CAMBODIA AND THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03029768
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: April 26, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: November 16, 1967

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
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SWF
Intelligence Memorandum
Cambodia and the Vietnamese Communists
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23
16 November 1967
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WARNING
This document contains classified information affectifig the national security
of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code
Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
16 November 1967
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Cambodia and the Vietnamese Communists
A Monthly Report
Contents
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I. Military Developments: Major elements of
the North Vietnamese B-3 Front, which had been based
in Cambodia since 1966, have moved to the Dak To
area of South Vietnam (Para. 1). Other B-3 Front
elements have moved from their normal operating areas
in Cambodia into South Vietnam (Para. 2). There is
no evidence that Communist units involved in the at-
tack on Loc Ninh in late October staged from Cam-
bodian territory, although it is likely that the ter-
ritory was useful in a supplementary role for the
enemy's operation (Paras. 3-4). There are more re-
ports of Communist medical and communications facil-
ities in Cambodia (Paras. 5-6). Cambodia is estab-
lishing a number of new outposts in the northeast,
possibly to control tribal dissidence rather than to
counter the Communists (Paras. 7-9).
The Vietnamese Communists continue to obtain
foodstuffs and other nonmilitary supplies from Cam-
bodia (Para. 11).
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence
and coordinated with the Office of Economic Research,
the Office of National Estimates, and the Clandestine
Services.
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that his unit was based in Cambodia
that it procured ammunition in Cambodia, and
a a Cambodian border post promised his unit "mor-
tar fire support" if required during operations in
South Vietnam (Paras. 12-15).
II. Political Developments: Prince Sihanouk
again denies that Vietnamese Communist troops are
based in Cambodia (Para. 20). Sihanouk reiterates
warning of consequences of US military operations
in Cambodia and restates his belief that the Commu-
nists will win in South Vietnam (Paras. 21-22).
Chou En-lai's most recent effort to improve Chinese-
Cambodian relations receives favorable response from
Sihanouk (Paras. 23-26).
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I. Military Developments
Communist Base Areas
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1. during October
revealed rne norrneastwara movement of major elements
of the North Vietnamese B-3 Front. Two of three NVA
regiments--the 32nd and 66th--which are subordinate
to the Front and which apparently have been based in
Cambodia since 1966, had relocated near the Dak To
area of South Vietnam by late October. The third
regiment, the 88th, was resubordinated in September,
and moved out of the border area of the highlands
to Phuoc Long Province in South Vietnam.
2. Headquarters elements of the B-3 Front 1st
Division also moved north from their normal operating
area in Ratanakiri Province of Cambodia into the tri-
border area. In addition, at least one element of
the 13-3 Front's 33rd Regiment moved eastward from
Cambodia into South Vietnam's Darlac Province. This
regiment has been located in South Vietnam during
most of 1967.
3. Farther south, the headquarters and forward
elements of the North Vietnamese 7th Division were
located in Cambodia's Kompong Cham Province in early
October, while units of the Viet Cong's 9th Light
Infantry Division were located along the border in
Kratie Province. There were, however, no indications
that Communist units
participating in the attack against Loc Ninh in late
October staged from Cambodian territory or took sanc-
tuary there during the course of the battle.
4.
fighting at Loc Ninh and di-
rected Cambodian border units to take precautionary
defensive measures. In contrast with past practice,
the Cambodians did not mention instances of Viet
Cong intrusions across the border during the battle,
or clearly state the posture that Cambodian forces
were to maintain in the face of such border violations.
The proximity of Loc Ninh to the border, however, and
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the fact that the Communists have maintained medical
facilities and have received foodstuffs and other
supplies in this area, strongly suggest that Cam-
bodian territory played at least a supplementary role
in the enemy's operation against Loc Ninh.
5. A North Vietnamese
recently, has described Communist
facilities in Cambodia opposite southwestern Tay Ninh
Province. He gave the location of a Viet Cong 300-
man hospital and a hand-grenade factory on Cambodian
territory and two Viet Cong broadcasting stations
and a commo-liaison station along the border. He
stated that at one time he had seen 250 North Viet-
namese troops at the latter installation.
6. The area in which these facilities are lo-
cated is one long associated with heavy Communist
use. Captured enemy documents reveal that one of
the principal uses the Communists make of Cambodian
territory is the location of medical facilities.
statement also underlines the extent to
which Communist base areas often overlap the Cam-
bodian - South Vietnamese border.
Cambodia Increasing Border Forces
7. Meanwhile, there are signs that Phnom Penh
is making a greater effort to increase the govern-
ment's presence in isolated areas of the northeast.
a number
of new border outposts have been recently established
in Ratanakiri and Mondolkiri provinces along the
South Vietnamese and Laotian borders.
elements of the Cambodian
Army's 23rd Battalion were being deployed to posi-
tions in the Ia Drang Valley. North Vietnamese troops
have been active in the valley since late 1965, when
a major battle was fought on the South Vietnamese
side of the poorly defined border. Other small Cam-
bodian military detachments are moving into sparsely
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inhabited and rugged country north of Route 19 in
Ratanakiri Province.
8. Although these new Cambodian posts are lo-
cated in areas of known or suspected Communist ac-
tivity, there is no indication
that their immediate purpose is to counter
the Communists.
In ad-
dition to the problem of North Vietnamese regulars op-
erating on its territory, Cambodia is now faced with
a fresh and potentially serious outbreak of tribal
dissidence there. Although no clashes have been re-
ported, tribal people have mounted a number of large
demonstrations and in one case surrounded and forced
the evacuation of a police outpost. The tribesmen
have been demonstrating against food shortages and
the establishment of additional security posts by pro-
vincial authorities. Although there have been reports
over the years that some of the montagnard tribes have
been brought under Communist influence, it is not
clear whether the current dissidence is Communist in-
spired. Some of the tribal dissidents, however, did
protest Mrs. Kennedy's visit--a line which the Com-
munists have pushed in other areas of Cambodia.
10. Phnom Penh is also showing some sensitivity
to possible Allied intelligence operations in the
northeast. The Cambodian press agency on 7 November
cited "journalistic sources" in reporting that US
forces were placing small teams in Ratanakiri Prov-
ince to seek out "Viet Cong" forces and to lay the
groundwork for a US "invasion."
Cambodian border units have been in-
structed to increase their vigilance against possible
US cross-border operations involving the use of heli-
copters. There is also one unconfirmed report that
three South Vietnamese soldiers who allegedly par-
ticipated in such operations have been captured. The
low-key attention which Phnom Penh has thus far ac-
corded the alleged operations, however, suggests that
it lacks hard evidence of any such activities.
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Supply Activity
11. The Communists are continuing to procure
substantial amounts of foodstuffs and other non-
military supplies from Cambodia.
a large number of boats were moving
north on the Tonle Kong River in September with food-
stuffs and medical supplies for North Vietnamese
forces in Laos. Although some lengthy disruptions
have been reported, the level of traffic on the river
so far this year appears to be similar to that ob-
served in 1966. Meanwhile, supplies are also reach-
ing the Vietnamese Communists along the South Viet-
namese border, despite some Cambodian effort to cur-
tail this illicit flow.
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12. 3.3(h)(2)
has given an account of his unit's participation in
combat and supply operations involving Cambodian ter-
ritory. 3.3(h)(2)
It trans-
ported ammunition from a cache on the Mekong River
a mile inside Cambodia to a transfer area, also within
Cambodia. Another unit relayed the ammunition to
the Seven Mountains area of South Vietnam's Chau Doc
Province. The ammunition, mostly of Chinese Commu-
nist origin, was for 60-mm. mortars, B-40 rocket
launchers, and small arms.
13. The source did not explain how the amniuni-
tion arrived at the Mekong pickup point, but he said
that the Viet Cong did not use the Mekong as a north-
south transportation route. They crossed the Mekong
only at night, as required by the Cambodians to avoid
"diplomatic embarrassment." He claimed that Cambodian
civilians feared the presence of the Viet Cong be-
cause of the danger of hostilities developing in the
area. The Viet Cong did, however, enjoy compatible
relations with Cambodian military personnel. There
were no restrictions on the Viet Cong other than the
regulation to move supplies only at night.
14. noted that his unit supported
the Viet Cong last March in an at-
tack on an Allied post in South Vietnam. The bat-
talion later retre-aTed across the border to Cambodia
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with the dead and wounded, and remained there to
"prepare for future operations." He claimed that
a Cambodian border post provided the Viet Cong with
small amounts of recoilless rifle ammunition dur-
ing the attack and that the Cambodians assured them
of "mortar fire support" if needed.
15. The border area has
long been used by the Communists for sanctuary and
supply. account of the battle, how-
ever, is at variance with captured Viet Cong docu-
ments which specifically prohibit Viet Cong units
from crossing the border with weapons or conducting
assaults from Cambodian territory.
armed Viet Cong units found in Cambodia would not be
allowed to remain. The source's account of Cam-
bodian soldiers providing small amounts of ammuni-
tion may be true. It is doubtful that the Viet Cong
were given a broad guarantee of Cambodian mortar
support, or that i_nstances of fire support are com-
mon along the border. The rallier's statements, how-
ever, provide further evidence that the use of Cam-
bodian territory by Communists is often determined
by the extent of friendly relations with local offi-
cials.
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II. Political Developments
20. Prince Sihanouk took advantage of the
presence of a large contingent of Western newsmen
in Phnom Penh in early November to reiterate denials
that viethamesb. Communist troops are based in
Cambodia. As he has in the past when affecting a
"reasonable" posture, Sihanouk admitted that it was
possible that "small numbers" of Communist troops
may occasionally pass through Cambodian territory.
He asserted that when such troops are encountered
by Cambodian patrols they are asked to return to
South Vietnam. He also offered the newsmen govern-
ment transportation to the northeast to "see for
themselves" if North Vietnamese "divisions" are in
Cambodia or whether the "Sihanouk trail" is being
used.
21. Sihanouk did go farther than he has in
the past to warn of the possible consequences of US
military operations in Cambodia. He stated that
Cambodia would resist any effort by the US to occupy
territory along the border to prevent the Viet Cong
from taking refuge there. He warned that such
action would only serve to drive Cambodia into the
hands of the Vietnamese Communists and Communist
China.
22. Sihanouk also indicated that he still
believes the Communists are going to prevail in
South Vietnam. His reference to a US withdrawal
within two years, however, does not jibe with his
previous assertions that the US would not be driven
from South Vietnam. He was also forced to admit
that a Communist take-over in South Vietnam did not
bode well for Cambodia's future.
Cambodia's Relations with Communist China
23. Prince Sihanouk has responded favorably
to Peking's latest effort to ease its relations with
Cambodia. Sihanouk announced on 1 November that he
had received a message from Premier Chou En-lai
calling for "re-establishment of sincere friendship"
between the two countries. According to Sihanouk,
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Chou acknowledged Sihanouk's leadership of the
Cambodian people and reaffirmed China's adherence
to the "Bandung principle" of nonintervention in
Cambodia's internal affairs. Sihanouk has charged
repeatedly over the past several months that China's
propaganda activities in Cambodia amounted to a
repudiation of these "principles."
24. The Chinese premier's message, which
played on Sihanouk's personal regard for Chou, ap-
pears to be a more artful version of one Chou sent
in mid-September which caused Sihanouk to reverse
a decision to withdraw Cambodian diplomatic person-
nel from Peking.
25. In response to the latest message,
Sihanouk stated his willingness to terminate anti-
Peking propaganda and accept a "complete reconcilia-
tion." Subsequently, he also called off a refer-
endum he had previously scheduled for early next
year. The referendum was intended as a vote of
confidence in Sihanouk's government and, as such,
would have been embarrassing for the pro-Peking
leftists who have called for a change in Sihanouk's
policies.
26. The Prince has also stated, however, that
a real reconciliation will depend entirely on the
cessation of Communist activity in Cambodia. Thus,
continued dissemination of Communist propaganda
throughout the country, and a reported renewal of
small-scale Communist dissident activity, could
prove to be persistent irritants in Cambodia's re-
lations with China. Nevertheless, although Sihanouk
recently again voiced his suspicion that Peking will
continue discreet support of Cambodia's pro-Commu-
nists, his response to Chou's letter underlines his
desire to maintain at least a facade of cordial re-
lations.
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