CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1955/01/30

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03157461
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: September 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2019
• Publication Date: January 30, 1955

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30 January 1955
Copy No. 9
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. t
NO CHANGE IN CLASS
1.1 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: '2.0
AUTH: FIR 70-2
DATE: 37;vs, t 0 REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Tf9-12-SEGLE:71
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Communist position on cease-fire in China area (page 3).
FAR EAST
2. Comment on Japanese reaction to recent Soviet overture (page 4).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. Comment on reported dissension in top rank of Burmese govern-
ment (page 5).
SOUTH ASIA
4. Ceylon's prime minister considering visit to Peiping (page 6).
NEAR EAST- AFRICA
5. Iraq "will stand firm" on proposed pact with Turkey (page 6).
EASTERN EUROPE
6. East� German officials reported highly disturbed at Soviet wooing of
West Germany (page 7).
WESTERN EUROPE
7. Bonn considering neo-Nazi to head projected air force (page 8).
8. French upper house delays fixing date for Paris accords debate
(page 8).
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GENERAL
I. Communist position on cease-fire in China area:
Chinese Communist Position
Chou En-laiis statements
eft room for Peiping to accept
an invitation from the UN Security Council to discuss the current
situation in the Chinese offshore islands area, but also suggest
that, if the Chinese Communists do attend, they are unlikely to
compromise on any major matter.
could not
agree to participate until he knew the terms of reference, but he
would welcome a discussion of American "intervention and aggres-
sion" against China. In view of the advantages that would seerii-to
accrue to Peiping from an airing of its charges against the United
States in the United Nations, and from an opportunity to gauge the
degree to which the United States and its major allies are prepared
to compromise, it seems possible that Peiping will decide to at-
tend.
As regards the terms of a possible settle-
ment, Peiping would not agree to a cease-
fire and would not distinguish between the minor offshore islands
on one hand and Formosa and the Pescadores on the other. Chou
emphasized that Peiping would not agree to any bargaining over
the islands.
It had been speculated that Peiping might
perceive certain advantages in agreeing to a cease-fire and to in-
definite postponement of a Formosa operation--which the Chinese
Communists do not appear prepared to undertake at this time in
any case--in exchange for such concessions as control over the
lesser offshore islands, reduction of economic pressures against
the regime, and progress toward obtaining a seat in the United
Nations. Although Chou has left an opening for a de facto agree-
ment along such lines, his remarks indicate that a formal settle-
ment in the near future is only a marginal possibility.
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Soviet Position
Molotov, while maintaining a Soviet posture of moderation
in the affair, reiterated the validity of Peiping's claim to Formosa
and charged all existing tension in the area was solely due to the
"aggressive action of American forces and their support or use
of Chiang Kai-shek and his clique." While Molotov did not com-
pletely rule out UN mediation, the Soviet press is charging that
UN action sponsored by America's allies is simply a device for
cloaking American intervention in internal Chinese affairs. This
line leaves Moscow free to back Peiping in accepting or rejecting
an invitation to the Security Council discussions.
The USSR also appeared to be attempting ,
to isolate the United States on this issue.
This tactic was also in-
dicated by the reported remarks of a Soviet delegate at the UN
that if the United States had not taken congressional action toward
unilateral guarantees on Formosa, the Pescadores, and related
areas, Moscow would have supported UN action.
FAR EAST
2. Comment on Japanese reaction to recent Soviet overture:
The apparent reversal of the Japanese
government's earlier position that a
peace treaty is necessary before normal
relations can be re-established with the USSR is an indication that
Prime Minister Hatoyama may have overruled Foreign Minister
Shigemitsuo Evidence that the Foreign Ministry is no longer in
control of the situation is revealed by the fact that Hatoyama him-
self accepted the Soviet "note" on 25 January after Shigemitsu had
refused to do so.
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Shigemitsu announced on 29 January--
possibly at Hatoyama's insistence--that Japan would "consider"
talks aimed at restoring diplomatic relations with the Soviet
Union, if Moscow confirms that its recent approach is official.
Hatoyama has been described by the press as eager to start talks
as soon as possible. He has also reportedly stated that normali-
zation of relations is a "prerequisite" to a settlement of territo-
rial problems, rather than the reverse.
The Foreign Ministry is aware that in this
reversal Japan will lose its bargaining position vis -a-vis the Soviet
Union. Nevertheless, Hatoyama apparently views the talks as a
popular election issue which may enhance his prestige.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. Comment on reported dissension in top rank of Burmese govern-
ment:
Dissension among the top leaders of the
Burmese government has increased since
Premier Nu's return from Communist
China. This dissension, if it continues,
could endanger Burma's marked progress toward stability, which
has been largely the result of general agreement on policy among
Premier Nu and the two most influential leaders of the dominant
Socialist Party, Minister of Industries Kyaw Nyein and Defense
Minister Ba Swe.
Kyaw Nyein, the most outspokenly anti-
Communist of the Burmese leaders, reportedly feels that Nu was
too much taken in by the Chinese Communists and has chided the
Burmese ambassador to Peiping, now in Rangoon, for encouraging
Nu to assume a "peacemaker" role.
Kyaw Nyein
has threatened to resign following charges of graft made against
him by the premier. He is also said to be in trouble with Defense
Minister Ba Swe and other of his Socialist colleagues.
In any showdown, Nu's hand will be
strengthened by the Burmese public's enthusiasm for his "accom-
plishments" in Peiping.
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SOUTH ASIA
4. Ceylon's prime minister considering visit to Peiping:
Prime Minister Kotelawala of Ceylon
is considering accepting an invitation
to visit Peiping. He told Ambassador
Crowe in Colombo that the invitation
was extended by Chou En-la,i last October, following trade talks
between Ceylon and Communist China. The ambassador believes
Kotelawala wants to go to Peiping, probably after the Afro-Asian
conference in April.
Comment: Kotelawala has insisted that
Ceylon is interested in Communist China only as a market for rub-
ber.
Peiping might press for the establishment
of diplomatic relations with Ceylon, and perhaps also for the con-
clusion of a nonaggression understanding similar to those it has
with India and Burma.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. Iraq "will stand firm" on proposed pact with Turkey:
Iraqi prime minister Nun i Said has given
Turkish prime minister Menderes "cate-
gorical reassurances" that Iraq "will
continue to stand firm" on its proposed
pact with Turkey regardless of the out-
come of the Cairo conference of Arab
prime ministers, according to the secre-
tary general of the Turkish Foreign Office.
Nun i Said plans to obtain general parlia-
mentary approval early in February and to "finalize and sign the
pact thereafter." He is expecting Turkish counterproposals to the
Iraqi draft within the "next day or two."
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The Turkish Foreign Office contemplates
a text which will be more specific than the Turkish-Pakistani pact
but less so than the Balkan pact. The Turkish charg�n Damascus
told Ambassador Moose on 21 January that an unsigned draft agreed
on at Baghdad during the Nuri-Menderes talks provided for, among
other things, staff talks on mutual defense during peacetime, and
consultation and free transit of war material in case of war.
Comment: Because of Nun's firm control
of the domestic situation,Thi�le-e�m�s to have been rendered immune
to the current strong Egyptian-Saudi Arabian attack against him.
The coming weeks are therefore the most propitious time for him
to consummate the proposed agreement with Turkey.
EASTERN EUROPE
6. East German officials reported highly disturbed at Soviet wooing of
West Germany:
East
German officials are highly disturbed
at the recent Soviet move to end the
state of war with Germany and espe-
cially at the possibility that diplomatic relations might be estab-
lished between the Soviet Union and West Germany. Soviet am-
bassador Pushkin reportedly has informed the East German lead-
ers that Moscow's declaration of peace was formulated suddenly
by the central committee of the Soviet Communist Party and not
by the Foreign Ministry.
As a consequence of this declaration, or-
ders were given to discontinue harassment tactics against West
Berlin and West Germany.
Comment: The developing Soviet em-
phasis on wooing West Germany probably has caused East German
leaders to fear that Moscow might replace them with officials more
acceptable to the West. East German leaders probably will resent
any move which appears to deprive East Germany of its claim to
represent all of Germany.
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It would not be unusual for the party
leadership rather than the Foreign Ministry to make the basic
decision on this matter0
strict
controls at check points between East and West Germany, which
were imposed in December, have recently been relaxed.
WESTERN EUROPE
7. Bonn considering neo-Nazi to head projected air force:
Former Luftwaffe major general Adolph
Galland is being seriously considered as
chief of the projected West German air
force, according to Ambassador Conant.
Comment: There have been widely dis-
seminated press reports that the controversial General Galland
would head the projected West German air force.
Galland served until recently as a tech-
nical adviser to the Argentine air force, and is reported to have
been very active in neo-Nazi groups conducting propaganda in
Argentina against the Bonn government. He is also alleged to
have made several trips to West Germany where he made con-
tact with neo-Nazi groups. He is said to believe that a revival
of nazism in Germany is both inevitable and desirable, and to
feel that this objective can best be served by co-operation, at
least temporarily, with the Western powers.
His appointment would tend to increase
the domestic opposition to German rearmament.
8. French upper house delays fixing date for Paris accords debate:
Consideration of the Paris accords by
the French Council of the Republic will
be delayed several days beyond the
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8 February date originally anticipated, according to the American
embassy in Paris. The council has scheduled a North Africa de-
bate for 8 February.
Mendes-France's personal spokesman
assured American officials that the premier is "keenly aNyare"
of the importance of speedy council action, and admitted that
Mendes- France was slightly worried by his failure to get the
council to set a specific date for the accords debate.
Center and rightist leaders are press-
ing for an amendment' by the Council. This would require the
National Assembly to take up the issue again.
Comment: Once the two bills on the
accords are released from comnatee, the council will probably
complete consideration within a week, and is still expected to
approve the accords without change. There is growing interest
among both Socialist and conservative senators in amending the
bills, however. Such a move would automatically return the bills
to the assembly, where final action could be postponed indefinitely.
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