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February 25, 2020
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February 27, 2020
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October 1, 1959
PDF icon CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15787704].pdf745.62 KB
/ ZZ, Z/ZZZIZZZ/Z/Z/ZZ Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164688 '11:) -SECRET Nme 1 October 1959 Copy No. C CENTRAL cDje D 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCI JMENT NO CHANC�if'. r:; 1: OLT:I ./V17,IFIL'n CLASS. CI-IANGEID TO: T NEXT REVIEV: DAL r's� AUT -2 DAT REVIEWER: T; TO Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164688/MMMMM j Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164688 ire% Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164688 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164688 a V' ���� %.0 ��� a � 1 OCTOBER 1953 I, THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR continues substantial relax- ation of jamming of VOA broadcasts to USSR after Ichrushchev's depar- ture from US. Communist China assumes reason- able attitude in border negotiations with Burmai Khrushchev's Peiping speech suggests Soviet dissociation from tougher Pei- ping policies in interest of detente with , West. IL ASIA-AFRICA UAR continues preparations to take advantage of possible Iraqi crisis. UAR - Chinese Communist relations further strained by speech of Syrian Communist in Peiping. III, THE WEST 0 France invites Algerian rebel requests for clarification of De Gaulle proposals. ()Latin American Communist leaders assemble in Peiping; may confer with Chinese officials on new plans. 0 Cuba--Fidel Castro concerned over grow- ing difficulties. rrn cr,DE-r Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164688 r Al o: 2020/02/21 C0316468e rifse d Release: f vow CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 1 October 1959 DAILY BRIEF to I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR: The substantial relaxation of jamming of Voice of America broadcasts to the USSR has continued since Ithru- shchev's departure from the United States. Jamming of VOA broadcasts intended for Eastern European audiences, howeve has continued. /in a talk with US officials on 15 September in Washington, Yuri Zhukov, chairman of the State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, said this relaxation was an "experiment" to see whether the VOA would cease "pur- suing the cold war./ (Page I) rnmmunist China - Burma: Peiping, aware that its rep- utation as a "friendly neighbor" has suffered considerably from the dispute with New Delhi over the Sino-Indian border, is anxious to avoid charges of recalcitrance in talks on the Sino-Burmese border problem. In the mildest exchange between the two gov- ernments in recent months, a Chinese Foreign Ministry official expressed to the Burmese ambassador Peiping's hope that the Burmese Would agree to meet either in Peiping or Rangoon to begin negotiations. The official said that Peiping could not accept Ne Win's border "package plan" outright, but that it was "very close to the mark" and negotiations would un- doubtedly "achieve results." (Page 2) *USSR - Communist China: Soviet Premier Khrushchev's emphasis on peaceful coexistence in his 30 September speech in Peiping is apparently designed to convey the impression to the West that he intends to maintain the atmosphere of detente by dissociating the USSR from Peiping's harder foreign policy line. His remarks that "we must do everything possible to TOP Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164688 4 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164688 preclude war" and that "we should not attempt to test the sta- bility of the capitalist system by force" vary markedly in tone from recent Chinese Communist pronouncements. Both Khru- shchev and Soviet party presidium member Suslov, who spoke in Peiping on 28 September, reflected Moscow's continuing re- luctance to endorse Communist China's current economic pol- icies, although they made the usual affirmations of Soviet sup- port and friendship. Both speakers avoided any reference to China's commune program and to the "leap forward;' and Sus- lov's extended praise of Soviet industrial and agricultural tech- nology appears to be an indirect suggestion to the Chinese that they would nnrcJn1v to the USSR's In these fields. IL ASIA-AFRICA UAR-Iraq: The UAR appears to be continuing its prepara- tions to take advantage of a possible crisis in Iraq, Nasir's key man in UAR planning on Iraq, Col. Abd al-Majid Farid, has been called from Damascus to Cairo "because of a very important matter." He has asked the UAR agent in Baghdad to gather information on the existence of a reserve transmitter at Radio Baghdad and is consulting with the UAR press attach�n Beirut. The UAR is making available to Syrian Interior Minister Sarraj rifles and large quantities of ammunition which could be used in a move against Cm. Iraqi military governor Major General Abdi has been "closeted" in his home and that the Communists 1717g. infnrmnel Oasim of others allegedly plot- tincr against him_ UAR - Communist China: The already strained relations between the UAR and Communist China will deteriorate further as a result of the 28 September speech in Peiping by Ehalid Bakdash, refugee Syrian Communist. Bakdash� speaking at the 1 Oct 59 DAILY BRIEF ii 11 TO ET Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164611 z r///// � 'Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164688 .Joif Chinese Communist tenth anniversary celebration, attacked the UAR's anti-Communist policies. Peiping has repeatedly shown its irritation with Cairo's anti-Communist campaign and with UAR criticism of Chinese action in Tibet. The UAR press has reprimanded the Chinese Communist Government for allowing Bakdash's attack, and the UAR Foreign Ministry has a formal protest to the Chinese ambassador in Cairo. Cairo ordered the Syrian In- terior Ministry to boycott the anniversary celebrations at the Chinese Consulate in Damascus. (Page 3) Watch Committee conclusions: ..'ituations susceptible of di- rect exploitation by Sino-Soviet bloc action which would jeopard ize US interests exist in Laos and in the Middle East, particu- larly in Iraq_and IraIg Laos: ssident activity has remained at a low level. The dissidents, however, with probable North Vietnamese assistance 0 continue to have the objective of establishing themselves in a strong position which they could use as the basis for political bargaining or for the expansion of military operatioaq Middle East: Tounting tensions in Iraq have increased the possibility of early attempts to assassinate or overthrow Qasim. Whether successful or not such moves might well be followed by anarchy or civil war between nationalist and Communist fore s. Under these circumstances, direct UAR involvement in Iraq9 with a consequent increase in the dancer of broader hostilities in the area, is possible France-Algeria: III. THE WEST IA if the Algerian rebel government "officially asks clarification of 1 Oct 59 DAILY BRIEF iii CRET Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164688V Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164688 *41110# rc-ertain aspects of De Gaulle's 16 September proposals, the French Embassy would transmit the requests to De Gaulle in "greatest secrecy." that Gaulle's cease- fire offer of October 1958 still stood and the embassy is ready to issue laissez-passer to any leaders of the rebel pro- visional government desiring to go to Paris to discuss such a cease -fir...0 (Page 4) Latin America - Communist China: The top leaders of the Argentine, Brazilian, and Venezuelan ommunist parties, who are in Peiping for the Chinese tenth anniversary celebra- tion,, each spoke at the formal opening ceremonies. The pres- ence of these and other prominent Latin American Communist leaders provides an opportunity for Chinese officials to discuss with them new tactical plans in furtherance of Chinese objectives in Latin America, and to review accomplishments since the last meeting of Latin American leaders in Peiping early this year. The Chinese, who are seeking to increase their role in the guid- ance of Latin American Communists, have stepped up their cul- tural and propaganda activity in the area in 1959. Page 5) Cuba: Prime Minister Fidel Castro's attack of 28 Septem- ber on press and other critics of his revolutionary program re- vealed a concern over his increasing difficulties. His high praise of "Che" Guevara, whom he placed in charge of industrial plan- ning, may reflect awareness of the distrust which many respon- sible Cubans feel for Guevara, who is generally regarded as pro- Communist. Castro may react vigorously to editorials on 29 September in leading Havalla dailies which claim that freedom of the Cuban press is limited. (Page 6) VA 1 Oct 59 DAILY BRIEF iv VA VA z T ECRET 4Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO3164688' A � _ Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164688 visor I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR Continues Selective Jamming Monitoring of Voice of America transmissions to the USSR reveals that the selective relaxation of Soviet jamming has con- tinued since Khrushchev's departure from the United States. Jam- ming of all broadcasts to the Eastern European satellites has continued. During the period 25-29 September, 88 percent of Russian-language broadcasts, 86 percent of Latvian, 92 percent of Lithuanian, and 54 percent of Estonian were audible Lin _a. talk with US officials in Washington on 15 September, Yuri Zhukov, chairman of the State Committee for Cultural Rela- tions with Foreign Countries, said this relaxation of jamming was an "experiment" to see whether the VOA would cease "pursuing the cold war." He expressed hope that the US could halt transmis- sions by such anti-Soviet stations as Radio Baikal and Radio Free Russia and said if this were done the USSR would stop jamming altogether. He warned, however, that if results were "negative," jamming would be resumed.] Zhukov further said the Soviet Government was also prepared to enter into reciprocal agreements, which would increase the cir- culation of Amerika and USSR magazines: open reading rooms in Moscow and New York public libraries, and implement the article in the US-Soviet exchange agreement concerning radio-television exchanges on political subiectsi ./30 E113E7A. L. 1 Oct 59 ccikrrr. � . Ik � "" I 'Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 003164688 Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164688 vow' Peiping Anxious to Improve Relations With Rangoon A Chinese Communist Foreign Ministry official told the Burmese ambassador that Peiping wants to improve its relations with Rangoon and hopes the Burmese will agree to border negotiations. In the mildest exchange between the two governments in recent months, the Chinese official said that, while Peiping could not ac- cept Ne Win's "package plan" for a border solution outright, it was "very close to the mark" and he did not doubt that negotiations could "achieve results." This display of mod- eration suggests that the Chinese, aware their reputation as "friendly" neighbors has suffered considerably from the Sino-Indian border dispute, are anxious to start working- level talks with the Burmese. Even if such negotiations are prolonged, as they are likely to be, the Chinese would hope to avoid charges of recalcitrance. The Chinese official, who was replying to a Burmese aide-memoire which apparently dealt with major problems in relations, indicated another step to improving "friend- ship" would be for the Burmese to return the defector, Liu Ping-yi, to Chinese custody. The Chinese spokesman did not repeat the blustering demands for Liu and the strong objections to his Rangoon trial which marked earlier Chi- nese talks with the Burmese ambassador. Burma's package proposal for a border settlement was originally offered on a "take it or leave it" basis. Prime Minister Ne Win indicated that if it was rejected by the Chinese, boundary negotiations would be broken off. Peiping's position may, however, be sufficiently encouraging to cause Ne Win to reconsider and agree to further explorations of the Chinese position. Ne Win is due to retire from the prime ministership after the nation- al elections early next year. He would undoubtedly like to have a border settlement as one more feather in his cap be- fore his resumption of full-time military duties T C E 1 Oct 69 CENTRAL INTFI I IC4FNCF Rill I FTIKI Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164688 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164688 Nue II. ASIA-AFRICA Cairo Protests Anti-UAR Speech Made in Peiping UAR President Nasir,rwho last week described his relations, with the USSR as in a "downward trendl now is involved in a dis- pute with Communist China, On 28 SOtember, refugee Syrian Communist leader Khalil Bakdash, speaking at Peiping's tenth anniversary celebration, severely criticized UAR policies. The UAR charge, who represented his government at the celebration, walked out of the meeting, and the UAR Foreign Ministry promptly summoned the Chinese Communist ambassador in Cairo and de- livered a formal protest. While it is not expected that Cairo will carry official action any further, the UAR press has taken up the incident, caustically reprimanding the Chinese for allowing Bak- dash to speak. This is likely to elicit propaganda reaction from Peiping and result in further deterioration in relations between the two countries. Caira,has meanwhile ordered the Syrian interior ministry to boyco:t the 1 October cele- brations in the Chinese Consulate in Damascus. Peiping's displeasure with Nasir stems from his anti-Com- munist campaign and from the conviction that the UAR is trying to undermine Communist China's position among the Afro-Asian neutrals. Along with the USSR and other members of the bloc, Peiping joined in the exchange of recriminations with Cairo touched off by Nasires, attack on local Communists last winter. The UAR- Chinese dispute focused specifically on relations between the two countries when Cairo criticized Chinese action in Tibet. In May, Communist China made an effort to patch up the sit- uation by muting its own propaganda, but UAR commentary on Tibet continued, and since mid-July the Chinese have periodically attacked Cairo's policies. Recently, the UAR representative on the Permanent Secretariat of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Council reportedly took issue with his Chinese counterpart over the Sino-Indian border dispute. '')F) SERI Tr 1 Oct 59 CCKITO A I HUTC1 I irtckit^c DI II I CTIkl Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164688 Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164688 Nor III. THE WEST De Gaulle Using Tunis As Channel to Algerian Rebels r!._.'rench Ambassador Gorse in Tunis, though not under "for- mal instructions," has informed Tunisian Defense Secretary Ladgham that if the Algerian rebel government "officially" seeks clarification through the Tunisian Government of certain aspects of De Gaulle's 16 September proposals for Algeria, the French Embassy will transmit the request in "greatest secrecy" to De Gaulle, The French counselor of embassy, who informed US officials of this on 28 September, said Gorse told Ladgham that De Gaulle's October 1958 offer of a cease-fire still stood, and that the embassy was ready to issue a laissez-passer to any rebel leader desiring to go to Paris to discuss a cease-fire. The counselor said this was of the utmost sensitivity and emphasized that if certain French Army circles learned of this the whole process might be endangerec9 aenying that the 16 September proposals were a French maneuver to get through the United Nations debates, Gorse told Ladgham that De Gaulle's offer could not be modified and "obvi- ously there could be no political negotiations," but France stood ready to make its intentions regarding all aspects of the program "fully understood." The Algerian rebels, according to a press re- port, have indicated that if France would agree to negotiate, they might not press their claim to be the legal Algerian government. Any rebel representatives who would go to Paris under such an arrangement would represent only the FLN.1 aris, in line with its policy of nonrecognition of the provi- siona Algerian government, is officially ignoring the rebel re- sponse of 28 September, The European settlers in Algeria view the rebel response as flatly negative:I S5-12 '1�E' 1 Oct 59 �GLITI% A I ikrrri I le,nb. te^n ni ii i r `Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164688 Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164688 -Amy' Key Latin American Communist Leaders Gather in Peiping (The presence of several prominent Latin American Commu- nist party leaders at the Chinese tenth anniversary celebrations provides an opportunity for them to discuss with Peiping officials new tactical plans in furtherance of Chinese objectives in Latin America and to review their accomplishments since the last such meeting in Peiping early this year. Luiz Carlos Prestes, Victor Codovilla, and Jesus Faria, top officials of the Brazilian, Argen- tine, and Venezuelan parties respectively, spoke at the opening ceremony. Key representatives of the Colombian, Cuban, Uru- guayan, Ecuadoran, Chilean, Panamanian, and Costa Rican Com- munist parties are also in Peiping, along with a number of non- Communist political, congressional, and cultural figures from several Latin American countries'el [The Chinese, who are seeking to increase their role in the guidance of Latin American Communists, have registered some successes in the program they outlined to the representatives of 12 Latin American parties who met in Peiping after the 21st Soviet party congress in early 1959. These plans included in- creased Latin American travel to China, the training of Latin American Communists in China, and the development of a Chi- nese propaganda network in Latin America. Subsequently, a Chinese journalist delegation visited four Latin American coun- tries, and the official New China News Agency has opened a branch in Havana and reportedly hired correspondents in Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela. Latin American travel to China dur- ing the first six months of 1959 far surpassed the total for all of 19563 [None of the 20 Latin American nations has diplomatic rela- tions with Communist China. Cuba, however, recently became the first Latin American nation since 1952 to abstain in a United Nations General Assembly vote on the question of Chinese UN representation-3 1 Oct 59 CApproved for Reas 2020/702/72I-0037164688 Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164688 Am, *we Status Report on Cuba Fidel Castro's preoccupation with growing economic prob- lems which threaten the realization of his reform program have heightened his marked sensitivity to criticism and his reliance on trusted companions from active revolutionary days. This was particularly evident in his TV appearance on 28 September. Castro made prolonged attacks on Havana dailies which have questioned government actions and on the decision of the In- ter-American Press Association to discuss whether freedom of the press exists in Cuba. Havana's leading newspaper, Diario de la Marina, which has Catholic and conservative backing, did not back down under the attack but charged ed- itorially on 29 September that press freedom is limited by the revolutionary government in many ways short of censor- ship. It was, surprisingly, joined by other independent pa- pers, in the first such strong and open exception to Castro's words since the revolutionary victory on 1 January. In the same speech Castro emphasized his great reliance on "true revolutionaries," naming among others "Che" Guevara, whose strident anti-Americanism and suspected pro-Commu- nism add to the general suspicion of him among Cubans. Castro announced that a government program for industrial planning would be headed by Guevara and that although private invest- ment would be accepted, outside help was not really needed. A reference to "investigation" of two large US-owned nickel and cobalt plants at Moa Bay and Nicaro indicated that the gov- ernment hopes to increase its income from them but has not yet decided by just what means. Castro's drastic solutions are only complicating the eco- nomic problems arising from his reform program. tested source reports that the Cuban Government will econo- mize by reducingthe army from its present 30,000-35,000 to 15,000 "select and trusted" troops. Discharges already made are causing much discontent because unemployment is unusual- ly high. 1 Oct 59 CAU�roVed for eT 2020/02/21-667164688 Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164688 A A 4'1 14 NNW� NNW THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director rflMcJfWPJT1AI Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164688 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164688 ur KCI NNW 4#####z1mmizzApproved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164688W/17/17