THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03027799
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: April 26, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: December 10, 1967

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
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10 December 1967
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WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national security
of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code
Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.
lop-Seerert-
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Information as of 1600
10 December 1967
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HIGHLIGHTS
Sharp fighting was reported in widely scattered
areas of South Vietnam over the weekend. In the
delta, South Vietnamese forces claim to have killed
over 400 Viet Cong in a battle in Chuong Thien Prov-
ince.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
South Vietnamese troops claim to have killed 451
Viet Cong guerrillas in a Mekong Delta battle which
began on 8 December and continued sporadically over
the weekend. Sharp fighting was also reported near
the Demilitarized Zone, in Quang Nam Province south
of Da Nang, in Binh Dinh Province, and near An Loc,
the capital of Binh Long Province (Paras. 1-5).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
Ithe Upper House has voted to draft an amnesty
bill covering certain persons arrested since 1 November
1963 (Paras. 5-7). A Viet Cong captive has provided
a description of the difficulties involved in carrying
out Communist political activities in a contested area
(Paras. 8-12).
10 December 1967
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IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: The
Chinese have upgraded the Liberation Front office
in Peking to a diplomatic mission (Paras. 1-2). Com-
ments by Front spokesmen are reported (Paras. 3-6).
The Liberation Front has issued a statement supporting
its call for holiday truces (Para. 7).
10 December 1967
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. South Vietnamese infantrymen and rangers
claim to have killed 451 Viet Cong guerrillas in a
Mekong Delta battle which began on 8 December in
Chuong Thien Province and continued sporadically
over the weekend. Sixty South Vietnamese died in
the fighting and 102 were wounded. Five US advisers
were also wounded in the engagement.
2. The fighting in Chuong Thien, the second
major action in the delta in a week, began when two
battalions of the South Vietnamese 21st Division
came under heavy fire while moving down both sides
of the 0 Mon Canal. Three additional South Viet-
namese Ranger battalions were quickly moved into
the battle area to reinforce the attacking ARVN
forces. Fighting continued throughout the day, and
during the night of 8-9 December heavy air and artil-
lery strikes were directed at the Viet Cong positions
On the morning of 9 December, small groups of Viet
Cong were sighted attempting to withdraw. Additional
air strikes were called in and the advancing govern-
ment battalions continued to meet sporadic resistance
throughout that day and the next.
3. Elements of three Viet Cong battalions
have been identified in the fight, an unusual oc-
currence in the delta where for several months the
enemy has operated for the most part in company size
formations, launching occasional battalion-size at-
tacks. The units engaged were the 303rd Main Force
Battalion and the U-Minh-10 and Tay Do Local Force
battalions, all veterans of numerous delta battles.
Other Actions
4. To the north of Saigon near An Loc, the
capital of Binh Long Province, soldiers from the
US 1st Infantry Division reported killing 124 North
Vietnamese troops as the enemy unsuccessfully at-
tempted to overrun a US artillery fire support base
on 10 December. One American was killed and 31 were
wounded in the battle. Captured documents tentatively
10 December 1967
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identify the enemy unit as an element of the North
Vietnamese 165th Regiment. This unit was last en-
gaged in battle between 29 October and 3 November
in the vicinity of Loc Ninh, about 14 miles north
of this most recent action.
5. Sharp fighting was also reported over the
weekend in the coastal plains south of Da Nang and
farther north near Gio Linh, the allied strongpoint
just below the Demilitarized Zone. In the fighting
south of Da Nang, US 1st Cavalry troops report kill-
ing 94 enemy soldiers over the weekend while suffering
relatively light losses themselves. In the action nearGio
Linh, ten South Vietnamese and 45 North Vietnamese
troops died in a clash on 9 December. The latter
fight developed when South Vietnamese patrols ran
into an estimated company-size enemy force which had
moved into well-fortified positions less than two
miles northwest of Gio Linh. Meanwhile, continued
skirmishes in the Bong Son plains of northern Binh
Dinh Province have raised the enemy casualty count
there to 252 dead in three days of fighting. US
losses in this sector have been reported as rela-
tively light.
10 December 1967
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II. POLITICAL SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
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National Assembly Activities
5. The Lower House voted on 7 December to set
the minimum membership for formation of an officially
recognized bloc at 14. This would permit as many as
nine blocs in the 137-member house and is proportionately
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similar to the 12-member requirement of the former
Provisional National Assembly. The 60-man Upper
House, by contrast, has set its minimum at 15, al-
lowing only four blocs.
7. In other National Assembly developments,
the Upper House on 7 December heard a report from
Senator Tran Van Don's special committee to review
clemency appeals submitted to the senate. Don re-
ported that, since the committee's establishment in
mid-November, 107 cases had been reviewed. Twenty
of these involved persons implicated in the coups or
attempted coups of 30 January 1965, 19 February 1965,
and 20 May 1965, and in the government's move on 30
June 1966 against struggle movement forces in Da Nang.
During the ensuing debate, the Upper House voted to
draft an amnesty bill covering certain categories of
persons arrested since the overthrow of the Diem regime
on 1 November.
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Political Difficulties in Contested Areas
8. A Viet Cong captive 3.3(h)(2)
has described difficulties encountered
in carrying out Communist political activities in a
particular area controlledby neither the Viet Cong nor
the government. The source's description is probably
typical of the many areas in South Vietnam which can
claim effective control by neither side. It is probably
safe to assume that the government encounters equal dif-
ficulty with its own efforts in such regions
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9. As an example of the problems involved, the
3.3(h)(2) captive ,I
; described
his own efforts at indoctrination of the local populace.
Extreme caution must be exercised, he said, in order
that neither the Viet Cong cadres nor the people them-
selves will run afoul of the government agents and
soldiers who frequently enter the area.
10. In the source's own area, full indoctrina-
tion sessions were abandoned in early 1967 because
of the increasing risk, and the Communists had to re-
sort to speaking to persons or families singly in a
house-to-house canvas. The source had previously been
able to gather as many as ten families together safely
for a propaganda session.
11. Difficulties were still encountered, however,
as many people refused to open their doors to the Viet
Cong cadres because they feared government reprisals.
The Communists, further, were unable to determine what
effect their indoctrination had on the local inhabitants
because no effective control measures existed. Viet
Cong agents could not live in the hamlet to oversee the
execution of Viet Cong policies, and even those people
known to be Communist sympathizers and supporters could
not be rewarded because of the danger of government dis-
covery.
12. This example also points up the extreme
pressure exerted upon local inhabitants who probably
in many cases favor neither the Communists nor the
government. As a result, either they are forced into
actions simply out of fear or they refuse to cooperate
with either side, making progress equally difficult for
the Viet Cong and the government.
10 December 1967
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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
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1. There is nothing of significance to report.
10 December 1967
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
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Chinese Grant Liberation Front Diplomatic Status
1. According to a Hanoi announcement, the Chi-
nese have upgraded the Liberation Front representa-
tion in Peking to the status of a diplomatic mission,
placing it on a par with other diplomatic posts in
the country. On 5 December Hanoi radio, in report-
ing a Peking reception honoring the new Front repre-
sentative, quoted Premier Chou En-lai as stating
that China "regards the NFLSV permanent mission in
China as an official diplomatic mission." On 10 De-
cember, Hanoi issued a statement warmly praising the
Chinese action and quoted a Liberation Front announce-
ment claiming that this new status "further raised
the international prestige of the NFLSV, the only
genuine representative of the South Vietnamese
people" and thanking the Chinese for their "whole-
hearted" moral and material assistance.
2. Peking's action is in keeping with the con-
siderable official and propaganda support it has
rendered the Front over the years. Such support has
included giving Front representatives exhalted po-
sitions, sometimes above representatives of Hanoi,
at meetings and diplomatic functions. China is the
third country to grant the Front such diplomatic
status. Cuba and Cambodia did so in June of this
year and other nations where the Front currently
enjoys representation may follow suit.
Comments by Front Spokesmen
3. Liberation Front spokesmen are continuing
to emphasize the reasonableness and acceptability
of their new program and to imply that more than
a cessation of the bombing of the North is necessary
to bring about conditions for ending the war in the
South.
4. Nguyen Van Tien, the Front representative
in Hanoi who is currently in Europe, stated in a
5 December interview on the French radio that the
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first gesture required to bring about favorable
conditions for peace is the cessation of the bomb-
ing of the North. He stressed, however, that US
acceptance of the Front's objectives is necessary
before the fighting in the South can be ended. He
defined these objectives as "the cessation of the
aggression against us, the cessation of the bombing,
the withdrawal of all US and satellite troops from
the South, and recognition of the Front."
5. Much the same line was adopted by the Front
representative in Prague, Ha Thanh Lam, in a recent
interview in the Italian press, only a portion of
which has yet been received. Lam demanded that the
US stop the bombing of the North unconditionally
but insisted that the NFLSV will continue to fight
until the US agrees to withdraw. Both Tien and Lam
side-stepped the question of how such a withdrawal
would be carried out or whether an agreement to
withdraw was sufficient to get negotiations under
way.
6. In his interview, Lam also provided an
outline for the period of transition after the time
when the Front has presumably come to power and has
promulgated a new constitution. Drawing on the
precepts of the new Front program, which stress
neutralism, Lam claimed the NFLSV will reconstruct
the country, give the South an independent foreign
policy, accept help from all countries, and approach
the issue of unification with the North gradually
over a period of several years. By way of illus-
trating the Front's willingness to cooperate with
other political elements in the South, Lam claimed
that the Front is ready to "support and respect"
the democratic front of defeated presidential can-
didate, Duong Dinh Dzu. Dzu has several times
been cited in Front statements and propaganda as
the type of individual in the "Saigon establishment"
who would be welcome./
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Liberation Front on Holiday Truce
7. The Liberation Front has issued a lengthy
statement stressing the humanitarian nature of its
proposal for truce periods at Christmas, New Year
and Tet and calling upon South Vietnamese troops
to "force their superiors" to observe the Front's
order for a suspension of military attacks. The
statement broadcast on 8 December claimed that the
South Vietnamese Government "together with their
US bosses" are attempting to undermine the Front's
initiative for a suspension of military attacks.
It pointed out that the Thieu-Ky "clique" has
been obliged to pretend to talk about a cease-fire
"in order to fool public opinion and to cope with
the Front's good will" but that it has had to
acquiesce to the US view "proving that it has no
right to solve problems dealing with our people's
feelings." The statement ended by stressing the
Communists' resolve not to let the "enemy" carry
out provocative acts or to take advantage of the
suspension of military attacks.
10 December 1967
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