Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 12, 2019
Document Release Date: 
December 20, 2019
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
July 11, 1957
PDF icon CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15757350].pdf528.89 KB
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169381/ p CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 11 July 1.957 Copy No. C! AUTFI: HU 70-2 DAT REVIEWER: 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an un- authorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detri- ment of the United States. 0 T�P S ET ' z Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169381 Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169381 daft onoi, Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169381 Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169381 A A. ALA A Ne) CONTENTS ZORIN ELABORATES ON HIS 8 JULY DISARMAMENT STATEMENT (page 3). 2. DEPOSED SOVIET LEADERS GIVEN NEW JOBS (page 4). 3. PRESIDIUM MAJORITY MAY HAVE OPPOSED KHRUSHCHEV (page 5). 4. SOVIET LEADERS ARRIVE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA (page 6). 5. MAO TSE-TUNG REPORTEDLY APPROVES SOVIET PARTY PURGE (page 7). 6. BONN SEEN DESIRING AMPLIFICATION OF DISARMAMENT- / REUNIFICATION LINK (page 8). 7. THE NEW JAPANESE CABINET (page 9). 8. PEIPING MAY REPLACE NON-COMMUNIST CABINET MINISTERS (page 10). 9. NEHRU REPORTEDLY AGAIN CONSIDERING RESIGNING AS PRIME MINISTER (page 11). 10. COMMUNIST-INSPIRED PROTEST MEETING MAY SPARK UNREST IN CHILE (page 12). 11 July 57 * * * * THE TAIWAN STRAIT (page 13) Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 2 T81CRET Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169381 Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169381 SE( 1. ZORIN ELABORATES ON HIS 8 JULY DISARMAMENT STATEMENT Comment on: In a 9 July bilateral meeting with the United States, Soviet delegate Zorin expressed surprise at the negative re- action of the Western delegates to his 8 July statement in the subcommittee. He said everything in the statement was already included in the Soviet 7 June memorandum, just as the US delegate had placed in the record the US position as outlined on 31 May. Zorin claimed that in some respects his 8 July statement represented an advance from the 7 June Soviet memorandum. In contrast he thought that the latest Western proposals, which connect suspension of tests not only with a cessation of production but also with the reduc- tion of armaments, were a step backward from the US views of 31 May and that the Western proposal for a committee of experts to study controls for suspension of tests would delay progress. This led him to believe that the United States had not succeeded in securing the approval of other Western delegations for its positions of 31 May. He recom- mended additional bilateral meetings between the Soviet and other Western delegations. Zorin said no further advances could be expected from the Soviet Union until the United States responded to the Soviet memorandum of 7 June. 11 July 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 3 Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169381 Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169381 # 1,-414j 2. DEPOSED SOVIET LEADERS GIVEN NEW JOBS Moscow radio announced on 10 July that the "members of the Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich antiparty group," deposed in the June purge, had been transferred to other work. Malenkov has been assigned to direct the Ust Kamenogorsk hydroelectric station in east Kazakhstan. The specific jobs of the other ousted leaders were not stated. The broadcast revealed strong sensitivity to Western press and radio speculation that the recent wave of meetings and demonstrations in the USSR against the ousted leaders was preparation for a Stalinist-type liquidation of the purgees, and insisted that they were justly condemned but were not being persecuted. The Communist Party is "not in the habit of taking petty revenge," it was explained. Though the possibility cannot be ruled out that further action might yet be taken against members of the "anti- party" group, Khrushchev has apparently ruled out the vindictive persecutions of the Stalinist period. 11 July 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 4 CON AL Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169381 Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169381 II' 11.91 ,91.1t4 3., PRESIDIUM MAJORITY MAY HAVE OPPOSED KHRUSHCHEV Comment on: A recent Soviet speech suggests that Khru- shchev was confronted on 18 June by a majority within the Soviet party presidium who demanded that he step down as party secretary. Frol R. Kozlov, Leningrad party boss who was upped from candidate to full member of the presidium as a result of the recent purge, told a Leningrad party meeting on 2 July that the "antiparty group" carried on its work secretly, trying to organize members of the party presidium "in order to knock together a majority, even if temporary and formal," and to bring about a change in the membership of the presidium and secretariat of the party central committee. The American embassy comments that it is unlikely Kozlov would gratuitously imply that a majority of the presidium had been against the Khru- shchev leadership unless this were true. A line-up of the two sides would iriclude Malenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov, Pervukhin, and posaibly Bulganin and Voroshilov in the "majority" against Khrushchev and Mikoyan. Saburov was attending a CEMA meeting in War- saw on 18 June, Kirichenko was at his home in Kiev, and Suslov, who did not appear publicly in Moscow from 19 May to 1 July, was probably on vacation. Candidate members do not vote in the presidium,but all candidate members present, except Shepi- loy, apparently supported Khrushchev in the argument, since they were promoted to full membership in the new expanded presidium. If Bulganin and Voroshilov did side against Khrushchev, they will probably suffer in due course. They may be demoted to presidium candidate status like Pervukhin or ousted from the presidium like Saburov. Such action would probably be followed by loss of their government posts. 11 July 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 5 COYJJBENTL4L Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169381 Approved for Release: 2019/12/10.003169381 4. SOVIET LEADERS ARRIVE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA Comment on: Khrushchev's speeches since his arrival in Czechoslovakia on 9 July Suggest that no sweeping changes in the Czech leader- ship are planned. Khrushchev stated that the Soviet leaders had come to make a "friendly visit...not in order to settle any contentious ques- tions or differences, for we are in full agreement." In his greeting to President Zapotocky in Prague, he stated that he felt the members of the Soviet delegation were now in the midst of "our closest relatives and faithful friends." In their initial exchanges with the Soviets, the Czech leaders have appeared confident and apparently re- main secure in their positions. Khrushchev has twice referred to Czech Party First Secretary Novotny in ternis of glowing praise. Although not similarly praised, Premier Siroky made a major address at the official luncheon in Prague given for the Soviet delegation and attended by top members of the Czech government and party. 11 July 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 6 Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169381 Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169381 462 41k. 5. MAO TSE-TUNG REPORTEDLY APPROVES SOVIET PARTY PURGE Mao Tse-tung approves of the Soviet party purge as strengthening those who support the Chinese Communist view on intrabloc relations. Mao reportedly expressed concern dur- ing Voroshilov's visit to Peiping in April over Soviet rela- tions with Yugoslavia and Poland, arguing that bloc unity must be maintained despite differences in the domestic pro- grams of Communist states. Peiping is said to believe that Khrushchev's first tasks are the restoration of good relations with Yugoslavia and the improvement of relations with Poland. Comment Peiping for the past year has advocated policies in intrabloc relations with which Khrushchev has been generally identified and which Molotov is known to have opposed. In early 1957, when the Kremlin was pub- licly quarreling with Belgrade and Warsaw, the Chinese crit- icized the conduct of the dispute and suggested that differences should be ironed out in private. In recent months the Kremlin has been attempting to smooth over its disagreements with Yugoslav and Polish policies. Peiping probably feels that fur- ther efforts are in order. 11 July 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 7 Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169381 Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169381 Ja-J NIV 6. BONN SEEN DESIRING AMPLIFICATION OF DISARMA- MENT-REUNIFICATION LINK Despite the West German government's shift in recent weeks to a public position more favorable toward the London disarm- ament negotiations, the American embassy in Bonn believes that actually the government is unenthusias- tic, particularly as regards the European inspection zone. Em- bassy officials believe that in private meetings Bonn may seek a Western agreement spelling out the link between disarmament and reunification. While Bonn will yield to popular opinion in supporting the principle of a European inspection zone, the embassy feels it may try to set certain conditions for such as- pects as the location and extent of the area and the need to avoid recognizing the East German Communist regime. The Germans may also seek to influence the timing of action on re- unification, possibly by pressing for Western agreement on a date for four-power talks with the USSR on that subject. Comment Despite Chancellor Adenauer's fears that a disarmament agreement would tend to perpetu- ate the split of Germany, the Bunde stag election campaign is likely to cause the government to adapt its public stand more and more to the general eagerness in West Germany for a de- tente. Bonn may also have to limit its private lobbying in Western circles, in view of the danger that its demands might be leaked during the election campaign. 11 July 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 8 SEJRET Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169381 Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 603169381 4h, Usti:NM ifiAL 7.. THE NEW JAPANESE CABINET Comment on: The Japanese cabinet installed on 10 July replaces the one Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi inherited from his predecessor last February and is designed to give the gov- ernment more of a "Kishi look." No radical changes are ex- pected in either domestic or foreign policy. Kishi waited more than four months, until he had gained increased prestige and political strength from trips to Southeast Asia and the United States, before undertak- ing cabinet changes which might otherwise have precipitated a renewal of factional struggles within the conservative Liberal- Democratic Party. Kishi also changed officials in the top posts of the party and probably has consolidated his position. Some factional leaders, however, may not be completely satisfied. The post of foreign minister, which had been held by Kishi himself, was given to Aiichiro Fujiyama, 60-year- old industrial magnate and president of the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry. His selection is an attempt to win greater support from Japanese business circles and to imple- ment Kishi's insistence on "economic diplomacy," particularly with regard to Southeast Asia. Mitsujiro Ishii was retained as deputy prime minister. Ichiro Kono, strong man of the former Hatoyama cab- inet, was named director of the Economic Planning Board. Hayato Ikeda, whose refusal to surrender the finance portfolio had threatened to complicate the cabinet reshuffle, was dropped and replaced by Hisato Ichimada, former finance minister under Hatoyama. 11 July 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 9 CONFIDEYTTA Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169381 Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169381 I1L /IL2 _M AL. vool 8, PEIPING MAY REPLACE NON-COMMUNIST CABINET IVIINIS TE RS Comment on: The increasingly bitter attacks on non- Communist "rightists" by the Chinese Communist National People's Congress now in session suggest that Peiping is building up a case for discharging them m ca net sitions and expelling them from "democratic" puppet parties. On 10 July, one speaker at the congress urged all members of his party, the China Democratic League, to dissociate themselves "politically and ideologically" from the "rightists." The ministers of communications, food and timber industry have drawn particularly sharp condemna- tion. On 8 July, Peiping reported that over 3,000 employees of the Ministry of Communications met to denounce the com- plaint of the minister, Chang Po-chun, that non-Communist officials have position but no authority. One employee crit- icized Chang for excessive absenteeism, failure to attend 37 out of 49 meetings of the ministry, and failure to fulfill his responsibilities. Although the "rightists" may have originally felt there was some support for their positions within Commu- nist Party ranks, no Communists have yet been singled out as coconspirators, and a party purge is apparently not imminent. 11 July 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 10 CWENTfAL Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169381 Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169381 Akk ://l4L 9c. NEHRU REPORTEDLY AGAIN CONSIDERING RESIGNING AS PRIME MINISTER Comment on: Prime Minister Nehru has again indi- cated that he is considering resign- 1 he is increasingly unable to deal with the country's problems and should leave the administration to stronger hands. Vice President Radhakrishnan report- edly believes that if Nehru resigns as prime minister, either permanently or for a few months only, he will be replaced by Pandit Pant, the moderately conservative minister for home affairs. Pant is considered a logical choice to carry on the Congress Party's program, although Minister of Commerce and Industry Morarji Desai may challenge his position as ulti- mate successor. On several past occasions when he has been under heavy stress, Nehru has considered stepping down as formal government leader in order to devote more time to party affairs and broader work for the welfare of India. The country is again entering a period of unusual strain, particularly in the economic field. The decision Nehru must face, now as before, is whether the country would be provided with stronger and more effective leadership if he retired. In the past he has decided each time that his continued leadership was needed. 11 July 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 11 Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169381 Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169381 NO 10 , COMMUNIST-INSPIRED PROTEST MEETING MAY SPARK UNREST IN CHILE Comment on: ances. A Communist-inspired National Com- mand meeting, scheduled for 11 July in Santiago, Chile, to protest price in- creases may result in public disturb- The price increases of 6 July on essential consumer items were brought about by the abandonment of costly gov- ernment subsidies which were causing serious budget def- icits and endangering the US-backed economic stabilization program. A similar attempt in early April resulted in wide- spread disorders which forced the government to retract the price rises. The National Command, composed of la- bor, student and left-wing political leaders, is reportedly planfiing boycotts and half-hour work stoppages. Commu- nist Party leaders are considering mass action to give force to the protest. The government, which has taken extensive military and police preparations against potential trouble, ap- pears confident and has partially relaxed the state of alert or- dered on 5 July. 11 July 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 12 SE T Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169381 Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169381 Al* �7":".. SUMMARY 26 June - 10 July 1957 THE TAIWAN STRAIT Report of the IAC Current Intelligence Group for the Taiwan Strait Problem 1. Combat activity has abated in the area since 24 June when the Chinese Communists carried out a heavy shelling of the Que- moys. The shelling is now believed to have involved 3,000 to 4,500 rounds rather than the 9,000 originally reported. No significant artillery exchanges have occurred since that date. 2. Aerial photographs of 10 July revealed 24 MIG-type fighters at Hsincheng airfield, about 250 miles west of the Quemoys. Earlier flights of Chinese Communist transports to this base suggest that this may be a permanent deployment of jet fighters to Hsincheng. A newly constructed air base, Hsincheng was completed earlier this year. Similar photography has also confirmed the use of Chenghai airfield, near Swatow, by Chinese Communist jet fighters. On 8 July, there were four MIG-type aircraft on this southernmost of the coastal airfields on the mainland opposite Taiwan; however, reports of a 9 July Nationalist reconnaissance mission indicate that the jet fighters had departed. a few jet fighters had operated temporarily at Chenghai in Jan- uary 1956, but this was not confirmed. This airfield could be used as a forward staging base for air defense in much the same manner as the new airfield at Shuikou, between Canton and Swatow. Use of Chenghai airfield and the move of jet fighters to Hsincheng airfield reflects some increase in Chinese Communist air defense capabilities in south and southeast China. The move- ments of aircraft appear to be aimed at discouraging Nationalist flights over the mainland rather than for any purely offensive pur- pose. 11 July 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 13 �1.1191;"SfeRE-T Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169381 Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169381 TAIWAN STRAIT CHINESE COMMUNIST AIRF ELD LEGEND: 10 JULY 1957 USABILITY � DESIGNATIONS PRIMARY AIRFIELD CONSIDERED MOST IMPORTANT IN AREA WITH PREPARED RUNWAY GENERALLY 5000 FEET OR LONGER. SECONDARY AIRFIELD AUXILIARY OR EMERGENCY BASES OR FIELDS OF LESSER IMPORTANCE. RUNWAYS GENERALLY LESS THAN 5000 FEET. MIG-15 MIG-17 TU-4 IL-28 TU-2" IL-10 LA-9/11 LI-2 ETC. Z 0 n ACTIVE BASE FOR MILITARY & CIVILIAN AIR- CRAFT. SOME BASES USED BY PISTON TYPES MAY BE USABLE BY JETS OPERATIONAL INACTIVE BASES CAPABLE OF USE BY AIRCRAFT SERVICEABLE * FIELDS NOT CONSIDERED CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING SUSTAINED OPER- ATIONS AT PRESENT. CURRENT STATUS UNDETERMINED UNKNOWN HO N AN H HANKOW A / NANCHAN 28 CHANGSHA H NGYANG / 26 24 � 22 593,000 T,ROOPs HUAINING 0 44HIU NG SHANGJA / � ) / ..�-� FOONbH4W 1 MATSUS HSINCHENG ("041641V Yungan NANTAN, 22,000 CHANGTING* LIE CH 53,000 ENG ii , LUNGTIEN , 118 120 KIANGSU WUHU t.) CHUHSIEN )- �) Yingtan / ( AHIAHSING HANGCHOW CH IENOU 'Nanping iNingte 2 32 SHANGHAI - CHOUSH 011410 NING HINHUA N IS. 30 LUCHIAO�TACHEN WENCHOW 0 � .1 uia n MAC LUNGCHIO AMOY 0,000 K WA NGTUNG \ CHENGHAIO CANTON SWATOW1h, IANG ivricao (Port.) 114 ��^- 41 SHUIKOU Hong Kong (as.) 116 � io,vviicHiu .CH NOYANd AOCHi QUEMOY /! .*TAiCHUNG 84,000 , 28 TAOYUAN r"Lstlf,1.6SH AN 4p* TAIPEI * ILAN TA IWAN PENGHU HIA53 I a, 000 16,000 AINAN 41i,IGTUNG 118 10 22 122 NAUTICAL MILES 100 150 5I0 100 150 STATUTE MILES H -4 Railroad -/-+ Under constructi n or projected *NATIONALIST AIRFIELD Primary roads Secondary roads AmoNnommoMIIMN Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169381