CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/04/18

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03156038
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: April 18, 1959

ApprivIelic;fi; Release: 20_4)/02/21 C03156038
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
18 April 1959
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
tis.r; cHANnriN CLA
1117(;LA.^,!7.47J iro
CHANCif:0 TO: Ism
NEXT I E1,';EtAi DATE:
AUTH:97b2Lit
DATE, _.t77,0030EVIEWER:
�TOP�SECRET�
fiefe;s: 020/02r/11'-C63'5#6.0387
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03156038
�1M0--eurrP1M-
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03156038
A. WV .1. Wt. IPS DROM
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03156038
Li
18 APRIL 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Iraq - Major cabinet revision impend-
ing.
Iran and Pakistan, gravely concerned
by trends in Iraq and Afghanistan; fear
build-up leading to military alliance
with USSR.
Tunisia and LIAR to accept Moroccan
mediation to permit active Tunisian
participation in Arab League.
III. THE WEST
0 Latin American liberals express
alarm over Communist threat in
Cuba; current Caribbean crisis char-
acterized by them as greatest in
Latin American history.
0 Panama seeking arms to cope with in-
vasion threats; dissident Panamanians
plotting in Cuba, but no expedition known
to be under way.
0 French moving diplomatically to under-
cut Algerian FLN international activities.
0 Netherlands - New government to be in-
stalled soon; will probably take tougher
line on Western arms sales to Indonesia.
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03156038
�
'APproved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03156038
/
' Simi 'ftroi
%
/
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
18 April 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Iraq: Communist pressures have resulted in a num-
ber of-Frsonnel changes in important Iraqi government
012, posts, and a major revision of the Iraqi cabinet is reported
to be impending. (Page 1)
Ba hdad Pact - Iraq - Afghanistan: During a meeting
of the Baghdad Council of Deputies on 14 April, both Iran
and Pakistan voiced "grave concern" over events in Iraq
and the Afghan arms build-up. Iran fears the possible for-
mation of a Middle East version of the Warsaw Pact, linking
Iraq, Afghanistan, and the USSR. Iranian and Pakistani ex-
pressions of concern are probably prompted in part by the
0 ' desire for firmer Western security guarantees and for addi-
tional military aid. Pakistan is considering whether to re-
spond to Nasirfs attempted mobilization of Islamic forces
against Communist penetration)
Tunisia-UAR: LThe Tunisian and UAR governments have
agreed to accept Moroccan mediation of their differences as
a means of bringing about the active participation of Tunisia
in the Arab League, according to the Moroccan ambassador
,A in Baghdad. Moroccan Crown Prince Moulay Hassan, who
V. arrived in Cairo on 20 April for a ten-day visit, is expected
to artici ate in tl_pp37strotmd of mediation talks)
(Page )
(Page 2)
5,�
7_�.
t� AApproved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03156038 7 A
,v4r 4
'Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03156038
14.0,
III. THE WEST
\A�
pp
Caribbean: A group of Latin American liberals agreed
at a meeting in Costa Rica with former President Jose Figueres
that the Communist threat in Cuba is of alarming proportions.
Referring also to Communist activities in Venezuela and Costa
Rica, Gonzalo Facio, Figueres' chief adviser, said he and
many of the others feel that the "current crisis in the Carib-
bean is the greatest in Latin American history." While this
evaluation may be somewhat overdrawn, the fears expressed
are generally justified. (Page 4)
Panama: Panamanian officials continue to be alarmed over
repariCirman imminent invasion." Guatemalan President Ydi-
goras states that Panama has sought military assistance to pre-
vent an invasion of "two boats carrying 300 men each" for the
purpose of carrying out a "Communist attack." The Guate-
malan President asked the US chief of MAAG for permission
to assist Panama with aircraft as well as military equipment,
including that from the battalion supplied under the US military
assistance program. Panama also has requested some $100,000
worth of small arms and ammunition from the US Embassy in
Panama. The Panamanian officials fear that the national guard
could not resist an invasion and fear the chaos that would follow
any invasion attempt.
There has been plotting by dissident Panamanians in Cuba,
but there is no confirmation that any ships have actually left for
Panama. Panamanian Communists have not been active in the
plotting in Cuba but would take advantage of disorders in Panama
caused by an invasion attempt.
rance: enc s1. smatic representatives have re-
ceived a strong .y worded directive to pose to France's friends
a choice between friendship with France or tolerance of Alge-
rian rebel activities on their soil. France has already in-
formed the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia it will break relations
if Moscow and Belgrade recognize the rebel provisional govern-
ment. French military leaders have been pressing for a "diplo-
matic campaign" to complement the military victory they main-
tain they have achieved in Algeria.)
(Page 5)
18 Apr 59
DAILY BRIEF
11
SECRET
/Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO3-15603/K/ Z/ W/
F,.///7-
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03156038
;/,
,
IX/
Netherlands: &he new coalition governments expected to
be installed soon, after more than a month of negotiating, will
be further to the right than its predecessor and may take a
stiffer attitude against Western arms sales to Indonesia. Dutch
officials have already warned that intended shipments of air-
craft from the United States and other NATO countries may
result in increased pressures for a defense build-up in West
New Guinea at the expense of the Netherlands' NATO commit-
ments.) (Page 6)
18 Apr 59
DAILY BRIEF iii
� / me/
;/1:/)proved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO3156038 //r/#.:
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03156038
v.po' Nur'
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
(No Back-Up Material)
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Personnel Changes in Iraqi Government
Communist pressures, aimed at gradually consolidating
the party's influence in the Iraqi Government, have resulted
in a number of further personnel changes in important posts.
Anti-Communist, National Democrat Husayn Jamil has been
ousted as minister of guidance, and on 17 April Baghdad an-
nounced his appointment as ambassador to Iran. His brother,
Talib Jamil� is still technically director general of the Eco-
nomic Ministry but states that he has been on "a month's va-
cation which may last several months."
On 16 April Baghdad announced the resignation of three
senior Foreign Ministry officials. The Iraqi Communist press
has assailed Foreign Minister Jawad himself, and is berating
the ministry for appointing All Haider Sulaiman as ambassador
to the United States. Two directors general of the Social Af-
fairs Ministry have been removed in quick succession, and
Communist newspapers are calling for the elimination from
this ministry of "large numbers of conspirators and enemies
of the republic."
The government has decided to enlarge the cabinet from
16 to 20 ministerial posts by abolishing the Ministry of Devel-
opment and creating five new specialized economic ministries.
There are persistent reports that a Communist party member
will be named to head at least one of these. The present min-
isters of interior, finance, agriculture, education, foreign af-
fairs, and social affairs may resign soon.
The Communists, who have had little direct representation
in the cabinet, are reported to be particularly anxious to obtain
control of the Interior and Foreign ministries, as well as to re-
place Brigadier al-Abdi as military governor general of Iraq.
Pro-Communist Brigadier Farid Dhia Mahmoud was recently
named acting deputy chief of staff for operations following the
arrest of Brigadier Shakir Mahmoud Shukri,
CONFIDENTIAL
CFNTRAI IKITFI I IC,FNCF RIII I FTINI Page 1
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03156038
Approved for Release�: 202-070/21 C03156038
Iran and Pakistan Again Express Concern Over Developments
In Iraq and Afghanistan
Aran and Pakistan, during a meeting of the Baghdad Pact
Council of Deputies on 14 April in Ankara, again expressed
alarm over recent developments in Iraq and grave concern
over the "mounting hostility of Afghanistan." Their statements
reflect a feeling of growing encirclement by hostile powers,
but may be motivated to some degree by a ,desire for additional
military equipment and Western guarantee,9
6La,n referred to the shipment of Soviet arms to Afghan-
istan and to the thinness of its defenses on Afghanistan's border.
It expressed fear that Iraq and Afghanistan might link themselves
with the USSR in a Middle East version of the Warsaw Pact and
urged action to reduce Iraq's reliance on the Soviet Union. Pak-
istan suggested the possibility that the USSR co 4d use Afghan-
istan as a base to conduct "aggression by proxy.
akistan is considering whether it should respond to Nasir's
call to mobilize the resources of Islam against Communist pen-
etration of the Middle East, Great Britain,, on the other hand,
considers Nasir's activities dangerous because they are pushing
Qasim toward the Communists,and both Britain and Turkey stated
that they still regard Qasim as the best hope for Iraq.)
18 Apr 59
CENTRAL INTEH inFKR-F RI III FT11�1
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03156038
Page 2
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03156038
Nor" Nue
Morocco May Be Able to Mediate Tunisian-UAR Differences
he Tunisian and UAR governments have agreed to accept
Moro can mediation of their differences as a means of return-
ing Tunisia to active participation in the Arab League, accord-
ing to the Moroccan ambassador in Baghdad. Moroccan Crown
Prince Moulay Hassan, who visited Tunis earlier this month and
will arrive in Cairo on 20 April for a ten-day visit, is expected
to participate in the first round of mediation talks.
Tunisia broke diplomatic relations with the UAR last Octo-
ber a er a long-standing dispute arising from UAR President
Nasir's support for Tunisian President Bourguiba's rival, ex-
iled former Neo-Destour Secretary General Salah ben Youssef.
Failing to find support within the Arab League for his sharp
criticism of Nasir's tactics, Bourguiba has not participated in
league sessions for six months. Early this month, however,
he indicated he was willing to participate in the Beirut meeting
of Arab League foreign ministers "if this meeting really intends
to solve disputes, including ours with the UAR." Failing such
assurances, Tunisia did not attend the Beirut meeting. On other
occasions, he has indicated a willingness to patch up his 'quarrel
with Nasir on condition that UAR facilities afforded Ben Youssef
be withdrawn)
Bourguiba and Nasi; at the urging of other Arab states,
nota ly Lebanon and Morocco, may welcome steps toward some
sort of rapprochement. In his dispute with Iraq, Nasir is par-
ticularly in need of as much support in the Arab world as he can
muster. Relations between the two governments, however, are
unlikely to be cordial, and the two leaders will continue to vie
both for leadership in the Arab world and for the exertion of max-
imum influence over the Algerian rebels)
-CONFIDENTIAL
18 Apr 59 CENTRAL INTFI I IC;FNCF Rill I FTIN
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 003156038
Page 3
Approved for Release: 2020/05721 C03156038
Nere Nei
III. THE WEST
Communist Threat in Caribbean Area
The Communist threat in the Caribbean area is considered
alarming by a group of Latin American and US liberals meeting
in Costa Rica with former President Jose Figueres. The groups,
which includes representatives of Figueres' National Libera-
tion party (PLN) and of Venezuelan President Betancourt's Dem-
ocratic Action party (AD), is particularly concerned over Corn-
munist penetration of the Cuban Government.
Figueres and Betancourt are justified in their fear that
Communist-controlled Nicaraguan and Dominican revolutionary
groups, which have been sympathetically received and encour-
aged by Cuban officials, will spread Communism throughout the
area. Gonzalo Facio, Figueres' right-hand man, referred to
Communist activities in Venezuela and Costa Rica and told US
Ambassador Willauer that he and many others at the meeting
feel the "eurrent Caribbean crisis is the greatest in Latin Amer-
ican history."
The group meeting in Costa Rica represents some of the
most influential elements in the democratic, antidictator cam-
paign in Latin America, which the Communists are trying to
penetrate. The leftist but non-Communist PLN and AD gave
Castro moral and material support during his long struggle
against the Batista dictatorship, but now have become disillusioned.
However, Costa Rican Communist leader Manuel Mora, just back
from a visit in Cuba, delivered a lengthy speech on 15 April de-
fending all aspects of the Castro regime and violently attacking
Figueres as a tool of the American Embassy.
The anti-Communist potential of the Cuban middle-class
elements, who are influential in the Castro administration, is
strong and the press has recently shown increased awareness
of the Communist threat. One paper identified the Communists
as the real counterrevolutionaries in Cuba today.
-SECRET-
18 Apr 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03156038
Page 4
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03156038
No"
France Steps J.lp Diplomatic Offensive Against Algerian Rebels
France has issued circular instructions in imperative
ter i&' to French diplomatic representatives to pose a choice
between friendship with France and the Algerian rebels to all
governments extending material aid or tolerating rebel activ-
ities on their soil The instructions call for strong demarches�
a protest to the UN secretary general against rebel activity at
.5 UN headquarters, moves to counter FLN ropagancla� and in-
creased pressure on Tunisia and Morocco.
6_)e Gaulle personally has informed the Soviet and Yugoslav
ambassadors that France NVill braak relations if Moscow and Bel-
grade recognize the Algerian rebel provisional government.
De Gaulle and other French officials have bitterly charged US
"encouragement" of the rebels, and most recently have pro-
tested their admission into the United States. When De Gaulle
withdrew the French Mediterranean fleet from NATO wartime
control, French spokesmen said the move was made because of
the lack of a common Western policy on North Africa)
(While the circular states that De Gaulle's cease-fire offer
still holds, the tougher French line reflects Paris' feeling that
the real struggle with the rebels now is outside Algeria. It
anticipates continued French military occupation of Algeria for
a long period, although French military leaders argue that they
have broken the armed rebellion. They are pressing the govern-
ment to discourage the rebels' efforts to win support abroad)
SECRET
18 Apr 59 CFSJTRAI INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03156038
Approved for Release: 10070-2/21 C03156038
�4011
New Dutch Government Expected Soon
A new Dutch coalition governments including Catholic,
Pro estant, and Liberal parties and headed by Catholic Prof.
J. Dequay, is expected to be installed within the next week
after over a month of negotiations. The Labor party, which
precipitated the 12 March national elections by withdrawing
from Prime Minister Drees' cabinet in December, now will
be in the opposition. The new government will be further to
the right than the Drees cabinet, in which elements of the
Labor party exercised a moderating influence, and is even
more deeply committed to Dutch retention of West New Guinea.
It is prepared, if necessary, to weaken the Netherlands' con-
tribution to NATO to support this stand and will probably pro-
test more strongly against arms sales t&Indonesia by the
United States and other NATO countries
61 _lie Dutch representative at a NATO committee meeting
in Paris on 14 April, in fact, warned of severe political reper-
cussions in The Hague if the United States proceeds with pro-
jected shipments of C-130-B transports and other arms to
Indonesia and said, in off-the-record comments, that popular
and parliamentary support for NATO would inevitably deteri-
orate. Defense build-up in West New Guinea, he said, would
have to be at the expense of Dutch NATO commitments, sin_c5
over-all defense expenditures are not likely to be increased.
61_Irther expression of Dutch resentment over Western de-
liveries of military items to Indonesia may be expected at the
next NATO committee meeting on 21 April. As evidence of the
danger of Indonesian aggression, the Dutch may produce a list
of military items including parachutes, for which Lakartais
reported to have been shopping "all over the world.'
-SE�RE-T-
18 Apr 59 r"LkITI5 A I WI-MI InFl�ICF RI II I FTIN
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03156038
Page 6
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03156038
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
-PFA1F444C-441-7'r-A-1,�
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03156038
ZZ/Zr/r/ZZZ/Zri FrZZ/1/
"Approved for Release. 2020/02/21 C0315603_3" /1".TOP SKLI
-TOP-SECRET-
7,-Arimmimm,Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03156038VMMZ/ZMAe
pJ