CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/03/06

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03162007
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: March 6, 1957

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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
3.5(c)
6 March
1957
Copy No. 131
A_ DOCUMENT No.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS
I DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHAN(iED TO: TS S Cai4
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
ALITH.
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP SECRET
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CONTENTS
1. NAS.R INSISTS ON EGYPTIAN ADMINISTRATION OF GAZA
STRU (page 3).
2, ISRAELIS SCHEDULED TO WITHDRAW FROM GAZA THIS
WEEK (page 4).
3. FRANCO-ITALIAN CONSORTIUM MAY FINANCE TRANS-
ISRAEL PIPELINE (page 5).
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EGYPTIANS TRY TO PREVENT EXECUTIONS AND COUP
IN SYRIA (page 6).
.)1� 5. SUKARNO REPORTEDLY OFFERS COMPROMISE TO ANTI-
( 7 COMMUNISTS (page 7).
611 THAI ARMY CHIEF REPORTEDLY DEMANDS PHAO OUSTER
(page 8).
7. CHOU EN-LAI'S FOREIGN POLICY STATEMENT
06 (page 9).
8. CHINESE COMMUNISTS AID PROGRAM IN CAMBODIA GETS
0, UNDER WAY (page 11).
9. CONFUSION AND DISSENSION APPARENT IN RUMANIA
oic (page 12).
10. CONTINUED ABSENCE OF TOP SOVIET LEADERS AT PUBLIC
FUNCTIONS (page 13).
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1. NASR INSISTS ON EGYPTIAN ADMINISTRATION OF
GAZA STRIP
Comment on:
Nasr told Egyptian foreign minister
Fawzi
"For your information we will notac-
cept, now or in the future, any non-
Egyptian administration of the Gaza
strip' This position, which Nasr apparently intends to
maintain, is in direct conflict with Israel's stand that Egypt
can never be allowed to return to the Gaza strip.
Fawzi suggest also that Egypt intends to in-
sist that the waters of the Gulf of Aqaba are not international
but belong entirely to the Arab states which border the gulf--
a position which is supported strongly by Syria and Saudi
Arabia.,
In both Gaza and Sharm al-Shaikh, the
next Egyptian objective following the Israeli withdrawal will
probably be the evacuation of the UN Emergency Force or
limitation of its functions to patrolling the 1949 Egyptian-
Israeli armistice lines.
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2. ISRAELIS SCHEDULED TO WITHDRAW FROM GAZA
THIS WEEK
Israeli military forces and civilian ad-
ministrative personnel are scheduled to
leave the Gaza strip on 7 March and to
withdraw from Sharm al-Shaikh on 8 March,
according to information received by the
secretary general from General Burns, commander of the
UN Emergency Force. A small group of Israelis will remain
at Sharm al-Shaikh, however, to supervise shipment as soon
as possible of Israeli equipment there. General Burns asked
that these dates not be made public, since to do so in advance
of the action might lead to rioting in the Gaza strip.
Comment The abruptness of the Israeli withdrawal
from the strip after several months of al-
most complete integration of its political administration and
economic life with that of Israel may well lead to disorganiza-
tion and disorders. The 210,000 refugees in the strip, as well
as its 85,000 permanent residents, may welcome the UN ini-
tially as a possible source of largess, but they probably will
soon begin to blame the UN for their chronic difficulties.
At Sharm al-Shaikh there is no local popula-
tion to create such problems.
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3. FRANCO-ITALIAN CONSORTIUM MAY FINANCE TRANS-
ISRAEL PIPELINE
The American embassy has been informed
that a
group of large Italian companies is form-
ing a consortium to finance, build and
operate a 30-inch crude oil pipeline in
Israel connecting the Gulf of Aqaba with the Mediterranean.
a line about 125 miles long with a
capacity of about 350,000 barrels a day is under considera-
tion. The cost of the project is estimated to be approximately
$50,000,000.
The embassy understands that negotiations
with French interests are already under way.
Comment While no Arab crude oil is likely to be avail-
able for transit through Israel for the fore-
seeable future, Tel Aviv evidently believes it can receive suffi-
cient Iranian--and possibly other�crude to make the line profit-
able. Before the shutdown of the Suez Canal, Iran shipped about
300,000 barrels a day of crude through the canal. Transit costs
through an Israeli pipeline would be lower than Suez Canal charges,
which would improve the competitive position of Iranian crude.
Iran wouldthereforenotbe likely to object on economic grounds
to using the Israeli route. Tehran, which until recently supplied
up to 60 percent of Israel's crude oil needs, would probably have
no political objection.
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4. EGYPTIANS TRY TO PREVENT EXECUTIONS AND COUP
IN SYRIA
Egypt is bringing strong pressure to
bear on the Syrian government against
...carrying out the death sentences imposed
in the recent treason trials of rightist
leaders.
leftist arm
officers led by Colonel Sarraj, the
to stage a coup if the
death sentences are not carried out by the present civilian
leaders. The coup was originally scheduled for 0300 on
3 March, but was delayed for unknown reasons, among them
possibly Egyptian pressure. The plotters intend to abolish
the civilian government and parliament and establish a revolu-
tionary council composed of six army officers and six civilian
members of the Arab Socialist Resurrection Party
Comment
While Nasr has previously indicated he
opposes the executions, he has also warned
Sarraj against attempting any coup. Sarraj and the leftists
who were instrumental in carrying out the trials wish to capi-
talize on the executions in order to strengthen their position.
The government, however, would like to find a way to commute
the sentences.
Nasr would look with disfavor on any coup
in Syria because he fears that a revolutionary council would
be less amenable to Egyptian guidance than the present ruling
clique. Egyptian pressure may forestall the executions and
a coup.
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5, SUKAFtN0 REPORTEDLY OFFERS COMPROMISE TO
ANTI-COMMUNISTS
President Sukarno has capitulated in his
demand for Communist participation in
any new Indonesian cabinet,
a reliable source in Djakarta Following
his return from Surabaya on 4 March, Sukarno
was ready to limit
Communist representation to the proposed national council
and agreed to the NU leader's insistent demand that the coun-
cil be strictly advisory.
Both the Masjumi and the NU are inclined
to accept this compromise and let Sukarno save face, since
they feel he and former vice president Hatta are the only men
able to unite Indonesia again. The army chief of staff, mean-
while, has taken a letter from Sukarno to Hatta reportedly in-
viting him to discuss restoration of the "duumvirate." (NOFORN)
Comment
Sukarno's reported capitulation would be
the result of opposition by the Moslem and
Christian parties and by the army leaders in Central Sumatra
and East Indonesia. He undoubtedly is aware that Central
Sumatran leaders have been laying plans to unite all opposi-
tion elements under Hatta and were considering the use of
force if Sukarno's original plans were put into effect.
Although the Communist Party has threat-
ened a national strike if it is barred from the cabinet, it is
more likely to limit its actions to vigorous protests and to set-
tle for participation in the council. The counciPs function al-
legedly will be strictly "advisory," but the Communists will
have significantly advanced their position by participation in
the government's formal apparatus. In addition to gaining in-
creased prestige, they will probably be able to exert signifi-
cant influence on Sukarno and government policy.
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6: THAI ARMY CHIEF REPORTEDLY DEMANDS PHAO OUSTER
General Sarit, the Thai army chief, has
confronted Premier Phibun with a demand
that Police Director General Phao and three
of Phao's cabinet supporters be dismissed
from all responsible positions in the government.
Sarit
maintained that the people obviously did not like the Phao fac-
tion and that many of the police had contacted Sarit to transfer
their support.
Sarit is reported to have threatened Phibun
that if he did not acquiesce to army demands, he would be re-
placed as premier by Deputy Premier Worakan Bancha�
Sarit is under great pressure from
the army to effect Phao's removal, by force if necessary.
Comment Sarit may have emerged from the postelec-
tion turmoil in Bangkok as the dominant
figure in the Thai government. In such case, Phibun would ap-
pear to be in no position, at the present time, to resist should
Sarit continue to press for the removal of Phao and his support-
ers. It is unlikely that Phibun will resign. In the past he has
successfully balanced the Phao and Sarit factions to maintain
his own position, and in the present situation he may continue
the same maneuver.
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7. CHOU EN-LAI'S FOREIGN POLICY STATEMENT
Comment on:
Premier Chou En-lai's 15,000-word
speech on 5 March is the first major
Chinese Communist foreign policy state-
ment in 1957. Discussing intrabloc rela-
tions, Chou asserted his confidence that
differences could be resolved by "comradely discussion
and consultation." In an oblique criticism of recent polem-
ics in the bloc, Chou asked that, in the interests of bloc
solidarity, issues not be forced where unanimity of views
was temporarily lacking.
In his survey of relations with the free
world, Chou excoriated American "colonialist" goals, es-
pecially among the Arab nations. Charging the United States
with desiring to supplant Britain and France in the Middle
East, Chou portrayed the United States as an unreliable ally.
On the matter of American-Chinese rela-
tions, Chou offered no new proposals but attempted to show
that here, too, the United States was preparing to abandon
its Chinese Nationalist ally. He accused the US of trying to
overthrow the authorities on Taiwan- a theme recently devel-
oped in Peiping broadcasts charging US support for liberal
elements on Taiwan critical of the Nationalist government.
In an effort to lend plausibility to reports of negotiations be-
tween the Nationalists and Communists, Chou declared that
prospects for "peaceful liberation" have improved with "more
and more" officials on Taiwan agreeable to a negotiated set-
tlement.
Chou's remarks suggest that Peiping will
continue its "soft" approach toward most nations and intensify
its overtures to those countries in the Far East which have not
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recognized Communist China. He referred specifically to
the desirability of improved relations with Japan, Thailand,
the Philippines, Singapore, and Malaya. Chou reaffirmed
Peiping's willingness to extend economic aid with no condi-
tions attached.
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8. CHINESE COMMUNIST AID PROGRAM IN CAMBODIA
GETS UNDER WAY
Communist China's $22,400,000 two-year
aid program negotiated with Cambodia
last June is about to be put into effect,
the American embassy in Phnom Penh
has been reliably informed. The initial
project calls for the construction of buildings to house var-
ious Cambodian government ministries and agencies. Mean-
while, arrangements are being made for the initial importa-
tion of nearly $6,000,000 worth of Chinese Communist goods
to create counterpart funds to finance the aid program.
Comment A Chinese Communist economic mission
at Phnom Penh has been discussing de-
tails with the Cambodian government since last September.
Peiping's program calls for "unconditional" assistance in the
fields of agriculture, light industry, communications and
transportation, health and education, and power.
A Soviet economic mission has also been
in Cambodia since last November drawing up a similar "un-
conditional" aid program. The goal of Sino-Soviet economic
aid to Cambodia apparently is to derive maximum political
returns from selected popular targets while not attempting to
match the scale of Western economic assistance.
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9. CONFUSION AND DISSENSION APPARENT IN RUMANIA
The Rumanian regime's recent unprec-
edented withdrawal of a decree issued
by the Council of Ministers on 22 Febru-
ary demonstrates confusion and dissen-
sion at the highest levels of authority,
according to the American legation in Bucharest. The lega-
tion also noted that this episode revealed a seeming differ-
ence of opinion between the party and the government.
lie decree, pr
parea oy tne government, naa peen suppressed by party first
secretary Gheorghiu-Dej on grounds that it was unworkable.
The decree, a drastic measure which re-
portedly stirred up vigorous worker complaints, limited each
wage earner and family group to only one source of income.
A great number of Rumanians depend on second sources of
income and most Bucharest families are able to subsist only
on the earnings of both husband and wife.
Comment Differences concerning possible courses
of action in regard to deteriorating eco-
nomic conditions apparently have led to official confusion.
One recent unconfirmed report reaching the legation, for ex-
ample, claimed that the Rumanian army has been receiving
conflicting orders from top government authorities. Worker
reaction may have been sufficiently strong to cause the re-
gime to withdraw its decree,
The Rumanian regime was forced late
last year to announce the overhaul of a large part of its eco-
nomic plans and methods, a change which apparently has al-
ready resulted in the firings of surplus state officials and
workers in certain industries.
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Ast tftillt 1.LPLIN 121.1.
W. CONTINUED ABSENCE OF TOP SOVIET LEADERS AT
PUBLIC FUNCTIONS
Reference:
Two top Soviet leaders, Nikita Khrushchev
and Anastas Mikoyan, have not appeared in
public since 21 February. Since that date,
Khrushchev has missed more functions at-
tended by other presidium members than at
any other time since Malenkov's ouster in February 1955 The
most recent occasion on which one or both normally would have
appeared was on 4 March.
Their absence may be explained by their at-
tendance at some unpublicized meeting within the bloc, or they
may merely be on vacation. Both men have appeared to be firm-
ly established in their positions in the hierarchy.
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