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February 27, 2020
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September 24, 1959
PDF icon CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15787745].pdf731.74 KB
if.4444444444444444444/ Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163:7 TOP SECRET 0.5(c) 24 September 1959 3.3(h)(2) Copy No. C 63 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO, tsar ( NO CHANGE IN I ! DFCLASSIFft-D W On re: CLA3F,. C;./ANC;e0 TO: NEXT REVIE Sok) AUTft DATE. REVIEWER � -TOP-S-EC-R-ET- ,ZjApproved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163357y, Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163357 Aft_ 4amk Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163357 r. Tr, ry rr Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163357 24 SEPTEMBER 1959 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Chinese Communist high level per- sonnel changes aimed at avoiding repetition of economic dislocations. Communist bloc leaders may meet with Khrushchev in Peiping in early October. I I. ASIA-AFRICA Indian forces strengthen position along Tibetan border. Iraq--Protest demonstrations have caused no serious incidents but polit- ical atmosphere is tense. Iran--Nehru made no effort to influ- ence Shah on Iranian-Soviet relations during visit to Tehran. III, THE WEST French reconnaissance overflights of Libya scheduled. Argentine President Fronclizi acts to outlaw Communist party. � Nicaragua--Rebel incursions into Nicaragua from Costa Rica and Hon- duras reportedly to occur soon. SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163357 'Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163357 IUILLtLJ air �11.1 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 24 September 1959 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Communist China: Peiping has announced an extensive reshuffling of government officials at the deputy ministerial level. More than 400 appointments have been announced) but most of these are reappointments; a lesser number represent transfers to posts of comparable authority. Only about 20 of- ficials--some of whom may have opposed the regime's recent policies--appear to have lost out in the shuffle. The personnel changes and some simultaneous organizational changes appear to have been designed principally to avoid a repetition of the serious economic dislocations which developed last year, (Page 1) Bloc Leaders' Meeting in PeipiivCA top-level meeting of Communist bloc readers will apparently take place in Peiping during the Chinese tenth anniversary celebrations in early Octo- ber. When Khrushchev goes to Peiping after his American trip, he will be accompanied or met there by "representatives" of the bloc countries who, together with the highest Chinese officials, will hear his report and comments on the results of the trip) ac cording to the Yugoslav ambassador in Prague, who received his information from Czech Deputy Foreign Minister Gregor. Gregor, who was formerly Czech ambassador to Communist China, also said that he is now busy briefing the Czech delega- tion,which will include Antonin Novotny; first secretary of the Czech Communist party. In addition to the ceremonial purposes of the trip, Khrushchev will probably try to iron out any exist- ing differences between Moscow and Peiping and also seek to � allay Chinese Communist apprehensions over the effect of his talks in Washington on Communist Chinese international objec- tives) particularly Taiwan:) TOP SECRET 4Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163357r A yr,tr - 144Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163357 0`TOP SECRET ,/#7/ IL ASIA-AFRICA Sib-Indian border dispute: Indian troops would not reoccupy Longju outpost if Chinese forces withdrew. the Indi- ans had withdrawn from one outpost, which had been specified in a Chinese complaint, after it had been found to be on the j Chinese side of the McMahon line. New Delhi intends to defend other checkposts along the border.) Indian military and security forces are strengthening their positions along the Indo- Tibetan border. The Indian Army has taken over from local security forces in the border area in Kashmir as well as Assam State, and army units in Assam have been reinforced. (Page 2) (Map) Iraq: Although demonstrations on 20-21 September protest- ing the Qasim regime's execution of anti-Communist officers triggered no serious incidents, the political atmosphere in Iraq remains tense. Rumors are widespread that new demonstra- tions, possibly by Communist elements as well as by "national- ists," will take place before the end of this week. Meanwhile, the first trial of pro-Communists and others accused of incit- ing the clashes last July in Kirkuk has opened before another special military court, and is likely to exacerbate rather than, as Qasim presumably hopes, calm the situation. The UAR is making a concerted propaganda effort to encourage disorders. (Page 4) Nehru visit to Iran: (preliminary reports of Indian Prime Min- ister Nehru's visit to Afghanistan and Iran confirm earlier impres- sions that he went to those countries to study their relations with the orbit rather than to give advice. Nehru made no effort to in- fluence the Shah in his relations with the USSR in his initial con- versations in Tehran and did not urge Iran to withdraw from CENTO or to adopt a neutralist foreign policy. His remarks both in Tehran and earlier in Kabul indicated that New Delhi) DAILY BRIEF ii . - Tnr ccfPFT p. � /Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO3163357, 4; 4%. Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163357 %TOP SECRET Cwould continue its neutral policy but that it is up to each nation to choose its own course of action) (Page 6) Watch Committee conclusions: (Situations susceptible of direct exploitation by Sib-Soviet bloc action which would jeop- ardize US interests exist in Laos and in the Middle East, par- ticularly in Iraq and Iran) Laos: (While the dissidents, with probable North Vietnames assistance, continue to have the objective of establishing them- selves in a strong position which they could use as the basis for political bargaining or for the expansion of military operations, dissident activity will probably continue at a low level during the presence of the UN fact-finding mission in Laos) (Middle East: The initiation of significant hostilities is un- likelf in this area in the immediate future") III. THE WEST France-Libya: The French Defense Ministry plans two more air reconnaissance missions over Libya, one on 25 or 26 September over the area north of the 30th parallel and another on 2 or 3 October over the area south of the 30th par- allel. Previous French flights of this nature, designed to check on suspected Algerian rebel activity in Libva have cone unde- tected by the Libyan Government Argentina: President Frondizi has requested court action to dissolve the Communist party and to withdraw its electoral recognition. He is particularly concerned over threats by sup- porters of the outlawed Peronista party to back Communist can- didates in the March 1960 congressional elections and over the Communist and Peronista labor unity pact to undermine the US- backed stabilization program. Frondizi and the armed forces are preparing for any violence that may ensue. (Page 7) 24 Sept 59 DAILY BRIEF 111 TfIR SECRET , 4Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163357 e, 2;{ i"'Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163357 114 Nicaragua: Simultaneous rebel incursions from across the Costa Rican and Honduran borders will occur before the end of this month, the President has been warned that the incursions may be preceded by attempts to ass er him or his brother, who heads the armed forces. (Page 8) 24 Sept 59 DAILY BRIEF iv 40-'1+ rl 171", T1 rl -------------------------- for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163357% , A Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163357 WINE iiiLv4 11AL I. THE COMMUNIJT BLOC Chinese Communist Government Personnel Changes Peiping has announced an extensive reshuffling of govern- ment officials at the deputy ministerial level. More than 400 appointments have been announced, but most of these are reap- pointments; a lesser number represent transfers to posts of comparable authority. Only about 20 officials--some of whom may have opposed the regime's recent policies--appear to have lost out in the shuffle. There is no indication so far that these will be subjected to further punishment. The across-the-board reshuffle of deputy ministers seems to have been undertaken to improve efficiency and to strengthen some ministries by adding more deputies- a maneuver which Peiping has tried periodically during the past ten years. Pei- ping may also believe that the appointments will stimulate the enthusiasm of officials for the regime's policies. The three former coordinating staff offices for heavy indus- try and construction, light industry, and transport and commu- nications have apparently been amalgamated. Direction of this new body has been given Li Fu-chun and Po I-pop his deputy, who are also responsible for long-range and annual economic planning, respectively. This move may have been designed to avoid a repe- tition of the serious dislocations which developed last year, and primary responsibility for preventing this will apparently fall to Li and Po, whose public statements have indicated general sym- pathy with Mao's "leap forward" program of the past year. CONFIDENTIAL 24 Sept 59 CEApproved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163357 Page I Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163357 USSR APO, J r KASHMI (In Dispute I. "� TIBET PAKISTAN DIU' (Port.) INDIA DAMAO (Port.) 00A (Port) SIN:KIANG \ _23 LADAKH AREA C. Sirro-Indian Border Disputed areas UNCLASSIFIED 30203 ----')C �H ,p$A M PAKI TAN 90923 3 I N A LONG IU TAIWAN Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163357 rik 1") Tv PT, Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163357 Niue II, ASIA-AFRICA The Sino-Indian Border Dispute Public announcements indicate ttat Indian military and security forces along the Indo-Tibetan bor- der are being augmented, even though both New Delhi and Pei- ping have stated their desire to settle the Tibetan border dis- pute through peaceful negotiations. CI:he current Indian attitud been outlined n no incidents since 26 August. India remains willing to leave the border post at Longju unoccupied if the Chinese will withdraw from it. The Chinese have not officially replied to this offer. The Indians have withdrawn fro- the outpost at Tamadem (unlocated), which was the subject of a Chinese complaint. After verifying the location of the McMahon line in this area, the Indians found the post to be on Tibetan soil CIndian policy, is that India will continue to occupy its other border posts along the McMahon line, that it will avoid provocative action, but that "if the Chinese try to enter into our territory, we shall oppose them." Both sides publicly are still committed to a peaceful solution of the border dispute through negotiation, but no means of bringing them to- gether has yet been found) While the controversy appears to be moving into diplomatic channels, General K. S. Thimayya announced on 22 September that the Indian Army had taken over from the local militia the de- fense of the border between Tibet and Ladakh, the easternmost province of Kashmir. On 21 September, the premier of Indian- held Kashmir also announced that a second battalion of Ladakhis TOP SECRET 24 Sept 59 r.r.h. urn A I IL Irrei fli II I I...TVA I 'Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163357 Page 2 pr,-1- Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163357 NNW 'Weir was being raised for the state militia. The army had taken over border duties from state forces in Assam in early Sep- tember. army reinforce- ments are being sent to Assam and that forces already in the area are being redeployed. The identity and size of the units are still open to question, however, there being some confusion as to whether elements of brigade or battalion size are included. parachute troops and artillery units are in- volved. TOP SECRET 24 Sept 59 IT!. A *A ���.v.� m ���������A ���� �� � ��������� � 'Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163357 Page 3 ri Ti"1/-1 Tri Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163357 Nose 441�9 The Iraqi Situation The political atmosphere in Iraq remains extremely tense, although demonstrations in Mosul and Baghdad on 20 and 21 Sep- tember against the Qasim regime's execution of a ti- officers passed without serious incidents. Crowds are reported to have shouted anti-Qasim slogans-an have torn down the prime minister's pictures. However, on the evening of 20 September Qasim drove through Baghdad streets with an escort of only two officers. Security forces are much in evidence and are on the alert throughout the country. Since the announcement of the executions, the UAR has whipped up a new rabidly anti-Qasim campaign. In Damascus more than 40,000 demonstrators paraded through the city in vehement protest against the "red massacre of Iraqi nationalist elements." Shouts of "woe unto the criminal Qasim, Baghdad's hangman" were heard. Similar demonstrations were staged in Cairo and other cities throughout the UAR. There are rumors in Baghdad that Communist-inspired dem- onstrations will occur on the Moslem sabbath, 25 September. In view of the high tension, it is doubtful that Qasim would permit new demonstrations at this time, since they very likely would re- sult in widespread disorders. Possibly to take the sting out of "nationalist" accusations of Qasim's partiality for the Communists, the special military court set up to try participants in the July Kirkuk riots has begun the trial of four of the accused. At least six others charged with com- plicity are scheduled for later trial. The prosecutor is demand- ing the death penalty for those implicated in the disorders. At this juncture, however, a new series of trials is likely to exacer- bate the situation, since pro-UAR nationalists are unlikely to be mollified by the execution of a few low-level Communists. Rumors of impending coup attempts against Qasim continue. Anti-Qasim elements may have been caught off balance by the SECRET 24 Sept 59 I�rn A I in.,. ���.�.��� eke on � �=1���11 � `Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 003163357 Page 4 TO-Vr. Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163357 Noe' suddenness of the executions. However, they may feel that their chances of success diminish the longer they delay action against the regime. Military governor Abdi continues to back Qasim, and Baghdad garrison troops apparentiv are carrying out orders with- out question. SECRET 24 Sept 59 anr.� in�r� � I I I Ior,i I I a h 10., 1%111 I 10.41�Ik I `Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163357 Page 5 ovr.nr,r, Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163357 lbw Prime Minister Nehru's Visit to Iran CPreliminary press and diplomatic reports regarding Prime Minister Nehru's, recently concluded visits to Kabul and Tehran indicate that he made no effort to settle Afghan and Iranian problems, that he did not actively oppose CENT�, and that he did not urge Iran to adopt a policy of neutrality) In both capitals Nehru made it clear in public remarks thafindia would continue its present neutral course regard- less of occasional irritations and provocations. His attitude toward others, however, is illustrated by his answer to a newsman's request in Tehran that he give his opinion on the new Central Treaty Organization. Nehru said, "I have always lived far removed from all pacts. I don't suppose a change of name makes it different from what it was. This is simply my personal opinion. It is for each country to decide." This new restraint on Nehru's part has been evident since the Tibetan re- volt broke out last March) (The Shah of Iran stated that in his talks with Nehru, the Indian prime minister did not attempt to change Iranian policy toward the USSR or give advice of any kind. Minister of Court Ala said that Nehru made no effort to influence the Shah in his relations with the USSR. The Shah added that Nehru is a much- changed man and that he is more realistic in his outlook toward Communist countries. Nehru indicated to the Shah that aggres- sion should be resisted) (These preliminary reports of Nehru's visits confirm earlier impressions that he traveled to Afghanistan and Iran primarily to study their relations with the orbit and to acquire background material to guide his own thinking about world problems rather than to give advice) -SECRET-- 24 Sept 59 rsKnvei IKITFI I inrkirr RI III PTIKI Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163357 Page 6 r, in�Ti Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163357 III. THE WEST Argentine President Asks Courts to Dissolve Communist Party Charging the Communist party with subversion, Argentine President Frondizi requested on 22 September that the courts dissolve the party and withdraw its electoral recognition. Be- hind this action is his concern over threats by supporters of the outlawed Peronista party to back Communist candidates in the March 1960 congressional elections. He is also concerned over an intensification of strike pressure against austerity meas- ures under the US-backed stabilization program as a result of the labor unity pact signed by the Communists and Peronistas in August. The government also anticipates an increase in violence from Communist and Peronista agitation. Communist party members were mak- ing bomb casings and other weapons in railway shops in the prov inces of Entre Rios and Corrientes for later shipment to other large cities) Considerably before the present 48-hour strike was scheduled, Peronista exiles in Bolivia talked about the joint Peronista strike plans, saying an armed attack against the Fron- dizi government would follow in October. The armed forces strongly endorse anti-Communist meas- ures and a firm policy against labor agitation. The new war secretary has warned that the army would "come out with all its power if foreign interests endanger the country" through strike action. -SECRET- 24 Sept 59 t"CkITD A I IkITGI I urtckirc DliiicTikl Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163357 Page 7 orrtrhE'rr Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163357 NNW Nicaraguan President Expects. New Revolutionary Attempts Simultaneous rebel incursions into Nicaragua from Costa Rica and Honduras, supported by internal revolutionary groups, will occur before the end of this month, the President has been warned that the incursions may be preceded by attempts to assassi- nate either him or his brother, General Anastasio Somoza, chief of the armed forces. The rebel force that would enter from Costa Rica presum- ably is the same one that raided a Nicaraguan border town on 7 September and then withdrew into Costa Rica. The raiders numbered about 40 men, but Somoza believes the strength of the entire group now is about 80. The group alleged to be poised at the Honduran border is of unknown strength but probably is also small. Both forces could probably be dispersed quickly if they should enter Nicaragua, as were other rebel groups earlier this year--unless coordinated action by the internal opposition were to be sufficiently energetic and widespread to distract and divide the 5,500-man National Guard, The President fears that the violently antiregime students known to be prominent in the revolutionary groups now organiz- ing inside the country do, in fact, plan coordinated revolutionary action with the invading bands. A leaflet was being distributed in many Nicaraguan cities last week announcing a new invasion by a "liberation army" and calling on all able-bodied citizens to join the "21st of September Movemenq a student-led internal revolu- tionary group named for the date in 1956 when the late President Somoza, rhh incumbent, was fatally wounded by an as- sassin. SECRET 24 Sept 59 rCkITD A I IkITCI I inckircDliiiCTIkl Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163357 Page 8 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163357 t-tiorriuzir %me THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Assistant for Security Cperations Coordination Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director CONFIDENTIAL Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163357 riVr Approved for 0 WI r/Z/V New, 13 vietiripelese2=21-1 C-0-31-63 ' / 1) , 4 , (4 , jrn/MMIZZ/ZZZApproved for Release: 2020/02/21 C031633577//