CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/07/10

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03169378
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: July 10, 1957

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CURRENT
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10 July 1957
Copy No. 136
AUT FIR 700,
DATE4rit'gr REVIEWEFi:
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This document contains classified information affecting
the national security of the United States within the
meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections
793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits its transmission
or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an un-
authorized person, as well as its use in any manner
prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States
or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detri-
ment of the United States.
/$/
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,igt*
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CONTENTS
`'41. SOVIET OFFICIALS IN LONDON COMMENT ON PRESIDIUM
PURGE AND DISARMAMENT (page 3).
\I-\ 2. WESTERN DELEGATES' REACTION TO SOVIET DISARMA-
MENT STATEMENT OF 8 JULY (page 5).
30 AMBASSA7 BOHLEN COMMENTS ON SOVIET PURGE
(page 6).
ISRAELI-SYRIAN BORDER INCIDENT
t5. KING SAUD TAKES STRONG LINE ON AQABA ISSUE
;page 8).
(page 7).
0\1) 6. ICATAY DESIGNATED TO MAKE SECOND BID FOR LAOTIAN
PREMIERSHIP (page 9).
kilo POSSIBLE COUP IN PANAMA
10 July 57
(page 10).
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1. SOVIET OFFICIALS IN LONDON COMMENT ON PRESIDIUM
PURGE AND DISARMAMENT
Comment on
Two members of the Soviet disarmament
delegation in London, Usachev and Shakhov,
told US officials on 4 July that the Soviet
delegation had long known that changes in
the Soviet leadership were in the making, but had not known
when they would take place. The realignment had strengthened
the leadership, and the displaced leaders would probably "take
their pensions and write books."
The delegates called it a move toward re-
laxing tensions. The presidium, they said, is now composed of
persons known for friendlier views toward the US, a good omen
for disarmament.
Apart from these remarks, there has been
no indication since the purge that the Soviet position on disarm-
ament has been affected. The Soviet statement to the subcom-
mittee on 8 July and an increasing volume of Soviet propaganda
suggest that the USSR is standing firm on the proposals it has
already placed before the subcommittee.
Apparently in an attempt to sow discord
among the Western delegations, the two Soviet officials said,
the French appeared to be the main obstacle to disarmament
and claimed that divergencies exist in US-French views on the
linking of a test moratorium and a cut-off of production. They
depreciated the French intention to make a bomb, commenting
that France did not have the means and was prevented by its
membership in EURATOM. Shakhov said the reason the US
had suggested 1959 as a cut-off date for nuclear weapons pro-
duction was to help the British, who did not have enough and
who could agree to an early cut-off only if they received such
weapons from the US. The Soviet officials said both France
and the UK were third-rate powers and that what mattered was
an agreement between the US and the USSR. Shakhov wondered
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why the US did not tell its allies what they should do on dis-
armament as he said the USSR told Gomulka and Mao Tse-tung.
Shakhov reaffirmed theY USSR's position
that it could agree to a cessation of production if tied to a pro-
hibition on use. This requirement subsequently was included
in a Moscow broadcast summary of Zorin's speech before the
subcommittee on 8 July.
On the prohibition of the use of nuclear
weapons, Shakhov stated emphatically that the USSR would use
nuclear weapons against the US if it attacked the USSR and vice
versa, but stressed at the same time that this should not pre-
vent these powers from assuming a solemn obligation not to
use nuclear weapons. As an example, he said that if Turkey
should attack the USSR, nuclear weapons would be unnecessary,
adding contemptuously that "it would take two Kazakh divisions�
to wipe Turkey off the map."
Usachev minimized American "clean bomb
talk," saying the only really dirty bomb was the "US tripledeck-
er" and that Soviet weapons had been consistently cleaner. He
said "clean" versus "dirty" was mainly a question of the height
of the explosion. Usachev conceded in the first such statement
by a Soviet official that it was possible to conduct tests without
detection but said such tests would have no military significance.
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2. WESTERN DELEGATES' REACTION TO SOVIET
DISARMAMENT STATEMENT OF 8 JULY
Reference:
British, French, and Canadian dele-
gates on the UN Disarmament Sub-
committee agree that Soviet Delegate
Zorin's 8 July speech was disappoint-
ing and negative. British Foreign Secretary Lloyd felt that
the speech was designed for propaganda purposes and gave
no indication of a real desire to reach an agreement. He pre-
dicted that there would be a strong Soviet drive to separate
the suspension of tests from other provisions, including the
cut-off in production of nuclear weapons deemed necessary
by the West for a first-step partial agreement.
French Delegate Jules Moch interpreted
Zorin's speech to mean that there was little prospect for an
agreement on terms acceptable to the West. The Canadian
delegate associated himself with Lloyd's and Moch's views.
Zorin has requested an early bilateral
session with the American delegates to explain the Soviet po-
sition.
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3. AMBASSADOR BOHLEN COMMENTS ON SOVIET PURGE
Reference:
Ambassador Bohlen, in a preliminary
comment from Manila on the recent
Moscow purges, expresses his belief
that the role of Zhukov must have been
an important it not vital factor in Khrushchev's victory. Boh-
len considers it very unlikely that Zhukov, who represents
the feeling of the army, would be prepared to support a re-
turn to Stalinist one-man rule with the inevitable emergence
of the secret police as a controlling factor.
Bohlen thinks, in view of Soviet insist-
ence on Molotov's opposition role in foreign policy, that some
important decision in the foreign policy field may have served
to unite the opposition. He considers that "it is at least con-
ceivable" that disarmament and particularly inspection may
have been instrumental. He makes it clear that he does not
mean to imply that internal problems were not key factors.
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4, ISRAELI-SYRIAN BORDER INCIDENT
Comment on�
Preliminary reports indicate that the
outbreak of fighting on the Israeli-
Syrian border near Gonen north of
Lake Huleh on 9 July was the most
serious incident of this kind since the
Suez-Sinai hostilities last fall. Mor-
tars as well as small arms were used,
the Israelis suffered casualties, and
attempts by UN truce observation teams
to halt the firing appear to have succeeded
only with considerable difficulty�
This latest incident fol-
lowed one the previous day, in
which the Israelis claim the
Syrians sought to kidnap a par-
ty investigating a still earlier
incident. Israeli casualties
have in the past been viewed by
Tel Aviv as a cause for fu-
ture retaliation unless avenged
on the spot. Israel's appar-
ent reluctance to have a full-
scale UN discussion on the
basic causes of the continu-
ing tension along its border
with Syria, however, may act
as a brake on further delib-
erate action at this time.
10 July 57
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50 KING SAUD TAKES STRONG LINE ON AQABA ISSUE
King Saud reportedly stated in a 4 July
speech to about 1,000 Moslem dignitar-
ies in Mecca on pilgrimage that if all
his peaceful efforts to restore the Gulf
of Aqaba to "the same status as before Israeli aggression"
should fail, he would "call on the Moslem and Arab worlds...
to act with me in repelling this danger which is threatening
the Kaaba of the Moslems and the mosque and grave of our
Prophet!'
Saud
insists that because Israel had no navy in the gulf before it at-
tacked Egypt last fall, the Israeli navy should now be expelled
and the gulf remain a closed Arab waterway.
the Aqaba problem was important enough to bring Egyptian War
Minister Amer to visit Saud from 4 to 6 July and that his visit
was "along the line of clearing the atmosphere to the advantage
of Arab collaboration."
Comment Saud is now pressing the Aqaba issue hard
in both his private and public diplomacy.
A Saudi minister of state said on 7 July that the UNEF should
be withdrawn from the Aqaba gulf area if it continued merely to
provide an "umbrella" for Israeli shipping there.
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.1. A
6. KATAY DESIGNATED TO MAKE SECOND BIDTOR-7
LAOTIAN PREMIERSHIP
Comment one.
Nationalist Party chief Katay has been
designated to make a second bid to form
a government in Laos' six-week-old cab-
inet crisis. Katay was defeated by only
one vote on his first bid, but the small
Democratic Party which opposed him is
now reportedly split. He will probably
make a bid for the support of the unai-
Mated deputies by offering to retain the
finance minister, whom he had previously sought to relegate
to a minor cabinet post. Katay is also expected to moderate
his tough policy toward the Pathet Lao--at least in public�in
order to offset apprehension that his investiture means a rup-
ture in Pathet negotiations and the continued division of the
country.
Outgoing Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma
controls a wing of the Nationalist Party and may wish to suc-
ceed himself. Should he join with elements of the Democratic
and National Union Parties, he could probably prevent Katay's
investiture.
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141111.
7. POSSIBLE COUP IN PANAMA
First Vice President Temistocles Diaz
of Panama is planning a coup for 14 July
to oust President Ernesto de la Guardia,
Diaz believes tNational Guard will tacitly support a public
demonstration against the administration, and De la Guardia
will be forced to resign,. Diaz would then legally become pres-
ident. He feels he must act quickly to fend off a possible coup
by Arnulfo Arias, popular nationalistic former president.
De la Guardia, who knows of Diaz' plan,
does not trust National Guard Commandant Vallarino and has
reportedly organized his own armed combat squads,
Comment Diaz probably cannot oust the President.
Success of his plan would require Valla-
rino's refusal to help De la Guardia overcome his opposition.
Nevertheless,. Diaz, in financial straits, angry at the admin-
istration coalition which ignored him, and overestimating the
political strength of the opposition coalition he has formed, may
be desperate enough to gamble that Vallarino, because of family
ties, will help him take advantage of De la Guardia's present
weakness. In office less than a year, the administration is
plagued by unemployment, economic difficulties, popular re-
sentment over the delay in implementing 1955 treaty provisions
concerning the Panama Canal, and charges of corruption and
Communist influence,
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