CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/01/21

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
03023339
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RIPPUB
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U
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16
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February 25, 2020
Document Release Date: 
February 27, 2020
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Publication Date: 
January 21, 1959
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frti6 //titfri f/r/A17./7///// Approved for 11:;a4sS.Z.iii11203023339 3.5(c) / 3.3(h)(2) NO" 21 January 1959 Copy No. C 63 CENrI1RAL INTELLIGF\CE BULLETIN' DOCUMENT NO. _ _ NO CHANGE IN CLASS. (.7cLASSFIED CLAS3. CHAN-.I'D TO: -A NE:r:T FiEV:E'A' DATE: DAT -TOP-SECRET- REVIEWER: Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023339 Approved for Rsere-ase7-21:6076771i C03023339 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023339 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023339 21 JANUARY 1959 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC II. ASIA-AFRICA Iran - Shah apparently giving serious consideration to nonaggression pact with USSR precluding US-Iranian bi- lateral treaty. Israelis caution against accommoda- tion with Nasir to contain Communism In Iraq; feel Nasir is greater threat. Iraq - Communists remove army post- ers publishing Qasim's restrictions on paramilitary forces. Qasim asks US friendurrip development aid. Morocco claims Berber dissidents re- ceive Spanish arms, funds. Indian cabinet plans to accept Soviet credit, equipment, and assistance to build and operate Assam refinery. 'f III. THE WEST � Cuba - Prime minister, dissatisfied with Castro's leadership, offers resig- nation. SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023339 r/,/,/Z(Z/Z7/Zf,/Ztn:///ZarZ/Z////Z/1/W/, /7/7"7/7177/W/7/717177/701W7Z/47,7"."71,ffA w Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023339 I. /11 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 21 January 1959 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC I I. ASIA-AFRICA Iran-USSR: aan is reported to be seriously consider- ing signature of a long-term nonaggression pact with the USSR which would preclude signature of the pending bilater defense agreement with the United States. Ambassador Wailes reported on 18 January that something "ominous" ding between Iran and the USSR] (Page 1) Israel: rael Aviv is increasingly worried by what it regards as the possibility that the US and its Baghdad Pact allies will decide to support Nasir's efforts to secure Iraq from Communist control. The Israelis, whose greatest fear is a unified Arab world, continue to feel that the major threat in the Middle East is Nasir, not the Communis (Page 2) Iraq: Military police began last week to enforce parts of Prime Minister Qasim's order limiting the functions of the Communist-dominated Popular Resistance Force, local Commu- nists have torn down copies of the order posted by army person- nel. Qasim, in his first meeting with the new American ambas- sador, reiterated that he is determined to follow a "neutral" policy and that he wants American help and friendship. He said he hopes American contractors will continue to worig /0 0 ,0 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023339 rezwz/f/m/z//zzzzz/A/p/aZZZ///; "/o /2/0 (egg z/3/ ///1/777/7/770 FJ rJ 0 '70 an Iraq's development program, and that the United States will buy Iraqi commodities. Qasim's remarks to the ambassador indicated, however, that he still believes the US is intriguin against him D (Page 3) Morocco: EN.. Moroccan official claims the army has un- covered proof that dissident Berber tribes in northern Morocco are armed and financed from Spanish sources. Rabat may re- new pressure for the evacuation of the 10,000 Spanish troops remaining in Morocco. Meanwhile, a hard core of armed Berber dissidents are attempting to deny reinforcements and supplies to Moroccan Army forces operating against them in the arelj, (Page 5) (Map) India-USSR: The Indian cabinet, finding Western bids less favorable, has decided provisionally to accept a Soviet offer made last 'September to supply on credit capital equip- ment for construction of an $82,000,000 oil refinery in Bihar. New Delhi has also requested complete Soviet technical as- sistance in building and' operating the refinery, and is await- ing Moscow's response. Agreement on this project, follow- ing contracts in October with Rumania for construction of a government-owned refinery in Assam, would assure the So- viet bloc an:importVit role in expanding India's oil industry. (Page 7) III. THE WEST Cuba: Eeveral responsible men in the new Cuban Govern- ment are becoming disillusioned over the delays and inefficiency occasioned by the constant deferral of decisions to Fidel Castro, whose time has been spent largely in public appearances. Prim Minister Miro Cardona, for these reasons as well as his anger over Castro's inflammatory attacks on the US, has submitted a letter of resi7natioS (Page 8) 21 Jan 59 DAILY BRIEF ii SECRET (1/7/7////////7,WA/M///////,/ Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023339 n rh r rr Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023339 Nor' New L THE COMMUNIST BLOC No Back-up .Material, IL ASIA-AFRICA Iran Reported Considering Nonaggression Pact With USSR /he Shah of Iran is seriously considering a 50-year nonaggression pact with the USSR The USSR, which proposed,the pact in late December, demands as a condition that Iran not sign the pending bilateral defense agree- ment with the United States. A guarantee of Iran's security would be requested from "five governments, including Great Britain, France, and India." The USSR would also be prepared to provide Iran with extensive military and economic aici] /he Iranian Government would require, before signing the pact, that the USSR cancel articles 5 and 6 of the Soviet-Iranian treaty of 1921 which gives the USSR the right to advance its troops into Iran to carry out operations "necessary for its defense" when menaced by military operations of another country. Eihe Shah is disappointed with the limited success of his cam- p ign over the last few months to obtain increased US support for Iran and the ghdad Pact. He 'claims that the draft bilateral agreement offers no additional guarantees to the security of IraJD While the Shah's consideration of Soviet offers could be a fur- ther extension of tactics to obtain US aid, Ambassador Wailes states that Something "ominous" may be pending between Iran arid the USSR, but doubts that Iran has yet made a decision which would seriously af- fect free-world interests. Iranian Foreign Minister Hekmat has warned the ambassador that Iran is "living next door to a beast" and that, while he could give no details now, the US must have "full trust" in its friend Iran and "in the way in which it will deal with the Soviet Union, 21 Jan 59 SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023339 ef Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023339 Israel Urges Opposition to Nasir's Influence in Iraq Israel is showing increased concern over the possibility that the United States, as well as Iran and Turkey, might sup- port Nasir while opposing Communist influence in Iraq. The Israelis fear the extension of Nasir's influence to Iraq would bring about unification of the Arab world and increase the Arab threat to Israers security] ael argues that the West should instead support Iraqi Prime Minister Qasim's resistance to Nasir and pro-UAR elements in Iraq. According to Israeli Ambassador Eban, Nasir is the cause of, rather than the remedy for, Qasim's ac- ceptance of Communist support, and Qasim would assume a more truly independent position if he had non-Communist sup- port against UAR pressur_e_21 an the past few days, Israeli officials in Paris are reported to have met with Iranian and Turkish officials and attempted to persuade them of this thesis. However, General Bakhtiar, chief of Iranian intelligence, contended that Nasir is a lesser threat to Iranian interests than a Communist-dominated regime in Iraq would be. The Israelis undoubtedly will reiterate their views on the Iraqi situation SECRET 21 Jan 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023339 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023339 Nese The Iraqi Situation Military police began last week to enforce parts of Prime Minister Qa,sim's order restricting the activities of the Communist-dominated Popular Resistance Force, /copies of Qasim's order posted throughout Baghdad by army ersonnel were torn down at night, military to redistribute the proclamations. Con- tinued Communist obstruction of the order may lead to clashes between military personnel and pro-Communist sympathizers. Clashes between pro-Communist and pro-UAR ele- ments may occur again at Mosul on 2 February when pro- UAR partisans will celebrate the first anniversary of the union of Syria and Egypt. Baghdad is attempting to provide "a greater number" of photographs of Nasir and UAR flags for the event. UAR anticipation of fast-moving events in Iraq may be indicated by P ordering the mili- tary command communications network between Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad to go on round-the-clock opera- tion "immediately." Qasirn, in his first meeting with US Ambassador Jernegan, reiterated previous statements that he is determined to follow a "neutral" policy and that he wants US friendship and assistance. Qasim stated that he hoped for increased trade, and the help of US contractors as well as technical advisers in the economic field in carrying out Iraqi development activities. He repeated long-standing 21 Jan 59 TOP SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023339 -- ApprovTd for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023339 'Rae' rumors alleging subversive activities by American diplomatic personnel, and "smilingly assured" the ambassador that he did not believe such rumors. However, he had intimated to the UK ambassador some weeks ago that he did believe these rumors. TOP SECRET 21 Jan 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023339 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023339 spAIN GIBRALTAR (UK) S7'RAIT OF GIBRALTAR Tangier " Ceuta (Sp.) ATLANTIC OCEAN Rabat STATUTE MILES 1 30246 � Tetuan se6o, Meknes � 100 Al hucemas 006' STa za MO 13CCO MEDITERRANEAN SEA Earea of Rif tribal dissidence Moroccan troop concentrations � Spanish troop concentrations. 90121 21 JANUARY 1959 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023339 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023339 Nkate Nita, Spanish Aid to Moroccan Dissidents panish involvement in the tribal dissidence in northern Morocco may cause Rabat to renew pressure for the evacua;- ton of the 10,000 Spanish troops remaining in Morocco. Rabat has repeatedly protested Spanish complicity3 aloroccan Vice Premier Bouabid, who with other offi- cials recently irspected military activities in northern Morocco, stated the Royal Army has proof that Spain has supplied arms and money to the Beni Our iaghel tribe. Bouabid also claimed he has discovered a definite separatist movement in the Rif and that the Beni Ouriaghel-- the tribe of Riffian warrior Abd-el-Krim who rebelled against Spain in the `1920s--apparently are determined to set up a Rif republ9 E_The Spanish ambassador in Rabat has admitted that some assistance to the Moroccan tribes may have come from local Spanish sources, but he has denied that Spain intends to make war on Morocco. "intense Spanish activity" throughout northern Morocco and the return to that area of many former Spanish native-affairs officers. Some of these officers may be considering--as they did during the French-imposed ex- ile of the present King--the idea of establishing an autonomous northern Moroccg E_The Spanish military governor of Melilla, one of five tiny Spanish-controlled points in northern Morocco, is reported to have granted asylum to Berber leader Lahcen Lyoussi, a former crown counselor who is being sought by government forces for involvement in tribal dissidence, , is supporting tribal dissidence as a means of forcing Morocco to commit itself to recognizing Spain's sovereignty over its present enclave 21 Jan 59 SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023339 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023339 411WW" . ",emor [Meanwhile, the Royal Moroccan Army has established control over most principal roads and towns. Several thousand armed Riffians apparently are attempting to deny reinforcements and supplies to these forces and brobablv will continue their harassing tacticA 21 Jan 59 SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023339 Approved for Re-lea�s.e7. 2-06/772/21b03023339 Iftwo India to Accept Soviet Offer to Help Build Oil Refinery Soviet bloc participation in India's expanding oil industry is likely to be broadened substantially as a result of a provision- al decision by the Indian cabinet to accept Moscow's offer of last September to help build a major oil refinery in Bihar State in eastern India. Soviet credit for capital equipment probably will cover a large share of the project's estimated $82,000,000 cost. In addition New Delhi has requested Soviet technical assistance in constructing and operating the refinery. Moscow apparently has not yet responded to this request. The project in Bihar is the larger of two refineries planned by the Indian Government to exploit oil deposits in northeastern India and to expand the public sector of the petroleum industry. Last October New Delhi signed an agreement with Rumania for construction of a :refinery in Assam with a capacity of 750,000 tons annually. The Indian Government early in 1958 requested the USSR and Western oil companies to consider assisting in the construc- tion of the Bihar refinery, which will have a probable annual capacity of 2,000,000 tons. British, Italian, and American firms have expressed interest in the project, but their various proposals were turned down by New Delhi, apparently because they demanded special concessions or offered less favorable credit terms. Most US companies are reluctant to invest in state-owned enterprises that will compete with privately owned refineries now operating in India 21 Jan 59 CONFIDENTIAL CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023339 Page 7 Approved for7Rei-e-a-S--e:--26-2-076Y2i a03023339 '4W III. THE WEST Some Key Members of New Cuban Government Becoming Disillusioned he tendency in the new Cuban Government to refer all governmental and military decisions to Fidel Castro is seri- ously slowing down government operationsz-and causing responr sible high officials to become increasingly frustrated and dis- illusioned. Provisional President Urrutia is said to refer all decisions to Castro, who has been almost completely occupied with public appearances. In the armed forces, subordinate commanders are unable to make even minor decisions with- out referring them to Castro. As commander in chief, Castro intends personally to reorganize the armed forces, a process that is expected to be7.sloviLD lime Minister Jose Miro Cardona, highly regarded lawyer whose membership in the government has done much to lend it prestige, on 19 January submitted a letter of resignation which several influential Cubans are trying to get him to withdraw. Though his alleged reason was his poor health, the basic reason is understood by the American Embassy to be frustration over the inefficiency of government operations.] Niro Cardona is further angered at Castro's attacks on the United States since the criticism of the summary executions of Batista "war criminals." Cardona and another cabinet member have urged Castro to exercise more restraint in his speeches and, on 18 January, at least two Havana newspapers stressed the need for more calm and less tallA aducation Minister Armando Hart is also reported to be seri- ously considering resigning. If this trend continues, public con- fidence in the government will be seriously shaken and a period of political instability will ensu92 21 Jan 59 CONFIDENTIAL CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023339 Page 8 firlATVITIL"Pti'T'l A I Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023339 '400,4 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Special Adviser to the President The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of the Interior The Secretary of the Interior Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director United States Information Agency The Director Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023339 ":p