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June 4, 1959
PDF icon CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15787539].pdf608.33 KB
./i;f � Approved / 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 4 June 1959 Copy No. C 62 Nvio' CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN' 6 DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN C1.ASS. Xr"-- 1 r...ECLASSTUED NEXT REVIEW DATE: CI- A CHANGED f 0 P SECRET zz Approved for Release: 200/62/21 C�3163339' REVIEWEP Approved for Release: 2020/02/21C03163339 AskU U BWIGT ANN. Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163339 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163339 �---TOP-SEeRET 4 JUNE 1959 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Guided Missile and Astronautics In- telligence Committee statement on 30 May Tyura Tam test firing -- see page 1. Gromyko insists UK and USSR as co- chairmen of 1954 Indochina settlement must discuss Laotian crisis. USSR may call Balkan "summit" meet- ing to discuss denuclearized Balkan- Adriatic zone. IL ASIA-AFRICA New Rhee Line fishing boat incident will heighten Japanese - South Korean tension. 'Djakarta alarmed over plans by dis- sident leaders to visit Tokyo while Sukarno is there. Nehru, concerned over Nepal's grow- ing diplomatic ties, to visit Katmandu next week. Turkish Government leaders split on degree of repression to be applied to opposition and press. IIL THE WEST CI Nicaraguan capital remains quiet under martial law but general strike continues. TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163339 . Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163339 � / -;-/ I Crl�j-Eritti� C' CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 4 June 1959 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR Missile Testing: Conclusions of the Guided Mis- sile andAstronautics Intelligence Committee on test firing at rvura Tam Missile Test Range. Page 1) *USSR_ Laos: Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on 1 June insisted that The USSR and UK, as cochairmen of the 1954 Geneva agreements for Indochina, discuss the Laotian crisis. This is Moscow's strongest move to date in support of North Vietnam's campaign to reconvene the International Control Commission for Laos. The Foreign Office has ad- vised Lloyd to resist efforts to reconvene the ICC-.) Watch Committee conclusion�Berlin:(So significant in- dications bearing on the possibility of hostilities) USSR: Moscow and its Balkan satellites may be planning to follow up Khrushchev's threats to establish missile bases in Albania with a call for a regional conference, including Yugo- slavia, Greece, Turkey, and Italy, to discuss the creation of a denuclearized zone in the Balkan and Adriatic area. Khrushchev's speech of 30 May in Tirana and the Soviet-Albanian joint statement recalled Rumanian Premier Stoicays proposal in November 1957 for such a conference. According to TASS, the USSR and Albania pro- pose to call a Balkan-Adriatic "summit" meeting to "discuss ur- gent questions and turn the Balkans into a denuclearized zone." TIDP,SECREL ,Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163.339/ / Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163334 vr 4-f Neve11 IL ASIA-AFRICA South Korea - Japan: Existing tension between Japan and South Korea over Tokyo's negotiations with Pyongyang regard- ing the repatriation of Koreans in Japan will be heightened by. a new fisheries incident. According to a Japanese report, a South Korean patrol boat reportedly has fired on a Japanese patrol ship attempting to obtain the release of a Japanese fish- ing boat taken in custody by the South Korean Coast Guard. This is the first time a South Korean ship has fired on Japanese patrol craft since March 1958. II *Indonesia: several Indonesian dissident leaders, including ex-Colonel Kawilarang, former military attache in Washington, plan to leave Manila soon for Taipei and Tokyo. President Sukarno is to visit Japan from 6 to 19 June. While Djakarta, out of concern for Sukarno's safety, has asked that the Japanese security service be alerted, the nature of the dissident group suggests that this step is largely. routine. The group may plan some approach to Sukarno to suggest a negotiated settlement of the rebellion c-Y / V z Nepal: Communist China's ambassador to New Delhi, who is also accredited to Nepal, was in Katmandu on 1 June, possibly to urge the establishment of a resident diplomatic mission. Nepal agreed in April to the opening of a Soviet embassy in Katmandu. Indian Prime Minister Nehru, who plans to go to Katmandu on 11 June, will probably attempt to discourage Nepal from increasing its ties with the outside world too rapidly. (Page 4) Turkey: A serious split has apparently developed within the ruling Democratic party and between President Bayar and Prime Minister Menderes over the degree of repression to be exerted against the press and the political opposition. Menderes has made it clear to press leaders that Bayar is the leading ex- ponent of the tough line. Menderes, who may feel that he can strengthen his political position by a more moderate government ap- proach, appears to be in a strong position to ease repression and also to maintain his control. (Page 5) 4 June 59 DAILY BRIEF I' TOP SECRET z � ,y , AApproved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163339v 'Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163339 Watch Committee conclusion�Asia-Africa: (Situations susceptible of direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet bloc action which would jeopardize US interests exist in Laos and in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq and Iran. The situation in the Middle East remains precarious, but a deliberate initia- tion of ,large-scale hostilities is unlikely in the immediate future.) Iraq:( Despite some indications of cooling relations between Qasim an the Iraqi. Communists, Qasim has not taken effective measures to reduce Communist influence.) III. THE WEST *Nicaragua: Opposition elements in Managua remain out- wardly quiescent under martial law, although the general strike, called by united opposition elements to obtain political as well as economic concessions from the regime, has curtailed most business activity. The small invasion from Costa Rica has not attract ed much support, but its failure would not end the threat to government Stability, since opposition businessmen participat- ing in the strike seem determined to hold out. The Organization of American States has postponed until 4 June action on the Nic- araguan Government's request for intervention by the OAS Council to prevent further attacks on Nicara aries based in other American countri rP 4 June 59 DAILY BRIEF iii TOP SECRET AApproved for Release: 2020/02/21 C0316333V Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163339 Liz ij LA_a %L. I Novi yaw I, THE COMMUNIST BLOC GMAIC Statement on 30 May Test Firing at Tyura Tam The Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Commit- tee on 3 June submitted to the United States Intelligence Board the following conclusions on the 30 May Soviet missile test at Tyura Tam: 1. At about 1742 EDT, Saturday, 30 May, the USSR launched another vehicle from the Tyura Tam Missile Test Range. There are several features of this activity that make it difficult to state with conviction what type of vehicle it was and its purpose. However, based primarily on subtleties in the firing sequence and the observed trajectory, �we believe this was a successful test ICBM. 2. ELINT indicates that the time of flight was consider- ably greater than usual. Preliminary analysis of RADINT with other data indicates that the vehicle went considerably farther than the Kamchatka Peninsula, to a total range of perhaps 4000-5500 nautical miles. This is the first time a vehicle has been launched to a range greater than approximately 3500 n. m. A firing to such a range would be expected in the Soviet ICBM test program. 3. In connection with this firing, other data must be con- sidered, in the direction of the test vehicle at the time, a luminous glow starting nine minutes after launch This could not have been an explosion is compatible with an ioniza- tion type experiment, such as the USSR has conducted in vertical firings at Kapustin Yar, and had, probably for observation pur- poses, in the lunar probe of 2 January 1959. On two previous test firings from Tyura Tam, 17 Febru- ary and 30 March 1959, similar luminous balls were seen at the time the test vehicles were in generally similar locations. TOP SECRET 4 June 59 e�rkivrn A I 1k1.191 I""Ir flhIlIIkI Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 003163339 Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163339 kir aGLICE. I NNW It is believed that these three sightings of luminescent balls were probably of ionization experiments associated with the launchings from Tyura Tam. should assist in determining more fully the purpose of these experiments. 4. We therefore conclude that the Soviets probably fired a test ICBM to about 4000-55006..1n. on 30 May, with an added ionization experiment. TOP SECRET 4 June 59 f�CkITri Al IkITCI I Ir�Cklf^C CI II I CTIkl Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163339 Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163339 Air% vior USSR and Satellites May Propose a Balkan Summit Meeting Moscow may attempt to bring greater pressure on the Italian and Greek governments on the subject of missile bases. The USSR is likely to join its Balkan satellites--Albania, Bul- garia, and Rumania--in formally calling for a summit confer- ence of Balkan states and Italy, to discuss the creation of a zone free of nuclear weapons and missiles in the Balkan and Adriatic area. The Soviet leaders probably anticipate that rejection by Turkey, Greece, and Italy of such a proposal would provide a pretext for carrying out Khrushchev's recent threats to establish missile bases in Albania "aimed at Italy and Greece." Renewed bloc interest in pressing for a Balkan conference and denuclearized zone was reflected in Khrushchev's speeches in Albania and in the Soviet-Albaniab joint statement. The So- viet premier recalled Rumanian Premier Stoica's 1957 proposal which called for a Balkan summit conference and reaffirmed an- other proposal, first made by Bulgarian Premier Yugov in Janu- ary 1958, for a Balkan zone in which nuclear weapons and mis- siles would be prohibited. He called on the Balkan peoples to "start a struggle to prevent the establishment of rocket bases and the stockpiling of atomic weapons on Balkan soil and in the Mediterranean basin." The joint statement asserted that a Balkan conference could contribute to the cause of "turning the Balkans into a zone of peace and quiet" by renouncing missile bases and nuclear weapons. A TASS summary of a Soviet New Times article stated on 3 June that the USSR and Albania propose to call a Balkan "summit" meeting to "discuss urgent questions and turn the Balkans into a denuclearized zone." Belgrade has long opposed the introduction of nuclear weapons into the Balkans and favors a Balkan summit meeting to ease ten- sions in the area. Yugoslavia qualified its acceptance of Stoica's 1957 invitation by insisting that all Balkan states be represented; Turkey and Greece refused. Rome, Athens,, and Ankara would probably reject any bid for such a summit meeting on the grounds that attendance would con- flict with NATO obligations and that the proposal is clearly ,an ef- fort to split NATO solidarity. 4 June 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163339 Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163339 Nisi � IL ASIA-AFRICA Nepal's Expanding Diplomatic Relations Nepalese Prime Minister Koirala's new government, which took office on 27 May, may soon be subjected to in- creasing international pressures as a result of moves made by the predecessor government to increase Nepal's foreign relations. Last April, apparently under the urging of sev- eral members of the outgoing government, King Mahendra agreed to the opening of a Soviet embassy in Katmandu in the near future. Britain and India have long had the only diplomatic missions resident in Katmandu and there had been an informal agreement with Nepal that the USSR and China would not be encouraged to open missions there. Nepalese officials may have reasoned that by playing off the USSR and the United States in matters of aid, Nepal might benefit materially. In fact, a new Soviet economic assistance agreement was announced simultaneously with the announcement of the new embassy. The United States has given economic aid to Nepal for some years. Communist China may now be seeking a mission of its own in Katmandu, complicating the position of the new Koirala government because of India's, strained relations with China over Tibet. The Chinese Communist ambassador to Nepal, who resides in New Delhi, reportedly had an audience with King Mahendra in Katmandu on 1 June. In addition to giving assurances that China has no expansionist intentions, he may well have raised the issue of a resident diplomatic mission. China has the right under its 1956 treaty with Nepal to open a consulate general, but in view of the fact that the USSR will open an embassy, the Chinese ambassador may suggest raising the level of Sino-Nepalese missions. Nehru, who is scheduled to arrive in Katmandu on 11 June for a four-day visit, will probably caution Koirala against increasing his ties with the outside world too rapidly. 3 June 59 0.46.1-rri A I ik nIIIIrIkI Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163339 Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163339 -C171T111 Turkish President and Premier Disagree on Restrictive Measures Turkey's President Bayar and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes are apparently in basic disagreement over the degree to which the government should restrict the press and the political opposition, and are thereby causing a strain within the ruling Democratic party (DP). Menderes privately told a group of Turkish press representatives recently that Bayar, rather than he, is the leading exponent of the government's, continuing repressive measures. Der spite the apparent bid for more party and administrative control by 74-year-old President Bayar and other advocates of a sterner repressive policy, Menderes, as in the past, is expected to maintain his pre-eminent position within both the party and the government. The possibility of a split in the party is also suggested in the failure of Menderes to name ministers for six cabinet posts which nay lack permanent incumbents and the unusual absence of an official party communiqu�ince 14 May. Bayar is believed to champion the severe penalties against the press which have recently left Ankara without any opposition daily newspaper and have put Turkey's most distinguished journalist in jail. Menderes, now appears anxious to dissociate himself from severe repressive :measures against the press and the opposition. These appear to be unpopular with many citizens, and half of the DP legislators are reported to oppose them. Menderes met with representatives of the Istanbul press recently and agreed to work toward a press amnesty if they would tone down their criticisms of the gov- ernment. While in the past Menderes has threatened further re- strictions, he may now consider this a liability which has increased popular sympathy for the opposition, and may adopt a more moderate policy in order to reduce political tensions,. CONFIDENTIAL 4 June 59 krrn A I ikrrei leNnwie�n flhluITIkI Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163339 Page 5 Approved i" yRele"a' F'se Ti T dt2OT0 7 2/1 7 21 C03163339 N4W THE PRESIMNT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of the Interior The Secretary of the Interior The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director United States Information Agency The Director CONFITWNTI AI, Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163339 /p