CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/10/29

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03155154
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: October 29, 1957

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/ CURRENT
/ INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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138
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3.5(c) /
29 October 1957
Copy No.
DOCUMENT NO. V
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EVIEWER: _
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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CONTENTS
On
. ZHUKOV'S STATUS REMAINS UNSETTLED
(page 3).
o 2. USSR WANTS DISARMAMENT COMMISSION TO INCLUDE
ALL UN MEMBERS (page 4).
o3� CANADA CONSIDERING MODIFICATION OF ITS STAND ON
DISARMAMENT (page 5).
virc) 4. YUGOSLAVS VOICE CONCERN OVER WESTERN MISTRUST
(page 6).
p\'1
Y REPORTEDLY TO TRY NAGY IN NEAR FUTURE
(page 7).
01116. SYRIAN-TURKISH TENSIONS
(page 8).
t,to 7. INTERVENTION BY HAMMARSKJOLD IN TURKISH-SYRIAN
SITUATION (page 9).
0141 tio� MENDERES REGIME GAINS VOTE OF CONFIDENCE IN
TURKEY (page 10).
0Ic 9. FRENCH POLITICAL CRISIS
10, THE SITUATION IN GUATEMALA
29 Oct 57
(page 11).
(page 12).
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1. ZHUKONT'S STATUS REMAINS UNSETTLED
(Information as of 0400 EST)
Comment on: I
Moscow has not yet broken official ,
silence on the future of Marshal Zhukov,
despite a number of reports that the
matter was placed before a plenum of
the central committee yesterday--28
October. There are, however, mounting
indications that a serious political con-
flict is going on in the USSR.
Western correspondents have managed to
clear reports through the Moscow censorship plainly alluding
to an early official announcement, and the Soviet military ra-
dio in East Germany has referred to such an announcement
"in a matter of hours." As of noon Moscow time on 29 Octo-
ber (0400 EST),no such announcement had yet been made.
Foreign Communist correspondents in
Moscow, who earlier had shied away from speculating that
Zhukov was in disfavor, now have sent out dispatches sug-
gesting that Zhukov had obstructed party control of the armed
forces. Pravda's lead editorial for 28 October, which carried
a title similar to those used immediately before announcement
of the June purge, contained a similar implication in its strong
affirmation of party primacy in all areas, including the mili-
tary. some
Sovietmilitary officers were interpreting the news of Zhukov's
removal as a demotion and were "surprised, shocked, and up-
set."
It now appears possible that Zhukov's re-
moval from his defense post was not a conclusive step in the
action against him and that the issues at stake were still in
doubt when the central committee convened. There is as yet
no confirmation for various press reports alleging that Zhukov
29 Oct 57
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lery
has been removed from the party presidium. A late broad-
cast, cleared by Soviet censorship, suggested, moreover, that
the issue is broader than a simple struggle between Khrushchev
and Zhukov and that they may, in fact, be aligned against some
third force. It was further stated that the source of conflict
was basically an internal problem rather than one of foreign or
military policy. The possibility remains that the action with
respect to Zhukov, whether promotion or demotion, has not
developed smoothly. If so, the positions of other presidium
members. including, even Khrushchev's, may be in jeopardy.
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2. USSR WANTS DISARMAMENT COMMISSION TO INCLUDE
ALL UN MEMBERS
Comment on:
The Soviet Union proposed on 27 October
to replace the present United Nations Dis-
armament Commission and Subcommittee
with a new permanent disarmament com-
mission composed of all 82 United Nations
members. The Soviet disarmament resolutions for a two- to
three-year nuclear testing ban and a five-year renunciation by
the nuclear powers of the employment of atomic and hydrogen
weapons have attracted considerably less support than Soviet
leaders apparently anticipated. The Soviet government has,
therefore, introduced this scheme with the hope of capitalizing
on dissatisfaction over the lack of progress by the 12-power
Disarmament Commission and its five-nation subcommittee.
Moscow may feel that the proposal will win some support from
neutralist states, particularly India, which has submitted a res-
olution calling for expansion of the present disarmament ma-
chinery.
In support of Soviet demands to give fullest
publicity to future disarmament negotiations, the proposal calls
for continuous, open sessions by the reconstituted commission.
Despite Soviet hints that the USSR is reluctant to resume negotia-
tions in the "secluded" atmosphere of the Disarmament Subcom-
mittee as presently constituted, it is unlikely that Moscow would
refuse to participate if the General Assembly again refers the
question to the subcommittee. The present Soviet move provides,
however, another indication that the Soviet government does not
believe it is possible to conclude even a partial disarmament agree-
ment at this time.
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3. CANADA CONSIDERING MODIFICATION OF ITS STAND
ON DISARMAMENT
Canadian Minister of External Affairs
Smith is disturbed at the finality with
which Canada has associated itself with
other Western powers in disarmament
debates and does not wish it to be irrev-
ocably committed to the four-power proposals, according to
a Canadian delegate to the UN General Assembly.
Smith, until his appointment as minister
of external affairs on 13 September, was president of the
University of Toronto and had never before held political of-
fice. In his approach to foreign affairs he appears to be fol-
lowing a long-held personal conviction that as a neighbor of
both the United States and the USSR, Canada must play the role
of mediator. His call for a basic restudy of Canada's role and
position in the UN's Disarmament Subcommittee seems in line
with Prime Minister Diefenbaker's suggestion on 23 September
that the subcommittee's membership be broadened and his state-
ment that Canada would withdraw if it would help achieve this.
According to the Canadian delegate, Smith
is not convinced of the Western position that test cessation
should be linked to a cutoff of fissionable material production
for weapons. The delegate added that Canada might find it diffi-
cult to vote against any resolutions calling for test suspensions.
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4. YUGOSLAVS VOICE CONCERN OVER
WESTERN MISTRUST
Comment on:
e ugos av regim apparen y con-
cerned that its rapprochement with the
USSR has seriously imperiled its West-
ern ties, has lost no opportunity to per-
suade Western representatives that
Yugoslavia has not abandoned its mid-
dle position between the East and West.
In a prolonged conversation with US
Senator Ellender on 26 October, President Tito was "dis-
tinctly emotional" regarding ties with the West and Western
mistrust of his good faith. He denied that Soviet pressure
was involved in the Yugoslav decision to recognize East Ger-
many and said it was ridiculous to believe the Yugoslays had
taken action in consequence of a Soviet offer to replace US aid.
Yugoslav Acting Foreign Secretary Bebler claimed that Soviet
policy toward Yugoslavia had changed for the better and that
Yugoslavia has no alternative but to accept the change as gen-
uine.
Yugoslav Vice President Kardelj, in his
recent talks with the Greeks, reportedly declared that Yugo-
slavia feels it imperative to remain in the middle between the
two blocs. Admitting that Yugoslavia cannot stand on its own,
Kardelj indicated great concern that the curtailment of Western
aid would seriously jeopardize Yugoslav ability to resist Soviet
pressures.
Commenting on Kardelj's remarks, a high
official said he believes the Yugoslays are sin-
cere in their general position, genuinely wish a revival of the
Balkan pact, and prefer that Greece remain in NAT "for the
time being and perhaps for the foreseeable future."
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5. HUNGARY REPORTEDLY TO TRY NAGY IN NEAR FUTURE
Comment on:
The Hungarian government plans to try for-
mer premier Imre Nagy in approximately two
weeks on charges of "engaging in detrimental
propaganda activity" because of the foreign
publication of his so-called testament,
The similarity be-
tween this charge and that recently used by Belgrade to convict
Milovan Djilas would be intended to avoid giving Tito any oppor-
tunity to criticize the handling of Nagy. During the Hungarian
revolution in October 1956, Tito supported Nagy and provided
him asylum in the Yugoslav embassy following the second Soviet
intervention.
Recent reports that a trial of writers who co-
operated with Nagy during the revolution is now under way lend
credibility to the suggestion that the Kadar regime is ready to
move against Nagy himself. Now that the anniversary of the na-
tional uprising has passed without incident, the regime probably
believes it is in a strong position to dispose of unresolved issues
stemming from the revolution and to move ahead with a program
to normalize conditions in Hungary. This program might include a
reduction in the number of Soviet occupation troops.
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6. SYRIAN-TURKISH TENSIONS
Comment on:
or the Syrian
tober.
Syrian-Turkish border tension continues,
highlighted by Syrian charges of Turkish
patrol incursions and of flights by uniden-
tifieil aircraft over Syria. Although Syria's
accusations may have some basis in fact,
they, together with efforts to involve the
populace in civil defense activities, appear
designed primarily to maintain the atmos-
phere of crisis to support renewed debate
complaint in the UN General Assembly on 28 Oc-
The Syrians are willing to accept a visit by
UN Secretary General Hammarskjold in lieu of a UN commission
of inquiry, according to the counselor of the Egyptian embassy in
Damascus. Egyptian domestic broadcasts, however, on 28 Octo-
ber quoted a statement by the secretary general of the Syrian
Foreign Ministry to the effect that Syria seeks "a committee,
formed on the basis of the regional representation of various
blocs in the United Nations," but that it would not object if
Hammarskj old headed this commission.
Turkey is apparently willing to accept a
Hammarskj old visit, but is unwilling to permit an interna-
tional UN inquiry mission on its territory.
Syrian acquiescence to a visit by the UN
chief could be upset by renewed suspicion over forthcoming
military exercises in Iraq. NATO land, sea, and air exer-
cises, "Operation Red Epoch," are to be held from 30 Octo-
ber to 2 November off the southwest coast of Turkey, although
scheduled air operations over Turkey have been canceled. The
joint maneuvers by Iraqi forces are scheduled to take place in
northeastern Iraq between 7 and 10 November. Most Iraqi air
units, including all operational let aircraft, are now in northern
Iraq.
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7, INTERVENTION BY HAMMARSKJOLD IN TURKISH-
SYRIAN SITUATION
Comment on;
Any intervention by UN Secretary. General
Hammarskjold in the Turkish-Syrian situ-
ation would place him in a vulnerable posi-
tion regarding his other mediation efforts
in the Middle East as a whole and might
complicate his relations with the USSR. The Norwegian UN
delegate on 25 October emphasized that caution must be exer-
cised to avoid causing strong Arab attacks which would lessen
the effectiveness of the secretary general in the area. The
Canadian delegation's instructions, according to one of its mem-
bers, were clearly to avoid any action that "might injure the
secretary general."
Contrary to earlier indications that the
USSR might welcome intervention by the secretary general,
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko at a 25 October Eastern
European caucus spoke sarcastically of the secretary gener-
al's introducing himself into the situation. He intimated this
would create a "liability" in Hammarskjold's future relations
with the USSR.
Hammarskj old is well aware of the risks in-
volved and can be expected to exhibit even more reserve and
caution than he maintained during the Suez crisis last year. He
has described the role of Syrian-Turkish mediator as an "in-
credibly exposed job."
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�8. MENDERES REGIME GAINS VOTE OF CONFIDENCE
IN TURKEY
Comment on:
Turkey's re-election on 27 October of
the Democratic regime of Prime Min-
ister Menderes, while not the "sweep-
ing" victory claimed by Menderes,
sustains his decisive control of the gov-
ernment. The final count will probably
give the Democratic party over 400 of
the 610 assembly seats.
Menderes has shown no intention of
altering his basic policies. Turkey will undoubtedly con-
tinue to maintain a firm policy toward Syria. Once his
government is formed after the assembly convenes on 1 No-
vember, he will probably seek some method of strengthening
the value of the Turkish currency and of controlling the con-
tinuing inflation, including a request for extraordinary finan-
cial assistance from the US. Menderes may be expected to
continue to push his industrialization and urban development
schemes.
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9. FRENCH POLITICAL CRISIS
Mollet's failure to win assembly approval
emphasizes the depth of the differences be-
tween the non-Communist left and right in
the French National Assembly. President
Coty regarded Mollet as his ace in the hole
n expectedmm to be able to reconcile differences over finan-
cial policy. His defeat considerably narrows the field of pos-
sible candidates and there will probably be increased speculation
that General De Gaulle will return.
A press report from Paris states that Rad-
ical Socialist Felix Gaillard, finance minister in the Bourges-
Maunoury government was called by President Coty to the Elysee
Palace early on 29 October. Gaillard's austerity program
alienated a good number of rightist deputies and he would have
difficulty obtaining the support of Independents and Peasants. The
center position of the Popular Republican party may make one of
their deputies, such as Robert Schuman or Pierre Pflimlin, a
likely compromise candidate.
Pressure stemming from France's deterio-
rating financial situation continues to mount as prices rise, la-
bor steps up its demands, and government finances worsen.
Although the right has opposed price controls and increased
taxes, it may be willing to accept Popular Republican leader
Schuman's pessimistic economic report to President Coty on 21
October as the basis of a policy as long as a Socialist is not im-
plementing it.
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10. THE SITUATION IN GUATEMALA
The Communists stand to gain from the
new Guatemalan political situation, in
which middle-of-the-road political forces
of the late president Castillo Armas are
now discredited and virtually destroyed.
The army, since 1954 the bulwark against
the extremes of right and left, is weakened
by factionalism and lacks strong leadership.
The Communists may gain, not through any
sudden increase in their numbers (they have only about 300 to
500 party members) but because they have already infiltrated
the leftist Revolutionary party, and this party has emerged
from the political disturbances of last week in a relatively strong
position. It will probably participate in the presidential and con-
gressional elections promised for the near future and might win.
There are sound liberal elements in the party who are now try-
ing to purge the party of Communists, but there are also many
others who worked with the Communists during the pro-Commu-
nist Arbenz regime.
Rightist Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes, runner-up
in the annulled 20 October presidential election who nearly gained
power last week on a wave of postelection mob violence, pro-
claims confidence in his ability to win the new eleetions. How-
ever, many of the votes he received on 20 October were cast
more in opposition to the then-dominant administration party
than in his favor. Some Ydigoras supporters fear he will not
win the elections and consider their only hope is a new military
coup in Ydigoras' favor.
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