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February 27, 2020
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September 16, 1959
PDF icon CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15787646].pdf537.39 KB
Niels* or � - - Approved for Releas;g1620i/K027:11C03029881 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 16 September 1959 Copy No. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLFTIN DOCUMENT O. NO CHANGE' N CLASS. i DECLAS`Siffee.:%3 T. REVIEiN DATE. l Ci ii%.NGED TO: le5 c NEX () ALM- HI DATE. REVIEWER: TOP SECRET Ap�provecIf;r�Rjle�ase:252(3/62/21-60101968V MP. AM Mm IR � M. I ik Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029881 Nftpli TOP SFCRIET Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029881 LYN I) E17' Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029881 1111110� 16 SEPTEMBER 1959 L THE COMMUNIST BLOC Ithrushchev may visit New Delhi on way home from Peiping to dis- cuss Sino-Indian border dispute. Khrushcliev may offer to "close" agreements while visiting US but defer signing until a summit meet- ing. II. ASIA-ArRICA Iranian-Soviet rapprochement pros- pects. Pakistani-Nepalese negotiations to establish diplomatic relations. III. THE WEST Cuba--Raul Castro endorses Latin American peoples' congress. rein r Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029881 PA Ii Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029881 fd ,(\ ,NEURL, I %ire *ire CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 16 September 1959 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR-India: Soviet Premier Ithrushchey, who plans to go to Peiping for the 1 October anniversary celebrations, has offered to visit New Delhi on his way home in connection with the Sino-Indian border dispute, Nehru apparently has in- formed Moscow that he welcomes the Soviet premier's proposal, u while making it clear that India stands by the McMahon line and that only minor adjustments could be discussed. (Page 1) TehruRhehev visit!( hile in the United States Khrushchev o er o c an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tek'sts, but prefers to defer actual signing of any agreements until a summit meeting. Khrushchev also reportedly believes a "limited face-saving agreement" is possible which will recognize Western rights to remain in West Berlin for "several years." the USSR would not sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany or take any unilateral action on Ber- lin. Moscow reportedly believes, however, that peaceful co- existence on the basis of the status quo in Europe will ultimately result in Western recognition of East Germany and a "perma- * " n '1111.eins� II. ASIA-AFRICA Iran-USSR:Cyhere is increasing prospect that talks con- cerned with Iranian-Soviet rapprochement will be held. Iran/ ean press comment on such a possibility has increased, and a) AApproved for Release: 2020/019721'9603029881 VA Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029881 6,3C.A...1LIC I SOOPI %Ed Croreign Ministry official stated on 14 September that negotia- ions are expected to be reopened soon. Soviet Ambassador Pegov, who left Iran about six months ago, is now en route by train from Moscow and is scheduled to arrive in Tehran on 16 September. In any new talks, the Soviet Union would prob ably press for a pledge against "foreign bases" in Iran, while Iran would insist on an end to Soviet propaganda attacks on the Shah andpossibly consider accepting Soviet economic aid), (Page 2) Pakistan-Nepal: Nepalese Prime Minister Koirala's an- nouncement on 12 September that Pakistan and Nepal were negotiating the establishment of diplomatic relations is likely to cause concern in New Delhi. The Indian Government is deeply disturbed by its border dispute with Communist China and may fear diplomatic activities by its rival, Pakistan, in sensitive bor- der regions India claims as its own special sphere of influence. New Delhi would almost certainly see a connection between Pakistani-Nepalese negotiations on diplomatic relations and President Ayub's campaign favoring joint Indo-Pakistani defense of the subcontinent against Communist China. India would find it difficult effectively to protest the establishment of diplomatic relations, however, in view of Nepal's recent expansion of rela- tions with a number of other countries and the proximity of Pak- istan. (Page 4) III. THE WEST Cuba: diaul Castro in a strongly anti-US speech on 11 Sep- tembpr endorsed the calling of a Latin American people's con- gress. This may be the congress planned in Moscow at a spe- cial conference of delegates of the 18 Latin American Communist parties attending the 21st congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union last February. Identification with the Castro revolu- tion rather than with a local Communist party would make the congress more attractive than otherwise to certain non-Commu- nists and provide opportunities for Communist penetration of future hemispheric activities) (Page 5) 16 Sept 59 DAILY BRIEF �SECRET� AApproved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029881v 11 A cv rr Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029881 .41,40 Nue I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Proposed Khrushchev Visit to India Premier Khrushchev offered to visit India in connection with the Sino-Indian border dispute, Khrushchev no o jec ion e wou go irectly to New Delhi following his forthcoming visit to Peiping. The offer is in line with Moscow's appeal on 9 September for a peaceful settlement of the dispute based on mutual inter- ests and "traditional friendship" between India and China. Soviet spokesmen have indicated concern over the issue, and Khrushchev may have hoped that such an offer at this time would prevent a worsening of the situation which might embarrass him during his visit to the US. Khrushchev probably is also seek- ing a way out of the dilemma which the border dispute has posed for the USSR's relations with both countries. Nehru apparently has sent word to Moscow that he welcomes the Soviet premier's proposal, but made it clear that New Delhi stands by the McMahon line as the Sino-Indian frontier and that only minor modifications could be the subject of diplomatic dis- cussions. Nehru probably regards Khrushchev's proposal as an opportunity for bringing about negotiations 'without loss of face by India. While he seems to feel Chinese objections could still bloc the Soviet leader's initiative, he probably hopes Khrushchev's personal influence will soften Peiping's unyielding attitude to- ward Sino-Indian problems. It is unlikely that Khrushchev would have approached India with this offer without first having obtained at least Peiping's agreement in principle. The Chinese would probably expect the Soviet premier to confine himself to urging that Nehru accept Chou En-lai's call for return to the "status quo" which existed along the McMahon line before the Tibetan revolt. As a preliminary step to nego- tiations, Peiping would want Khrushchev to press for Withdrawal of Indian troops from points on the McMahon line they occupied last spring. 16 Sept 59 CA�p'pro;ed.fo'rle-ase: 2620/02/21 CO3029881 Page 1 " ,r1r rg rll, Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029881 viigpv IL ASIA-AFRICA Soviet-Iranian Relations Entering New Phase (Soviet Ambassador Pegov, who left Iran six months ago following the abrupt breakdown in nonaggression talks, and the pro-Soviet Iranian ambassador to Moscow, Masud-Ansari, are returning to Tehran amid increasing official and unofficial spec- ulation of renewed efforts to end the tension that has severely strained Soviet-Iranian relations during the past seven months. Pegov is scheduled to arrive in Tehran on 16 September. While some significant new development appears in prospect, its character remains unclear) citonbassador Pegoves return apparently resulted from Ansarits rece t interview with Khrushchev, who indicated that Pegov should return "as soon as possible" to present Soviet views to the Shah. Ansari is returning at his own request to report to the Shah on his talks. He recommended that no proposals be offered the USSR until Pegoves return to Tehran and Soviet propaganda at- tacks are halted. While Radio Moscow has greatly tempered its recent broadcasts to Iran, and has even offered "the hand of friendship," the Soviet-sponsored clandestine broadcasts to Iran are as vituperative as ever regarding the Shah and Prime Minis- ter Eqbal) According to Ansari, Khrushchev pointed to American mu- ltaiy activities in Iran as threatening the southern borders of the USSR and warned that the USSR may be obliged to avail itsel4 of the provisions of the treaty of 1921 and occupy Iran. Khrushchev asserted that the USSR only asked "that Iran should not join the American aggressors who want to encircle us...." He admitted there had been errors in Soviet policy toward Iran, but assured that everything possible was being done to redress the past. Khrushchev reportedly argued the advantages of neutrality for Iran,noting that Iran could bargain for many times as much Amer- ican aid and at the same time get Russian assistance. He empha- sized that Iran is more important to the USSR than any of the neutral countries in the area.) SECRET 16 Sept 59 rh,..i�rri A i ikrrni i"cb.14,-.r_� hi Iii r�rik Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029881 Page 2 nrinrsr�rr, Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029881 Nape Iwo achrushchev claimed that "our spies furnish us with very accurate information everywhere" and that he had docu- mentary evidence of American pressure on Iran not to sign the nonaggression pact with the USSR last February and "precise information" of persons, even in the entourage of the Shah, who "want to benefit" from the present tension) (Meanwhile, Iranian officials are expressing considerable concern over the open and threatening tone of Khrushchev in his interview reported by Ansari. Eqbal inquired of Ambassador Wailes what the United States is prepared to do in the event of a Soviet paratroop invasion and has requested public assurances that the United States will defend Iran if attacked/ (Iranian officials have offered assurances to the US ,ambassa- dor -that Iran will remain firm despite Soviet threats and blandish- ments. The Shah, however, influenced by neutralists among his advisers and attracted by the prospects of increased foreign as- sistance, may again consider the advantages of a nonaggression pact and become embroiled in serious negotiations with the USSR.) SECRET 16 Sept 59 r`CkITEI Al IkITCI I iri.ckir.e DI II I CTIkl Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029881 Page 3 re no^w rs rim" Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029881 NNW Pakistan and Nepal Negotiating to Establish Diplomatic Relations Nepalese Prime Minister Koirala's announcement on 12 September that his country and Pakistan are negotiating regarding the establish- ment of diplomatic relations is likely to cause irritation in New Delhi and may wipe out some of the good will created by Prime Minister Nehru's talks with Pakistani President Ayub on 1 September. Despite the fact that Nepal is recognized as an independent country, India considers it and the other Himalayan border states of Sikkim and Bhutan to lie within its own special sphere of influence. New Delhi has therefore attempted to keep foreign activity in Nepal to a minimum. It is especially sensitive at the present time, when it is taking military precautions and negotiating with both Nepal and Bhutan to prevent fur- ther Chinese incursions from Tibet into the subcontinent. In fact, For- eign Secretary Dutt has warned the American Embassy in New Delhi that any US move to establish diplomatic relations with Bhutan would be regarded as a "definitely unfriendly act." India would find it difficult effectively to protest the establishment of diplomatic relations between Pakistan and Nepal, in view of Nepal's recent expansion of relations with a number of other countries and the proximity of Pakistan as a close South Asian neighbor. However, the Indian Government may press Nepal at least to limit its diplomatic con- tacts to accrediting its ambassador in New Delhi to Pakistan and the Pakistani high commissioner in New Delhi to Katmandu. Pakistan's interest in developing relations with Nepal at this time presumably derives from its desire to foster defense cooperation on the Indian sub- continent against Chinese Communist expansionism. The Pakistani Government has already approached Nepalese representatives to discuss this matter. CKarachi's concern over Chinese Communist intentions along the Himalayan frontier is suggested by a reported move to strengthen its control over Pakistani territory bordering the Chinese province of Sinkiang. Five platoons of Northern Scouts have been sent to the bor- 1Pr nf T-Tii n 7n�which lies west of Ladakh on the Sinkiang border.) -SECRET-- 16 Sept 59 f"CAITD AI IkITCI I irtckirc RI II I CTIkl Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029881 Page 4 CVPPrT Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029881 Nose' III. THE WEST Raul Castro Speech May Advance Soviet Strategy In Latin America (Raul Castro, whose influence in the Cuban Government headed by his brother is steadily increasing, in a speech on 11 September threw the prestige of the Cuban revolution be- hind a Latin American people's congress to be held some time during the next year. Such a congress appears to be part of the Communist plan of action in this hemisphere$) (.The Latin American delegates to the 21st Soviet party con- gress in Moscow resolved to hold a people's congress ostensi- bly dedicated to some popular cause which could be used to attract the sponsorship of popular Latin American leaders like Fidel Castro. The sponsors would be drawn into association with the Communists,who would remain in the background, guid- ing the congress in an "anti-imperialist," anti-US direction) (Considerable progress toward a congress was made during discussions by Communists and other Latin American leftists-- including the Cuban minister of education--held in Santiago, Chile, in an effort to influence the American foreign ministers' meeting there in August. These elements agreed that a meeting of all democratic and representative groups and persons should be called to consider common Latin American problems and to oppose colonialism) (The congress may be planned to coincide with the Eleventh Inter-American Congress scheduled to be held in Quito, Ecuador, in February 1960. It could be used to detract from that meeting sponsored by the Organization of American States, a favorite target of Communist propaganda attacks as an instrument of "US CMeanwhile, Ernesto Guevara, a pro-Communist leader of the Castro revolution, told a TV audience on 14 September that the US naval base at Guantanamo Bay made Cuba a target for nu- clear attacks. An intensified campaign against US military bases and missions was another important tactic in the action program adopted in Moscow.) SECRET 16 Sept 59 1^nlk.rrn A I H. vrri I IIk I# ni II I r-rik I Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029881 Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029881 � 11/1..al � I 1411/... '41isor 'verf THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director M NFIDOVT1 A 1 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029881 VZI VZ/Z7ZZA VZ/ZZ/Z1 rd Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029881 ir .310E I Nee -TOP SECRET- / ZApproved for Release: 2020/02/21 C030298817,41