CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/09/26

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03163359
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: September 26, 1959

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26 September 1959
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
CLASS.
S. CHANGED TO. Ts�
NEVI RE-VIEW DATE:
AUTH1 II1a4O
DATE,
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REVIEWER:
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26 SEPTEMBER 1959
L THE COMMOILST BLOC
Soviet Ambassador Pegov takes mod-
erate approach in meeting with Shah.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Algerian rebels seeking Moroccan and
Tunisian endorsement for statement
commenting favorably on De Gaulle's
self-determination offer but em-
phasizing need for further clarifica-
tion.
Iraq--Baath party plans to as,qaqqinatp
Oasim within next two weeks,
Laos--Regent Prince Savang blames
Interior minister and director of
police for poor security situation;
demands their ouster.
Ceylon--Moderate named prime min-
ister following Bandaranaike's death.
0 Japan�Right-wing Socialist faction
decides to remain in party and will
support its campaign against revi-
sion of security treaty with US.
President Rhee does not intend to re-
lax appreciably his ban on trade with
Japan.
I I I. THE WEST
0 Conference to decide future course of
West Indian federation to open on 28
September.
LATE ITEM
Some Chinese Communist military
units going on alert status for period
around 1 October national holiday.
'MP crow-T.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
26 September 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR-Iran:(hSoviet Ambassador Pegov, in his first inter-
view with the Sha since returning to Tehran, stated on 23
September that the USSR hoped Iran would see the "wisdom"
of a neutral policy, according to the Shah. Pegov took a mod-
erate line, merely calling the US-Iranian defense agreement
a "bad decision" by Iran. The Shah said he told Pegov that,
in the event of future negotiations with the USSR, Iran would
consult its allies. He also said he told the Soviet ambassador
that Iran would be willing to give the USSR a written guarantee
that it would not grant missile bases in peacetime. Moscow
may seize on this offer as the basis for reopening formal talks
with the Iranian Government)
(Page 1)
(DYN
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Algeria:CRMael leaders, gathered in Tunis, appear to be
seeking Moroccan and Tunisian endorsement for a statement
which will comment favorably on De Gaulle's offer of self-
determination for Algeria while emphasizing the need for clar-
ification on several points. Mohamed Ben Bella, a rebel vice
premier now under house arrest in France, has reportedly ad-
vised the rebels that De Gaulle's proposals represent a step
forward and should not be rejected. The rebels may offer
counterproposals, but Paris is unlikely to accept any which im-
ply negotiations beyond a cease-fire)
(Page 2)
Iraq,: The Baath party has decided to attempt the assassi-
nation of Qasim within the next two weeks as a preliminary to
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�"rtita�Sten-Laq:
a nationalist military coup,
the army cannot launch a movement before Qasim's as-
sassination
a Baath representative had been sent to
the Syrian border to take delivery of six Czech machine guns.
It is auite nossihle that Qasim is aware of these plans.
(Page 3)
Laos: Regent Prince Savang, blaming the poor security
situation on the "weakness" of Interior Minister Katay and the
director of police, is pushing for their prompt removal. He
has suggested that Army Commander General Ouane take charge
of the police. Savang is a strong advocate of military ascendancy
in the government, but in the past has deferred to Premier Pho
who opposes ousting Katay on the ground that it would cause a
governmental crisis) (Page 4)
Ambassador Whitney in London reports that the British
Foreign Office plans an early approach to the United States to
stress the desirability of a political solution in Laos, on the as-
sumption that this holds the only hope for peace in that country.
The British envisage a UN Security Council invitation to Laos and
North Vietnam to comment on the ultimate report of the UN sub-
committee in Laos, and then perhaps negotiate a new settlement.
*Ceylon: Wijeyananda Dahanayake, who was named prime
minister on 26 September within a few hours after the death from
gunshot wounds of Prime Minister Bandaranaike, is one of the mod-
erate leaders of Bandaranaike's own political party. As a member
of this party, which retains the largest representation in parliament
though not an absolute majority, Dahanayake will probably be ex-
pected to run a caretaker government until new national elections
can be arranged. Both moderate and leftist elements in Ceylon
may cooperate with Dahanayake if elections are scheduled for the
near future. There is a possibility, however, that popular dis-
turbances will occur as a result of a general scramble for posi-
tion if Dahanayake fails to put together a working majority in par-
liament or if a call for general elections is delayed.
(Page 5)
26 Sept 59 DAILY BRIEF
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Japan: The right-wing faction of Suehiro Nishio decided
on 24 September not to withdraw from the Japanese Socialist
party at this time, presumably due to inability to attract suf-
ficient defectors. Moreover, the faction has agreed to support
0 ()the Socialist party campaign against the revision of the US-
,' Japan security treaty. The Nishio faction's isolation in the
party and its refusal to accept any posts mark further progress
in the left-wing effort to make the Socialists a "labor class"
7artv with nrci-rommitnigt cirientatinn
South Korea - Janan:,
President Rhee does not
intend to relax appreciably South Korea's ban on trade with Japan,
a recent purchase of Japanese fertil-
izer is a "special transaction" made necessary by US aid regu-
lations, and does not affect the government's policy. The trade
ban was imposed last June in an attempt to press Tokyo into
abandoning its program to permit the repatriation of Koreans
in Japan to North Korea. It is apparently being maintained by
Rhee over the objections of the entire cabinet and haamhuch
more adverse effect on South Korea than on Japan.)
(Page 6)
III. THE WEST
West Indies: 1 A conference to determine the future course
of the largely se -governing West Indian federation opens in
Port of Spain, Trinidad, on 28 September. Trinidad's demands
for a strengthening of federal powers clash with Jamaica's in-
sistence on greater protection for local interests. There is
relative unanimity in West Indian circles in the desire for early
independence. Trinidad's Premier Eric Williams however,
wants the federation to demand complete independence within
the Commonwealth by April 1960. He has assured the US con-
sul general in Port of Spain that he would not "rock any boats
on the 'Chagt issue," but he may nevertheless seek support at
the conference for his attempts to curtail US use of the naval base
at Chaguaramas,3 ) (Page 7)
26 Sept 59
DAILY BRIEF
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LATE ITEM
*Chinese Communist Military Activity.
some military units are being put on an alert or
1-
combat-ready status for a period of days around the national
holiday on 1 October.
The activity over the holiday period may reflect
Communist preparations to counter any possible Chinese Nation-
alist actions, including overflights to drop propaganda. While
the Chinese Communists may be preparing to step up military
activity and have the capability of doing so in the Taiwan Strait
area with little or no warning, hostile action in the immediate
future seems unlikely, especially in view of current and sched-
uled hi h-level meetings involving the USSR and Communist
China.)
26 Sept 59 DAILY BRIEF
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet Ambassador Urges Shah to Adopt Neutrality
according to the Shah, Soviet Ambassador Pegov, in a long
interview on 23 September--his first since returning to Tehran--
stated that the USSR hoped Iran would see the "wisdom" of a
policy of neutrality without military agreements with either the
West or the bloc. He called Afghanistan an example of a neu-
tral country which derives benefits from both sides.)
(Discussing the talk with Ambassador Wailes, the Shah said
Pegov took a generally moderate line, and, in contrast to Ithru-
shchev's condemnation of the US-Iranian defense agreement in
his talk with the Iranian ambassador on 2 September merely
called the pact a "bad decision" by Iran. The Shah said he de-
fended the agreement as a purely defensive arrangement and
offered to give the USSR a written guarantee that Iran would not
grant missile bases to any foreign country in peacetime)
CMoscow may seize on the Shah's offer as a basis for reopen-
ing formal talks with the Iranian Government. While the Shah
gave Ambassador Wailes no indication that such talks might be
forthcoming, he claimed he also told Pegov that, in event of any
future negotiations with the USSR, Iran would feel obliged to con-
sult with its CENTO allies and the United States)
(Meanwhile, Radio McKicow, which halted its personal crit-
icism of the Shah on 10 September and instead began urging
friendly relations in its broadcasts to Iran, has kept up its at-
tacks on Iranian "rulers." The clandestine "National Voice of
Iran" and the East German station which acts as a mouthpiece
for Tudeh party exiles are maintaining their propaganda pressure
on Tehran with calls for the overthrow of the Shah's regime.)
SECRET
26 Sept 59
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
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S 'CK
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Algerian Rebels Delay Response to De Gaulle
Algerian rebel leaders meeting in Tunis appear to be seek-
ing Moroccan and Tunisian support for a statement which will
refer favorably to De Gaulle's program for Algerian self -determi-
nation but emphasize the need for clarification in several areas.
The American Embassy in Tunis notes, however, that consulta-
tions between rebel representatives and Moroccan officials in
Rabat could lead to a stiffening of the rebels' position if their
representatives are influenced by Cairo-oriented Moroccan ele-
ments-21 In any case, Algerian efforts to extract further conces-
sions from De Gaulle will probably be firmly opposed by Paris.
Members of the rebel cabinet are said to be agreed that the
French proposals cannot be rejected out of hand--a view report-
edly concurred in by Mohamed Ben Bella, an influential vice
premier of the dissident government who is currently under house
arrest in France.
In Algiers, the implication of possible Algerian independence
in De Gaulle's proposals reportedly has caused "genuine and pro-
found concern" among Europeans and pro-French Moslems,
despite De Gaulle's assurances that their rights would be re-
spected. Elsewhere in Algeria, the French Army continues to
claim progress in its effort to pacify rebel strongholds in the
Kabylie Mountains, and may inaugurate a simultaneous effort in
the area of the Tunisian border.
In an apparent effort to undercut the rebels, Messali Hadj,
leader of a splinter Algerian independence party, gave qualified
endorsement to the De Gaulle proposals on 20 September. Mes-
sali, who was the target of an unsuccessful rebel assassination
attempt on 17 September, stated that the concept of total inde-
pendence for Algeria was outdated, but that community status--
ocated by De Gaulle--would be acceptable.
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Assassination of Iraqi Prime Minister Planned
Pro-UAR Baathists in Iraq have decided to attempt the
assassination of Prime Minister Qasim within the next two
weeks,
_In summing up the situation in Iraq,
anti-Qasim army elements feel they cannot act
prior to Qasim's assassination. Since no one in the army
wants to do the job, the Baathists apparently feel that they
must prod the army into taking over. This suggests that
the army is now so divided and disorganized that it is im-
mobilized and without strong leaders. Baathist leaders have
decided to inform "all military men and high officials con-
cerned in the matter" that the Ba,ath will carry out the as-
sassination.
army elements had planned
a coup against Qasim on 19-2U September, but that the execu-
tion of Brigadier Tabaqchali and 12 other officers on 20 Sep-
tember disrupted the plan. Clandestine UAR operations against
Qasim have been going on for some time.
a Baathist representative had been sent to the S
der to take delivery nf si C'rzeph mnphine guns.
the delivery o su
machine guns and some revo vers to Iraa.
rian bor-
"hand grenades
and armor-piercing machine guns" be handed over to an Iraqi
agent in northern Syria.
Qasim is probably aware of some of the UARts activities
against him, and he may have been warned of the Baathist
sassination plans.
Qasim hastened th execuuon 01 me orticers
uieioiis that a coup movement was afoot.
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Laotian Prince Regent Pressing for Removal of Interior Minister
(Prince Regent Savang, at a recent Defense Council meeting,
pressed for the early removal of Interior Minister Katay and the
director of police under him, blaming the two officials for the
poor security conditions now existing in Laos. Savang suggested
that General Ouane, the armed forces commander, be designated
police director general. Premier Phoui opposed the proposal on
the ground that Katay's ouster would provoke a government crisis.)
(Savang, whose succession to his ailing father's throne was
virtually assured when he was named regent last month, has
been a strong advocate of military ascendancy in the government.
In the wake of Communist military successes in Sam Neua Prov-
ince in early September, Savang proposed that the country be
placed under a state of siege; this would have greatly enhanced
the army's power in civil affairs. Phoui, however, persuaded
the government to declare a state of emergency, a much more
limited measure-)
Phoui and Katay are co-leaders of the Rally of the Lao
People (RLP), a conservative coalition which shares power with
the army-backed, reformist Committee for the Defense of the
National Interests (CDNI). The retention of Katay, despite his
frequently contentious attitude, is therefore important to Phoui
in fending off pressures for greater army participation in the
government. While in the past Savang has deferred to Phoui,
his newly enhanced status as regent may encourage him to in-
sist on Katay's removal)
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New Prime Minister Appointed in Ceylon
Wijeyananda Dahanayake, 57-year-old Education Minister and
acting party leader in the lower house of parliament was ap-
pointed Prime Minister on 26 September following the death of
Solomon Bandaranaike from gunshot wounds a few hours earlier.
Dahanayake in recent months has emerged as one of the moderate
leaders of Bandaranaike's Sri Lanka Freedom party, and played
an important part in ousting far-leftist Food Minister Philip Goon-
awardene earlier this year. As leader in the house, Dahanayake
was the logical successor tO Bandaranaike.
It seems likely that Governor General Goonetilleke appointed
the new prime minister on the understanding that Dahanayake
would merely run a caretaker government pending new national
elections. Bandaranaike had lost his coalition's absolute majority
in parliament, retaining only a working majority of about eight in-
dependent and appointed members, and there had been two, recent
parliamentary efforts to overthrow him. Nevertheless, both
leftist and moderate political parties in Ceylon might cooperate
temporarily with Dahanayake if promised new elections in the near
future.
Should Dahanayake attempt to assume Bandaranaike's mantle
and retain control of parliament until the regularly scheduled elec-
tions in 1961, however, he would almost certainly encounter a
storm of opposition. His effort would be opposed by numerous
groups who had been unwilling to challenge Bandaranaike at the
polls but who would be eager to unseat his leaderless party. Among
these groups would be powerful Buddhist and conservative elements.
Ceylon's leftist parties would also wish to capitalize on the situation
and increase their holdings in parliament. The efforts of both con-
servative and leftist groups would be aided by the strong possibility
that Bandaranaike's dwindling parliamentary party will disintegrate
further following his death. Should Dahanayake be seriously chal-
lenged, Governor General Goonetilleke might ask Dudley Senana-
yake, leader of the moderate United National party, to try to create
a new coalition.
Goonetilleke, apparently aware that maneuvering by power-
seeking opposition parties might create popular disturbances, has
alerted Ceylon's regular and reserve military forces, and police
have been located strategically throughout Colombo. The public
thus far has remained calm.
CONFIDENTIAL
26 Sept 59
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Seoul Not Planning to Lift Ban on Japanese Trade
Seoul is not planning an extensive relaxation of Its
ban on trade with Japan.
the purchase of $4,214,000 worth of
Japanese fertilizer essential for the fall planting "is a special
transaction" and does not affect the government's policy on the
over-all suspension of trade. President Rhee assented to carry-
ing out the transaction only when Washington refused to waive its
requirement of competitive bids for US-financed purchases
(Rhee ordered all trade with Japan suspended last June in
retaliation for Tokyo's decision to permit the repatriation of
Koreans in Japan to North Korea. Rhee has resisted any ma-
jor relaxation of the boycott, despite the realization of his cab-
inet that the ban is having a far greater adverse effect on South
Korea than Japan. The suspension of trade appears to have been
painful only to a few isolated Japanese industries
Rhee has apparently not lost hope that he can still block the
repatriation of Koreans in Japan to North Korea, scheduled to
commence on 10 November. Although the ban runs contrary to the
American objective of developing export markets for South Korea,
Rhee has often said that the US investment in South Korea
is so large he can do just about as he pleases)
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26 Sept 59
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III. THE WEST
-West Indies Constitutional Conference
crucial constitutional conference among members of the
West Indies federation opens in Port of Spain, Trinidad, on 28
September. Differences between strongly profederalist forces,
led by Trinidad's anti-American premier, Eric Williams, and
the antifederalist Jamaicans could result in the breakup of the
largely self-governing federation, only a year and a half old.)
(Jamaica's "states rights" demands constitute the principal
threat. Jamaica, the strongest single unit, insists that power
to levy income taxes and excise duties be reserved to the sep-
arate islands. Diametrically opposed is Trinidad's comprehen-
sive plan for more federal powers and activities which would
involve an annual budget nearly 15 times the present size. Ja-
maica also wants increased representation in closer accord with
the size of its population. Smaller islands will promote compro-
mises in order to ensure that neither Jamaica nor Trinidad se-
cedes)
(Differences over a date for complete independence within the
Commonwealth� the second major topic, are more likely to be
resolved. The earliest date--April 1960--has been proposed by
Williams. Independence is almost sure to come between 1961
and 1965, according to a high British Colonial Office official,
for London is prepared to grant independence if there is an ef-
fective government which can pay the way_2)
(Although not on the agenda, the question of US bases in the
West Indies will color the discussions. Williams assured the US
consul general in Port of Spain on 24 September that he will con-
tinue his present moderation at the conference; nevertheless, he
may be expected to seek support for his efforts to curtail Amer-
ican use of the major military base at Chaguaramas
26 Sept 59
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igekCONFIDENTiAL AIN
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Cperations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Cperations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDF.NT1A1.
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