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February 27, 2020
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April 18, 1959
PDF icon CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15787575].pdf670.09 KB
ApprivIelic;fi; Release: 20_4)/02/21 C03156038 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 18 April 1959 Copy No. C CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO. tis.r; cHANnriN CLA 1117(;LA.^,!7.47J iro CHANCif:0 TO: Ism NEXT I E1,';EtAi DATE: AUTH:97b2Lit DATE, _.t77,0030EVIEWER: �TOP�SECRET� fiefe;s: 020/02r/11'-C63'5#6.0387 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03156038 �1M0--eurrP1M- Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03156038 A. WV .1. Wt. IPS DROM Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03156038 Li 18 APRIL 1959 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC II. ASIA-AFRICA Iraq - Major cabinet revision impend- ing. Iran and Pakistan, gravely concerned by trends in Iraq and Afghanistan; fear build-up leading to military alliance with USSR. Tunisia and LIAR to accept Moroccan mediation to permit active Tunisian participation in Arab League. III. THE WEST 0 Latin American liberals express alarm over Communist threat in Cuba; current Caribbean crisis char- acterized by them as greatest in Latin American history. 0 Panama seeking arms to cope with in- vasion threats; dissident Panamanians plotting in Cuba, but no expedition known to be under way. 0 French moving diplomatically to under- cut Algerian FLN international activities. 0 Netherlands - New government to be in- stalled soon; will probably take tougher line on Western arms sales to Indonesia. SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03156038 � 'APproved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03156038 / ' Simi 'ftroi % / CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 18 April 1959 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC II. ASIA-AFRICA Iraq: Communist pressures have resulted in a num- ber of-Frsonnel changes in important Iraqi government 012, posts, and a major revision of the Iraqi cabinet is reported to be impending. (Page 1) Ba hdad Pact - Iraq - Afghanistan: During a meeting of the Baghdad Council of Deputies on 14 April, both Iran and Pakistan voiced "grave concern" over events in Iraq and the Afghan arms build-up. Iran fears the possible for- mation of a Middle East version of the Warsaw Pact, linking Iraq, Afghanistan, and the USSR. Iranian and Pakistani ex- pressions of concern are probably prompted in part by the 0 ' desire for firmer Western security guarantees and for addi- tional military aid. Pakistan is considering whether to re- spond to Nasirfs attempted mobilization of Islamic forces against Communist penetration) Tunisia-UAR: LThe Tunisian and UAR governments have agreed to accept Moroccan mediation of their differences as a means of bringing about the active participation of Tunisia in the Arab League, according to the Moroccan ambassador ,A in Baghdad. Moroccan Crown Prince Moulay Hassan, who V. arrived in Cairo on 20 April for a ten-day visit, is expected to artici ate in tl_pp37strotmd of mediation talks) (Page ) (Page 2) 5,� 7_�. t� AApproved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03156038 7 A ,v4r 4 'Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03156038 14.0, III. THE WEST \A� pp Caribbean: A group of Latin American liberals agreed at a meeting in Costa Rica with former President Jose Figueres that the Communist threat in Cuba is of alarming proportions. Referring also to Communist activities in Venezuela and Costa Rica, Gonzalo Facio, Figueres' chief adviser, said he and many of the others feel that the "current crisis in the Carib- bean is the greatest in Latin American history." While this evaluation may be somewhat overdrawn, the fears expressed are generally justified. (Page 4) Panama: Panamanian officials continue to be alarmed over repariCirman imminent invasion." Guatemalan President Ydi- goras states that Panama has sought military assistance to pre- vent an invasion of "two boats carrying 300 men each" for the purpose of carrying out a "Communist attack." The Guate- malan President asked the US chief of MAAG for permission to assist Panama with aircraft as well as military equipment, including that from the battalion supplied under the US military assistance program. Panama also has requested some $100,000 worth of small arms and ammunition from the US Embassy in Panama. The Panamanian officials fear that the national guard could not resist an invasion and fear the chaos that would follow any invasion attempt. There has been plotting by dissident Panamanians in Cuba, but there is no confirmation that any ships have actually left for Panama. Panamanian Communists have not been active in the plotting in Cuba but would take advantage of disorders in Panama caused by an invasion attempt. rance: enc s1. smatic representatives have re- ceived a strong .y worded directive to pose to France's friends a choice between friendship with France or tolerance of Alge- rian rebel activities on their soil. France has already in- formed the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia it will break relations if Moscow and Belgrade recognize the rebel provisional govern- ment. French military leaders have been pressing for a "diplo- matic campaign" to complement the military victory they main- tain they have achieved in Algeria.) (Page 5) 18 Apr 59 DAILY BRIEF 11 SECRET /Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO3-15603/K/ Z/ W/ F,.///7- Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03156038 ;/, , IX/ Netherlands: &he new coalition governments expected to be installed soon, after more than a month of negotiating, will be further to the right than its predecessor and may take a stiffer attitude against Western arms sales to Indonesia. Dutch officials have already warned that intended shipments of air- craft from the United States and other NATO countries may result in increased pressures for a defense build-up in West New Guinea at the expense of the Netherlands' NATO commit- ments.) (Page 6) 18 Apr 59 DAILY BRIEF iii � / me/ ;/1:/)proved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO3156038 //r/#.: Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03156038 v.po' Nur' I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC (No Back-Up Material) IL ASIA-AFRICA Personnel Changes in Iraqi Government Communist pressures, aimed at gradually consolidating the party's influence in the Iraqi Government, have resulted in a number of further personnel changes in important posts. Anti-Communist, National Democrat Husayn Jamil has been ousted as minister of guidance, and on 17 April Baghdad an- nounced his appointment as ambassador to Iran. His brother, Talib Jamil� is still technically director general of the Eco- nomic Ministry but states that he has been on "a month's va- cation which may last several months." On 16 April Baghdad announced the resignation of three senior Foreign Ministry officials. The Iraqi Communist press has assailed Foreign Minister Jawad himself, and is berating the ministry for appointing All Haider Sulaiman as ambassador to the United States. Two directors general of the Social Af- fairs Ministry have been removed in quick succession, and Communist newspapers are calling for the elimination from this ministry of "large numbers of conspirators and enemies of the republic." The government has decided to enlarge the cabinet from 16 to 20 ministerial posts by abolishing the Ministry of Devel- opment and creating five new specialized economic ministries. There are persistent reports that a Communist party member will be named to head at least one of these. The present min- isters of interior, finance, agriculture, education, foreign af- fairs, and social affairs may resign soon. The Communists, who have had little direct representation in the cabinet, are reported to be particularly anxious to obtain control of the Interior and Foreign ministries, as well as to re- place Brigadier al-Abdi as military governor general of Iraq. Pro-Communist Brigadier Farid Dhia Mahmoud was recently named acting deputy chief of staff for operations following the arrest of Brigadier Shakir Mahmoud Shukri, CONFIDENTIAL CFNTRAI IKITFI I IC,FNCF RIII I FTINI Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03156038 Approved for Release�: 202-070/21 C03156038 Iran and Pakistan Again Express Concern Over Developments In Iraq and Afghanistan Aran and Pakistan, during a meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council of Deputies on 14 April in Ankara, again expressed alarm over recent developments in Iraq and grave concern over the "mounting hostility of Afghanistan." Their statements reflect a feeling of growing encirclement by hostile powers, but may be motivated to some degree by a ,desire for additional military equipment and Western guarantee,9 6La,n referred to the shipment of Soviet arms to Afghan- istan and to the thinness of its defenses on Afghanistan's border. It expressed fear that Iraq and Afghanistan might link themselves with the USSR in a Middle East version of the Warsaw Pact and urged action to reduce Iraq's reliance on the Soviet Union. Pak- istan suggested the possibility that the USSR co 4d use Afghan- istan as a base to conduct "aggression by proxy. akistan is considering whether it should respond to Nasir's call to mobilize the resources of Islam against Communist pen- etration of the Middle East, Great Britain,, on the other hand, considers Nasir's activities dangerous because they are pushing Qasim toward the Communists,and both Britain and Turkey stated that they still regard Qasim as the best hope for Iraq.) 18 Apr 59 CENTRAL INTEH inFKR-F RI III FT11�1 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03156038 Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03156038 Nor" Nue Morocco May Be Able to Mediate Tunisian-UAR Differences he Tunisian and UAR governments have agreed to accept Moro can mediation of their differences as a means of return- ing Tunisia to active participation in the Arab League, accord- ing to the Moroccan ambassador in Baghdad. Moroccan Crown Prince Moulay Hassan, who visited Tunis earlier this month and will arrive in Cairo on 20 April for a ten-day visit, is expected to participate in the first round of mediation talks. Tunisia broke diplomatic relations with the UAR last Octo- ber a er a long-standing dispute arising from UAR President Nasir's support for Tunisian President Bourguiba's rival, ex- iled former Neo-Destour Secretary General Salah ben Youssef. Failing to find support within the Arab League for his sharp criticism of Nasir's tactics, Bourguiba has not participated in league sessions for six months. Early this month, however, he indicated he was willing to participate in the Beirut meeting of Arab League foreign ministers "if this meeting really intends to solve disputes, including ours with the UAR." Failing such assurances, Tunisia did not attend the Beirut meeting. On other occasions, he has indicated a willingness to patch up his 'quarrel with Nasir on condition that UAR facilities afforded Ben Youssef be withdrawn) Bourguiba and Nasi; at the urging of other Arab states, nota ly Lebanon and Morocco, may welcome steps toward some sort of rapprochement. In his dispute with Iraq, Nasir is par- ticularly in need of as much support in the Arab world as he can muster. Relations between the two governments, however, are unlikely to be cordial, and the two leaders will continue to vie both for leadership in the Arab world and for the exertion of max- imum influence over the Algerian rebels) -CONFIDENTIAL 18 Apr 59 CENTRAL INTFI I IC;FNCF Rill I FTIN Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 003156038 Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/05721 C03156038 Nere Nei III. THE WEST Communist Threat in Caribbean Area The Communist threat in the Caribbean area is considered alarming by a group of Latin American and US liberals meeting in Costa Rica with former President Jose Figueres. The groups, which includes representatives of Figueres' National Libera- tion party (PLN) and of Venezuelan President Betancourt's Dem- ocratic Action party (AD), is particularly concerned over Corn- munist penetration of the Cuban Government. Figueres and Betancourt are justified in their fear that Communist-controlled Nicaraguan and Dominican revolutionary groups, which have been sympathetically received and encour- aged by Cuban officials, will spread Communism throughout the area. Gonzalo Facio, Figueres' right-hand man, referred to Communist activities in Venezuela and Costa Rica and told US Ambassador Willauer that he and many others at the meeting feel the "eurrent Caribbean crisis is the greatest in Latin Amer- ican history." The group meeting in Costa Rica represents some of the most influential elements in the democratic, antidictator cam- paign in Latin America, which the Communists are trying to penetrate. The leftist but non-Communist PLN and AD gave Castro moral and material support during his long struggle against the Batista dictatorship, but now have become disillusioned. However, Costa Rican Communist leader Manuel Mora, just back from a visit in Cuba, delivered a lengthy speech on 15 April de- fending all aspects of the Castro regime and violently attacking Figueres as a tool of the American Embassy. The anti-Communist potential of the Cuban middle-class elements, who are influential in the Castro administration, is strong and the press has recently shown increased awareness of the Communist threat. One paper identified the Communists as the real counterrevolutionaries in Cuba today. -SECRET- 18 Apr 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03156038 Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03156038 No" France Steps J.lp Diplomatic Offensive Against Algerian Rebels France has issued circular instructions in imperative ter i&' to French diplomatic representatives to pose a choice between friendship with France and the Algerian rebels to all governments extending material aid or tolerating rebel activ- ities on their soil The instructions call for strong demarches� a protest to the UN secretary general against rebel activity at .5 UN headquarters, moves to counter FLN ropagancla� and in- creased pressure on Tunisia and Morocco. 6_)e Gaulle personally has informed the Soviet and Yugoslav ambassadors that France NVill braak relations if Moscow and Bel- grade recognize the Algerian rebel provisional government. De Gaulle and other French officials have bitterly charged US "encouragement" of the rebels, and most recently have pro- tested their admission into the United States. When De Gaulle withdrew the French Mediterranean fleet from NATO wartime control, French spokesmen said the move was made because of the lack of a common Western policy on North Africa) (While the circular states that De Gaulle's cease-fire offer still holds, the tougher French line reflects Paris' feeling that the real struggle with the rebels now is outside Algeria. It anticipates continued French military occupation of Algeria for a long period, although French military leaders argue that they have broken the armed rebellion. They are pressing the govern- ment to discourage the rebels' efforts to win support abroad) SECRET 18 Apr 59 CFSJTRAI INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03156038 Approved for Release: 10070-2/21 C03156038 �4011 New Dutch Government Expected Soon A new Dutch coalition governments including Catholic, Pro estant, and Liberal parties and headed by Catholic Prof. J. Dequay, is expected to be installed within the next week after over a month of negotiations. The Labor party, which precipitated the 12 March national elections by withdrawing from Prime Minister Drees' cabinet in December, now will be in the opposition. The new government will be further to the right than the Drees cabinet, in which elements of the Labor party exercised a moderating influence, and is even more deeply committed to Dutch retention of West New Guinea. It is prepared, if necessary, to weaken the Netherlands' con- tribution to NATO to support this stand and will probably pro- test more strongly against arms sales t&Indonesia by the United States and other NATO countries 61 _lie Dutch representative at a NATO committee meeting in Paris on 14 April, in fact, warned of severe political reper- cussions in The Hague if the United States proceeds with pro- jected shipments of C-130-B transports and other arms to Indonesia and said, in off-the-record comments, that popular and parliamentary support for NATO would inevitably deteri- orate. Defense build-up in West New Guinea, he said, would have to be at the expense of Dutch NATO commitments, sin_c5 over-all defense expenditures are not likely to be increased. 61_Irther expression of Dutch resentment over Western de- liveries of military items to Indonesia may be expected at the next NATO committee meeting on 21 April. As evidence of the danger of Indonesian aggression, the Dutch may produce a list of military items including parachutes, for which Lakartais reported to have been shopping "all over the world.' -SE�RE-T- 18 Apr 59 r"LkITI5 A I WI-MI InFl�ICF RI II I FTIN Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03156038 Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03156038 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of the Interior The Secretary of the Interior The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director United States Information Agency The Director -PFA1F444C-441-7'r-A-1,� Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03156038 ZZ/Zr/r/ZZZ/Zri FrZZ/1/ "Approved for Release. 2020/02/21 C0315603_3" /1".TOP SKLI -TOP-SECRET- 7,-Arimmimm,Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03156038VMMZ/ZMAe pJ