlis after it reconvenes on 24 August.
Comment: All phases of the oil agreement
appear to be on the verge of completion except for the separate British-
Iranian compensation negotiations.
6
1'11P CRFT
Approved for Release: 2019/08/13 C03017423
23 July 54