CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/04/05

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Keywords: 2018 Sanitization
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03160439
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: April 5, 1957

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5 April 1957
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CONTE:NTS
POSSIBLE SOVIET PREPARATIONS FOR FLIGHT TESTING
OF INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE OR EARTH
SATELLITE (page 3).
42. BRITISH URGE IMMEDIATE SECURITY COUNCIL MEET-
ING ON SUEZ page 5)0K Of 60
e 11,8 SUKARNO ANNOUNCES HE WILL FORM INDONESIAN CAB-
INET (page 6).
4. LATEST SOVIET NUCLEAR TEST
ADEN-YEMEN DEVELOPMENTS
14
61160 THE NEW IRANIAN CABINET
(page 7).
(page 8)0
(page 9),
11 70 JORDAN REPORTEDLY ASKS USSR FOR ARMS (Secret Pivot
(page 10).
ANNEX--Conclusions of the Watch Report of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee
(page 11).
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1. POSSIBLE SOVIET PREPARATIONS FOR FLIGHT TESTING
OF INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE OR EARTH
SATELLITE
Reference:
Communications developments involving
the Novokazalinsk/Dzhusaly and Klyuchi
areas may reflect preparations for test-
ing either a Soviet long-range missile or
an earth satellite, although the timing of
such a test is not evident. The orbiting of an earth satellite
In 1957 is estimated by the IAC to be within Soviet capabilities.
It is also estimated that the USSR could probably have a proto-
type ICBM ready for operational use in the 1960-61 time period.
The first firing of an ICBM test vehicle would probably occur
two to three years prior to the initial operational capability date.
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PETROPAVLOVSK
blA,MTICAL MILES
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SELECTED COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES
Radioprinter and /or Morse facilities with possible parallel landline facilities
Radioprinter and/or Morse facilities
" Station on communication net
� Missile -associated addressee noted in communications
4 APRIL 1957 70403 3
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TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET
High-priority construction projects began
in the Novokazalinsk/Dzhusaly and Klyuchi areas in mid-1955
Direct flights from
Moscow to Dzhusaly by an aircraft associated with the Kapustin
Yar rangehead suggest that a similar rangehead activity may
be under development in the Novokazalinsk/Dzhusaly area.
Stations on Kamchatka about 3,500 nautical miles away could
be used for monitoring the terminal phase of an ICBM or for
observation and tracking of an earth satellite launched from
the Novokazalinsk/Dzhusaly area. International Geophysical
Year stations have been listed by the USSR at Iczyl Orda (near
Dzhusaly) and at Petropavlovsk, Kamchatka.
A special Soviet commission was formed
in late 1954 to organize earth satellite work. Since then nu-
merous public statements by Soviet scientists and officials have
indicated their intention to launch an earth satellite at an early
date.
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2 BRITISH URGE IMMEDIATE SECURITY COUNCIL
MEETING ON SUEZ
British UN delegate Dixon has informed
Ambassador Wadsworth that Britain
wants the United States immediately to
call a Security Council meeting for next
week regarding Egypt's Suez Canal memorandum. Ambas-
sador Wadsworth states that he did not feel that Dixon was
being frank regarding Britain's reasons for going to the coun-
cil, since he said only that London wants to "cancel out"
Egypt's legal position based on the memorandum and to get
on record its own legal and political attitude.
Dixon said the Foreign Office proposes
that a resolution be introduced calling for further negotia-
tions on the basis of the six points agreed upon with Egypt
and endorsed in a Security Council resolution on 13 October
last year. The resolution might be supported by arguing
that the unilateral Egyptian memorandum does not satisfy
the October resolution calling for a settlement, and other-
wise falls short of the six principles. Dixon did not indicate
what Britain would do if the Soviet Union vetoed the proposed
resolution.
Comment Britain's pressure for Security Council
action in part reflects its desire to restore
the entire Middle East question to the council before the next
session of the General Assembly. More generally, however,
Britain's tactic appears to be to exhaust the recourses open to
the UN for settling with Egypt, possibly to clear the way for
future independent British moves.
On 3 April the French cabinet reportedly
decided to propose the Suez problem for UN Security Council
consideration but not until the results of American negotiations
on the problem were known.
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3. SUKARNO ANNOUNCES HE WILL FORM
INDONESIAN CABINET
Comment on:
Indonesian president Sukarno has an-
nounced that he will personally under-
take to establish an "extraparliamentary
emergency business cabinet" to which
former vice president Hatta will be ap-
pointed. Sukarno has given no j[ndication whom he wants as
premier.
It is probable that Sukarno will offer most
of the cabinet,posts to members of the National Party and the
vacillating Nandlatul Ulama (NU), but that some fellow travel-
ers--or outright Communists--will also be included, In the
interest of national "unity," he may offer minor portfolios to
the Moslem Masjumi. It is highly unlikely that Sukarno would
offer Hatta a position of real authority.
Sukarno undoubtedly calculates that he
can succeed in forming a cabinet by either bribing or intimi-
dating the opponents of his "concept!' The NU, for instance,
is strongly attracted by offers of high positions and other
emoluments, and was on the verge of accepting those prom-
ised by the last formateur, Suwirjo. Sukarno can also threaten
to smear--or he can jail--his opponents as "imperialist agents"
with evidence the army may have turned up in its current "anti-
corruption" drive. In this connection, political leaders in
Djakarta are already reported to be badly frightened.
Sukarno's action is something of a politi-
cal gamble. Never before has his prestige been committed
to this extent, and if he fails to form a government, the re-
sult may be chaos or the emergence of a military junta.
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4. LATEST SOVIET NUCLEAR TEST
Comment
This is the third Soviet atomic test of the
1957 test serie0 detected since
the beginning of nuclear testing within the Soviet Union, Ear-
her low-yield tests this year took place on 19 January and
8 March.
The January test in the area northeast of
Kapustin Yar was accom ied by aircraft activity which
strongly suggests that the weapon was delivered by an air-to-
surface missile launched from a BADGER (TU-16). The March
test took place in the Soviet nuclear weapons proving ground
near Semipalatinsk.
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"I 6-1 LA41 L I
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5. ADEN-YEMEN DEVELOPMENTS
Comment on:
Britain is adding to its forces in Aden
an armored car unit from Malaya and
other heavy equipment from Jordan.
The British may be preparing for fur-
ther trouble on the Aden-Yemen frontier
following the expected arrival of new
heavy arms shipments from the Soviet
bloc via the Suez Canal. In the last two
months Yemen has received several hun-
dred tons of light Egyptian and Czech arms
and supplies from Egypt, while Syria and
Saudi Arabia have contributed lesser quan-
titieS. In late March, moreover, 20 Czech
antitank guns for Yemen arrived in Egypt
by air.
The reinforcements will probably be used
to keep open the key roads in the moun-
tainous interior of Aden Protectorate,
where Yemeni-supported dissidents have recently established
roadblocks. New Yemeni plans for terrorism in the protec-
torate are suggested by the Imam's recent request that the ex-
Grand Mufti of Jerusalem furnish three to five ex-
perienced fedayeen "to undertake actions which will satisfy
Allah!' Egypt is plan-
ning clandestine activities in Aden�possibly to stir up labor
unrest among port workers in Aden Colony.
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6. THE NEW IRANIAN CABINET
Comment on:
ministrative
The Shah appears to have given Iranian
prime minister Manuchehr Eqbal a
ree hand in choosing his cabinet. Eqbal
has retained about one third of the old
cabinet and filled the remaining posts
with technically competent ministers who
have not been active in partisan politics
in recent years, although nearly all of
a wide variety of cabinet, subcabinet or ad-
positions.
The new cabinet represents a victory
for Eqbal over his political opponents, notably the former
minister of interior and the former minister of justice. The
notoriously corrupt minister of finance has also been removed.
A key question still unresolved is the future relationship be-
tween Eqbal and Abol Hassan Ebtehaj, the controversial head
of the Seven-Year Plan organization, which will play a vital
role in any development plans for the country.
The new government is not expected to
make any significant changes in foreign policy. Iran's ties
with the West and with the Baghdad pact will remain unim-
paired.
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7. JORDAN REPORTEDLY ASKS USSR FOR ARMS
� 7
Jordan has requested arms from the
Soviet bloc,
The USSR reportedly demanded that Jor-
dan first extend diplomatic recognition, and Jordan accord-
ingly agreed to the exchange of diplomatic representatives.
The attach�dded that authorities in Syria "are working for
Jordan to obtain these arms!'
Comment
If true, this would be another success
for Jordanian Prime Minister Nabulsi's
anti-Western government against King Hussain's recent at-
t mpts to stem Jordan's leftward drift.
ordanian army chief of staff Nuwar returned from Damascus
on 1 April with an offer of Soviet aid "at low prices!' The cab-
inet decided next day that Jordan would establish diplomatic
'relations with the Soviet Union. Since 30 March Soviet prop-
aganda has strongly supported the Nabulsi government against
King Hussain.
Implementation of major Soviet bloc arms
assistance to Jordan would greatly increase Israel's sense of
insecurity.
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17fl"40%
Watch Report 348, 4 April
of the
Intelligence Advisory Committee
Conclusions on Indications of Hostilities
On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the
Intelligence Advisory Committee concludes that:
A. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities
against the continental US or its possessions in the imme-
diate future.
B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities
against US forces abroad, US allies or areas peripheral
to the Orbit in the immediate future.
C. A deliberate initiation of hostilities against Israel by the
Arab states is improbable in the immediate future. Israel
may at any time renew hostilities if faced with one or more
provocations, such as an introduction of substantial Egyp-
tian military forces into the Gaza strip, a renewal of ex-
tensive feclayeen raids, or an attempted denial of passage
for Israeli shipping through the Straits of Tiran. Other
unsettled issues and tensions in the Middle East, espe-
cially in Syria and Jordan, also constitute possibilities
for violence.
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