CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/03/01

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
03156602
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RIPPUB
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U
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22
Document Creation Date: 
January 27, 2020
Document Release Date: 
January 30, 2020
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Publication Date: 
March 1, 1958
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ZApproved for Release: 2019/08/20 156602/ TOP SECRET 3.3(h)' ej.:7� i) 3.5(c) 1 March 1958 Copy No. 137 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO NO CHANCE IN CLASS. i LT.CLASSFIE:D IEVEW DA CLASS. CHANCED TO: TS S F TE: czi 6 DATE. TIEVIEVVER -T-OP-SfeR-E-T- Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03156602e Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03156602 Aft II VII� QMOVIIIG 01146 .111. " Ir. rove Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03156602 1 MARCH 1958 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Unusual lull in Soviet air activity see special Watch Committee meeting conclusion, Page 1. USSR agrees to foreign ministers' conference to prepare for summit talks. Saud gives first formal audience to Soviet diplomat. II. ASIA-AFRICA French and Tunisian differences could lead to new incidents as heavy fighting with Algerian rebels con- tinues near Tunisian border. Indonesia - Djakarta continues preparations for attack on Sumatra. Iran - Shah greatly disturbed over alleged conspiracy against him; tension mounts as leaders are arrested. Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C031156602 -TOP SECRET \\ 0 Morocco believes itself near con- flict with St-Jain, but pushes for annexation of additional Saharan regions. III. THE WEST Two cabinet resignations weaken Greek Government. London - Labor party, trades unions plan joint national cam- paign on disarmament and East- West talks. New Guatemalan president will begin term on 2 March hampered by bitter partisan rivalries. TrUI gFrPFT Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03156602 ' N \ n Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03156602' \ , t, ---, 4 4 h CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN ** N N .1 1 March 1958 i q\\ \ :.\.� 5'Z \ DAILY BRIEF ,,-,,. s a \i'yefii .�;:-.= 6 \ I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC ,...,,. . ]%\N iss A N iI ! ::. 1\ \ ., . ; ,x,. :..'\k l' \ ', ,: .�,., N: N :.\\N., t ; -\\ ,..,: \ ,,..N -N- ' N N ,.s, , k--, - N , . \\ A m ,, ,,-,: Lull in Soviet air activity,: The Watch Committee of the Intelligence Advisory Committee met on 28 Feb- ruary 1958 to consider an unusual lull in Soviet air activity. After examining all available evidence, the Watch Committee recommended no change in its con- clusion of 27 Februkry 1958 which stated that there was no indication of Sino-Soviet intention to initiate hostilities. The lack of Soviet air activity remains the subject of close scrutiny by the intelligence com- munity. (Page 1) *USSR... Summit talks: Moscow has abandoned its adamant opposition to a foreign ministers' confer- ence to prepare for summit talks. Gromyko has given an aide -memoire to Ambassador Thompson proposing a meeting on this level in April to work out an agenda for a summit conference, determine its composition, and fix its time and place. Page 2) Soviet approach to King Saud: The USSR is prob- ably using the 27 February visit to King Saud by the Soviet ambassador to Syria to make exploratory of- fers of Soviet support and to request the establish- ment of formal relations. Saud has previously been firm in to �do business with the Soviet Union. (Page 3) TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03156602 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03156602 TOP SECRET IL ASIA-AFRICA France-Tunisia: A member of Foreign Minister Pineau's personal staff warns that "serious incidents" are inevitable if the Tunisian blockade of French gar- risons is not alleviated "within a maximum of two weeks." Although France's top political and military leaders are committed to try to maintain strict con- trol, the possibility of further incidents has been in- creased by Bourguiba's recent public statements and heavy fighting in Algeria near the Tunisian border. If the impasse continues much longer, Bourguiba will take his case back to the UN Security Council, and serious disorders inside Tunisia may erupt. (Page 4) (Map) Indonesia: The Djakarta government is continuing its preparations for an invasion of Central Sumatra, which the dissident EI believe is imminent. These troops would presumably De moved inland to 13upport paratroop forces which Djakarta apparently plans to drop in the area of the oil center of Pakanbart[. (Page 5) (Map) Iranian conspiracy: The Shah is greatly disturbed over an alleged conapiracy headed by General Gharani which aimed at forclng the Shah into a purely titular role. Gharani, former army G-2, is under arrest and awaiting secret trial. An all-out government- directed press campaign against the "conspirators who have secret meetings with foreigners" has been launched. The atmosphere in Tehran is rapidly be- coming more tense as arrests are announced and as rumors spread that many others are under suspicion. (Page 6) 1 Mar 58 DAILY BRIEF ii TOP SECRET ::Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03156602r � Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03156602 I %.11- Ef 1..0-1=7 51.0 timowl Morocco: The government apparently believes it may be on the verge of conflict with Spain, The King has instructed his cabinet to continue efforts to annex large portions of French- and Spanish-controlled regions of the Sahara. (Page 7) In. THE WEST Greek Government: The resignation of two prominent Greek cabinet ministers opens a period of political un- certainty which could result in the fall of the Karamanlis government. The resignations, in any event, will tempo- rarily weaken the government and restrict its maneuver- ability on international problems such as Cyprus. (Page 8) Britain: Recent Labor party trends point to possible intensification of pressures on the Macmillan government to show further initiatives on disarmament and East-West Issues. A group of some 70 Labor MP's is advocating that Britain renounce nuclear weapons and missile bases. With- out going this far, the party and trade union leaderships are planning a joint national campaign this spring on disarma- ment questions. (Page 9) Guatemala: Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes, who starts his six-year presidential term on 2 March, will be hampered in his efforts to restore political stability by bitter partisan rivalries and divisions among his own supporters. His ap- pointment of a moderate leftist, Carlos Garcia Bauer, as foreign minister has already aroused opposition within his own party. (Page 10) 1 Mar 58 DAILY BRIEF iii -TOP-SEGRE-T \����� 1 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03156602 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03156602 Aft :OP SECRET I. THE: COMMUNIST BLOC Findings of a Special Watch Committee Meeting, 28 February 1958 The apparent low level pf Soviet air activity which has been evi- dent since 23 February has affected in varying degree all Soviet as well as satellite military ai!7 units. The lull is of a greater scope than would be warranted by either weather factors or maintenance requirements after the exceptionally high level of activity during the past week, although additional influencing factors are present in the armed forces holiday of 23 February and in the expected communications change on 1 March. The USSR has encounte::.ed no major internal or diplomatic re- verses recently which might prompt the USSR to resort to hostilities to achieve 'Its objectives and the evidence available concerning naval, ground forces, Iogislic, internal or clandestine preparations does not denote a concerted effort by the USSR to improve its gen- eral readiness for early hostilities. We know of no US or Allied actions which would prompt the Soviets to assume a ready posture which, in the air context, might be reflected in a maintenance standdown. Thus, the low level of Soviet flying could be attributed to a pre- planned period of inactivity which has no relation to hostilities; it could also be preparatory to forward deployment for attack, but this cannot be supported by avai..able evidence. (It is possible, though not probable, that a forward deployment could be taking place under radio silence.) Therefore, while the Watch Committee does not recommend a change in either Conclusion A. or B., the intelligence community is maintaining a condition of special watchfulness, CONCLUSIONS A. and B. from Watch Report No. 395, 19-26 February 1958: A. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the continental US or its possessions in the im- mediate future. B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against US forces abroad, US allies, or areas peripheral to the orbit in the immediate future. 1.1.4a-SECITirT 1 Mar 58 ������� A I IA ITO., I I I.RIA I nil II I r�ruh. Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03156602 Pagel Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03156602 USSR Agrees to Foreign Ministers' Conference to Prepare for Summit Talks The USSR has abandoned its adamant opposition to a foreign ministers' conference and has proposed discussions on this level for April 1958 limited to questions relating to the "organizational side of preparation of a meeting at the summit." Presentation of the proposal in an aide-memoire to the US ambassador probably was designed to meet President Eisenhower's call for an end to "repetitive public debate" and his suggestion that the impasse in the summit exchange "can be broken by less formal and less pub- licized contacts...." The foreign ministers, according to Gromyko, should work out an agenda for the summit conference, determine its composi- tion, and fix its time and place. He asserted that "approximately" the same countries should be represented in the foreign ministers talks as will participate in the summit, meeting and offered two alternatives: all members of NATO arid the Warsaw Pact, plus such neutrals as India, Afghanistan, Egypt, Yugoslavia, Sweden and Austria; or a "narrower" conference to include the United States, Britain, France, Italy, the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania, plus India, Yugoslavia, and Sweden. Gromyko gave no hint of future Soviet insistence on Chinese Communist participation. The Soviet foreign minister repeated Bulganin's nine-point agenda proposals but added a new item entitled "conclusion of a German peace treaty." This apparently was intended as a "con- cession" to Western insistence that the German question must be discussed. He stated that representatives of the two German gov- ernments should participate in the discussion of this question. Gromyko, however, carefully drew a distinction between the peace treaty question and the unification issue. He repeated the long- established Soviet position that unification must be negotiated by the two German states alone and cannot be discussed at a summit meeting. Moscow may be preparing to put forward a draft peace treaty which would define the future international status of a reunified Germany. Its terms probably would include neutralization, ceil- ings on armed forces, withdrawal of foreign troops, and a prohibi- tion on nuclear weapons and missiles. SECRET 1 Mar 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03156602 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03156602 3t,L11r,/ Saud Gives First Fprmal Audience to Soviet Diplomat S. S. Nemchina, the Soviet ambassador to Syria, arrived in Riyadh from Damascus on 27 February in a plane sent by 1Cing Saud. The visit is the result of long Soviet efforts to establish direct relations with the King. In mid-January, Nemchina requested an audience with Saud but was turned down. He then said he wished to deliver a personal message from Premier Bulganin. At that time Saud assured the Am- erican ambassador that whether he saw Nemchina or not, his policy toward the USSR and Communism would in no way change. Saud will probably reiterate these sentiments fol- lowing the visit of lhe Soviet envoy. He has indicated that he will keep the United States fully informed about any message he receives from the USSR. Moscow is probably hopeful that Saudi Arabia's economic difficul- ties and differences with the West over the Gulf of Aqaba will make Saud more amenable to fuller rela- tions with the bloc. SECRET 1 Mar 58 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03156602 Page 3 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03156602 TUNISIA FRENCH TROOP DISPOSITIONS Bone � Constantine BIZERTE �13000 TUNIS. 2850 � MEDJEZ ILeA13 420 - eGAFSA 580 GABES. 1560 � MARETH 440 ALGERIA 1 MARCH 1958 Miles � SFAX 680 1700 IN AREA REMDA 200 ITALY TRIPOLITANIA LIBYA 80228 3 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03156602 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03156602 11-# Uri VI .1.1L/A:41 1_e1.a4 Nor NMI IL ASIA-AFRICA New� French-Tunisian Incidents Foreseen A member of French Foreign Minister Pineauis per- sonal staff has warned American representatives in Paris that "serious incidents" are inevitable if Anglo-American good offices cannot relax the confinement of isolated French garrisons in Tunisia to their barracks within a maxi- mum of two weeks. The spokesman stated that there was "a limit beyond which even the best troops will not take such treatment," - particularly since they could force their way through the blockade "without undue difficulty." In view of France's interest in facilitating the progress of the good offices mission while attempting to avert con- sideration of the Algerian situation, French political and military authorities are expected to try to maintain strict control over their troops. Nevertheless, the adamant position adopted publicly by Bourguiba, who is now blamed by Paris for all France's Algerian difficulties, together with the heavy border fighting between French and well- equipped and -trained rebel units crossing from Tunisia, increases the possibility of incidents in the near future. If the present impasse continues much longer, Bour- gniba will press his case in the UN Security Council, and serious disorders are likely to erupt in Tunisia. -CONFIDENTIAL 1 Mar 58 CENTRAI INTFI I inFtqc-F RI II I FTIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03156602 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03156602 Name MEDAN � SIAK R PAKANBARU. � BUKITTINGGI PADANG SUMATRA 1 MARCH 1958 1110 210 300 400 MILES TANDJUNGPINANG RIAU IS. PALEM BANG. -c) DJAKARTA J A Vc.sik 80228 4 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03156602 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03156602 'Ii zt, rt ic Invasion of Central Sumatra May Be Imminent A military invasion of Central Sumatra by troops loyal to the Djakarta government may be imminent. The Indonesian naval commander in the Riau area off the east coast of Central Sumatra informed Djakarta on 21 Feb- ruary that he would be prepared on the 26th to begin re- ceiving troops "provided they proceed direct to their posi- tions." These troops presumably would be moved up the Siak River to defend the oil center of Pakanbaru which, accord- ing to the army chief of staff's reported plan, is to be seized by paratroopers. The recent Chartering of com- mercial aircraft by Djakarta may have been for the purpose of assisting the air force to carry out this operation. The operation against Pakanbaru probably would coincide with an amphibious landing on the west coast by several army battalions with instructions to capture the rebel strongholds of Padang and Bukittinggi. The rebels expect to be attacked in the "next few days," and are preparing their defenses. They have a long coast line to defend, however, and it is questionable that they have sufficient forces to repulse a government landing. The dissidents may also be harassed from the rear by irregular forces, particularly by paramilitary groups drawn from among Javanese plantation workers affiliated with SOBSI, the Communist-dominated labor federation. the Commu- nists are infiltrating agents into Central Sumatra from the north to serve as guerrillas as well as to attempt the kidnaping and execution of dissident leaders. TOP SECRET 1 Mar 58 CFKITRAI IKITFI I IICZFKICF RI III FTIKI Page 5 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03156602 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03156602 -Awe low Shahof Iran Moving Vigorously Against Conspiracy The Shah is moving quickly against an alleged con- spiracy of army and political leaders, headed by the army intelligence chief, General Valiollah Gharani, to reduce the Shah to a figurehead. Announcement of more than 30 arrests and rumors of many additional suspects are increasing nervousness in Tehran. Adding to the stress is an intensive press campaign, being conducted under the direction of the National Information and Se- curity Agency, against conspirators who are accused of covertly meeting with foreigners. The Gharani group was known to be conspiring last June, but its plot against the Shah was not implemented because it failed to obtain desired support. Action was then planned for March 1958, to begin with a series of interpellations in the Parliament designed to bring a no- confidence vote, after which the Shah would be forced to accept a new prime minister responsible to the Majlis-- presumably Gharani himself. The current arrests, which included Gharani, may have paralyzed the group since its security, compartmentation, and communications have been poor. Dissatisfaction with the Shah's personal direction of the government is growing and, regardless of the degree to which he destroys the potential of this coalition, he will probably be faced in the future with conspiracies of an increasingly desperate nature, 1 Mar 58 CFNTRAI INITFI I ICZFKICP RI II I FTI1�1 Page 6 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03156602 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03156602 1.1-Li 1 Nome The Moroccan Situation The Moroccan Government believes that it may be onAhe verge of conflict with Spaiii:because of Spanish military activities in Ifni and Spanish Sahara, iess,. tfle icing nas in- structed his cabinet to proceed with its efforts to annex large portions of the Sahara controlled by France and Spain. The King initiated this campaign on 25 February when he declared that Morocco will press "for the re- turn of our Sahara." The president of the Moroccan Consultative Assembly, who is emerging as one of the outstanding leaders of the dominant Istiqlal party, has indicated that initially Morocco expects to acquire the Tindouf area of western Algeria as well as Spanish-held Southern Morocco. Madrid takes a serious view oi the King's "'naked claim" to Spanish African territory, and implied that a negotiated settle- ment with Morocco on the relinquishment of Southern Morocco is unlikely at present. SECRET 1 Mar 58 CA�p'pr�ov�e'd'fol7�'14�el�e.a.s.e72-01.678/11U071k602 Page 7 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03156602 Nor III. THE WEST Greek Cabinet Resignations The resignations on 27 February of Minister of Trade and Industry Panagiotis Papaligouras and Min- ister of Public Works George Rallis will probably lead to a period of confusion and uncertainty in the Greek Government. The resignations are not likely to cause its fall at this time, but may temporarily weaken it to sucha point that it would hesitate to push forward on such foreign policy issues as a Cyprus settlement. Papaligouras and Rallis, both energetic and ambitious young moderates, had threatened previous- ly to resign. Papaligouras has been dissatisfied ever since he assumed office in early 1956. The immediate cause of the resignations was the authoritarian way in which Prime Minister Kararnanlis presented a new electoral law to his cabinet. There may have been other reasons, however, such as an imminent re- shuffling of the cabinet, which Karamanlis reportedly has been planning for some time. Karamanlis' party, the National Radical Union (ERE), controls 164 of 300 seats iri the Greek Chamber of Deputies. Even if Papaligouras and Rallis leave the ERE and secure the defection of other members, it is unlikely that they can draw enough adherents to bring down the government. In addition, Karamanlis may be negotiating with opposition leaders in,order to strengthen his position -SECRET- 1 Mar 58 CAPPI:CT;ed-for:'Rjlef01-976.865 C0315.6602 Page �8 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03156602 ILL,/ tr 113.E4/ N New British Labor Plans New Assault on Disarmament Policy The British Labor party and the trade union movement are planning a joint campaign to demand a greater British initiative in seeking international agreement on disarma- ment and disengagement. The Macmillan government's susceptibility to such public pressure is illustrated by a government spokesman's remark on 27 February that mis- sile sites would not be completed before any summit meet- ing in the near future. The Labor party and the Trades' Union Congress are preparing a joint policy statement which endorses the Gaitskell plan for a neutral zone in Central Europe and calls for a unilateral British suspension of thermonuclear testing for a limited period and a disarmament agreement in several stages beginning with test suspension. A splinter Labor group of some 70 Members of Parliament demands an even more radical approach, proposing a ban on the use and production of nuclear weapons and complete rejection of missile bases in Britain. While this split may hurt the party's public standing, the group will provide a focus for more far-reaching attacks on the government's defense and foreign policies. 1 Mar 58 CFNTRAI IKITFI I inFKirF RI III FTIN page 9 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03156602 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03156602 Ydigoras Will Have Difficulty Restoring Stability In Guatemala Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes, who is scheduled to as- sume the presidency of Guatemala for a six-year term on 2 March, will be hampered in his efforts to restore politi- cal stability by divisions among his own supporters and by bitter partisan rivalries. The 62-year-old Ydigoras won a plurality in the 19 January election more because of his personal appeal than because of any well-defined program. His followers range from extreme conservatives to moderate leftists, and he is certain to lose some support as his policies evolve. His cabinet and other appointments will also cause disillusionment among his supporters. His first appoint- ment, that of the moderate leftist Carlos Garcia Bauer to head the Foreign Ministry, has already caused consterna- tion in his party. Garcia is not a member of Ydigoras' party. Ydigoras is also obligated, by a postelection agree- ment with Jose Luis Cruz Salazar, one of his opponents in the election, to give some posts to Crug followers. The agreement is resented by many Ydigoras supporters. One of Ydigoras' party officials, the ambitious Roberto Barrios Pena, already plans to break with Ydigoras and set up his own party, Barrios says he doubts Ydigoras' ability to retain sufficient support to remain in power for long. The army will be likely to oust Ydigoras when ad if it becomes apparent that he has lost most of his present popular support. 1 Mar 58 rFKITRAI INITFI I IICZFKICF RI III FTIK1 Page 10 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03156602 4 Noe Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03156602 Nome DISTRIBUTION THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense Mobilization Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Operations Coordinating Board Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director United States Information Agency The Director Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03156602 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03156602 ur et.A.3ti, 1 Nue \ 11 CENTRAL INTELL IGENCE BULLETIN 1 March 1958 DAILY BRIEF L THE COMMUNIST BLOC Lull in Soviet air activity; The Watch Committee of the Intelligence Advisory Committee met on 28 Feb- ruary 1958 to consider an unusual lull in Soviet air activity. After examining all available evidence, the Watch Committee recommended no change in its con- clusion of 27 Februkry 1958 which stated that there was no indication of Sino-Soviet intention to initiate hostilities. The lack of Soviet air activity remains the subject of close scrutiny by the intelligence com- munity. (Page 1) *USSR... -Summit talks: Moscow arlbandoned its adamant opposition to a fore' ministers' confer- ence to prepare for summ ks. Gromyko has given an aide -memoire to assador Thompson proposing a meeting on thi vel in April to work out an agenda for a sum onference, determine s composition, and fix time and place. (Page 2) Soviet approach to King Saud: The USSR is prob- ably using the 27 February visit to King Saud by the Soviet ambassador to Syria to make exploratory of- fers of Soviet support and to request the establish- ment of formal relations. Saud has previously been firm in his refusal toll) business with the Soviet Union. (Page 3) II i=UtZ4, 7Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03156602 N ' Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03156602' *.,09 TOP SECRET Morocco: The government apparently believes may be on the verge of conflict with Spain, accor g to a confidant of the King. The King has inst ed his cabinet to continue efforts to annex large pr !ions of French- and Spanish-controlled regions �e Sahara. (SECRET NOFORN) (Page 7) THE ST Greek Government: T resignation of two prominent Greek cabinet ministers ns a period of political un- certainty which could re it in the fall of the Karamanlis government. The res nations, in any event, will tempo- rarily weaken the go rnment and restrict its maneuver- ability on internati& al problems such as Cyprus. (Page , Britain: 0Recent Labor party trends point to possible intensificatipn of pressures on the Macmillan government to show figiher initiatives on disarmament and East-West issues A group of some 70 Labor MP's is advocating that Britain renounce nuclear weapons and missile bases. With- ). out going this far, the party and trade union leaderships are planning a joint national campaign this spring on disarma- ment questions. (Page 9) Guatemala: Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes, who starts his six-year presidential term on 2 March, will be hampered in his efforts to restore political stability by bitter partisan rivalries and divisions among his own supporters. His ap- pointment of a moderate leftist, Carlos Garcia Bauer, as foreign minis eady aroused opposition within his own party. (Page 10) 1 Mar 58 DAILY BRIEF iii TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03156602L LI A �\\ \ Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03156602 vie Nor I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Findings of a Special Watch Committee Meeting, 28 February 1958 The apparent low level of Soviet air activity which has been evi- dent since 23 February has affected in varying degree all Soviet as well as satellite military air units. The lull is of a greater scope than would be warranted by either weather factors or maintenance requirements after the exceptionally high level of activity during the past week, although additional influencing factors are present in the armed forces holiday of 23 February and in the expected communications change on 1 March. The USSR has encountered no major internal or diplomatic re- verses recently which might prompt the USSR to resort to hostilities to achieve 'its obiSctives and the evidence available concerning naval, ground forces, logistic, internal or clandestine preparations does not denote a concerted effort by the USSR to improve its gen- eral readiness for early hostilities. We know of no US or Allied actions which would prompt the Soviets to assume a ready posture which, in the air context, might be reflected in a maintenance standdown. Thus2 the low level of Soviet flying could be attributed to a pre- planned period of inactivity which has no relation to hostilities; it could also be preparatory to forward deployment for attack, but this cannot be supported by available evidence. (It is possible, though not probable, that a forward deployment could be taking place under radio silence.), Therefore, while the Watch Committee does not recommend a change in either Conclusion A. or B., the intelligence community is maintaining a condition of special watchfulness, CONCLUSIONS A. and B. fP frWaretrIreintlia A. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the continental US or its possessions in the im- mediate future. B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against US forces abroad, US allies, or areas nerinheral to the orbit in the immediate futurp. TO RET 1 Mar 58 CENTRAI INITFI I l(ZFsiC I IIIprim Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03156602 Page 1