CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/01/17

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
03161978
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RIPPUB
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U
Document Page Count: 
11
Document Creation Date: 
December 12, 2019
Document Release Date: 
December 20, 2019
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Publication Date: 
January 17, 1957
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PDF icon CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15755625].pdf334.28 KB
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�4Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03161978 -1-11P-61,1Vit-Z1� y CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) 17 January 1957 t-opy NO. DOCUMENT NO NO CHANGE IN CLASS. I DEC LAS: CLASS CHANGED TO: TS S NEXT REVIEW DATE: AUTFL jR 70- DAT REVIEWER: 131 OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03161978 Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03161978 Agw Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03161978 Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03161978 CONTENTS 1, LARGER-SC4LE VIOLENCE SEEN IMMINENT IN BUDAPEST (page 3). 2. POSSIBLE RESIGNATION OF IRAQI PRIME MINISTER (page 4). 3, FALL OF INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT REPORTED IMMINENT (page 5), 4, THE SINO-POLISH COMMUNIQUE 5. "EGYPTIANIZATION" OF WESTERN FIRMS (page 7). 6. ISRAEL PROMOTING EILAT-HAIFA OIL PIPELINE AS ALTERNATIVE TO SUEZ (page 8). (page 6). 7. BRITAIN PLANS SHARP REDUCTION IN AID TO LIBYA (page 10). 17 Jan 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 2 Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 003161978 Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03161978 //,./14/. II 111414 -- 1- LARGER-SCALE VIOLENCE SEEN IMMINENT IN BUDAPEST The American legation in Budapest ex- pects outbreaks of violence in Budapest this week, larger in scale than the worker eruptions of last week. The legation sees no evidence of any impending compromise between the regime and the population, and notes that labor unrest has grown as a result of the regime's harsh policies and that the recent ex- tension of martial law in Hungary is "foreboding!' Recent reports reaching the legation claim that Premier Kadar over the week end had informed a delega- tion of the Peasant Party that the Soviets will remain, Nagy is not returning, Kadar is not resigning, and the delegation had better go home and get to work. Comment Press reports from Vienna allege that post- ers in Budapest are calling for a new re- volt on 26 January, urging the people to "stand by" until that date. Although a full-scale, nationwide uprising appears un- likely, the regime has admitted its concern about a possible new and violent phase of the revolution, and intends to crack down "mercilessly" on all "enemies:' The labor unrest reached a high point on Csepel Island on 11 January when demonstrating workers at- tacked with bare hands Hungarian military forces sent to con- trol them, resulting in two worker deaths and five or six wounded. Soviet troops called to Csepel stopped at the main gate and did not fire. Further outbreaks of violence of this nature, initiated by defiant workers, appear almost inevitable, both on Csepel and within Budapest. 17 Jan 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 3 Approved7o'r:'Refe7S-e72F1I72764'603161978 Approved for Release:2019/12/04 C03161978 Clik 2. POSSIBLE RESIGNATION OF IRAQI PRIME MINISTER Fadhil Jamali, present head of the Iraqi delegation to the United Nations and former prime minister, is slated to replace Nun i Said, Nun i expected to continue to influence the government from behind the scenes. No further cabinet changes are contemplated. Comment Despite strong internal and external pressures for Nun i to step down, this is the first indication the veteran Iraqi leader may be seriously considering resigning. Nun i may feel his de- parture would help to heal Iraq's strained relations with the other Arab states. Iraqi policy would be unlikely to change substantially under Jamali. He is strongly pro-Western, outspokenly anti-Communist, and represents the liberal � and reformist trend within the ruling group in Iraq. He does not have a substantial personal following in Iraq, how- ever, and would probably be unable to withstand Arab na- tionalist pressures as successfully as Nun i has done in the past. 17 Jan 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 4 crt"r) E�r Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03161978 Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03161978 1_41 -1 XI:. 1- 3. FALL OF INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT REPORTED IMMINENT Comment on: The deputy chairman of the Nandlatul Ulama, the second largest party in the Indonesian cabinet, told the press that his party has decided "to persuade the government to resign:' Without the NU the coalition cabinet led by the National Party would no longer have a majority in parliament. The call for the cabinet's resignation may be delayed until after Prime Minister Ali addresses parliament, which convenes on 21 January. In Djakarta, the press indicates that President Sukarno is about to announce his plan to impose a state of war and siege over the entire nation and to set up a "revolutionary council" under his own leadership. Merdeka--a Djakarta daily which frequently speaks for Prime Minister Al's National Party--has published further details of the proposal, probably to elicit political and re- gional reactions. According to Merdeka, the council would have a membership of 14 and would include representatives of the military, youth and "mass organizations," and re- ligious, nationalist and Marxist political groupings. In the face of the Djakarta government's delaying tactics and political promises, Colonel Simbolon, the rebel commander in North Sumatra, and Lt. Col. Hussein, successful coup leader in Central Sumatra, are organizing and arming a rfnfrrilla force of 1,000 men, They will resort to force, however, only if Djakarta continues to refuse their political demands. These are the resignation of the Ali cabinet, more autonomy for Sumatra, and the establishment of six provinces there. 17 Jan 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 5 Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03161978 Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03161978 ()IP 4. THE SINO-POLISH COMMUNIQUE Comment on: The joint communiqu�ssued in Poland on 16 January at the close of Chou En-lai's visit suggests Sino- Soviet ratification of Poland's recently won position of greater independence--at least with respect to matters of internal policy. The statement reaffirms that the development of socialism must take into consideration the conditions prevailing in different countries. On the question of intra-Orbit relations, the communiqu�nsists on the principle of equality and respect for national sovereignty. Soviet leadership of the bloc, empha- sized in recent Chinese statements, is not mentioned. At the same time, the communiqu� em- phasis on bloc solidarity based on a common ideology and a common view of world affairs reflects Chou's success in his efforts to obtain closer identification of the Gomulka regime with the bloc. Standard Communist criticism of Western pol- icy in Europe and the Middle East is repeated and much of the communiqu�s devoted to the dangers of Western aggression and subversion. Chou failed, however, to obtain open Polish endorsement for either the Soviet intervention in Hungary or the standard line that the Hungarian insurrection was the re- sult of capitalist subversion. The communiqu�tates only that both countries support the Kadar government and are "resolutely opposed to all attempts by imli)erialist circles to intervene in the internal affairs of Hungary." 17 Jan 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 6 CONFIDENTIAL Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03161978 Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03161978 5."EGYPTIANIZATION" OF WESTERN FIRMS Comment on: Cairo's enactment on 15 January of four laws designed to "Egyptianize" economic activities appears aimed at maintaining the momentum of nationalism and bolster- ing the regime politically. Egyptianiza- tion will require most foreign firms to be sold to and com- pletely managed by native Egyptians in the next five years. The move will not result in any immediate economic benefits and may wipe out the remaining confidence of the Egyptian business community in the Nasr government's ability to keep the country from bankruptcy. The new laws will further discourage Western investment in Egypt. Egyptianization of "enemy" (British and French) assets is a follow-up to the sequestration decrees issued soon after the Anglo-French intervention. The broad- ening of this takeover to include other foreign companies dur- ing the next five years suggests that Nasr does not plan on Western private or possibly even governmental economic aid, hoping instead for Soviet economic assistance. Egypt obtains virtually no foreign exchange by this action, since firms operating in Egypt--including banks-- would have few unencumbered monetary assets aside from small balances in Egyptian pounds. American firms will come under the five-year grace period. 17 Jan 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 7 "illiThILIATsPir--4-1- Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03161978 Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 wipe' �Iime 6. ISRAEL PROMOTING EILAT-HAIFA OIL PIPELINE AS ALTERNATIVE TO SUEZ Comment on: Oil pipe- line con- struction across Is- rael from Elia to Haim, bypassing the Suez Canal, not only will give Israel a source of additional revenue, but also is being used by Israel to promote great- er Western interest in se- curing and maintaining freedom of transit in the Gulf of Aqaba. Israel probably also sees polit- ical advantages flowing from increased Western economic interests in Israel. According to Israeli ambassador E-- ban, an 8-inch line from Aqaba to Haifa will be open in a matter of weeks. The capacity of such a line is about 16,000 bar- rels per day. Eban said a 16-inch line is being discussed, and the "ulti- mate vision" is a 32-inch line which would carry 400-500,000 barrels per day, nearly one fifth of Western Europe's normal daily imports. ISRAEL UNCLASSIFIED 8 INCH PIPELINE � PRESENT , ISRAELI BOUNDARY TEL AVIV AS H QELON GAZA STRIP EGYPT GUL 0 A OAB 16 JANUARY 1957 17 Jan 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin 705163 Page 8 410(TVITDr7TIPT 41 Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03161978 Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03161978 �10 France has expressed readiness to share in the cost of construction. The principal obstacle to the Israeli pipeline projects, however, is an assured source of crude oil. The Arab states would almost certainly not allow oil produced in Arab countries to transit Israel. The only likely source of supply would be Iran. Iran has shipped a- about 340,000 barrels daily through the Suez Canal and at least some of this could be diverted to pipelines through Israel. While the Iranian government itself would have no objections, it would be subjected to strong Arab pressure, particularly from Egypt, which would lose sizable canal revenues. 17 Jan 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 9 �09ATHBEMPFA+ Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03161978 Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03161978 I 7, BRITAIN PLANS SHARP REDUCTION IN AID TO LIBYA Foreign Office permanent under secretary Kirkpatrick has informed American rep- resentatives that Britain intends a drastic reduction in its military and economic com- mitments in Libya. Stressing that Britain's present financial difficulties have made necessary a broad re-examination of its foreign policy throughout the world, Kirkpatrick said that in the case of Libya a reduction is indicated because its value as a British base is steadily diminishing. Kirkpatrick said London is considering reduc- ing annual grant aid from the present $11,400,000 to $2,800,000. British forces in Libya would be reduced from 8,000 to 2,000 by the end of 1958. A contribution of $7,700,000 toward a build-up of the Libyan army would be offered in fulfillment of an earlier promise. Comment The British have long sought to increase American interest in Libya but had not pre- viously indicated that their reduced capabilities dictated such a sharp drop in their own role. Libyan prime minister Ben Halim told the American embassy in Tripoli recently that he wanted the British to stay, but preferred to have the United States take a primary role. The British claim that their shift in Libya is dictated both by financial difficulties and the need to concen- trate on defending their more vital interests in oil-producing Iraq and the Persian Gulf. 17 Jan 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 10 _Co /Mr" T1 �"7", Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03161978