CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/01/26

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
03023336
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
U
Document Page Count: 
12
Document Creation Date: 
February 25, 2020
Document Release Date: 
February 27, 2020
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
January 26, 1959
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PDF icon CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15787515].pdf477.45 KB
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f/r/Z/ZZ/ZA Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023336 /1/14 3.5(c) 26 January 1959 Copy No. C CENTRAL 3.3(h)(2) 63 INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO NO CHANGE IN CLASS. >4- E:ECLASSIRED CLASG. CHANGE) TO: evb NE/3 FEIVIEW DATE� tTEUATI#4 -TOP-SECRET- ad REVIEWER: A Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023336 ,Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023336 f -TOP-SEORET- Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023336 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023336 kid 26 JANUARY 1959 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Failure of Mao to attend Soviet Party Congress does not appear significant in itself. IL ASIA-AFRICA Yemen may be close to open struggle over succession issue. Ghana moving toward expanded diplo- matic and commercial relations with Sib-Soviet bloc. New Laotian cabinet reflects increas- ing strength of the army and young reformers. Japan - Kishi, although temporarily secure as prime minister, faces con- tinued dissension in his own party. III. THE WEST 0 Italian Premier Fanfani threatening to resign. TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023336 ii Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023336 NW, NIse CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 26 January 1959 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Communist China: Chou En-lai, third-ranking member of the Chinese Communist party, is leading Peiping's dele- gation to the Soviet 21st Party Congress, although delegations from other bloc countries are being headed by their party first secretaries. Mao Tse-tung has never attended a Soviet party congress and the Chinese appear to have been rotating their representation at such functions among the leaders ranking im- mediately under Mao. Therefore, the failure of Mao to attend this congress does not in itself seem significant. It is possible that while in Moscow Choti may, as premier, participate in some phase of the negotiations on the 1959 Sib-Soviet trade nant whirh hag hpiark iincipr digeligginn fnr spvern1 mnnths Yemen: arms and funds for Yemeni dissidents were arriving in Yemen from Saudi Arabia, while the Imam on his side was attempting to raise several thousand armed tribesmen. His government appears to be facing increased instability, and the country may well be close to an open struggle intended to block the succes- sion of pro-Soviet Crown Prince Badr. (Page 1) IL ASIA-AFRICA Ghana - Sino-Soviet bloc: Ghana now is apparently ready to exchange diplomatic missions with the USSR and may also soon conclude formal trade agreements and exchange perma- raent commercial missions with Poland and Czechoslovakia. Lome type of economic arrangement with East Germany mai] TOP SECRET 4,7? Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023336 Vf1APProved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023336r Nopri ; @so be imminent.) Prime Minister Nkrumah, who is re- portedly being ericouraged by Cairo to expand his contacts with certain of the satellites, may feel such a step at this time would increase pressure on potential Western sources of financing for Ghana's development program. (Page 3) Laos: Ethe new reflects the increas reformers. Prime efforts to pack the c previous cabinet la officers. Although wood and several oi ernment is on bah Japan: Prime term as president while less decisive tion for the time bei. slightly more than on_ Kenzo /vIatsumura is evidence of significant intraparLy satisfaction with Kishi and will preclude his exercise of firm control of the party and government. Factional leaders will be alert for any pretext on which to renew their ehallerwp nf KiShi. r_ III. Wk.:ST t 1 emier Fanfani is seriously considering resigning within the next ays. He fears that as a result of the recent Nenni Social- ist congress, enough Democratic Socialist deputies will desert the government to erase its slim parliamentary margin. Fan- fani charges that President Gronchi--who is known to favor a 26 Jan 59 DAILY BRIEF 11 TOP SECRET Arrt' /tit:A Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023336 V. Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023336 Nerl rapprochement between the Christian Democrats and a reunified Socialist party�wants to topple his cabinet and force new elec- tions during 1959. The immediate consequence of a Fanfani resignation at this time would probably be a minority Christian Democratic government, with the question of new elections de- layed until after the Christian Democratic party congress in mid- April. 26 Jan 59 DAILY BRIEF iii TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023336 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023336 =gie Nor L THE COMMUNIST BLOC No Back-up Material II. ASIA-AFRICA Developments in Yemen Recent fragmentary reports from Yemen indicate that the country is faced with increased instability and may well be close to open struggle. The harsh regime of Imam Ahmad has long been the object of conspiracies. The current wide- spread opposition, however, is primarily directed at the Imam's incompetent son, pro-Soviet Crown Prince Badr, whose claim to succession is opposed by leaders of Yemen's patrician tribes who traditionally elect each new Imam. These chieftains appear generally to support the present Imam's brother, Prince Hasan, head of Yemen's UN delegation. Popular dissatisfaction in Yemen is furthered by the de- terioration in the effectiveness of the government, which has been unable to provide relief in Yemen's serious famine. Since 1955, the government has accepted approximately $65,000,000 in military and economic aid credits from the Sino-Soviet bloc, apparently without regard to its ability to repay. Yemen, vir- tually bankrupt, has failed to meet obligations due Saudi Arabia, Czechoslovakia, Communist China, and the USSR. About 350 Sib-Soviet bloc personnel are now in Yemen. A major factor in Yemen's arms deals with the bloc was Rules hope that the modern weapons would encourage army loyalty and permit effec- tive control of rebellious tribes. Successful oppositipn to Badr would probably require some army support. In mid-December, the Imam was warned by a trusted official in the northern cap- ital of Sana that there was a new conspiracy against him. Fol- lowing this, Yemeni authorities arrested a number of officials 26 Jan 59 TOP SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023336 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023336 NW' Nue and army officers suspected of plotting to overthrow the re- gime. Despite these precautions, the Imam and Badr grew increasingly concerned during January. At that time, the Imam reinforced the guards around his palaces, certain airfields and the radio sta- tion, attempted to raise several thousand armed tribesmen and forbade Yemeni nationals to travel to Saudi Arabia. Saudi silver coins were pouring into Sana together with arms from Saudi Arabia, described the situation as permeated with unrest, and said that several important northern Yemeni tribes had agreed in the event of a coup against the government to seize government stores of weapons and ammunition near the capital. These tribes also apparently oppose the government's association with Egypt in the United Arab States�the loose federation of the UAR and Yemen. 26 Jan 59 TOP CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023336 Approved for Reie�as�e:-26.27/02/21 C03023336 Ghana Expanding Contacts With Sino-Soviet Bloc Prime Minister Nkrumah's government is expanding its contacts and appears likely soon to conclude its first real political and economic ties with the Sib-Soviet bloc. Nkrumah indicated in a 14 January press conference that Ghana now is prepared to implement the agreement which it reached a year ago with the USSR to exchange diplomatic missions at embassy level "in due course." Since then the USSR is believed to have maintained pressure for an early exchange through its embassy in London and through such special instruments as the Soviet observer-delegation to the recent All-African Peoples' Confer- ence in Accra. Meanwhilelahree of th_ejEuropean satellites are making an apparently concerted effort to induce Ghana to increase its economic ties with the bloc�heretofore limited essentially to commercial transactions accounting for only about two percent of Ghana's foreign trade. Poland, which has had a trade group in Accra this month, and Czechoslovakia, which sent such a delegation taGba,na in November, appear to be pressing for for- mal trade agreements and an exchange of permanent commercial representatives, ffn addition, Czechoslovakia and East Germany, which sent a trade mission of its own to Accra last week, are re- ported offering to install a variety of light industries, presumably at attractive pricesj, While some general arrangements may be announced shortly, many, if not all of the agreements, will probably not take final shape until spring when Ghana apparently intends to send a trade and good-will mission to eastern Europe. Except in the case of East Germany--with which Nkrumah will certainly deal more cautiously in view of the importance of West Germany as a mar- ket for Ghana's principal export, cocoa--such economic arrange- ments might soon lead to formal diplomatic ties as well. Although some key Ghanaian officials appear to have been impressed by essentially economic arguments for closer rela- tions with the bloc) Nkrumah may also feel such a course at this 26 Jan 59 SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023336 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023336 Name time would step up pressure on potential Western sources for financing Ghana's development program�particularly its am- bitious $850,0002000 Volta River hydroelectric-aluminum proj- ect. krumah, encouraged by Nasir to establish diplo- matic relations with certain satellite countries 26 Jan 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023336 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023336 CONFIDENTIAL THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of the Interior The Secretary of the Interior The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director United States Information Agency The Director Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023336 r(7/ ZZI WZ/ZZZ/Z/ZrZ/ZZ Approved for Release. 2020/02/21C03023336 0 -TOP SECRET- Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023336