CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/01/06

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03166572
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: January 6, 1961

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6 January 1961
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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6 JANUARY 1961
I. SPECIAL ITEM
Situation in Laos.
IL THE COMMUNIST BLOC
East German refugee flow to West Berlin
heavy during holiday period.
III. ASIA-AFRICA
Iran--Shah has apparently decided to rig
Impending parliamentary elections to as�
sure victory of pre-selected candidates.
Ethiopian Emperor's failure to follow up
success in crushing recent revolt raises
doubts in Ethiopia over his ability to re-
assert one-man rule.
Japanese Socialists adopt new moderate
approach in effort to rally popular oppo-
sition to some government policies.
Nepalese Communists and former ruling
Nepali Congress party have begun sep-
arately to operate underground in opposi
tion to King's takeover of government.
0
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IV. THE WEST
� Mexican foreign minister says Cuban
situation is problem for Cuban people
but they may need some outside help.
LATE ITEM
� Beirut rioting may force Lebanese Presi-
dent Shihab to form military government
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
6 January 1961
DAILY BRIEF
I. SPECIAL ITEM
Laos: While sporadic skirmishing has been reported,
there has been no appreciable change in the areas held by ,e.LejLtz.�/
the opposing forces during the past two days. Even if agree- Th.,
deL4_,E_
ment in principle is soon reached on reactivation of the ICC, "
the time required to get the commission in place and to LL..2t it- 7,
agree on the terms under which it would operate would per e
mit both sides to engage in considerable military activity in
orde to be in the best position should a truce be declared.
he Boun Oum government, its investiture by the Na-
tional Assembly now completed, is sending an emissary to
Phnom Penh in an effort to persuade Souvanna Phouma to
recognize the new government; an ambassadorship or some
other roost may be offered Souvanna.
(Page 1)
II. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Berlin: The near record refugee flow to West Berlin over
the h�oTiFin7period reflects the deep-seated disaffection of the
East German populace, even among doctors, teachers, and
technical men, to whom the regime has been granting special
political and economic concessions. Some relaxation in East
German controls also probably, contributed to the fact that
4,345 refugees were able to flee to West Berlin in the week
ending 3 January. The refugee flow to Berlin in the last twelve
months has totaled more than 150,000--as compared with 90,000
in 1959. Ulbricht's difficulty in dealing with this problem is
complicated by the USSR's desire to keep tensions over Berlin
down pending a period of East-West negotiations.
(Page 3)
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I I I. ASIA-AFRICA
11
o K
Iran: LA:fter several weeks of hesitation, the Shah ap-
pears to have decided that the parliamentary elections
which are expected to start sometime this month should A 2
again be rigged to assure the choice of preselected can- ft
didates. Commentary in the Iranian press on these elec-
tions, in contrast to the treatment of the August elections,
has been very scanty, apparently, because the regime hopes /r
to reduce the impact of electoral chicanery on the public.
Iranian security officials expect demonstrations but believe
they can handle them easily. One high security official ex-
pressed the view that the "real and tragic damage" which
will result from these elections will be the irrepar
ening.je gap between the regime and the people
(Page 4)
Ethiopia: Emperor Haile Selassie's failure to follow up
his success in crushing the recent attempt to depose him
with positive steps to reconstruct his regime has paralyzed
normal governmental operations and is raising doubts among
Ethiopians regarding his ability to reassert his one-man rule
over Ethiopia. On 3 January a high security official appealed
for calm over Radio Addis Ababa and denied the credibility
of numerous rumors circulating in the capital. While the
American ambassador foresees no immediate breakdown of
public order, he points out that trouble could break out if the
Em eror fails to take early steps to quell the discontent.
(Page 6)
Japan: he Socialist party has begun a campaign to rally 0 Ar
popular opposition to government negotiations for settlement
with South Korea by pointing out that Seoul cannot speak for all
of Korea. Since mid-October. the Socialists have shifted their
tactics away from the mass action of last summer to attacking elitj e
the conservative government in parliament on issues with wide
popular appeal such as renewal of Sino-Japanese relations an.L17
6 Jan 61
DAILY BRIEF ii
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� opposition to Jan's defense build-up. The more moderate
Socialist appr.ach in the present political context offers con-
. � sider e.,,r ,�,,,-,z-nment and to US-Japanese rela-
tions.
(Page 7)
.al: Leaders of both the Communist party and the for-
mer ruling Nepal/. Congress party have begun separately to
operate underround in Nepal. They are also engaging in or-
ganizational acavities in India in opposition to the takeover of
the government by King Mahendra. The King's 5 January ban
on political parties will 5Erc-erf:_rthti their determination to op-
pose his direct-rule policies. Former Deputy Prime Minister
Subarna Shumshere, who has been in Calcutta since the King's
takeover in December, is already in contact with Indian gov-
ernment leaders and has reportedly received New Delhi's cov-
ert LIessing for "limited resistance activities:' Subarna has,
however, ruled out collaboration with the Communists.
IV. THE WEST
Cuba: Latin American reaction to the US-Cuban diplomatic
break Fus far has been mixed and fragmentary. The most strik-
ing comment has come from Mexican Foreign Minister Tello.
He told US Embassy officials that while the Cuban situation is
a problem for the Cubans themselves, they will need "a little
bit of outside help." He implied that the problem, could be dealt
with by the Organization of American States, under its Caracas
Resolution of 1954 against international Communism. Mexico
is a strong proponent of the concept of nonintervention, and this
Is the furthest any Mexican official has yet gone toward condon-
ing external action to solve the Cuban problem. Tello also spoke
of the great difficulty of influencing Cuba back into the American
family of nations--a sharply contrasting attitude to the warm of-
ficial reception given by Mexico to Cuban President Dorticos
last June. (Page 9)
6 Jan 61
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LATE ITEM
*Lebanon: Fears that Moslem rioting in Beirut on 4-5
january might lead to Christian-Moslem strife may force Presi-
dent Shihab to accede to pressures from some army elements
for a military takeover of the government, according to Ambassa-
dor McClintook. Rivals of Prime Minister Salam, including
former Prime Minister Yafi, apparently instigated the disorders
hoping to bring down Salamis cabinet, Although Shihab has become
increasingly disillusioned with Lebabese political leaders, whom
he contemptuously terms "cheese-eaters," he has consistently
resiRtPri nast stioynagtinns that h ..P avr m milifary anuarrirnartf
12
urn
V. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
(Available during the preceding week)
Chinese Communist Atomic Energy Program--Summary and
Conclusions: Organization, Technical Capabilities, Ore Produc-
tion, Soviet Aid, and Likely Dates for First Chinese Production
Reactor to Attain Criticality and for Detonation of a Nuclear De-
vice. NIE 13-2-60. 13 December 1960.
Probable Communist Intentions in Laos and Factors Likely
to Affect Future Soviet, Chinese, and North Vietnamese Moves.
SNIE 68-2060. 28 December 1960.
Soviet Atomic Energy Program. Graphs, Maps, Tables.
NIE 11-2A-60. 21 June 1960. (Disseminated 14 December 1960.)
116693.
6 Jan 61 DAILY BRIEF
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vr.or
� Situation in Laos
Scattered skirmishing between Pathet Lao/Kong Le
forces and government troops has been reported in the
past two days, but there appears to have been no appre-
ciable change in the areas held by the opposing forces. The
Pathet Lao and Kong Le appear to be consolidating their
control in the Plaine des Jarres area and are exerting pres-
sure on government paratroop elements dropped a few miles
outside Xieng Khouang town on 1 January. The government
post at Ban Ban to the northeast also appears to be under
strong enemy pressure. Government elements in Xieng
Khouang Province are widely scattered and will have to re-
group and be reinforced before any attempt to retake the
Plaine des Jarres can be undertaken.
[Elsewhere in the country, a government blocking posi-
tion north of Luang Prabang came under mortar fire on 4
January, possibly presaging an early increase in Pathet Lao
pressure on the royal capitalj Communist radio claims of
Pathet Lao successes in other parts of Laos are probably con-
siderably inflated, although guerrilla activity is believed to be
on the increase in southern and central Laos.
[premier Boun Own, his government now formally invested
by the National Assembly, has informed Ambassador Brown in
Vientiane that one of his cabinet ministers will leave shortly for
Phnom Penh in an effort to persuade Souvanna Phouma to recog-
nize the legality of his regime. An ambassadorship or some other
government post may be offered Souvanna as an inducement to
drop any pretension he may entertain that he still heads the legal
government of Laos. Souvanna recently indicated to the press
that he would resign the moment the Boun Oum government was
constitutionally established; however, he is subject to strong
Soviet influence in Phnom Penh and may not follow through on
his promise. Even though he appears unlikely to proclaim a
government-in-exile, he may choose simply to remain sileplj
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aus keeping himself free to come in as a compromise pre-
mier in a negotiated settlement, which he may feel will be the
final upshot of the crisis in Laos3
[The Boun Oum government continues to show a strong anti
French animus, stemming from the belief that the French were
behind the Kong Le coup and openly favored leftist elements in
the struggle between Savannakhet and the Souvanna government
in Vientiane. The government has ordered all French civil serv-
ants and military personnel in southern Laos to congregate at
the Seno military base near Savannakhet. All such persons
In the First Military Region in northern Laos have been oraered
to return to Vientiane. In his conversation with Ambassador
Brown, Boun Oum reiterated his government's intention to take
over Seno, the use of which was granted
FrPneh iinricrr +h.
1954 Indochina Armistice Agreementli,
The Boun Oum government has indicated a willingness to
consider reactivation of the ICC in Laos if all signatories to the
1954 Geneva Agreements desire this and if the Geneva co-chair-
men--Great Britain and the USSR�submit the request for recall
to Boun Oum's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The USSR, Commu-
nist China, and North Vietnam�which signed the Geneva Agree-
ments along with Britain, France, and Cambodia--continue to
call for reactivation of the ICC but have insisted that all dealings
be with ex-Premier. Souvarma Phouma. Even if agreement in
principle is soon reached on reactivation of the ICC, the time
required to get the commission in place and to agree on the terms
under which it would operate would permit both sides to engage in
considerable military activity in order to be in the best position
should a truce be declared.
All ten Soviet IL44s made flights into Laos on 4 . armary
and were scheduled for ten more flights on 5 January
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giord
East German pular Disaffection Reflected in High
Refugee Flow
A near record holiday flow of more than 7,000 refugees
reached West Berlin in the two weeks including Christmas and
New Year's�some 4,345 in the week ending 3 January. This
influx brings the total number of escapes to West Berlin in 1960
to more than 150,000, compared with less than 90,000 last year.
Escapes to both West Berlin and West Germany this year totaled
just under 200,000, compared with less than 144,000 in 1959.
Among the refugees are many medical men, teachers, engineers,
technicians, and skilled workers whose services are vitally need-
ed by the Ulbricht regime.
In recent weeks, the regime has sought to stem the flow at
least among professional people. Medical men, teachers, and
engineers have been promised better living conditions, some re-
lief from political pressures, and an opportunity to follow their
professional preferences. Party boss Ulbricht took a conciliatory
line in his report to the eleventh central committee plenum in mid-
December, admitting even that "sometimes there is reason for
dissatisfaction" in East Germany. He reproved officials for using
"crude" methods toward professional men and intellectuals and
ordered instead the use of persuasion.
Left to himself, Ulbricht probably would sharply intensify
controls on East Germans desiring to travel to West Berlin and
West Germany. However, he must instead fall in line with the
USSR's desire to keep tension over Berlin at a low point brat
least the time being. The regime has therefore reduced controls
within Berlin and reportedly in mid-December liberalized the
granting of permits to visit the Federal Republic. As Ulbricht
complained in his speech to the party plenum: "We had to and
still must compete with imperialist and capitalist West Germany
with open frontiers. This is not easy."
In past months, there has been evidence that East German
party functionaries have been critical of Khrushchev's decision
to delay a solution of the Berlin question. Although Ulbricht has
always seemed to accommodate himself to Khrushchev's tactics
and has kept such elements in line, internal party pressures for
harsher policies to prevent escapes will probably mount.
6 Jan 61
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vlsol
Shah Appears Determined to RiglParliamentary Elations
he Shah has apparently received conflicting advice on
the conduct of the elections: one school, exemplified by for-
mer Prime Minister Eqbal, maintains that they should be
completely controlled; the other view, held by Bakhtiar and
presumably by Sharif-Emami, is that a free choice should be
permitted among carefully selected candidates. It now ap-
pears that the Eqbal approach has not only won out but that
Sharif-Emami has himself been persuaded to support a policy
he has previously deplored. The Shah, however, is likely to
be under pressure, up to the day the voting begins, to reverse
this policy. In contrast to its treatment of the abortive elec-
tions of August 1960, the Tehran press has nearly ignored the
coming elections. This appears to be an attempt by the regime
to reduce public interest and thus avoid a repetition of last
year's widespread criticisl-nj
53_althtiar and other security officials expect demonstra-
tions if rigged elections are repeated, but none that cannot b_23
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Cpssntrolled. He believes that the "real and tragic damage" will
be the irreparable widening of the gap between the regime and
the people. The violent repression of demonstrations could
precipitate formation of a unified nationalist opposition con-
trolled by radical element23
6 Jan 61
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Nwv � Nary
Ethiopia Faces Growing Instability
Emperor Haile Selassie has failed to follow up his suc-
cess in crushing the recent attempt to depose him by taking
positive steps to reconstruct his regime. As a result, nor-
mal governmental operations have become paralyzed, and
there are indications that some Ethiopians are beginning to
doubt his ability to reassert his one-man rule in Ethiopia.
The Emperor's inaction and his recent public pronounce-
ments reveal an intense preoccupation with the security of
his regime and with the lack of personal loyalty displayed
toward him during the abortive coup. Meanwhile he is com-
pletely disregarding the need for reforms.
Continued instability in the capital was demonstrated on
3 January when a high security official made an appeal over
Radio Addis Ababa for calm and declared that rumors circu-
lating in the capital were groundless. One rumor--that the
army has threatened to "take action" unless it receives an
immediate pay raise--is causing considerable apprehension
in government circles, in part because the short-lived coup
government promised such a raise. The American ambassa-
dor observes that even if this rumor has no factual basis, it
might create sufficient discontent to cause possible action by
the army or by individual soldiers. Regarding another rumor--
that Ethiopian foreign officials have defected and are seeking
political asylum�the ambassador indicated that a number of
officials are known to be dissatisfied with the prevailing situa-
tion in Addis Ababa and that there now is much more criticism
of the Emperor than before the attempted coup0
k_)espite indications that his shaky regime may face even
more serious difficulties, the Emperor is reported opposed
o making concessions to progressive younger elements who
dvocate some of the reforms also promised by the rebels.
e is said to be seeking advice only from the surviving mem-
ers of the conservative old guard who oppose changes in pres-
nt government policy, in the hope of maintaining the status
u5D While the ambassador foresees no immediate breakdown
of public order, he believes there may be trouble if
peror fails to take early steps to quell the discontent
NOFORN)
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*Itie Now
New Sodk Strategy Dangerous to US
Interests in Japan
bp 3 January the Japanese Socialist party began a cam-
paign to rally popular opposition to government negotiations
for an over-all settlement with South Korea by pointing out
that Seoul cannot speak for all of Korea. The Socialists is-
sued a statement that an agreement would perpetuate the par-
tition of Korea and open the door to formation of a northeast
Asian military alliance among Japan, South Korea, National-
ist China, and the Philippines. They are also exploiting pop-
ular apprehension that no settlement of Korean financial
claims will be final if North Korea is excluded
his attack is in line with tactics adopted by the party
in mid-October, when it abandoned last summer's mass dem-
onstration tactics and began attacking the conservative govern-
ment in parliament on issues having wide popular appeal. This
new moderate approach in the present political context offers
considerable danger to the government and to US..Japamisvit_
relation/
yring the special Diet session which ended on 22 Decem-
ber, the Socialists replaced last year's frontal attack on the US
alliance with a less direct one in the form of a widely appeal-
ing argument for neutralism. They argued that the consequences
of US dollar-protection measures support their position that
Japan can no longer depend wholly on the US for trade and
should renew trade relations with Communist China. They
maintained that the Japanese economy cannot afford increased
defense expenditures, that American military assistance will
soon be drastically cut because of the US balance-of-payments
problem, and that the Japanese must therefore seek security
in nonaggression pacts with their Communist neighborj9
The theoretical basis of the new Socialist tactics is the
so-called "structural reform" program promoted Jay Secretary)
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Nagy
aeneral Saburo Eda and modeled on pronouncements of Ital-
ian Communist party Secretary General Togliatti. This pro-
gram calls for de-emphasizing class struggle and long-range
goals which can be accomplished only after the Socialists have
come to power and for concentrating on immediate popular
issues where there is a possibility of forcing changes in gov-
ernment policy. The program probably represents only a
temporary shift to gain greater popular support. Its unac-
knowledged goal is to create a series of government crises,
to topple successive conservative governments, and eventually
to undermine conservative strength-.
6 Jan 61
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)440
Latin American Reaction to, US-Cuban Break
Latin American reaction to the US-Cuban diplomatic
break thus far has been mixed and fragmentary. The most
striking comment has come from Mexican Foreign Minister
who told American Embassy officials that the exer-
..a oi any influence to bring Cuba back into the American
family of nations would be most difficult since Cuba's recent
ctions demonstrate zomplete alignment with the &b-
Soviet bloc. He said that while the Cuban situation is a prob-
lem for the Cubans themselves, they will need "a bit of out-
side help" in some form which would not "lower the prestige
of any nation." He said that the Cuban problem could only be
dealt with by the Organization of American States (OAS)
through the provisions of the Caracas resolution of 1954
-against international Communism, but he added that this
would preclude any Mexican involvement in the voting. Mex-
ico remains the only Latin American nation which has not
endorsed the 1954 resolution.
The US Embassy in Mexico city sees this statement as
an indication that Mexico may "convey a benevolent nod for
someone else to terminate the Cuban headache while Mexico
goes on abstaining." Mexico has long been a stanch supporter
of the doctrine of nonintervention, and the Tello statement is
the furthest any Mexican official has yet gone in condoning ex-
ternal action to solve the Cuban problem. Some Mexican offi-
cials have publicly voiced their sympathy for the Cuban people
and the aims of their revolution since June 1960, when Cuban
President Osvaldo Dorticos was received warmly by Mexican
officials as well as the general public during his tour of the
country. This attitude has been due both to Mexico's finding
an analogy between the Cuban and Mexican revolutions and
to mounting leftist pressures on the Lopez Mateos govern-
ment.
A Brazilian Foreign Office official criticized the US for
not consulting the other OAS governments beforehand, and
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_red
expressed fears that the break will play into Castro's hands
in his efforts to drive a wedge between the United States and
the rest of Latin America. Venezuelan foreign Minister
Falcon Briceno commented favorably on the US action and
said that he considered i evitable, Haitian Foreign Minis-
ter Baguidy expressed a similar sentiment. Venezuelan
relations with Cuba are already strained, and Ambassador
Sparks in Caracas feels that Venezuela's future course in re-
gard to Cuba will be determined by the degree of satisfaction
of the Betancourt government with.the outcome of the 4 Jan-
uary OAS council meeting, which voted to impose limited eco-
nomic sanctions against the Trujillo dictatorship in the Domin-
ican Republic. Costa Rican and Panamanian officials have
indicated that their governments now are considering the pos-
sibility of breaking diplomatic ties with Cuba.
� Uruguayan officials have indicated their government may
use the Cuban precedent in demanding the reduction of the US
diplomatic mission in Havana to the same level as the Cuban
representation in Washington as a means of trimming the size
of the Soviet diplomatic mission of some 30 individuals in Mon-
tevideo to the three Uruguayans in Moscow.
Meanwhile, there Is no evidence of a Cuban move against .
the US naval base at Guantanamo, but the Cuban ambassador to
1:xico said on 3 January that his government would present a
"petition" to the United Nations "to have the base eliminated."
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Detense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Security Agency
The Director
� National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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