CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/12/07

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
03148928
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
U
Document Page Count: 
14
Document Creation Date: 
March 17, 2020
Document Release Date: 
March 26, 2020
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
December 7, 1960
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Body: 
*No,' Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03148928 3.3(h)(2) �vr =ghiRC I 3.5(c) 7 December 1960 Copy No. C CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO NO 00.',NGE IN CLASS. fl DECLA%IFIL CLASS, C.H. Mic- TO: TS S ,9 NEXT 2,1_ "111 JUN 1983 DAM REVIEWER 0/ /Approve- fOrWle�a;e:-262L/63T1160g.1:17g28, Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03148928K TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03148928 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03148928 7 DECEMBER 1960 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Chinese Communist troops reportedly at- tacked and seized Chinese Nationalist out-, posts inside Burmese territory. II. ASIA-AFRICA Indonesia�President Sukarno's intention to include domestic Communist party in Djakarta government strengthened by his increasingly cordial relations with Soviet bloc. Moroccan relations with West deteriorat- ing as result of contrasting Western and Soviet positions on the Mauritania issue. 0 Congo--Lumumba's supporters continue efforts to control Orientale Province; Sudan apparently refuses transi ege for foreign aid to Stanleyville. III. THE WEST France--Lagaillarde flight increases con- cern in France over possible coup at- tempt in Algeria. 0 LATE ITEM �Situation in Laos. rrr grpRvelrrease: 2020/03/13 C03148928 A Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03148928 "taf TOP SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 7 December 1960 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Communist China - Burma: L9inese Communist troops in late November attacked and seized Chinese Nationalist outposts inside Burmese territory, Limited Burmese in was suggested referring to "joint efforts with the Red Chinese to fight e KMTs." The Communist troops involved are apparently those cooperating with Burmese forces to clear the border area of Nationalist guerrillas who might harass joint Sino- Burmese boundary-demarcation teams. The Nationalists may consider that the encounters with the Communists justify_ greater efforts to build un t e irregular forces in Burma i li (Pagel, 1) II. ASIA-AFRICA 471.4.) Indonesia: 7he increasingly cordial relations between President Sukarno and the Soviet bloc during the past six months appear to have strengthened Sukarno's intention to include the domestic Communist party in the Djakarta govern- ment. According to the US ambassador in Djakarta, factors influencing Sukarno are his belief that the United States is op= posed to him personally, the Soviet Union's cultivation of him as a leader of the Afro-Asian bloc, massive Soviet economic and military aid, and his views of socialism and Western co- lonialism. The army leaders, when unified, have the power and the will to resist Sukarno on a sharply defined issue of Commu- nist representation in the cabinet, but the President, by cloud= thising .euver the army2, (Page 2) ii ----TOP�SEMET A4proved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO3148928/ A �� / / / A4/-'" / 'Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO3148928 z;:z.Z //i7A4 Morocco: Moroccan relations with the West are de- teriorating as a result of the Western position on Morocco's claims to Mauritania in contrast with the USSR's support of Rabat's position in vetoing Mauritania's application for UN membership. Morocco can be expected to intensify its ef- fort to annex Mauritania and may be preparing to abrogate its 1 September military evacuation and base agreement with France by drawing 1113 a long list of French "vinlatinnR" of the agreements. (Page 3) 77.7.7 Congo: Followers of ex-Premier Lumumba continue their efforts to solidify control of Orientale Province as Moscow has directed scathing criticism of Mobutu and of Western activities in the Congo. "control , ), without pity" of activities of Belgian politicians and ordered the detention of any Belgian attempting to leave the province "before the liberation of Prime Minister Lumumba." There are indications, however, that the Stanleyville Lumumbists may face difficulties in arranging delivery of large-scale foreign aid. "it is not possibld:A0 guarantee the ar- rival (in Stanleyville) of any material or military aid via Sudan." (Page 4) III. THE WEST France-Algeria: fConcern over a possible coup attempt, perhaps timed to coincide with President de Gaulle's scheduled arrival in Algeria on 9 December, has increased in France fol- lowing the flight of rightist Deputy Pierre Lagaillarde to Spain. Retired Air Force Chief of Staff Edmond Jouhaud, already in Algeria, is reported linked with Lagaillarde as military leader of a coup. Several other generals were reported to have left their posts in France, presumably en route to Algeria: however the only two cited by name have since reported in French security officials are aware of many of the rightists' plans, but they have failed to apprehend Lagaillarde or the four other de- fendants missing from the Paris trial of leaders of the January uprising in Algiers. (Page 6) - t 7 Dec 60 DAILY BRIEF TOP SECRET 11 f '4747 I 4 4 4,744777447 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C031489280�, r A Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03148928 TOP SECRET *Laos:21ans o,a pro-�noumi coup in Vientiane againsig-juvanna Phoutna apparently are going ahead. General Phoumi has given his approval to the intention of Col. Kouprasith, 5th Military Region Commander in Vientiane, to move against the Souvanna Phouma regime. In addition, another group of plotters apparently is co- ordinating is nians fnr qimilar antinn with Kniriprasith's adherents. such a move is imminent. Meanwhile, Phoumi's troops are reportedly pressing their offensive again and ITIAV have rPpstahlighprl a position in the Pak Ca Dinh aren:1 7 Dec 60 DAILY BRIEF iii 10P-SE-eRET-- Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03148928 &proved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03148928 il-Inn nn_ 4fat, -4 Chinese Communists Attack Chinese Nationalist Forces in Burma Chinese Communist troops, perhaps ill collaboration with Burmese forces, in late November attacked and seized Chinese Nationalist nutnosts in Filirma Communist groups totaling 1,700 men penetrated as deep as 13 miles into Burma in the Burma-China-Laos border area. The Nationalists are reported to have fled without resisting. i Limited Burmese involvement in the Communist action ,. was suggested joint efforts with the Red Chinese to fight the ir- regulars. The Chinese Communists, in any event, would probably act only with Rangoon's permission, as it is unlike- ly they would forfeit the propaganda advantages of the recent border treaty w th Burma by taking unilateral action: The Communist troops involved are apparently those co- operating with Burmese forces to clear the border area of Nationalist guerrillas who might harass joint Sino-Burmese boundary demarcation teams. National-. ist bands have in the past hampered the work of these teams, and last summer the Burmese gave Chinese Communist secu- rity forces permission to go as far as six miles inside Burma in pursuit of Nationalists.'i Taipei has been resupplying its irregular forces in the Burma border area with weapons and other equipment and is attempting to reorganize them into an effective military force capable of tactical missions. The Nationalists may consider that the encounters with the Communists justify greater ef- forts to build up the irregular forces. SECRET 7 Dec 60 CEIApproved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03148928 page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03148928 �ftipo' SECRET Indonesian-Soviet Relations Influence Sukarno's Domestic Policy ahe increasingly t ordial relations between President Sukarno and the Soviet bloc during the past six months appear to have strengthened Sukarno's intentions to include the domestic Communist party in the cabinet, according to the American ambassador in Djakarta. ESukarno's cordiality appears largely based on Khru- shchev's cultivation of him as a leader ,Of. the Afro-Asian bloc and the potential head of a third force. Sukarno has accepted Khrushchev's latest invitation to visit the USSR and is expected to go there in March or April. A further influence on Sukarno has been the bloc's support for Dja- karta's claim to Netherlands New Guinea and bloc credit arrangements for economic and military aid, which now total approximately $700 million and may soon include an- other $300 million. Sukarno!s own views of Marxism and Western colonialism and his concept of "Indonesian social- ism" are factors in his tendency to accept Moscow's flattery and general propaganda line. In contrast to his attitude to- ward Moscow, Sukarno appears to believe that the United States opposes him personally21 rThe army has been the principal deterrent to Sukarno's domestic maneuvers to protect and use the Communist party. The American ambassador feels that the army may have both the power and the will to resist Sukarno on this latest aspect of the Communist issue. The ambassador fears, however, that the President may blur the issue of Communist participation in the cabinet by presenting it as identical with aspects of "Indonesian socialism" which the army has already accepted. Re could also weaken the army's position by rallying the country behind him on the highly charged nationalistic claim to Netherlands New Guinea and under cover of such a campaien proceed to reorganize the cabineCi SECRET 7 Dec 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCF RI III FTIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03148928 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03148928 Ott pm.% Morocco 'kely to Adhere More Closely to Moroeco's relations with the West are deteriorating markedly as Rabat moves toward a stricter implementa- tion of its professed policy of nonalignment. This de- velopment is partially the result of the negative Western attitude toward Morocco's claims to Mauritania as con- trasted with Communist bloc support, particularly the USSR's veto of Mauritania's application for UN member- ship. Morocco can be expected to intensify its efforts to annex Mauritania. At the same time, Morocco may be preparing to abrogate its 1 September military evacuation and base agreement with France. This agreement has been sharp- ly criticized by the leftist opposition, which has pointedly contrasted the presence of foreign military forces in Morocco with the Congo's success in kidding its territory of Belgian forces. The first step toward a possible re- pudiation of the agreement is the compilation of a long list of French "violations" of the agreement. Among other things, the Moroccans claim that France maintains large stocks of munitions at their basic flight training schools and uses these schools to repair bombers en- gaged in Algerian operations. Although the crown prince, and presumably also the King, has approved the transfer of French military headquarters from Rabat-Sale to the jointly operated French-American naval air facility at Kenitra there is "absolutely" no necessity for France to re am a headquarters in Morocco beyond 1 March, when all French military personnel except those connected with the operation of training facilities at six specified bases are to have been withdrawn} --While both the crown prince and the King have ex- plicitly stated they would honor the King's 22 December 1959 agreement that the US might retain some forces in Morocco until the end of 1963, they may also--in line with their tougher posture toward the West�renew over- tures initiated last May that American withdrawal be ex- pedited. \ SECitet' 7 Dec 60 ClApproved for Release:'26-2-(3/0ii1TaTila8928 Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03148928 vTOP SECRLT HP' The Situation in the Congo Followers of ex-Premier Lumumba continue their efforts to solidify control of Orientale Province, and Mos- cow has launched vigorous criticis Western activities in thp Conan ordered the detention of any Belgian attempting to leave the province "before the liberation of Prime Min- ister Lumumba." Continuing its anti-Belgian line, ecipients "control without pity the activities of Belgian politicians remaining in your district. Press reports of raids into neighboring Equateur Province by Lumumbists in Orientale tend to confirm in- dications that Lumumba's adherents will attempt to expand their influence outside Orientale Province. There are other indications, however, that the Stanleyville Lumum- bists may face difficulties in arranging delivery of large- scale foreign aid. Sudanese Premier Abboud, mnecDusU�IthNasir in Late November, stated that he did not favor allowing Lu- mumba's forces to shi materia Suda.n. "it is not pos- ee e arr va(in Stanleyville) of any ma- terial or:militaxyaid viO, Sudan." On 5 December the USSR issued an official statement on the Congo--the second in three days�which scathingly attacked NATO, liammarskjold and the UN Command, and the "large colonial powers." Asserting that the situation has entered a new and more acute state, Moscow laid the blame entirely on alleged US interference in internal Congolese affairs. The Soviet statement voiced displeasure with those African and Asian states which "have not preserved the requisite unity" on the Congo issue and demanded that order TOP SECRET 7 Dec 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE RUH FTIN Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03148928 Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03148928 be restored in the Congo by releasing 'Premier Lumumba, reinstating his legitimate government, and disarming Mo- butu's "terrorist" forces. Despite Soviet UN delegate Zorin's insistence yesterday on a meeting of the Security Council last night, a majority of the eleven council members agreed to meet this morning to discuss Lumumba's arrest and treatment. UN officials in New York, who lately have shown a dispcisition to blame UN military commander Von Horn for the shortcomings of the Congo operation, have indicated that he will be replaced shortly.] Meanwhile, Nasir may be sounding out various African nations concerning a possible troop withdrawal from the Congo. Nasir has sent a letter dealing with "the critical Congo situation" to seven Asian-African countries with troops in the UN Congo force. 7 Dec 60 .11 Aui i16.1/0�0 DI II I CTIkI Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03148928Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03148928 SECRET Lagaillarde Flight Stirs Concern Over Iniminen Coup Attempt LConcern over creased in France following the disappearance of rightist Deputy Pierre Lagaillarde, who apparently crossed the border into Spain and may be on his way to Algeria. Warrants have been issued for the arrest of Lagaillarde and four other defendants missing from the Paris trial of leaders of the January uprising in Al- giers, but French security forces have failed to apprehend any of them. Lagaillarde is reported to have escaped through Spain with the aid of former Algerian commander Raoul Salan, who has been in Spain for over a month. Salan had been reported planning to go to Algeria to organize opposition to De Gaulle's referendum. Both Salan and Lagaillarde have been reported to be members of a group of rightists planning to set up a pro- visional Algerian government pledged to the integration of Al- geria with France.j also reported missing were several French generals--pre- sumably en route to Algeria. Only, two of these, however, Jacques Faure and Henri Mirambeau, were cited by name, and they have since reported in as being at their posts Another military figure linked with Lagaillarde is retired Air Force Chief of Staff Edmond Jouhaud, who played an important role in the May 1958 revolt and who, especially since his retirement, has openly aligned himself with the rightist forces in Algeria. Jouhaud, who now lives in Oran, is reportedly ready to assume military leader- ship of a coupi Lagaillarde was released on bail almost three weeks ago. His dec sion to take advantage of his freedom suggests that the accel- erated pace of De Gaulle's program for a referendum in Algeria may be precipitating action by opponents of the regime. Either the opening of debate on De Gaulle's Algerian program in the Na- tional Assembly on 7 December or the arrival of De Gaulle in Algeria on 9 December could spark rightist actionj CF rench security forces are aware of many of the rightist plans, but have apparently been unable to restrict the activities of key plotters. The transfer of large numbers of metropolitan security and police personnel to Algeria in anticipation of rightist-initiated trouble there probably has reduced police effectiveness in Francej. 7 Dec 60 CENTDAI ikrret I it-�rkiifto el rvik I Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C0314892-81age 6 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03148928 0111" CONFIDENTIAL THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Commandant, United States Marine Corps Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03148928 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03148928 '' ,/ / / / / / /' /fr;/. / ,4 / / �,,,i, 7/ ,4 ' / Vzo, Vz r,, '7,; 7z, V , , --TOP�SKRET� i;&// ZAPProved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03148928V./Z/ZMW/Mt/ it / / / // / / / / / / / r / / / / / / /