CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/07/08

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03163343
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: July 8, 1959

TOP SECRET 3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
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8 July 1959
Copy No. C 63
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN'
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: T32 elcte
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
DWATTE":11: REVIEWER
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qin. MIN "INI SEW II
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Narl
8 July 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Peiping makes significant modifica-
tion of a key feature of commune
system.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Iraq�Communists reported plan-
ning major demonstrations on night
of 9-10 July; Qasim responds to UK
arms offer, asks for jet bombers.
Yemen�Badr increasingly relying on
Egyptian assistance to retain his
authority; Imam may return from
Italy shortly.
Further bloc protests expected with
introduction of American personnel
for joint US-French training of Lao-
tian Army.
International Red Cross believes it
must assist in repatriating Koreans
in Japan to North Korea.
III. THE WEST
0 Austria--Raab decides to resign as
chancellor.
IV.
Conclusions of special USIB com-
mittee on Berlin situation.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
f, 8 July 1959
DAILY BRIEF
ffi
(
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Communist China: Peiping has retreated on a fundamen-
tal feature of its commune system. A leading regime spokes-
man on agriculture stated in a recent magazine article that
peasants are no longer required to eat in communal messhalls.
This, in effect, constitutes a significant admission of failure
to obtain peasant compliance in a major regime program.
(Page 1)
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Iraq: Iraqi Communists are reportedly planning a major
demonstrati n in Baghdad on the night of 9-10 July. Qasim
presumably has been alerted to this plan. A large Commu-
nist demonstration would be likely to end in considerable vio-
lence, and might well test the determination and ability of
Qasim and the army to meet such a Communist cha11enge4
oc'Vleanwhile, in his first active response to the Brills/ of-
fer arms aid, Qasim has requested 14 Canberra (B-57) jet
light bombers from the UK. according to the British air attach�
in Baghdac9 (Page 2)
Yemen: Crown Prince Badr i employing the large
Egyptian military mission in Yemen to reinforce his author-
ity, and is increasingly relying on Egyptian assistance in
various fields. Reports of unrest in Yemen, and possible
fear that Badr and the Egyptians are scheming to retain con-
trol there, are influencing the Imam toward returning home
shortly from medical treatment in Italy, accompanied by his
brother Prince Hasan, Badrts chief riva or success.io�jll
(Page 3)
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Laos: Prince Souphannouvong� chief of the Communist-
front party in Laos, has protested vigorously against govern-
ment repression of his party. He has asserted that he has
solid foreign backing and has threatened a return to guerrilla
warfare unless the government ceases its alleged persecutionQ
Further protests from the Communist bloc can be expecte
over t e introduction of American military personnel into Laos
for joint US-French training of the Laotian Army. This train-
ing is to begin soon. The Communist bloc is still calling for
the reconvening of the International Control Commission in Laos.
Ho Chi Minh of North Vietnam arrived last week in Moscow,
probably for medical reasons and is likely to review the Lao-
tian situation with Soviet leaders there:j
(Page 4)
Japan-Korea: The International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), although it has not yet made a final decision, apparently
feels that it is morally committed to assist in the repatriation
of Koreans in Japan to North Korea. It believes that it might be
able to make a private arrangement with the Japanese Red Cross
which would give the ICRC an effective role in the screening of
the repatriates. An ICRC official has stated that there is no pos-
sibility of including South Korea in the repatriation plan because
of Seoul's long-standing opposition to the project.
III. THE WEST
Austria: Chancellor Raab's decision to resign as chancellor-
designate results from his failure to form a new government fol-
lowing the 10 May general election. Resolution of the eight-week
impasse between the conservative People's party and the Social-
ists--which have governed for more than 13 years--now largely
depends on a successful last-minute move by President Schaerf
to preserve the coalition. The alternative is an unstable govern-
ment and a drift toward the bitter partisanship of the prewar years.
(Page 5)
8 July 59
DAILY BRIEF ii
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z
IV. CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB COMMITTEE
ON BERLIN SITUATION
The USIB has taken note of the following conclusions reached
by its special committee on the Berlin situation. The committee
pointed out that its conclusions are to be used in context with all
SNIEs relevant to the Berlin situation.
1. During the recess of the foreign ministers'
conference, ending 13 July, the USSR will not con-
clude a separate peace treaty with the GDR or turn
over access controls to the East Germans. Moscow
will continue to use threats of such actio.. as a form
of pressure on the West; nevertheless, as long as
it estimates that there are any prospects for nego-
tiations profitable to the USSR, it probably will not
take such action. The actual physical transfer of
controls could be accomplished with little or no warn-
ing.
2. Soviet diplomatic activity relating to the re-
sumption of East-West negotiations at Geneva continues
to aim at weakening the Western position with a com-
bination of professed willingness to reach agreement
and threats of crisis and possible war if no agreement
is reached.
3. While there are no reliable indications of a
bloc intent to deny Allied or West German access to
West Berlin, or to seal off West Berlin in the imme-
diate future, such action could be taken with little or
no warning.
4. While public morale continues at a high level,
some West Berlin political leaders during the past week
have become concerned over Western "disunity" and
fear that "Berlin fatigue" may gain ground in the United
States. There has been no significant change in Berlin's
economic situation.
8 July 59
DAILY BRIEF iii
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5. There have been no significant changes in
Soviet capabilities to respond to possible Western
actions in the event of turnover, harassment, or
blockade.
6. There were no major intelligence indica-
tions of Western allied diplomatic intentions, apart
from information obtained through official contacts
with US representatives.
8 July 59
DAILY BRIEF iv
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CONFID T1AL
Noe
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Further Modification in Chinese Communist Commune Program
The most significant modification to date of Peiping's com-
mune program is revealed in the 16 June issue of China Youth,
in an article by Teng Tzu-hui, the regime's leading spokesman
for a conservative approach to agricultural problems. Rural
cadres have been authorized to permit peasants to withdraw from
commune messhalls without risking criticism as "backward ele-
ments" or reflection upon their "progressiveness." While other
reports have indicated that some messhalls in South China were
being closed temporarily, this is the first indication of a coun-
try-wide movement to reduce their services.
Teng's article reports that only the "activists"--unmarried
young people and childless couples--support the messhall idea,
while the majority of peasants are either indifferent or opposed.
Teng admits that many messhalls were inefficiently run and that
some cadres had been guilty of graft. Teng also admits that some
messhalls may have to close if voluntary withdrawals are permitted,
but calls for the continuation of this service no matter how few
persons participate. He justifies the retreat on the grounds that
the opponents would withdraw whether permitted or not--a serious
admission of Peiping's inability to extract total compliance from
the rural population.
Teng, however, endorses the basic idea of the messhalls.
He urges their reorganization with emphasis on reduction in
size to 100 persons each and greater flexibility. The system
has been undergoing overhaul since early last fall, but a suc-
cessful solution has eluded the Communists.
Ten& article shows some of the same concerns that were
forced on Soviet party leaders during a similar experiment with
communes in the early days of the USSR. The experiment was a
failure, and the program was abandoned by Stalin in the early
1930s.
8 July 59
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NOP
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Iraqi Communists Planning Massive Demonstration plop,-
ffhe Iraqi Communists are planning a major demonstra-
tion in Baghdad on the night of 9-10 July,
number of bloody clashes between Communist and anti-
Communist forces have been broken up by the army and police
in Baghdad's suburbs recently, and such clashes may increase
in frequency as the 14 July anniversary of last year's revolu-
tion draws near. A major Communist demonstration could well
be the occasion for large-scale violence and might be designed
to test the ability and determination of the Qasim regime's security
apparatu5,1
d_he Communists have been dealt several severe blows during
the past few days: Qasim has publicly expressed his disapproval
of the Communist effort to reconstitute a "National Front" and
has openly differed with his Communist-inclined aide-de-camp,
Col. Luta Tahir, over the latter's suspension of an anti-Commu-
nist newspaper. The military governor of Baghdad publicly re-
futed an article in the official Communist newspaper on 4 July,
calling it "a lying report." Salim Fakhri, Communist-line
director of broadcasting, has been reported arrestecg
(The Communists may renew their demands for participa-
tion in a new cabinet expected to be announced around 14 July
8 July 59
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Developments in'lemen
Alair
Crown Prince Rules extraordinary reliance on the large Egyp-
tian military mission in Yemen, and his increasing dependence on
Egyptian assistance in a wide range of governmental matters, may
lose him the essential support of Yemen's conservative tribal lead-
ers. During June the Egyptian military mission was enlarged to about
100 men, who are apparently intended to function as instructors for a
stepped-up training program and as a special task force to aid Badr.
EgypAan military personnel
manned Soviet-manufactured tanks and armored cars while assisting
loyal army units and armed tribesmen to disarm troops involved in
disorders in mid-June.
a UAR Air Force mission had arrived there to assist in
putting Yemen's Soviet-manufactured combat aircraft�presumably the
0-IL-10 piston attack aircraft--in a state of readiness. Badr is also
relying on Egyptian experts in police and security matters, and on
specialists in government administration and in various technical
fields, in an effort to consolidate his control of the government and
to provide some evidence that more efficient administration is in
prospect.
Popular disgust with incompetent and harsh government, and
Badr's vacillation between leniency and severity, have contributed
to a general state of unrest in .'emen since the Imam's departure.
Elements in the army, aware of their ability to intimidate local of-
ficials� remain restive, watchful for signs of government weakness.
Badr's major support against army dissidence has come from the
chiefs of Yemen's principal martial tribes. Their support could
waver, however, if Badr is unable to maintain subsidies to them
from Yemen's near-bankrupt treasury.
Reports of unrest in Yemen, and possible suspicion that Badr
and the Egyptians are scheming to retain control there� are said to
have convinced the Imam that he must return home shortly from med-
ical treatment in Italy. an
E ptian aircraft would return the Imam to Yemen in about ten days.
The Imam will reportedly be accompanied home by his brother� Prince
Hasan, Badr's chief rival for successiorQ
8 July 59
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Noie
Communist Bloc Expected to Protest Joint US-French Training
Of Laotian Army
he Communist bloc is likely to set up a greater cry over
the introduction of American military personnel into Laos to
begin joint US-French training of the Laotian Army than it did
during the recent episode involving the rebellion of a former
Pathet Lao battalion. Britain, in anticipation of Communist
charges that joint US-French training violates the Geneva agree-
ments, has informally requested the United States to supply it
with an explanation of the training that it could use, in its
capacity as cochairman of the 1954 Geneva conference, to
counter the Communist char es.
/Hanoi would regard the introduction of American military
advisers into Laos as "confirmation" of its charges that the US
is attempting to turn Laos into an American military base, and
redouble its efforts to have the International Control Commission
recalled. Since mid-June most of North Vietnam's statements
on Laos have criticized the recent Vientiane-Saigon agreements,
which Hanoi describes as an effort to bring Laos illegally into
SEATO
CP-resident Ho Chi Minh will undoubtedly review the Laotian
situation during his current unofficial visit in the USSR, although
the primary reason for his trip is probably medicag
riVieanwhile, Prince Souphannouvong, chief of the Communist-
front party in Laos, and only recently released from house ar-
rest following the mutiny of the Pathet Lao battalion, has threatened
to return to guerrilla warfare unless the regime ceases its alleged
persecutions.
Souphannouvong charged that over 300 of his followers had
been systematically executed. He claimed that his party was
strong, popular, and had solid foreign support..3
8 July 59
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-*ren Noir
I I I. THE WEST
Austria's Political Crisis
After eight weeks of effort to bring his conservative Peo-
ple's party and the Socialists together in a new coalition,
Austrian Chancellor Raab has asked and received his party's
permission to let someone else carry on future negotiations
to form a new government. His resignation as chancellor-
designate has been accepted by President Schaerf.
The two parties have been at loggerheads since the gen-
eral elections of 10 May in which Socialist gains reduced
the People's party's plurality to one parliamentary seat. The
Socialists, with the largest popular vote, have accordingly in-
sisted on a larger role in the government. Their demand for
preponderant control over the nationalized industries apparently
caused the talks to break down. The Socialists contend that this
point had previously been conceded to them, and it is possible
that Raab may again have been overruled by conservative ele-
ments within his own party who oppose his conciliatory tactics.
Prospects for restoring the coalition, which contributed so
much to Austria's postwar economic and political stability, now
largely depend on the mediation of President Schaerf, A Social-
ist devoted to the coalition idea, Schaerf reportedly does not sym-
pathize with his party's tactics. There is: however, no readily
apparent solution to the impasse, and its continuation would en-
courage the partisan excesses which craracterized Austria in the
interwar period. The Socialists probably could not form a minor-
ity government, and an attempt by the People's party to rely on
the support of the small, right-wing, pan-German, Liberal part
would be certain to provoke a violent Socialist reaction.
8 July 59
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v A L' Nurf
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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