COMMENTS ON AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN'S CABLE ON AIR OPERATION IN LAOS, NOVEMBER 1967

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03164686
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: April 26, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: December 1, 1967

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CENTRAL TNTELLTOEVVE AGENCY.
Directorate ef %fltelligenee
Intelligence Memorandum
Comments on Ambassador Sullivan's Cable on
Air Operation in Laos, November 1967
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Project S-2(3
December" 1967
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Comments on Ambassador Sullivan's Cable on
Air Operation in Laos, November 1967
Summary.
1. In a cable of 27 November 1967 commenting on the air war
in Laos, Ambassador Sullivan stated that 1) the total of trucks
destroyed in Laos in November would in all probability exceed 600,
2) an overwhelming proportion of the truck "kills" had been on
Routes 911 and 912 and as a result practically none of the North
Vietnamese dry season cargo is reaching as far south as Route 9,
and 3) ". . . if this rate of success continues, the entire inven-
tory of trucks which the North Vietnamese hold for the Ho Chi Minh
Trail activity will be wiped out before the end of this calendar
year."
2. During November, Seventh Air Force pilots reported 531 trucks
destroyed and 198 damaged, the highest monthly rate of destruction
reported in Laos during the past two years (see Table 1). Ninety-
eight.percent of the trucks reported destroyed in Laos during Novem-
'ter and 95 percent of those reported damaged were found in the
Panhandle (Steel Tiger) Area of Laos. The number of trucks reported
destroyed in Laos in November has been exceeded in North Vietnam
only during the months of July and August 1967 when 603 and 743
respectively were reported destroyed (see Table 2).
.3. The record level of reported destruction of trucks in
November results from a combination of factors; (1) exceedingly
good weather in Laos and the highest number of sorties over Laos
since April, (2) the first full month of the dry season and an
increase in traffic densities, and (3) possibly poor convoy dis-
cipline resulting from the use of inexperienced truck drivers.
We know of no change in US tactics or weapons systems that would
account for the increased effectiveness of US air attacks.
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4. We agree with Ambassador Sullivan that air operations in
Laos were especially effective in November. Even allowing for the
inflation known to exist in pilot reporting,a continuation of such
heavy losses would seriously erode the North Vietnamese truck in-
ventory in Laos and North Vietnam unless imports from the Communist
countries increased substantially. It is to be noted, however,
that reported truck losses in North Vietnam in November were light,
only 50 destroyed and 66 damaged.
5. We disagree with Ambassador Sullivan's claim that practi-
cally no traffic is reaching as far south as Route 9. While road
watch teams report little traffic south of Route 9, recent aerial
reconnaissance covering the period 4-17 November shows that at
least 15 percent of the trucks sighted in the Panhandle were operat-
ing on Route 9 or south of Route 9. Finally, there are anomalies
in the data for November which cannot yet be explained. In November
relatively more trucks were destroyed than damaged than in any pre-
vious period. In addition, only 6 sorties were required per truck
destroyed or damaged compared to 35 sorties per truck destroyed and
damaged in November 1966, when about the same number of sorties were
flown but only 115 trucks were destroyed.
:6. We believe that the November experience is heartening but
it is still too early to conclude that a major turning point has
been reached in the US. air interdiction campaign in Southeast Asia.
Based on past experience there is considerable doubt that the
November performance in Laos can be sustained.,
Comments
7. Exceedingly good weather prevailed in Laos south of Mu Gia
Pass in November which made it possible to identify trucks at night
to a much greater extent than is normally possible. Truck activity
in Laos takes place almost exclusively during the hours of darkness,
and approximately half of the 4,400 attack sorties in November were
flown during these hours. Bad weather over much of North Vietnam
made more attack sorties available for Laos (see Tables 1 and 2).
November was the first full month of the current dry season in Laos,
prompting the Communists to increase their truck traffic to and in
Laos at this time. Truck traffic has increased substantially in
November 1967 as compared with 1966. During two weeks from 1-14
November 1966, pilots reported sighting _:about 160 trucks in
the entire Panhandle of Laos. In the two weeks from 4-17 November
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1967, however, pilots reported seeing 1,722 trucks in the same area.
These reports also showed substantial increases in truck movement
on Routes 912 and 911 in 1967 as compared with 1966. No Road Watch
Reports are available for Route 912, but for Route 15 these reports
show about the same average number of trucks moving south per day
for the period 1-25 November in both 1966 and 1967, but a consider-
ably higher number moving north in 1967 than in 1966.
8. The desire to increase truck traffic during the month prob-
ably forced the Communists to use less experienced truck drivers
new to the Laotian roads which may have led to poorer co4vOy dis-
cipline,thus making the trucks easier to identify and more vulner-
able to air attacks.
9. During January through October 1967 it required 24 sorties
to destroy and damage one truck but in November it required only
6 sorties. The only previous period which witnessed the same
effectiveness in Laos was in April and May 1966, also periods of
high traffic density, when it took only 8 and 6 sorties, respectively,
to destroy and damage one truck. The average for all of 1966 in
the Laotian Panhandle was 16 sorties. In North Vietnam the average
for the period January 1966 - to date has been 22 sorties. Undoubt-
edly good weather and a large number of trucks on the road contri-
buted to the increase in the kill ratio. We cannot fully explain
its dramatic improvement in November and past experience suggests
that it will not be possible to maintain it month after month.
10. The relationship between the number destroyed and the num-
ber damaged also changed considerably in November reporting. From
January 1966 through October 1967 about half of the trucks attacked
in the Laotian Panhandle were reported to be destroyed and the other
half damaged (see Table 3). In November, however, nearly 75 percent
were reported destroyed and the remainder damaged. Similar data
for North Vietnam show 55 percent destroyed since January 1965.
Although there has been a shift in favor of destroyed in the report-
ing from both North Vietnam and Laos during 1967 compared with 1966,
the ratio of destroyed to damaged for November in Laos is the highest
ever euerienced in either country. We cannot explain this sudden
change. It may merely reflect a change in the criterion used by
pilots in their reporting, rather than a real change in efficiency
of operations.
11. Pilots claims of trucks destroyed or damaged are not an
accurate measure of actual destruction rates. Operational condi-
tions make it virtually impossible for pilots always to report
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accurately as to whether a truck is destroyed or damaged. There
is also duplication in reporting which analysts in OER attempt to
eliminate. In addition, the Communists have the capability to
cannibalize and repair some "destroyed" and damaged trucks. To
take into account operational problems in reporting, duplicate
counting and repair capability, OER and DIA have agreed to consider
75 percent of the trucks reported by pilots as destroyed and 25 .
percent of the trucks reported by pilots as damaged to be effectively
lost. Applying these factors to the trucks reported destroyed and
damaged in Laos during November 1967, effective losses become about
450..
12. Ambassador Sullivan's statement that ". . . the entire
inventory of trucks which we believe the North Vietnamese hold for
the Ho Chi Minh Trail activity will be wiped out before the end
of the calendar year." has little meaning. The entire North Viet-
namese inventory is the one of importance. If the November truck
loss rates for effective losses in Laos can be maintained, and
losses in North Vietnam increased, the North Vietnam truck inven-
tory would be seriously eroded unless imports from other Communist
countries are increased substantially. From January 1966 through
November 1967 North Vietnam.imported about 7,950 trucks, an average
of about 345 per month. This rate has been sufficient to maintain
the truck inventory at between 11,000 and 12,000 trucks since
January 1966.
13. We agree that an overwhelming proportion of the truck "kills"
during November were probably on Routes 911 and 912 (see the Map).
But this does not necessarily mean that practically none of the dry
season cargo reached as far south as Route 9. There is no assurance
that all trucks moving south were destroyed. The Road Watch Team
in the Mu Gia Pass Area, outside the target area, reported 343 trucks
moving north and only 242 trucks moving south during the period 1-
25 November. Moreover, our most recent report of aerial reconnais-
sance covering the period 4-17 November shows that at least 15 per-
cent of the trucks sighted in the Panhandle were operating on
Route 9 or south of Route 9. Furthermore, this report also indicated
that, of the total of 1,464 trucks observed during this :twci week
period on the routes north of Route 9, only 267 or about 18 percent
were destroyed and damaged. For these reasons we think it highly
unlikely that the North Vietnamese have been unable to move cargo
as far south as Route 9 during November.
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Table 1
Laos: Number of Trucks Reported Destroyed and Damaged
by Air Operations
� 1966 and January-November 1967 *
Trucks Reported Destroyed Number of Sorties
and Damaged Attack Flown Per Truck
Damaged, Total Sorties Destroyed and Damaged
1966
Destroyed
Jan
Feb
52
90
Mar
146.
Apr
421
May
314 '
Jun
102
Jul
14
Aug
10
Sep
19
Oct
9
Nov
76
Dec
115
Total
1
368
1967.7
Jan
103
Feb
117
Mar
131
44
96 .
8,000
83
143
233
--5,262
23
144
290
6,247
22
377
798
6,206
8
387
701
4,421
6
'115
217
3,540
16
64 I
78
2,207
28
28
38
820
'22
31
50
1,265
25
36
45
1,568
- 35
49
125
4,369
35
187
' 302 .
4,808
16
1,605 , '
2,973
16
.48,713
,
88
191
5,570
: 29
169
286
6,752
24
99
230
:5,326
23
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Table 1 - Continued
Laos: Number of Trucks Re orted Destra ect and Dama ed
by Air Operations
1966 and January-November 1967 *
Trucks Reported Destroyed
and Damaged
. Attack
Sorties
Number of Sorties
Flown Per Truck
Destroyed and Damaged
Destroyed
Damaged
Total
1967 - continued
Apr 133
92
225
5,160
23
May 55
62
117
2,523
22
Jun 51
35
86
1,441
17
Jul 26
29
55
' 1,299
24
Aug 37
24
61
1,241
20
Sep 18 .
27
45
1,668
'
37
Oct 6o
73
133
-2,922
22
Nov 531
198
729
11.,1+O0,
6
Total
(10 months) 731
1.4.429
33,902
Total
.4.
(11 months) 1;262
.,2,158
$8,302,
Total 2.1.6a0
.92�.
2.2.201
5.0.31
'81015
1966 and. ,11
months 1967
* These are unadjusted figures as reported by pilots, Both CIA and DIA
accept only 75 percent of the trucks reported to be destroyed and only 25
percent of the trucks reported to be damaged as effective losses.
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Table 2
North Vietnam: Number of Trucks Reported Destroyed
and Damaged by Air Operations
1966 and January-November, 1967 *
Number of Attack
Numbers of Trucks Number of Sorties Per Truck
Destroyed Attack Destroyed and
Destroyed Damaged and. Damaged Sorties Damaged
1966:
-
Jan
Feb
22
Mar
85
Apr
83
May
3.05
Jun
178
Jul
389
Aug
496
Sep
259
Oct
113
Nov
137
Dec
68
. 1966
,
, Totals : 141.222
1967:
Jan 22
Feb 82
Mar 74
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-
n.a
130
n.a
14
36
2,810
78
124
209
:
40490
21
96
179
5,14.50
30
74
-179
14,470
25
�
164
342
7,790
23
. :
322
711
10,200
14
393
889
11,310
13
:
292
551
12,350
22
�
154
267
8,700
33
128
265
7,260
. 27
40
108
6,710
62
81,670,
22
_
104
,
I ;
,1,801
41
,3,736
63
6,580
51
133
5,470
41
(
Bo
154
8,500
55
�
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Table 2 - continued
North Vietnam: Number of Trucks Reported Destroyed
and Damaged by Air Operations
1966 and January-November, 1967 *
Numbers of Trucks
Number of
Attack
Sorties
Number of Attack
Sorties Per Truck
Destroyed and
Damaged
Destroyed
Destroyed Damaged and Damaged
1967: - continued
Apr
103
179
282
8,960
32
May
384
134
518
11,330
22
Jun
,
332
326
658 .
11,470
17
Jul
603
235
838
11,310
13
Aug
743
441
1,184
11,890
10
Sep
284
142
426
8,920
21
Oct
103
93
1969
48
Nov
50
66
116
7:77
62
11 months
1967
2,780
1,788
4,568
100,987
22
Total
4.2112
11582
811011
1821672
22
* These are unadjusted figures as reported by pilots. Both CIA and DIA
accept only 75 percent of the trucks reported to be destroyed and only
25 percent of the trucks reported to be damaged as effective losses.
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Table 3
North Vietnam and Laos: Comparison of the Number
of Trucks Reported Destroyed and Damaged
1965-66 and January-November 1967 *
North Vietnam
Destroyed
318
Destroyed as
Damaged Percent of Total
487
40
1965
1966
� 1)935
1,801
52
1967 (11 months)
2,780
1,788
61
Total
5,033
14,076
.22
Laos
,
1966
1,368
'1,605
46
1967 (11 months)
1,262
896
58
Total
2630
3.12.91
.2.1.
Laotian Panhandle
1966
1,243
1,508
45
1967 (10 months),
November
609
520
573
186
52
74
1967 (11 months)
1,129
759
60
Total
2,472,
2.222
52
* These are unadjusted figures as reported by pilots. Both CIA
and DIA accept only 75 percent of the trucks reported to be destroyed
and only 25 percent of the trucks reported tcrbe damaged as effective
losses.
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