THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03029760
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: April 26, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: November 7, 1967

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
cret
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
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7 November 1967
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,k.'ARNING
1-his document corn inns classified information affecting the national security
the United Status within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code
nle L. Sections 793, 794, and 798.
e
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Information as of 1600
7 November 1967
HIGHLIGHTS
Food shipments to North Vietnam from China
and the USSR continue to rise, reaching a total
of over 370,000 tons so far this year (cf. 55,000
tons last year). Sharp clashes between Allied
and Communist forces were reported in scattered
areas of South Vietnam.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
Heavy figETIng was reported near Dak To in the
central highlands and in several other widely scat-
tered areas on 6-7 November (Paras. 1-4). The South
Koreans reported killing 113 enemy soldiers (Paras.
5-6). An update of the 5 November fighting near
Song Be discloses that the South Vietnamese lost
nearly 100 killed (Paras. 7-9). Additional fight-
ing was reported at Loc Ninh and in an area south
of Da Nang (Paras. 10-12).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
The Communists persist in terror tactics against
the Chinese community and have sent threatening
letters to Chinese newsmen in Cholon (Para 1).
A Liberation Front official claims that the Front
will not transfer itself into a formal government
as long as the war continues (Paras. 2-3).
III, Military Developments in North Vietnam:
Unusually heavy MIG activity was reported over
North Vietnam on 6 and 7 November,/
IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: Com-
munist propaganda still claims that recent mili-
tary actions at Loc Ninh were in retaliation for
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US attacks on Hanoi (Paras. 1-2). Le Duan has
written a major article in honor of the 50th an-
niversary of the Bolshevik Revolution (Paras. 3-7).
7 November 1967
ii
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Heavy fighting was reported near Dak To
in the central highlands and in several other
widely scattered areas on 6-7 November.
2. A battalion of the US 173rd Airborne
Brigade, operating with the US 4th Infantry Division
in Kontum Province, killed 18 North Vietnamese
soldiers in clashes southwest of Dak To. US
losses were 16 killed and 29 wounded.
3. The major fighting began in midafternoon
when a US company patrolling in the vicinity of
a recent B-52 strike came under heavy small-arms
fire from an enemy force in well-fortified positions.
The positions were overrun after another US company,
air strikes, and artillery were called in. During
the night the two companies' defensive perimeter
was hit by a ground probe and several mortar-rounds.
4. Two other companies of the US 173rd reported
brief but violent clashes in the same general area,
ten to 12 miles southwest of Dak To. US 4th Infan-
try Division troops have also fought North Vietnamese
regulars in this area recently.
5. In Khanh Hoa Province along the central
coast South Korean troops reported killing 113 enemy
soldiers in another cordon operation around two
villages near Ninh Hoa, capital of the district of
the same name. Twenty-two ROK troops have been
killed so far.
7 November 1967
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6. The enemy troops, an estimated two companies of the
North Vietnamese 18B Regiment, were believed to have been on
a rice collection mission when they were trapped by the South
Koreans. The cordon-and-search operation is a favorite tac-
tic of the South Koreans who have made it increasingly dif-
ficult for the enemy to operate in the heavily populated coastal
districts of Khanh Hoa Province. Nonetheless, the enemy has
persistently attempted to maintain a presence in this region,
taking high casualties in the process.
7. South Vietnamese suffered badly in the fighting on
5 November three miles south of Song Be. Ninety-six South
Vietnamese were killed and 33 wounded. Three US advisers were
wounded, and 25 ARVN soldiers are listed as missing. The
enemy's losses are reported as 23 killed.
S. Reporting on the engagement is sketchy. It appears,
however, that the South Vietnamese 31st Ranger Battalion ran
into trouble while en route to reinforce another South Viet-
namese unit which had engaged an enemy battalion.
9. Both the North Vietnamese 88th and the Viet Cong
275th regiments are believed to be in the area. The 88th,
formerly a subordinate of the North Vietnamese 1st Division
in the central highlands, moved down to Phuoc Long Province
late in the summer. It opened the current enemy offensive
in III Corps with a heavy ground assault against an outpost
near Song Be on 27 October. The 275th, a regiment of the
Viet Cong 5th Light Infantry Division in southeastern III
Corps, has been noted moving cross-country to the Phuoc Long
area since early October.
10. Meanwhile, 25 miles west of Song Be at Loc Ninh,18
US infantrymen were wounded in a brief enemy mortar barrage.
The fire was returned but enemy casualties were not determined.
11. In other action, US Marines in Operation ESSEX, some
25 miles southwest of Da Nang, ran into stiff resistance on
6 November from an enemy force in a village fortified with
bunkers, trenches, spider holes, and barbed-wire barriers.
Two Marine companies attacked with air and artillery support,
7 November 1967
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forcing
-
forcing the enemy to fall back from one defense line to another,
taking their dead and wounded with them. Six Americans were
killed and 45 wounded in 12 hours of sporadic fighting.
7 November 1967
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. The Communists are continuing terror tactics
against the Chinese community in the Saigon-Cholon
area. warning
letters from the "Saigon - Gia Dinh Special Operations
Unit" were delivered on 30 October to all Chinese
newspapers in Cholon, Chinese newsmen at Saigon radio
and the Voice of Asia, and the Chinese Correspondents'
Club in Cholon. The letters to the newspapers
criticized them for having encouraged voting in the
recent elections and warned that they must immediately
stop publishing news favorable to the government.
The newspaper editors, as a result, are reportedly
avoiding appearing in the streets, and at least one
paper has stationed a 24-hour police guard at its
offices.
2. Foreign Ministry officials in Paris have
offered a few comments on the National Liberation
Front. The Front's representative in Hanoi told
the French delegate general there in September that
the Front would not transform itself into a formal
government as long as the war continued. He empha-
sized the importance of the Front's new political
program, however, and stressed in particular the
alleged differences between the Front and the North
Vietnamese Government. He cited the program's call
for a coalition government in the South and its
encouragement of "bourgeois" economic elements in
making his point. Other Front spokesmen have taken
a similar line recently.
3. The French also believe the Front has adopted
a harsher line toward a negotiated settlement of the
war. They say that, in both public and private
statements recently, Front spokesmen have been talk-
ing less about negotiations or the relevance of the
Geneva agreements than they had earlier this year.
We have reported this trend before; it is in keeping
with Hanoi's very rigid approach toward negotiations
in recent months.
7 November 1967
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VIEN'trki4E,*
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THAILANII
NORTH VIETNAM
0
7 NOVEMBER
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DEMARCATION LINE ,
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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
1. Unusually heavy MIG activity during the past
two days once again raises questions about the size
and mission of the North Vietnamese fighter force.
Pilot reports of MIG sightings and encounters on 6
November indicated a greater number of Communist in-
terceptors active in the defense of the Hanoi/Haiphong
area than had shown up in
been detected flying
that Hanoi either is
storage areas or has
from China or the Soviet Union.
Since no new aircraft have
into North Vietnam, it is assumed
using MIGs kept in concealed
received a new shipment of fighters
3. The air activity of the past two days has
demonstrated again the resilience of Hanoi's air de-
fense. Despite heavy MIG losses North Vietnam can
continue to launch enough aircraft to pose a signifi-
cant threat to US air operations. /
The aggressive performance of North Vietnamese MIGs
on 6-7 November suggests that at a minimum Hanoi will
attempt to have enough fighters operating from bases
in the Red River Valley to force US strike aircraft
to be accompanied by heavy fighter cover.
7 November 1967
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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. The Communists continue to portray the cur-
rent military activity around Loc Ninh as a retaliation
for recent US bombings of the Hanoi area and to herald
it as the beginning of the winter-spring campaign. An
article in the 2 November issue of the Hanoi army
daily, Quan Doi Nhan Dan, stated that the "victories
of the Southern people7r-armed forces" were a fore-
taste of greater successes to come in the winter-
spi-ing campaign. The paper asserted, "it is obvious
that if the US aggressors attack the North one time,
the Southern armed forces and people will counter-
attack five or ten times--no matter how many diffi-
culties and hardships we have to overcome and even if
we have to make sacrifices and engage in protracted
fighting." The article praised the skillful fighting
methods used in the Loc Ninh "victories," especially
the use and close coordination of infantry and artillery
units.
2. Further Hanoi commentary on the same theme
is found in the party daily, Nhan Dan, and in regular
Hanoi broadcasts. Nhan Dan on 3 November referred
to the Loc Ninh battles as the "bugle call" of the
winter-spring assault and a Hanoi broadcast of 6 No-
vember claimed that the "punishing blows" dealt by the
Communists at Loc Ninh were in response to the politi-
cal program of the NFLSV and in retaliation against
"the savage US raids on Hanoi."
3. Nhan Dan has published a lengthy and wide-
ranging al7=1"J-Tri praise of the Bolshevik Revolution
and its lessons for today's struggle against the US.
The article was written by party First Secretary Le
Duan, who is now in Moscow as head of Hanoi's dele-
gation to the 50th anniversary celebrations. It is
broader and aore pointed than the pro forma items by
Ho Chi Minh and Defense Minister Giap published re-
cently in the Soviet press. The latter were confined
largely to praise for Soviet accomplishments. Le
Duan's fuller treatment seems intended as the major
North Vietnamese pronouncement on this occasion and
is aimed mainly at interpreting current Communist
problems in the light of the 50 years' experience.
7 November 1967
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4. Le Duan comes down hard on the need for
Communist unity in pursuing the struggle in Viet-
nam. His language is more specific on this point
than that of any recent Vietnamese Communist spokes-
man. Today's "urgent problem," he says, is "to
consolidate and strengthen the unity of the social-
ist camp," and the "unity of the international Com-
munist movement" in order to continue the "common
struggle for socialist revolution." Le Duan calls
for the "establishment of a world united front"
against the United States similar to that used by
the USSR in the 1930s against Nazi Germany. He
asserts that setting up such a front is one of
the "most basic problems" facing the Communist
movement.
5. While his call for Communist unity doubt-
less will please Soviet leaders, Le Duan also reaf-
firms North Vietnam's insistence on revolutionary
violence as an indispensable ingredient of national
liberation movements-. He emphasizes the responsibil-
ities of all Communist countries to support such
movements wherever they exist, but makes it clear
that the Vietnam struggle is the main task at pres-
ent. The "world revolution," he reminds his audience,
will surely enter a new phase "provided the socialist
camp and other revolutionary forces in the world
prove resolute" in promoting the "offensive spirit
of the October revolution and follow the revolutionary
line of Marxism-Leninism."
6. Reflecting Hanoi's deep-rooted nationalist.
sentiments, Le Duan also asserted that, while working
for unity, each Communist party must "firmly preserve
its independence, and fully accomplish its duties as
a revolutionary vanguard."
7. North Vietnamese dependence on other Commu-
nist countries for material support to continue the
war has made cooperation within the "socialist camp"
an issue of paramount concern to the Vietnamese Com-
munists. The ramifications of the Sino-Soviet conflict
7 November 1967
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continually complicate the situation for Hanoi,
and it has been forced to tread a razor's edge
between Moscow and Peking. While maintaining
an essentially neutral stance in the Sino-Soviet
conflict, the North Vietnamese seem to be using
the Soviet anniversary as an occasion again to
remind both Moscow and Peking that their dif-
ferences must not be allowed to undermine the
Communist effort in Vietnam.
7 November 1967
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SEQKET moo
South Vietnamese and Viet Cong Casualties and
Weapons Losses: 1962 - 30 September 1967
1. General Statistical Data:
Viet Killed Wounded
Cong in in Captured Total Weapons
Time Inci- Action Action or Missing Casualties Losses
Period dents GVN VC GVN VC GVN VC GVN VC GVN VC
1962 1825 299 1294 475 212 116 390 890 1896
Jan 1963 927 453 1754 908 318 102 379 1463 2451
1964 1770 343 1223 913 - 555 240 1811 1463
1965 2206 904 2203 1938 - 471 565 3313 2768
1966 3914 747 2648 1557 - 450 588 2754 3236
1967 3369 887 6064 2036 - 166 - 3089 --
1962 1460 244 1205 300 316 124 353 668 1874
Feb 1963 788 379 1082 656 303 82 292 1117 1677
1964 2078 374 1055 916 - 303 289 1593 1344
1965 1982 880 1564 1840 - 1394 309 4114 1873
1966 3100 1015 4727 2095 - 477 508 3587 5235
1967 3183 771 7341 2125 - 154 - 3050 --
1962 1961 523 1456 737 551 140 523 1400 2530
Mar 1963 1282 410 1443 851 368 66 222 1327 2033
1964 2160 439 1456 1249 - 345 531 2033 1987
1965 2056 751 2022 1633 - 720 394 3104 2416
1966 3670 938 5685 1961 - 466 604 3365 6289
1967 3379 1718 10313 2786 - 468 - 4372 10313
1962 1933 387 1596 532 292 151 415 1070 2303
Apr 1963 1331 506 1660 878 256 96 388 1440 2304
1964 2284 594 1671 1584 - 398 245 2576 1916
1965 1860 591 1909 1650 - 232 529 2473 2438
1966 3190 573 2818 1522 - 121 483 2216 3301
1967 3494 935 6227 2490 - 134 - 3559 --
1962 1825 390 1756 509 352 94 524 993 2632
May 1963 1208 435 1895 889 295 94 695 1418 2885
1964 2143 458 1135 987 - 202 242 1647 1377
1965 2263 1049 1975 2143 - 873 548 4065 2523
1966 3566 661 4239 1454 - 196 652 2311 4891
1967 3571 1026 9808 2830 - 148 - 4006 9808
1962 1477 325 1666 613 413 77 441 1015 2520
Jun 1963 1311 389 1863 772 310 90 437 1251 2609
1964 2062 494 1005 1145 - 313 230 1952 1235
1965 2597 1211 2208 1920 - 1260 189 4391 2397
1966 3359 860 4815 1800 - 183 752 2843 5567
1967 2893 771 7354 2118 - 139 - 3028 7354
1962 1564 384 1544 686 424 212 542 1282 2510
Jul 1963 1368 529 1918 1071 372 306 387 1906 2677
1964 3045 900 1427 1812 - 510 219 3222 1646
1965 2520 1160 2980 1591 - 540 580 3425 3560
1966 2844 862 5532 1638 - 242 414 2742 5946
1967 3078 666 7923 1935 - 123 - 2724 7923
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-
457
683
917
532
1700
711
935
979
738
2360
-
-
253
399
708
471
2454
620
1076
1219
532
2395
-
-
467
367
814
532
1442
698
1393
1632
984
4215
-
-
797
468
990
424
757
973
594
829
725
2118
-
-
463
564
723
281
1701
831
493
1087
646
2781
-
-
580
394
718
387
2387
793
735
3761
536
1979
-
-
663
374
1889
447
1375
882
744
1483
560
3508
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Viet Killed Wounded
Cong in in Captured Total Weapons
Time Inci- Action Action or Missing Casualties Losses
Period dents GVN VC GVN VC GVN VC GVN VC GVN VC
1962 1642 377 2271 626 367 63 669 1066 3307 - -
Aug 1963 1349 411 1685 804 237 352 482 1567 2404 637 428
1964 2580 721 1449 1612 - 478 282 2811 1731 1106 619
1965 2498 808 3624 1945 - 287 606 3040 4230 705 1074
1966 2401 722 5857 1491 - 209 924 2422 6781 654 1298
1967 3271 852 5810 2282 - 131 - 3265 5810 521 2068
1962 1375 419 2218 646 365 59 446 1124 3029 - -
Sep 1963 1763 672 1982 1155 234 566 347 2393 2563 878 389
1964 3091 819 1187 1759 - 737 230 3315 1417 1465 525
1965 2473 655 3485 1724 - 266 838 2645 4323 778 838
1966 2864 566 4447 1554 - 185 839 2305 5286 426 1580
1967 3757 740 6354 2416 - 103 - 3259 6354 444 1877
1962 1357 365 1967 619 286 64 373 1048 2626 - -
Oct 1963 1422 428 1520 989 244 398 236 1815 2000 753 330
1964 2827 739 1617 1583 - 693 576 3015 2193 1510 482
1965 3330 961 3874 2416 - 225 660 3602 4534 762 1013
1966 2923 906 5665 2118 - 216 2438 3240 8103 851 1977
1962 1311 410 1982 834 368 92 561 1336 2911 - -
Nov 1963 3182 664 2333 1554 373 665 252 2883 2958 1595 455
1964 1982 574 1747 1404 - 410 570 2388 2317 1104 515
1965 3638 1034 5516 2056 - 520 592 3610 6108 1126 2164
1966 2778 804 5227 1933 - 200 816 2937 6043 650 1423
1962 1346 294 2203 618 289 78 463 990 2955 - -
Dec 1963 1921 389 1440 961 191 320 190 1670 1821 724 546
1964 2504 1002 1813 2053 - 1092 503 4147 2316 2111 666
1965 4106 1239 4076 2262 - 926 516 4427 4592 1728 1158
1966 2837 815 3864 1851 - 338 701 3004 4565 830 1338
Composite Annual Totals
VC Captured Total Weapons
Time Inci- KIA WIA or Missing Casualties Losses
Period dents GVN VC GVN VC GVN VC GVN VC GVN VC
1962 19076 4417 21158 7195 4235 1270 5700 12882 31093 5195 4049*
1963 17852 5665 20575 11488 3501 3137 4307 20290 28383 8267 5397
1964 28526 7457 16785 17017 - 6036 4157 30510 20942 14055 5881
1965 31529 11243 35436 23118 - 7848 6326 42209 41762 16915 11755
1966 37446 9469 55524 20974 - 3283 9719 33726 65243 9381 18606
**1967 29932 7766 66232 21018 1566 -- 30350 -- 5686 22912
*Monthly data unavailable for 1962 Weapons Losses.
**Through 30 September 1967
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2. Viet Cong Incidents: 1962
- 30 September 1967
Time
Period
Viet Cong
i Incidents
ATTACKS
Harassment &
Terrorism
Sabotage'
Propa- Anti-
ganda Aircraft
Small I
Unit 1
En. Size
or Larger
Total
1962
1825
549
0
549
839
180
257 -
Jan 1963
927
250
2
252
447
49
179
-
1964
1770
220
3
223
1244
129
174
-
1965
2206
62
1
63
1489
272
170
212
1966
3914
65
5
70
2490
312
299
743
1967
3369
141
1
142
1772
70
128
1257
1962
1460
500
0
500
613
137
210
-
Feb 1963
788
194
1
195
433
69
91
-
1964
2078
214
3
217
1389
210
271
-
1965
1982
79
3
82
1411
267
91
131
1966
3100
60
9
69
1829
201
172
829
1967
3183
115
2
117
1499
39
76
1452
1962
1961
588
0
588
660
290
423
-
Mar 1963
1282
344
0
344
653
131
154
-
1964
2160
202
1
203
1632
158
167
-
1965
2056
83
3
86
1476
240
90
164
1966
3670
42
10
52
2332
212
154
920
1967
3379
212
7
219
1844
50
45
1221
1962
1933
497
0
497
1024
220
192
-
Apr 1963
1331
380
3
383
688
105
155
-
1964
2284
217
3
220
1738
169
157
-
1965
1860
39
4
43
1407
149
96
165
1966
3190
68
9
77
2238
252
110
513
1967
3494
155
7
162
1992
67
109
1164
1962
1825
518
0
528
892
154
251
-
May 1963
1208
357
0
357
608
93
150
-
1964
2143
173
2
175
418
217
140
193
1965
2263
47
11
58
1558
365
115
170
1966
3566
46
7
53
2552
295
106
560
1967
3571
189
4
193
1985
74
59
1260
1962
1477
362
0
362
736
157
222
-
Jun 1963
1311
409
1
410
652
107
142
-
1964
2062
138
2
140
1390
176
162
194
1965
2597
63
6
69
1784
469
103
172
1966
3359
57
11
68
2382
211
110
588
1967
2893
166
2
168
1557
72
44
1052
1962
1564
447
1
448
735
158
223
-
Jul 1963
1368
416
1
407
698
80
183
-
1964
3045
178
7
185
2132
286
224
218
1965
2520
42
6
48
1706
400
154
212
1966
2844
91
0
91
1906
200
86
561
1967
3078
188
9
197
1739
141
61
940
S-3
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03029760
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03029760
�itir
SEGR-ET
3.5(c)
Time
Period
Viet Cong
Incidents
ATTACKS
Harassment &
Terrorism
Sabotage
Propa- Anti-
ganda Aircraft
Small
Unit
Bn. Size
or Larger
Total
1962
1642
378
0
378
885
146
233
-
Aug 1963
1349
367
1
368
647
113
221
-
1964
2580
110
3
113
1775
315
173
204
1965
2498
47
5
52
1597
349
200
300
1966
2401
59
5
64
1752
113
87
385
1967
3271
203
1
204
1653
145
96
1173
1962
1375
391
0
391
624
178
182
-
Sep 1963
1763
500
3
503
889
164
207
-
1964
3091
114
4
118
1938
482
178
375
1965
2473
26
5
31
1530
278
185
449
1966
2864
84
2
86
1972
90
115
601
1967
3757
255
5
260
2148
206
65
1078
1962
1357
418
1
419
583
189
166
-
Oct 1963
1422
365
0
365
802
105
150
-
1964
2827
77
6
83
1790
480
197
277
1965
3330
32
12
44
1969
415
198
704
1966
2923
119
2
121
1749
103
81
869
1962
1311
418
3
421
614
144
132
-
Nov 1963
3182
642
3
645
1990
269
278
-
1964
1982
59
1
60
1391
247
109
175
1965
3638
42
10
52
2234
486
255
611
1966
2778
84
2
86
1701
125
72
794
1962
1346
383
1
384
670
107
185
-
Dec 1963
1921
261
0
261
1298
111
251
-
1964
2504
90
6
96
1719
318
128
243
1965
4106
50
7
57
2572
442
317
718
1966
2837
97
4
101
1761
98
112
765
Composite Annual Totals
1962
19076
5459
6
5465
8875
2060
2676
No Data
1963
17852
4475
15
4490
9805
1396
2161
No Data
1964
28526
1792
41
1833
19556
3178
20080
1879
1965
31529
612
73
685
20730
4132
1974
4008
1966
37446
872
66
938
24664
2212
1504
8128
*1967
29932
1624
38
1662
16126
864
683
10597
*Through 30 September 1967
S-4
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03029760
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03029760
vise
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03029760