CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1955/03/27

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03162014
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RIPPUB
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U
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10
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September 20, 2019
Document Release Date: 
September 26, 2019
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Publication Date: 
March 27, 1955
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PDF icon CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15722664].pdf345.23 KB
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Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03162014 TOP 3.3(h)(2) 27 March 1955 Copy No, CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS at 0 DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2 t9 AUTH: HR 70-2 DATE: S Z;34. VO REVIEWER _ Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03162014 Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03162014 � � `Nor %ore SUMMARY SOVIET UNION 1. Khrushchev defines reasons for Malenkov's downfall (page 3). FAR EAST 2. Allison anticipates weak, irresponsible government in Japan (page 3). NEAR EAST - AFRICA 3. Egypt rushes arms procurement following Gaza attack (page 4). LATE ITEMS 4. Comment on declaration of state of emergency in Pakistan (page 5). 5. Comment on withdrawal of Vietnamese sects from Diem govern- ment (page 6). THE FORMOSA STRAITS (pages 8, 9) 27 Mar 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03162014 Approved for Release: 2019/06/17 C03162614 Nor SOVIET UNION 1. Khrushchev defines reasons for Malenkov's downfall: Indonesian ambassador Subandrio, who recently had an interview with N. S. Khrushchev, told the British ambassar dor in Moscow that Khrushchev outspok- enly criticized Malenkov's policies and direction. Khrushchev highlighted (a) Malenkov's maladministration of economic matters, (b) his attempt to run the government through bureaucrats rather than through the party, and (c) his lack of firmness in foreign policy on China. Khrushchev allegedly stated that if China were "attacked," the Soviet Union would honor its 1950 treaty, but did not specify ex- actly what he meant by "attacked." Ambassador Bohlen comments that Khrushchev's reference to a lack of firmness on China may re,- late to Malenkov's general foreign policy and in particular to hip statement concerning the "destruction of civilization" in a future war which has been the subject of special criticism recently in the Soviet press. Khrushchev's unprecedented expression of criticism to a foreigner, together with the recent publication of Tito's personal attack on Molotov, in Bohlen's view, would ap- pear to indicate that the present leadership is operating on a dif- ferent basis than in the past and with considerably less precision. Bohlen believes this is in part due to the nature of group rule, which, despite the fall of Malenkov, still appears to characterize the Soviet dictatorship. FAR EAST 2. Allison anticipates weak, irresponsible government in Japan: Recent political developments in Japan lead Ambassador Allison to believe that a responsible and capable conservative government in Japan is still a long way off, He thinks that within the two conservative parties--the Lib- erals and Democrats--there will be a continuing struggle for positions and power, to the advantage of the Socialists. 27 Mar 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 TnP qrrOr'r Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03162014 Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03162014 I He notes that the Yoshida-Ogata Liberal Party has apparently decided to cause maximum trouble and em- barrassment to the Hatoyama government, partly out of simple revenge, and partly because it believes this strategy is best for the party. Although the Liberals probably will not carry their opposition so far as to join with the Socialists in a no-confidence motion against the government as a whole, they may do so with respect to individual cabinet members. They are expected to focus on the government's foreign policy mistakes, especially on Japan's negotiations with the Orbit, and on the "dete- rioration" in relations with the United States, Comment: Since Hatoyama is quick to keep on the same side of issues as public opinion, it will be difficult for the Liberals to capitalize on their position of hold- ing the balance of power between the Socialists and the govern- ment. NEAR EAST - AFRICA 3. Egypt rushes arms procurement following Gaza attack: 27 Mar 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 rrr-% r r. TeN Iry .7, Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03162014 Approved for Release: 2019/_09/17 C03162014 ',owe '44000 Comment: Cairo's urgent efforts to ob- tain additional arms suggest tharffie Nasr regime is concerned over its ability to repulse a major Israeli attack. Internal polit- ical pressures are likely to require the regime to retaliate in force in the event of another raid on the scale of the Gaza inci- dent. An unsuccessful engagement with Israel would have seri- ous repercussions and threaten the stability of the regime. It is unlikely that Egypt can obtain heavy equipment such as tanks and artillery at this time from the above sources; it can, however, increase its current procurement of small arms and ammunition. LATE ITEMS 4. Comment on declaration of state of emergency in Pakistan: Governor General Ghulam Mohammad's declaration on 27 March of a state of emergency in Pakistan and his assump- tion of "supreme powers" were probably inspired by his decision to speed up pas- sage of a national constitution and not by fear that his government was in immi- nent danger of being overthrown. Despite the Pakistani ruling group's de- sire to establish constitutional government as soon as possible, a recent effort by,Prime Minister Mohammad Ali and Interior Min- ister Mirza to end governor's rule and restore responsible parlia- mentary government in East Pakistan failed because of political factionalism and instability there. In addition the province of Sind In West Pakistan is also in the midst of a political crisis caused by opposition to land reform measures and to provincial reorgani- zation plans. 27 Mar 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03162014 Approved7oi:-14-ele-a-S-e:-2019/09/17 C03162014 *vase Consequently, Ghulam Mohammad has probably decided not to wait until all provincial legislatures are ready to elect responsible delegates to a national constituent as- sembly. Instead, the governor general is probably going to nominate the delegates himself; as Mirza is reported to have sug- gested,and to call a constitutional convention within the next month. By this means, Ghulam Mohammad can presumably assure the selection of men loyal to him who will nevertheless command the greatest possible popular respect. 5. Comment on withdrawal of Vietnamese sects from Diem govern- ment: The withdrawal of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao representatives from the Vietnamese government indicates that Premier Diem has gained the upper hand, at least in the political phase, in his struggle with the sects. The possibility remains, however, that the sects will resort to guerrilla war- fare against the government. Previously the sects had failed to make good their threats to "take action" against Diem unless he agreed to form a cabinet approved by them, although the ultimatum deadline expired on 25 March. Moreover, "popular" demonstrations against the gov- ernment scheduled for the week end did not materialize and sect troops were reported withdrawing from the environs of Saigon. Meanwhile, Diem is moving boldly to re- tain the initiative. He has publicly castigated the sects for "pro- voking disunion fatal to the higher interests of Vietnam" and has indicated an intention to form a government "comprised of men determined to serve only the interests of the state and of the peo- ple--outside of partisan spirit." Diem has also launched a cam- paign to recapture control of the Saigon- Cholon police from the Binh Xuyen. 27 Mar 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03162014 Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03162014 Although some disorders are likely to occur, Saigon has remained calm and the only preparations for an emergency have been small-scale movements of national army troops and activity by a few French motor patrols. Although of- ficials of the American embassy in Paris have suggested that French intervention in local hostilities should not be taken for granted, General Jacquot, acting commander in chief of French Union forces, said on 26 March he would back up the Vietnamese army in the event of disturbances. 27 Mar 55 CURRENT INTELLIPENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03162014 Approved for -kelei;e7101-97-69/17 C03162014 ,440 THE FORMOSA STRAITS Report of the IAC Current Intelligence Group for the Formosa Straits Problem This report is based on information received in Washington up to 1100 hours 26 March 1955. 1. No significant military activity was reported. Bad weather hampered aerial reconnaissance. 2. A regimental combat team from the Nationalist 57th Division was scheduled to sail from Formosa on the night of 25 March to replace the infantry regiment on the Paichuan (White Dog) islands, which will return to its parent unit on Quemoy. The movement of the RCT will further increase the strength of the Matsu Island Group to approximately 15,000 regular troops. Com- bat readiness tests, similar to the recent tests concluded on Que- moy under IVIAAG supervision, will be conducted in the Matsu Island Group beginning 1 April. 30 the Chinese Nation- alists now have the weapons and crews to make a decisive attack against Nantai airfield near Foochow. The Nationalists have not yet, however, formulated concrete plans or carried out the neces- sary preparations required for such an attack. 4. an attempt by Chinese Communist jet fighters from Canton to intercept Nationalist recon- naissance planes west of Swatow just before noon on 17 March. The lack of positive results in this day-time intercept attempt is another indication that there has been no appreciable improvetnent in Chinese Communist capability to intercept intruder aircraft in this area. 27 Mar 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8 Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03162014 6 IL Approved for Release: 2019/69/17 C03162014 THE FORMOSA STRAITS Report of the IAC Current Ititelligence Group for the Formosa Straits Problem This report is based on information received in Washington up to 1100 hours 27 March 1955. 1� Military activity in the area has remained negligible 2. TU-2 piston light bombers of the 1st Naval Air Division and of two unidentified bomber units have been noted since 1 March in rather heavy training activity in the Shanghai area This activity has included night training by the 1st Naval Air Division. Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders, both publicly and privately, have previously suggested that the Sino-Soviet treaty would be applicable in the event of hostilities between the United States and Communist China. The treaty is so worded, however, as to permit the USSR to decide for itself the degree of support which it would provide, and Soviet statements have been evasive on the question� Khrushchev probably expected his remarks to be trans- mitted to the United States and to other governments which might try to bring pressure on the US. The remarks appear to represent a psychological warfare measure. 27 Mar 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9 Approved for Release:_ 2019/09/17 C03162014 Ing ����� Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03162014 %We HANGSHAj 00 CANTON HONG KONG (UK.) NGSU N NKING 0 WUHU � -r'r ANHWEI HANG CH NANCHANG CHANGT,ING o AMOY SWATO 0 '�� CHOUSHAN IS. oCit, , - o 2 IACH ENS 4rim t5r-g 18huan Is (White Dogs) ! WUCHIU ZUHSIEN 00 SHANGHAI CHIAHSINo 116,14..0 NING under construction 'IWENCHOW - � 1CHIENOU FOOCHOW QUEMOY PESVDORES IS KAOHSIUNG SOUTH CHINA COAST (ind. FORMOSA) Rail (selected) 116 27 lVarcl 15 Available Airfield (jet) Available Airfield (conventional) Airfield Site Nationalist-held Islands 100 Statute Miles 190 Kilometers 240 290 Road (selected) KEELUNG FORMOSA 50318-2 0 D I' 7' Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03162014