CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/10/13

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
03164698
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
U
Document Page Count: 
11
Document Creation Date: 
February 25, 2020
Document Release Date: 
February 27, 2020
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 13, 1959
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15787644].pdf463.49 KB
Body: 
//////////////////////// Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164698 13 October 1959 Copy No. C or CENTRAL L\TELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO, NO CHANGE IN CLA DECLASSIF17:D CO 1. CLASS. CHANGED TO: ittS NEXT REVIEW DATE:j�q A REVIEWER: 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) TOP SECRET ,/�..m,Ap proved for Release: 2020/02/21 C 03164698fi//////////,/,,/,, Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164698 -NNW uqpip. dr. rin rsr'r Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164698 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164698 L.I 13 OCTOBER 1959 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC II. ASIA-AFRICA Indonesia--Parliament to air issue of parliamentary versus executive powers. IIL THE WEST Important French military officials agitating against liberal solution for Algeria. Financial problems in Belgium and Congo threaten Belgium's ruling coalition. Cyprus--IVIakarios and Grivas issue ambiguous communiqu�t end of talks; differences probably persist. Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164698 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164698 %inse *so CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 13 October 1959 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC II, ASIA-AFRICA Indonesia: The major political parties are opposed to the government's recent decree limiting the autonomy of regional governments. They apparently hope to use it as a test case during the present parliamentary session to define parliamentary versus executive powers under the new constitution. The gov- ernment istking steps to limit criticism of the decree. (Page 1) III, THE WEST France-Algeria: &portant French military officials, in- cluding General Zeller, until recently French army chief of staff, and General Raoul Salan, ex-commander of forces in Algeria, are reliably reported to be agitating in army circles against a liberal solution for Algeria. French intelligence authorities say that the government is not alarmed in view of De Gaulle's resounding popular and bureaucratic support. Never- theless, elements of the army in France and Algeria can be ex- pected to try to frustrate any solution other than integratiorq (Page 2) Belgium: A serious treasury crisis and growing uncer- tainty over the viability of the Congo program have aggravated the precarious position of Prime Minister Eyskens' coalition. The government, faced with mounting financial difficulties in the D Congo, for the first time in history has found it necessary to sub- sidize the Congo budget in the face of Belgium's weak financial SECRET 4Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164698v A 7 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164698 %La a '41.00 Naomi position. Moreover, there are increasing indications of native hostility to the territorial elections scheduled for December. (Page 3) Cyprus: Archbishop Makarios and General Grivas have con- cluded their three-day talks on the island of Rhodes with a corn- Ok muniqud consisting largely of vague generalities which soft- 1.341),)pedaled their differences. In promoting the talks, Grivas saw n 7/tA4va..the chance to enhance his political prestige in Greece. Makarios ,c,ve-et lip r obab ly has been able to avoid any commitments to Grivas which ( I would seriously limit his freedom of action. However issues G Ivhich separate the two men apparently persist. (Page 4) ../1"`-1,47.0A'A 3 134- 13 Oct 59 DAILY BRIEF ii �SECRET� Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164698 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164698 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC wow- IL ASIA-AFRICA Indonesian Political Parties Oppose Sukarno Decree All major Indonesian political parties, with the Communists in the forefront, oppose a presidential decree of 7 September lim- iting local autonomy. In addition to opposing the substance of the decree, the parties apparently also hope to use it as a test case during the present parliamentary session to define parliamentary versus executive powers under the changed constitution. 0_2mmu- fist labor leaders are reported considering a nationwide protest strike, even though such action would be illegal and would provoke army retaliation} The decree abolishes most of the local autonomy extended by parliamentary law in 1957 and restores to the central government direct responsibility for the provinces through the county level. These changes, if effected in December as planned, would further diminish party influence which has already been reduced at the national level by the return to the 1945 constitution last July. Parliament reconvened on 1 October, and, despite a cabinet announcement that the decree will not be submitted to parliament for approval, will probably debate the measure. Party leaders fear the development of a constitutional interpretation by which parliament would lose substantial authority over legislation and be subordinated to the executive. Unless parliament can seriously embarrass the cabinet on the decree, however, and thereby induce government concessions, its protests are unlikely to be effective. The interior minister has stated that the present parliament is not competent to debate a presidential decree, apparently hint- ing that significant bills will be submitted to the legislature only after the formation of the People's Congress--the legislative body provided for under the 1945 constitution. The Congress, on which the cabinet has promised "early" action, apparently will be com- posed of some members of the present elected parliament plus functional and regional representatives appointed by Sukarno. Meanwhile, the army has taken some steps, such as canceling a national conference of regional government officials, to limit crit- icism of the decree outside parliament. 13 Oct 59 rink l�rn A I El rrnI I IeNnk n I II I r-rok "Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164698 Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164698 III. THE WEST Important French Army Leaders Agitate Against Liberal Solution in Algeria (General Andre Zeller, until recently French Army chief of staff, is agitating in army circles against a liberal solu- tion in Algeria, Others working with Zeller are said to include General Raoul Salan, formerly commander in chief in Algeria and now inspector general for national defense, and a pr ion commander in Algeria, General Jacques Faure. the French Government is not yet seriously alarme in view o e "resounding" support for De Gaulle] 4___This is the first specific report of adverse military reac- tion to De Gaulle's 16 September proposals concerning Algeria. Most such reaction has been from elements identified with the army but not on active duty, such as octogenarian General Maxime Weygand. Increasing official sensitivity to possible military opposition is suggested by the government's belated reprimand last week to the army reserve officers' organiza- tion for its 28 September resolution favoring integration as the only solution LT-ile wide popular approval of De Gaulle's proposals in France would probably give pause to any overt military opposition. An 13 Oct 59 e-CAITD A I IkITCI I IrlPkIrr RI II I PTIN Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164698 Page 2 Approved for Release: '2020/02/21 C03164698 Financial and Congo Problems Shake Belgian Coalition A serious treasury crisis and growing uncertainty over the viability of its Congo program have aggravated the .precarious.po- sition of Belgian Prime Minister Eyskens' coalition. If the So- cialists succeed in calling an extraordinary session of parliament on Congo policy this week, the resulting debate could bring down the government. In any case, American Embassy observers in Brussels consider it problematical how much longer the Social Christian - Liberal coalition can survive its "internal contradic- tions." At a cabinet session on 7 October, the government left un- resolved Belgium's long-term financial problems in the Congo, but decided to underwrite the 1959 Congo budget to the extent of $100,000,000. This is the first time in Belgian history that a subsidy has been required for the Congo. It will aggravate the existing Belgian deficit, which is expected to lead to a major treasury crisis before the end of the year. The Liberals are committed to deserting the coalition rather than voting the taxes needed to meet the crisis. Another complication facing the coalition is the evidence of increased Congolese hostility toward the program of accelerated political development announced by Brussels last January. Prom- inent Congolese nationalists have already denounced as undemocrat- ic the elections for the proposed territorial councils scheduled for Dec ember Congo Minister de Schrijver is expected to issue a "clarifica- tion" of the Congo political program later this week. If this fails to satisfy the Congolese as well as domestic critics of the program, he will probably be in serious trouble only a little over a month after taking office. Although the Socialist opposition is still sup- porting a nonpartisan policy on the Congo, it is anxious to estab- lish a position of confidence with the Congolese in the event the present coalition should fall. 13 Oct 59 CAPpnr�o�veAd for Release: 2020/02/21003164698 Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164698 NNW Cyprus The recent meetings on Rhodes between Archbishop Ma- karios anaformer EOKA leader General Grivas appear to have resulted in a victory for Makarios and added prestige for Grivas. The communique issued at the end of the three-day conference called for renewed unity and cooperation in the establishment of an independent Cypriot republic, but failed to mention specific issues which have increasingly separated the two men, rMakarios apparently made no significant concession to Grivas. the former underground leader had asked Makarios to acknowledge publicly that Grivas had not par- ticipated in the much-publicized planning for a coup against the Archbishop's leadership and had not been fully informed of the text of the London-Zurich Agreements before they were signed. The final communique does not mention these issues-4 At the conclusion of the talks, Grivas publicly pledged to work for the implementation of the agreements and expressed his ",unreserved support" for Makarios. Nakarios assured the gen- eral that he will continue to oppose any British attempts to expand the size of military bases on Cyprus and any Turkish efforts to es- tablish a republic with equality of power between a Greek Cypriot president and Turkish Cypriot vice president--positions which Makarios has consistently advocates:9 The Archbishop thus returns to Cyprus with enhanced prestige in the Greek Cypriot community for having re-established outward unity. Grivas' full acceptance of the London Agreements�even though he had previously "dissociated" himself from them--will do much to destroy the position of the hard-core Greek Cypriot nationalists who have consistently refused to accept anything less than "enosis"--union with Greece. Grivas' major benefits appear to stem from acceptance by Makarios of his right to be consulted on important issues involv- ing Cyprus, implied by the holding of the meeting itself, and the political prestige which he has secured through publicity connected with the meeting. -SE�RE-T-- 13 Oct 59 CAPp.r7e'd. fo.r.14ereas.e7.. 200-/02/. -d0-371-64698 Page 4 _Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164698 4.10' THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director CONFIDENTIAL Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164698 Approved for Release. 2020/02/21 C03164698 0 TOP SECRET / //Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03164698e