CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/10/29

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03031256
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: October 29, 1959

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29 October 1959
Copy No. C 65
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO $
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29 OCTOBER 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Evidence that CPSU received little ad-
vance information on Chinese commune
program suggests lack of close Sino-
Soviet consultation on doctrinal matters. 0
Khrushchev says he is convinced West
would not have gone to war had he fore-
closed Western occupation of Berlin.
Peiping reportedly sends sharp protest
to Djakarta over its action against local
Chinese businessmen.
GM.AIC comments on recent Tyura Tam
firings.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Nehru said to consider withdrawal of
Indian diplomats from Peiping if Chinese
continue aggressive acts; diplomatic
break unlikely.
Soviet official states USSR absolutely op-
posed to continued UN presence in Laos. (A)
�Shake-up of Libyan Government appears
imminent.
�Way opened for repatriation of Koreans
in Japan to North Korea.
Til P �Per T'Ir"11
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29 October 1959
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gi gie) I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
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DAILY BRIEF
USSR - Communist China: A recently completed study
of Soviet party journals and newspapers published between
March and September 1958--the period of conception and
initial organization of the Chinese communes--suggests an
absence of coordination between the Soviet and Chinese par-
ties on this issue. During this period Soviet journals con-
tinued to treat Chinese agricultural policies with an approval
which contrasted to their attitude after the full implications
of the commune program emerged. The seeming lack of
prior liaison on an issue of such importance to the bloc calls
into question the effectiv ino-Soviet consultation on
other doctrinal matters. (Page 1)
USSR: IL_Chrushchev told Austrian Foreign Minister Kreisky,
during the recent visit of the Austrian delegation to the USSR,
that he could have declared an end to Western occupation of
West Berlin instead of offering his "generous" free city pro-
posal. The Soviet premier said he was absolutely convinced
that the Western powers would not have gone to war, and cited
the effect of Bulganin's threatening letters to Britain and France
during their attack on Suez in 1956. Khrushchev also stated that
Soviet plans for raising the standard of living are based on in-
creases inproductivity under the Seven-Year Plan and not on pos-
sible savings from disarmament;
(Page 3) �
Communist China - Indonesia: a reported sharp protest
by the Chinese Communist Embassy over Indonesia's treatment
of Overseas Chinese reflects the intense friction over this issue,
which has developed into a major irritant to Sino-Indonesian re-
lations. Peiping's action was prompted by measures being taken
now in small villages in Java to round up and move by truck tq.
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larger cities alien retailers, who are primarily Chinese. Pei-
ping's action through diplomatic channels may foreshadow eco-
nnmie rPtaliatinn acrninct llialrarta
USSR: F6 cOm�m-entliby the Guided Missile and Astro-
nautics Intelligence Committee on the recent extended-range
firings from Tyura Tam, see page 4.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
India - Communist China:
was considering a with-
drawal of Indian diplomats from Peiping as a mark of protest
if the Chinese continue to act aggressively along the frontier.
New tactics for dealing with border problems are being consid-
ered; growing public resentment over the government's "inaction"
since last week's clash in Ladakh is apparently influencing Nehru
in the direction of a tougher policy toward Peiping. New Delhi is
unlikely to take any action drastic enough to prevent negotiations,
which both sides apparently still hope to bring about. Nehru also
advised that troops were being moved into Ladakh to re-
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Lidos- U0011- mebowel ampassaaor in Lonaan Una seiwyn
Lloyd on 23 October that the USSR was absolutely opposed to a
UN presence in Laos. The USSR probably feels that even tacit
acquiescence in Hammarskjold's plan would undercut its position
that the only international framework on which to base a solu-
tion in Laos is the Geneva agreements. [Meanwhile Hammarskjold_
continues to search for a way to establish a UN presence in Laos
that would get around Soviet objections-.)
Iraq: Iraqi authorities in Lebanon are in touch with Syrian
minority groups--Kurds and Druze�probably for the purpose of
fomenting trouble against the UAR regime in Syria. Although it
is doubtful that such efforts would be successful, they suggest
that the Qasim regime is now prepared to retaliate against the
UAR on its own territory. (Page 6)
29 Oct 59
DAILY BRIEF ii
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Watch Committee Conclusions: aituations susceptible of
direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet bloc action which would jeop-
ardize US interests exist in Laos and in the Middle East� par-
ticularly in Irajj.
Laos: (Dissident military activity has remained at a low level
but subversive activity continues at a high level, particularly in
the south. These activities may increase in intensity, particularly
if the Lao Government carries out its deferred plan to put Neo Lao
Hak Zat leaders on public trial. Direct North Vietnamese mil-
itary intervention is not likely in the immediate future
-
Middle East: 'rile situation in Iraq remains tense. With the
approaching trials of Qasim's alleged attackers and the antici-
pated release of Qasim from the hospital, the possibility of fur-
ther assassination attempts or coups remains. In these circum-
stances, the UAR may become more deeply invnlvecq
Libya: A shake-up of the Libyan cabinet appears imminent.
King Idriss is reported to be disgusted over recent scandals in-
volving government officials. Changes may be made in the Coun-
cil of Ministers, as well as in lesser positions. The King, how-
ever, will probably maintain his control over affairs ripsnitp hi
continued floor hpalth
uiie ese uovernment reportedly
is modifying the procedures for repatriation of Koreans from
Japan to North Korea in order to lift the month-old boycott of
the program by the pro-Communist General Federation of Ko-
reans in Japan. The changes do not appear to modify the safe-
guards against involuntary repatriation substantially. The first
repatriation ship is expected to sail on 10 December if there is
no delay in approval of revised procedures by the International
Committee of the Red Cros5 (Page
29 Oct 59
DAILY BRIEF iii
CRET
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I
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Lack of Sino-Soviet Liaison on Communes
A recently completed study of Soviet party journals and
newspapers published between March and September 1958--
the period of conception and initial organization of the Chinese
communes�suggests an absence of coordination between the
Soviet and Chinese parties on this issue. During this period
Soviet journals continued to treat Chinese agricultural policies
with an approval greatly in contrast to their attitude after the
full implications of the commune program emerged. The seem-
ing lack of prior liaison on an issue of such importance to the
bloc calls into question the effectiveness of Sino-Soviet consul-
tation on other doctrinal matters.
The Chinese Communist party leadership was actively con-
sidering and making preparations for a nationwide commune
program throughout the spring of 1958. Prototype communes
were formed in April, the same month that Mao Tse-tung wrote
an article--not published until June�in which he implied an in-
tention to move into a more advanced stage of agricultural organ-
ization. At the same time, the Chinese stepped up their claims
to be advancing toward the ultimate stage of Communism, in the
face of the Soviet position that only the USSR had graduated
from the preliminary "socialist" stage. The communes were
almost certainly discussed at the Chinese party congress in
May, although the proceedings were never published. The very
term "people's commune"--Peiping has since said--was first
adopted in June 1958.
While the Soviet leaders presumably knew some sort of
change was impending in the Chinese countryside during this
period, they do not seem to have been aware of the implications
of Peiping's plans�not publicly revealed by the Chinese until
September 1958 when the commune system had already reached
an advanced stage. Had the USSR been fully informed, it would
almost certainly have been alarmed. Yet in June 1958, at the
Bulgarian party congress, Khrushchev himself bestowed an un-
usual accolade on the Chinese party for its "enormous contribu-
tion to the theory and practice of the socialist revolution."
29 Oct 59
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As late as early September, up to the eve of the publication
of the Chinese party's commune resolution, authoritative Soviet
papers and spokesmen continued to praise the existing Chinese
cooperative system in terms which suggested that they did not
expect it to change. These Soviet statements emphasized that
China was following the tested Leninist cooperative plan and
Soviet experience, whereas in fact the impending commune pro-
gram was a radical departure from Soviet practice. Moscow
also continued to congratulate the Chinese on their creative ap-
plication of Marxism, a "creativity" which the USSR subsequently
disapproved when it became fullry aware of the commune program,
29 Oct 59
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE RIB I FTIKI
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Khrushchev Comments to Austrians gn East-West Issties
Khrushchev told Austrian Foreign Minister Kreisky early
this month that he could have declared an end to Western occu-
pation of West Berlin instead of offering his "generous" proposal
for a free city. The Soviet premier said he was absolutely con-
vinced that the Western powers would not have gone to war, and
cited the effect of the USSR's threatening letters to Britain and
France during their attack on Suez in 1956.1
/Further evidence that Moscow's long-range economic and
military planning is not predicated on any substantial reductions
in military expenditures through East-West disarmament agree-
ment was provided by Khrushchey's remarks. According to
Kreisky, the Soviet premier stated that Soviet plans for raising
the standard of living are based on the goals of the Seven-Year
Plan, and not on savings from disarmament./
IKhrushchey said he had asked his military advisers for an
estimate of the cost of shifting the Soviet military system from
conventional armaments to missiles. They had estimated 30 bil-
lion rubles:, he said, which would be cheaper than the cost of
maintaining a system based on conventional armaments4
!Kreisky gained the impression from Khrushchev that the
USSR would accept disarmament controls, but expressed doubt
that Soviet views on the timing and scope of controls would be
acceptable to the United States. Khrushchev appears to have re-
peated the vague and ambiguous position on controls that he out-
lined in his speech before the UN General Assembly on 18 Septem-
ber and in subsequent pronouncements. He called for an inter-
national control body composed of all states but made it clear
that this body would have "free access to all objects under con-
trol" only after complete disarmament has been achieved:(
29 Oct 59
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GMAIC Comments on Recent Extended-Range Firings
From Tyura Tam
The maximum feasible guided-missile test distance for
land impact in Soviet-controlled territory appears to be about
3,500 nautical miles. This distance is adequate for most
ICBM test firings but greater ranges are desirable. The
first two extended-range firings occurred on 30 May and 9
June 1959, one to a range of about 4,500 miles, the other to
a similar or greater range. There is a good possibility that
these were unintentional overshoots since: a. telemetry indi-
cates that the rocket thrust terminated by running out of fuel
rather than in two steps by command; and b. there is a strong
probability that the USSR had no instrumentation ships in the
impact area. It is also possible that these were intentionally
fired past the Kamchatka Peninsula for the purpose of propul-
sion or other tests requiring little or no instrumentation in the
impact area.
Subsequently four highly instrumented ships have been iden-
tified connected with the impact area of the Tyura Tam range.
On 22 October and, 72 hours later, on 25 October there were
two intentional firings to a range of approximately 4,700 nauti-
cal miles to the vicinity of these ships. The trajectories were
lower and the velocities greater than optimum (minimum energy)
for this range�IndicatiriElhat_the vehicles have a ereater range
capability.
29 Oct 59 CFNTPAI INTF1 inFtqc-F RI II I FTIN
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CONF. "1AL
IL ASIA-AFRICA
USSR Opposed to UN Presence in Laos
Soviet Ambassador to London Malik told British For-
eign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd on 23 October that the USSR
was "absolutely opposed" to a UN presence in Laos. Dep-
uty Foreign Minister Kuznetsov had raised no objection on
7 October when UN Secretary General Hammarskjold first
outlined his plan to appoint a representative in Laos after
the UN fact-finding subcommittee submits its report.
The Soviet Government probably feels that any acqui-
escence, even though unspoken, in Hammarskjold's plan
would undercut its insistence that the only international
framework on which to base a solution in Laos is the Geneva
agreements. It may also fear that tacit approval will com-
mit Moscow to a procedure Hammarskjold can use in the
future to side-step a Soviet veto. The Malik statement sug-
gests that the USSR will-veto any Western-backed proposal
to establish more permanent and effective UN machinery in
Laos.
On 26 October Malik made strong representations to
Lloyd and delivered a Soviet note protesting the trial of the
14 Neo Lao Hak Zat leaders as a violation of the Geneva
agreements and calling for a meeting of the Laos Interna-
tional Control Commission to consider what should be done.
The Foreign Office plans to reply that the trials are an inter-
nal problem for Laos and are neither in violation of nor within
the scope of the Geneva agreements:7
iflammarskjold continues to seek a legal basis which the
USSR-cannot challenge for establishing a UN presence in
Laos, and seems willing to take a calculated risk of provok-
ing renewed Soviet charges that he has violated the principle.
of impartiality inherent in the office of the secretary general.'
CONFI AL
29 Oct 59
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Qasim Regime Contacts Syrian Anti-UAR Elements
Baghdad has approved the request of a former member of
the Syrian parliament to accompany a reprocontative nf dissiripnt
Druze elements in Syria on a trip to Iraq,
Iraqi Premier Qasim wants to sound out Kurdish_
and Druze elements on the possibility of undertaking subversivl
action against the Nasir regime in Syria], Baghdad's radio and
press have been loudly claiming that gy-rian unrest has reached
new heights recently.
Baghdad probably stands little chance at this time of insti-
gating a successful move to upset Nasir's hold on Syria, particu-
larly in view of the precautions Cairo has recently taken against
such a possibility. Vice President Amir's new assignment in
Syria is intended in part to forestall any such effort. Qasim may
feel, however, that Nasir's program for tightening his control
and solving the economic and political problems of Syria will only
heighten discontent there and may ultimately fail. In such an
event, contacts with groups that might be expected to take advan-
tage of Nasir's errors would ultimately prove valuable to Iraq.
There has been some feeling within Syria that alignment with Iraq
is more "natural" than the present union with Egypt, a sentiment
which could spread if Qasim succeeds in stabilizing conditions in
Iraq while Nasir makes only slow progress in rehabilitating the
Syrian economic and political situation.
29 Oct 59
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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panese - North Korean Repatriation Stalemate Resolved
the way appears to have been cleared ior tne repatriation
()1 Korean residents in Japan to North Korea as a result of the
approval by the pro-Communist Korean residents' organization
(Chosen Soren) of modifications in the program proposed by the
Japanese Government. The revised procedures will relax re-
strictions on visits to the repatriates during their stay at the
port of embarkation, and provide for final interviews of fam-
ilies rather than individuals to determine that the repatriates
had "freedom of choice" in making their decision. The Jap-
anese have indicated that these procedures will not substantively
modify conditions which would confirm the voluntary intentions
of the repatriates91
The Japanese Red Cross plans to reopen repatriation regis-
tration offices as soon as the International Committee of the Red
Cross approves the revised procedures--an approval Tokyo hopes
to receive in a few days. Chosen Soren's nationwide boycott dur-
ing the three days the registration offices were open in late Sep-
tember had restricted applications for repatriation to slightly
more than 200. Although Chosen Soren has claimed that 170,000
of the approximately 700,000 Koreans in Japan want to return to
North Korea, some observers believe that the number may be
less than 50,000. The first repatriation ship is expected to sail
in early December.)
tSouth Korea has publicly threatened to break off talks now
under way to settle outstanding differences with Japan if Tokyo
compromised with the Korean organization./
tRorth Korea now may be willing to allow the repatriation to
move forward in the belief that further obstruction would reflect
on its good faith and hamper its efforts to promote relations with
non-Communist countries. Should the number of prospective re-
patriates prove disappointing, Pyongyang may renew charges that
interference by Japan is responsible/
CONF 1AL
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Nor' "Niro
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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