CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/01/15

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03031262
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RIPPUB
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U
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12
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March 17, 2020
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March 26, 2020
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January 15, 1960
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V-447/ Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03031262 Top SECRET 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) $00111SNT NO. AA NO OHANGE IN CLASS. Aor O !DECLAIMED CLASS. ONANOLII TOr TS $ $ NEXT Harm LAU: ..4.49. AUTH i4i ia.2 DATE* 8...../11)&192011VIEWENI 15 January 1960 Copy No. C 67 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03031262 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03031262 #014 0,114 -TOP-SECRET- Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03031262 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03031262 15 JANUARY 1960 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Khrushchev's program for Soviet military, if implemented, would mean sweeping shake-up of armed forces on scale simi- lar to previous programs for industry and agriculture. 0 II. ASIA-AFRICA Recent developments show continued progress by Pakistan and India toward solving some of their most bothersome problems. III. THE WEST �British and Greek Cypriots still far apart on size of Cyprus bases to be re- tained by Britain; however, representa- tives to London conference starting 16 January appear determined to reach agreement so that Cyprus independence date of 19 February will be met. ()Question of exchanging diplomatic mis- sions with USSR again arises in Bolivia; although President Siles and foreign min- ister apparently oppose such an exchange, congressional and public support for it is strong. -SECRET- Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03031262 \�� \ \ \ \ 'Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03031262 *le \\\ 1 \\ CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 15 January 1960 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR: &preliminary analysis of Khrushchev's major dis- armament statement to the Supreme Soviet session on 14 Jan- uary indicates it is a major move in East-West relations. The main points of his program for the Soviet military, if imple- mented, would mean a sweeping shake-up of the Soviet armed forces on a scale similar to his previous programs for industry and agricultur!_t] (Page 1) Erhe representative of the Department of State believes that the Soviet moves if implementeds would be principally motivatec by technological and manpower considerations. He further be- lieves that the timing of the Soviet announcement is designed to be of maximum benefit to the Soviet position prior to impending East-West negotiations II. ASIA-AFRICA Pakistan-India: Recent developments indicate continued progress by Pakistan and India toward solving some of their most bothersome problems. Recently representatives of both countries announced that all border delineation disputes were resolved except in one area on the southern West Pakistan - Indian border. (The Kashmir dispute remains essentially un- touched.) Earlier the Ayub government had reported it had nearly settled the complex internal problem of claims by Mos- lem refugees from India on Hindu evacuee properties in Pak- istan. In early January a meeting of representatives of both countries announced substantial progress toward final settle- ment of the financial disputes which arose out of the 1947 par- tition of British India. (Page 3) 4., wN-m� 4\ \\N\N \ Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03031262 \ Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03031262 J.�� Nue � �������� Cyprus: @reek Cypriot and British positions on the size of the military bases to be retained by Britain on Cyprus are still far apart as the London conference opens on 16 January., The British want a total of 113 square miles the Greek Cypriots want them limited to 42 square miles. British, Greek, Turkish,and Cypriot representatives to the conference however, appear determined to reach an agree- ment so that Cyprus will attain independence as scheduled on 19 February_D (Page 4) Bolivia: The question of exchanging diplomatic missions with the USSR has arisen again in Bolivia in the midst of a struggle over the governing party's nominations for the pres- idential elections later this year. President &Iles and his foreign minister apparently oppose an exchange of missions. Funds for a Moscow embassy have been allocated in the pres- ent budget, however, and congressional and public support for active diplomatic relations is strong. (Page 5) IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES (Available during the preceding week) Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1959-1964. NIE 11-4-59. 5 Jan 1960. Outlook in Libya. NIE 36.5-60. 12 Jan 1960. 15 Jan 60 DAILY BRIEF TOP SECRET Ii Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03031262 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03031262 NoI/ I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Khrushchev's Supreme Soviet Statement A preliminary analysis of Khrushchev's major disarma- ment statement to the Supreme Soviet session on 14 January indicates it is a major move in East-West relations. The main points of his program for the Soviet military, if imple- mented, would mean a sweeping shake-up of the Soviet armed forces on a scale similar to his previous programs for in- dustry and agriculture. The main points were as follows: A. The armed forces are to be reduced (unilater- ally) by 1,200,000 men (from 3,600,000 to 2,- 400,000) over the next one to two years. B. The air force has "lost its previous importance." "Almost the entire military air force is being replaced by rocket machinery. We have by now cut down sharply and it seems will continue to cut down and even discontinue the manufacture of bombers and other obsolete machinery." C. The submarine fleet "assumes great importance"; surface ships are no longer as useful as "in the past." D. A saving of 16 to 17 billion rubles will result, it is claimed, from the reduction in armed forces. Khrushchev warned, however, that "our defense budget can stand an increase in military expendi- tures" if "defense of the motherland" requires it. Khrushchev stated, "We have consulted our military and come to the conclusion that our defenses will not be jeopard- ized." Numerical strength of forces is not as important as it was "three years ago," he said. "The defenses of a country are determined not by the number of soldiers, but by economic factors--and the power of weapons and the means of their de- livery." Khrushchev reassured the Soviet people that the pro- posed measures would not reduce military power since "our �CONFIDENT-M-L 15 Jan 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03031262 r�F NTIA L Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03031262 ftos, 1110 army has such arms as have heretofore been unknown to men." He added, "We possess formidable weapons," but those which are being designed and contemplated are "incredible." Khrushchev told his audience that while the US has decided to catch up with the USSR in five years, it would be naive to think that in the meantime "we will sit with folded arms." He warned that modern war will begin "in the heart of countries�" and all industrial and strategic centers will be attacked "during the first minutes." Meanwhile, the USSR is creating an ICBM system with "sufficient duplication and triplication" to ensure retaliation should "our enemies suddenly attack." 15 Jan 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03031262 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03031262 Noe I I. ASIA-AFRICA Recent Progress Under Pakistani Military Government The Ayub government is continuing to make progress to-, ward solving some of its most bothersome problems. On 11 January it announced the resolution of all but one of the bor- der disputes with India which in the past have resulted in bor- der firing incidents. At the close of December the govern- ment reported that it had nearly settled the complex problem of claims by Moslem refugees from India on Hindu evacuee properties in Pakistan. This will tend to enhance the regime's reputation for efficiency and strengthen its prestige among the politically important refugee element of the population, whose problems have long been a political football. In early January, negotiators from the two countries overcame the most difficult obstacles to a final settlement of the financial disputes which arose out of the 1947 partition of British India. A further improvement in Indo-Pakistani economic relations will probably follow. Although considerable preparatory work for these achieve- ments was done under previous regimes, Ayub's government has attacked many of the country's long-standing problems with vigor, and it will probably receive the lion's share of the credit. The improvement in relations with Indth, has also been encouraged by the common danger presented by Chinese Communist pressures on the Himalayan border area. The Pakistani military government, however, has yet to make major progress on other basic problems. Little head- way has been made in eliminating the food production deficit . or in raising the standard of living. Although Ayub has given the Kashmir dispute increased attention in his recent speeches, no direct effort has ye 1^,:tc." r"^"Ii-'s 4-^te negotiations with India on this problem. 15 Jan 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03031262 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03031262 1%me 140 SECRET III. THE WEST Cyprus Conference ao. me British officiars, including Cyprus' Governor Foot, have warned that the transfer of sovereignty, sched- uled for 19 February, may have to be postponed if the Cyprus conference, scheduled to begin in London on 16 January, cannot agree quickly on the major issues_j /he main issue to be discussed concerns the two mil- itary bases to be retained by Britain after independence. British and Greek Cypriot positions may be difficult to reconcile in the short time available for negotiation.t.1 C_The extent of the sovereign areas to be retained by Britain and provisions for other facilities outside the bases, such as training areas, for use by British military forces, are still in dispute. The Cypriots are prepared to accept British sovereignty over base areas of 42 square miles, while London demands 113. In addition, the Cypriots want assurances that the bases will be ceded to the Cypriot Re- public if Britain finds them unnecessary, that no foreign labor will be settled on the bases, that the administration of the areas will be military rather than civilian, and that a satisfactory status-of-forces agreement can be negotiated. The Cypriots also insist on financial compensation for all facilities provided the British outside their sovereign areas-- a demand that Britain has rejectel:g EiLrchbishop Makarios will be under conflicting pressures at London. The Greek Government is apparently urging con- cessions to Britain, while, some of his Cypriot advisers will oppose any further compromise. In addition, reports indicate that last October's agreement between Makarios and General Grivas pledged the Archbishop to try to limit the base area to approximately 36 square miles. The adverse Cypriot reaction which would follow even a temporary postponement of independ- ence, however, will be a powerful factor inclining him to some form of settlemelS 15 Jan 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03031262 � Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03031262 Status of Bolivia's Relations With the USSR The question of Bolivian relations with the USSR has risen again in the midst of a struggle over the governing party's nominations for the presidential elections in May or June. The two countries did not exchange representa- tives after relations were established in 1945, but Bolivia's new Foreign Ministry budget, reflecting strong public and congressional interest, provides funds for a Moscow mis- sion. Part of this pressure derives from hope of Soviet economic aid. President Siles and Foreign Minister Walter Guevara-- the presidential aspirant favored by right-wing elements of the government party--apparently oppose the exchange of missions. @uevara on 12 January assured US Ambassador Strom that as long as he is foreign minister no Moscow em bassy will be establish4 Guevara's tenure, however, is uncertain, as he may decide to resign soon to devote him- self to campaignin The probable victor at the party's nominating convention of 15-21 February, with nomination tantamount to election, is former President Victor Paz Estenssoro, who has not ex- pressed himself on the exchange of missions, but is supported by the ,party's left wing. Paz is friendly to the United States but seems to favor a more independent line than incumbent President Siles, and thus may be responsive to public pres- sures for active relations with the USSR. 15 Jan 60 -SfeRE-T- CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03031262 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03031262 INA ILL-41N I Iel La THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget � Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director CONFIDENTIAL Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03031262 Wirif / TOP�SECRET ,,,v% . � / / / / / / / 7 / / ///// / / 4 / / / / / / /4 ./17z ,47 0 72 // �TOP SKRET� -,e4 7 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03031262