CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/01/26

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03023336
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: January 26, 1959

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3.5(c)
26 January 1959
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
3.3(h)(2)
63
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO
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26 JANUARY 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Failure of Mao to attend Soviet Party
Congress does not appear significant
in itself.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Yemen may be close to open struggle
over succession issue.
Ghana moving toward expanded diplo-
matic and commercial relations with
Sib-Soviet bloc.
New Laotian cabinet reflects increas-
ing strength of the army and young
reformers.
Japan - Kishi, although temporarily
secure as prime minister, faces con-
tinued dissension in his own party.
III. THE WEST
0 Italian Premier Fanfani threatening
to resign.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
26 January 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Communist China: Chou En-lai, third-ranking member
of the Chinese Communist party, is leading Peiping's dele-
gation to the Soviet 21st Party Congress, although delegations
from other bloc countries are being headed by their party first
secretaries. Mao Tse-tung has never attended a Soviet party
congress and the Chinese appear to have been rotating their
representation at such functions among the leaders ranking im-
mediately under Mao. Therefore, the failure of Mao to attend
this congress does not in itself seem significant. It is possible
that while in Moscow Choti may, as premier, participate in
some phase of the negotiations on the 1959 Sib-Soviet trade
nant whirh hag hpiark iincipr digeligginn fnr spvern1 mnnths
Yemen:
arms and funds for Yemeni dissidents were arriving in Yemen
from Saudi Arabia, while the Imam on his side was attempting
to raise several thousand armed tribesmen. His government
appears to be facing increased instability, and the country may
well be close to an open struggle intended to block the succes-
sion of pro-Soviet Crown Prince Badr.
(Page 1)
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Ghana - Sino-Soviet bloc: Ghana now is apparently ready
to exchange diplomatic missions with the USSR and may also
soon conclude formal trade agreements and exchange perma-
raent commercial missions with Poland and Czechoslovakia.
Lome type of economic arrangement with East Germany mai]
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@so be imminent.) Prime Minister Nkrumah, who is re-
portedly being ericouraged by Cairo to expand his contacts
with certain of the satellites, may feel such a step at this
time would increase pressure on potential Western sources
of financing for Ghana's development program.
(Page 3)
Laos: Ethe new
reflects the increas
reformers. Prime
efforts to pack the c
previous cabinet la
officers. Although
wood and several oi
ernment is on bah
Japan: Prime
term as president
while less decisive
tion for the time bei.
slightly more than on_
Kenzo /vIatsumura is evidence of significant intraparLy
satisfaction with Kishi and will preclude his exercise of firm
control of the party and government. Factional leaders will
be alert for any pretext on which to renew their ehallerwp nf
KiShi.
r_
III. Wk.:ST
t 1 emier Fanfani
is seriously considering resigning within the next
ays. He fears that as a result of the recent Nenni Social-
ist congress, enough Democratic Socialist deputies will desert
the government to erase its slim parliamentary margin. Fan-
fani charges that President Gronchi--who is known to favor a
26 Jan 59
DAILY BRIEF 11
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rapprochement between the Christian Democrats and a reunified
Socialist party�wants to topple his cabinet and force new elec-
tions during 1959. The immediate consequence of a Fanfani
resignation at this time would probably be a minority Christian
Democratic government, with the question of new elections de-
layed until after the Christian Democratic party congress in mid-
April.
26 Jan 59
DAILY BRIEF iii
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L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
No Back-up Material
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Developments in Yemen
Recent fragmentary reports from Yemen indicate that
the country is faced with increased instability and may well
be close to open struggle. The harsh regime of Imam Ahmad
has long been the object of conspiracies. The current wide-
spread opposition, however, is primarily directed at the
Imam's incompetent son, pro-Soviet Crown Prince Badr,
whose claim to succession is opposed by leaders of Yemen's
patrician tribes who traditionally elect each new Imam. These
chieftains appear generally to support the present Imam's
brother, Prince Hasan, head of Yemen's UN delegation.
Popular dissatisfaction in Yemen is furthered by the de-
terioration in the effectiveness of the government, which has
been unable to provide relief in Yemen's serious famine. Since
1955, the government has accepted approximately $65,000,000
in military and economic aid credits from the Sino-Soviet bloc,
apparently without regard to its ability to repay. Yemen, vir-
tually bankrupt, has failed to meet obligations due Saudi Arabia,
Czechoslovakia, Communist China, and the USSR. About 350
Sib-Soviet bloc personnel are now in Yemen. A major factor
in Yemen's arms deals with the bloc was Rules hope that the
modern weapons would encourage army loyalty and permit effec-
tive control of rebellious tribes. Successful oppositipn to Badr
would probably require some army support.
In mid-December,
the Imam was warned by a trusted official in the northern cap-
ital of Sana that there was a new conspiracy against him. Fol-
lowing this, Yemeni authorities arrested a number of officials
26 Jan 59
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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and army officers suspected of plotting to overthrow the re-
gime. Despite these precautions, the Imam and Badr grew
increasingly concerned during January. At that time,
the Imam reinforced the
guards around his palaces, certain airfields and the radio sta-
tion, attempted to raise several thousand armed tribesmen
and forbade Yemeni nationals to travel to Saudi Arabia.
Saudi silver
coins were pouring into Sana together with arms from Saudi
Arabia,
described the situation as permeated with unrest, and said
that several important northern Yemeni tribes had agreed in
the event of a coup against the government to seize government
stores of weapons and ammunition near the capital. These
tribes also apparently oppose the government's association
with Egypt in the United Arab States�the loose federation of
the UAR and Yemen.
26 Jan 59
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Ghana Expanding Contacts With Sino-Soviet Bloc
Prime Minister Nkrumah's government is expanding its
contacts and appears likely soon to conclude its first real
political and economic ties with the Sib-Soviet bloc. Nkrumah
indicated in a 14 January press conference that Ghana now is
prepared to implement the agreement which it reached a year
ago with the USSR to exchange diplomatic missions at embassy
level "in due course." Since then the USSR is believed to have
maintained pressure for an early exchange through its embassy
in London and through such special instruments as the Soviet
observer-delegation to the recent All-African Peoples' Confer-
ence in Accra.
Meanwhilelahree of th_ejEuropean satellites are making
an apparently concerted effort to induce Ghana to increase its
economic ties with the bloc�heretofore limited essentially to
commercial transactions accounting for only about two percent
of Ghana's foreign trade. Poland, which has had a trade group
in Accra this month, and Czechoslovakia, which sent such a
delegation taGba,na in November, appear to be pressing for for-
mal trade agreements and an exchange of permanent commercial
representatives, ffn addition, Czechoslovakia and East Germany,
which sent a trade mission of its own to Accra last week, are re-
ported offering to install a variety of light industries, presumably
at attractive pricesj,
While some general arrangements may be announced shortly,
many, if not all of the agreements, will probably not take final
shape until spring when Ghana apparently intends to send a trade
and good-will mission to eastern Europe. Except in the case of
East Germany--with which Nkrumah will certainly deal more
cautiously in view of the importance of West Germany as a mar-
ket for Ghana's principal export, cocoa--such economic arrange-
ments might soon lead to formal diplomatic ties as well.
Although some key Ghanaian officials appear to have been
impressed by essentially economic arguments for closer rela-
tions with the bloc) Nkrumah may also feel such a course at this
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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time would step up pressure on potential Western sources for
financing Ghana's development program�particularly its am-
bitious $850,0002000 Volta River hydroelectric-aluminum proj-
ect. krumah,
encouraged by Nasir to establish diplo-
matic relations with certain satellite countries
26 Jan 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
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CONFIDENTIAL
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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