CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/02/10

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
03169392
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RIPPUB
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U
Document Page Count: 
14
Document Creation Date: 
January 27, 2020
Document Release Date: 
January 30, 2020
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Publication Date: 
February 10, 1958
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PDF icon CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15772381].pdf715.63 KB
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WZi V.77 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03169392 116 4a%+ML I %Orr 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) //1 00/ JjApproved ro'r Rel;a;e72-01-9/08726 6051-69-39-2r A 10 February 1958 Copy No. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN- CLASS. CHANGED TO: NEXT REVIEW DATE. 1240 0 REVIEWER: Approved7or Release: 2137/08/20 C03169392 PP% Vidiria MI IP WIN Mt Mar Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03169392 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03169392 10 FEBRUARY 1958 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Repressive policies to follow East German party purge. Communist Chinese military build-up to continue at same rate as last year. USSR - New information on probable ICBM launching of 30 Jan 58. (See page i.) II. ASIA-AFRICA Egyptian-Syrian union - Iraq considering moves in support of Jordanian Government. Lebanon - Foreign Minister Malik may resign if Lebanon recognizes United Arab Republic. USSR and Egypfmay exploit French bombing of Tunisian village to complicate Bourguiba's relations with the West. \ \ \ $1yuchi Indonesia - Sumatran dissidents continue pressure on Djakarta government. Peiping's opening of Amoy to Japanese shipping may lead to tension between Japan and Nationalist China. III. THE WEST Bonn may protest to Moscow over East German detention of three scientists returning from USSR. Argentina - Peronista and Communist support of Frondizi for president may lead to unrest. 0 rrn r� Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03169392 46101 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03169392 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 10 February 1958 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC East German party purge: The purge of three leading East-GeTrnan CrOm.cnantep makes it clear that Moscow con- tinues to back Stalinist party boss Walter Ulbricht and re- pressive policies associated with him. Ulbricht% victory over the moderate opposition group will probably heighten popular unrest and increase the possibility of overt resiSt- ance. A further purge of persons suspected of anti-Ulbricht leanings will probably be carried out at all levels of the So- cialist Unity (Communist)party. (Page 1) Communist China's defense budget: Build-up of Com- munist China's military forces will apparently continue at the same rate as last year. A deputy director of the armed forces political department, speaking before the National People's Congress, said that the defense budget for 1958 is equivalent to about $2,000,000,000--only $10,000,000 less than last year's defense expenditure. � Additional information on receRt ICBM launching: The Guided Missile Intelligence Committee issued the following statement on 7 February 1958: 1. There is additional information which permits a more definitive statement regarding the event of 30 January 1958 at the Tyura Tam Missile Test Range. 2. The evidence supports to a considerable degree that on 30 January 1958 at 2014:51Z the USSR launched a test ICBM from Tyura Tam, scheduled to impact in the vicinity of the � Kamchatka Peninsula, some 3,500)NM downrange. \\ TOP SECRET '4;11;7e7?;-1;;;;IOT97a /2 0 C03169392 , Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03169392 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03169392 Approved for Relea_s_e:._2019/08/20 C03169392' grool 3. the missile reached the vicinity of the Kamchatka Peninsula. II, ASIA-AFRICA Iraq-Jordan: Iraq may move troops into Jordan to try to help protect King Hussayn's government from new pres- sures resulting from the Egyptian-Syrian union. Exiled leftist Jordanians, are reported to be stepping up subversive activities against Hussay economic pressure may also be used in this effort. Page 2) Lebanon: Foreign Minister Malik may resign soon, since the Lebanese Government apparently has decided to recognize the new United Arab Republic. Malik's de- parture from the cabinet would signal the beginning of a trend away from his outright but not generally popular pro-Western policy toward one of accommodation to Egyptian-Syrian pressure. Tunisia: The bombing of a Tunisian border village by French Air Force B-26's and Corsairs on 81 February provides an opportunity for President.,Nasir and the SoViet Union to complicate Tunisian: President Bourguiba's rela- tions with the West by offering him arms and economic assistance. On 6 February Bourguiba publicly appealed for expanded economic aid from the West to relieve Tu- nisia's serious economic problems. (Map) 10 Feb 58 DAILY BRIEF ii . \ TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C0316939k \ Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03169392 ��\ Chinese Communist port opening: Chinese Communist opening of the port of Amoy to Japanese shipping may lead to some tension between Nationalist China and Japan. The Nationalists will probably confine their protests to the diplo- matic field, but might take hostile action against Japanese shipping if they become convinced this is necessary to pre- vent a serious loss of prestige. (Page 3) Indonesia: Sumatran dissidents are maintaining a steady barrage of broadcasts and mass rallies denouncing President Sukarno and the Djuanda cabinet, apparently in the hope of inducing Sukarno to capitulate and of developing popular sup- "MAO port. They still plan to force the issue if Sukarno refuses. The reluctance of dissidents to take action has apparently prevented the activthts from delivering a formal ultimatum to the Djakarta government or proclaiming a rival Indonesian government. III. THE WEST West Germany--the USSR: The Bonn government is reasonably certain that three of a group of 21 West German scientists who were being repatriated from the USSR are forcibly detained in East Germany. Bonn plans to wait un- til 14 February and then protest to the Soviet Union. Trade and repatriation talks may be broken off. Argentina. Recent moves by ,deposed Argentine dictator Juan Peron and by the Communist party will probably place substantial support behind the presidential candidacy of Arturo Frondizi and may lead to a Frondizi victory in the Argentine general elections of 23 February. The prospect of Peronista influence in the incoming government is likely to increase unrest among conservative military groups and may lead to military plotting either to postpone the elections or to nullify the results if Frondizi wins. (Page 4) 10 Feb 58 DAILY BRIEF iii TOP SECRET \\& Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03169392 \ \ �r-TflT1'1flINTt4 1.. Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03169392 NW" NNW . THE COMMUNIST BLOC East German Party Purge After the most serious intraparty struggle ha has yet encountered, East Germany's Stalinist party. boss Walter Ulbricht has emerged victorious over an opposition groUp which sought a more moderate approach to the country's po- litical and economic problems. The purge of three leading Communists on charges of opportunism and revisionism and the election of four loyal Ulbricht men to top party posts in- dicate that Moscow continues to back Ulbricht and the poli- cies of iron repression associated with him. A far-reaching purge of persons suspected of anti-Ulbricht leanings is ex- pected to be carried out at all levels of the Socialist Unity (Communist) party (SED). Those purged are the party's number-two man, Karl Schclowan, party theoretician Fred Oelssner, and former Minister of State Security Ernst Wollweber. As a result of Ulbricht% victory, East German domestic policies are likely to follow an even harder line, such as up- ward revisions of work norms, continued emphasis on heavy industry at the expense of consumer goods, pressures for collectivization, stepped-up attacks on the church, and in- tensified Soviet-East German efforts to erode the Western position in Berlin. These policies will probably heighten popular unrest and increase the possibility of overt resist- ance to the regime. -CONFIDENTIAL 10 Feb 58 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20003169392 Page 1 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03169392 TOP SECRET II. ASIA-AFRICA Iraqi-Jordanian Reaction to Syrian Egyptian Union Iraq may move troops into Jordan to try to help pro- tect King Hussayn's government from new pressures gen- erated by the Syrian-Egyptian union, according to Iraqi Crown Prince Abd al-Illaho The troops would Move into northern Jordan on Hussaynis request. Abd al-Illah hag recalled Iraqi strong man Nun i Said to Baghdad to discuss a changeJof cabinet which would bring in a "strong" rand broadly based government. Hussayn and Iraq's King Faysal are to meet this week in Amman to discuss joint moves, including a possible con- federation of their two countries. If agreement is reached on a plan, no announcement will be made until Hussayn has met with King Saud, possibly also this week. Exiled leftist Jordanians, are reported to be stepping up subversive activities against Hussayn for the purpose of ultimately bringing about the merger of Jordan with the Egyptian-Syrian union. Other measures to achieve this might include economic pressure, such as closing the roads from Syria into Jordan, and an an- nouncement that a 'Palestine government, "located in the Egyptian-occupied Gaza strip, would join the United Arab Republic/ It is doubtful that Nasir desires to push these measures hard enough at this time to try to overthrow Hussayn. His aim at the moment seems to be to try to reassure elements, such as King Saud and the Lebanese, who have been frightened by the formation of the union. An Iraqi move to "unite" with Jordan, nevertheless. might lead Nasir to take vigorous counL termeasures. TOP SECRET 10 Feb 58 Approved for Release: 201 9/08/20 Page 2 _ Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03169392 srgesi VW, Opening of Amoy to Japanese Shipping May Cause Tension Between Japan and Nationalist China Communist China's opening of the port of Amoy to Japa- nese shipping may cause tension between Nationalist China and Japan. the National- ists on 3 February issued a statement reiterating their "port closure" of China mainland ports and warned that foreign shipping entering the Taiwan Strait area should inform Na- tionalist officials in advance. The Nationalists probably will confine their protests to the diplomatic field. British ships since last August have been entering Amoy without interference, and Nationalist of- ficials have stated that earlier attempts to prevent them from entering gained the Nationalist government nothing. Unless the Nationalist now are convinced that a reversal of policy is necessary to prevent a serious loss of prestige, military action to close the port appears unlikely. TOP SECRET 10 Feb 58 irrt � I I\ IMPP.1 1 IA" rglf. pone. II II I rih. I Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03169392 Page 3 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03169392 Noi0 III. THE WEST Peronista Resurgence Feared In Argentina A manifesto issued on 4 February by former Argentine dictator Peron is believed to be a tacit endorsement of the presidential 'candidacy of Arturo Frondizi in Argentina'sgen- eral elections scheduled for 23 February. Frondizi, a nationalist, heads the ticket of the intransigent R� party, which ran second in the Constituent Assembly elections last July. Despite Frondizit denials, there is a general be- lief that Peron't manifesto resulted froM agreement by which Frondizi would be obliged, if he took of- fice on I May, to permit legalization of the Peronista party and the reintegration of pro-Peronistas into the military establishments. In the manifesto Peron urged his followers to "vote in an appropriate manner against the continuation of the tyranny" in contrast to his order last July for them to cast blank ballots. As a result of squabbling Among his lieutenants, .Peron does not completely control his followers,, Only 25 percent of the Peronista vote in some of the larger provinces, how- ever, would be sufficient to put Frondizi ahead of his more moderate rival, Ricardo Balbin of the Popular Radical party. The Communiet party has already thrown its support to Frondizi. The prospect of Peronista influence in the incoming gov- ernment is likely to increase unrest among conseiwative mili- tary groups and may lead to military plotting either to post- pone the elections or to nullify , the results,if. .Frondizi wins. SECIZEr 1.0 Feb 58 IP" h. 1 1, I I II I. AP-P7okvmeicl foIr Release: '2019/08/20 C03169392 Page 4 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03169392 .... V a.. wftorsra Nolo DISTRIBUTION THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense Mobilization Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Operations Coordinating Board Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Seciretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director United States Information Agency The Director �Calkiri-MrAgr Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03169392 \ \ Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03169392 Sol -11 \ CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 10 February 1958 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC East German party purge: The purge of three leading Eastian CrOuunalnias makes it clear that Moscow con- tinues to back Stalinist party boss Walter Ulbricht and re- pressive policies associated with him. Ulbricht's victory over the moderate opposition group will probably heighten popular unrest and increase the possibility of overt resigt- ance. A further purge of persons suspected of anti-Ulbricht leanings will probably be carried out at all levels of the So- cialist Unity. (Communist) party. (Page 1) Communist China's defense budget: Build-up of Com- munistChina's military forces win apparently continue at the same rate as last year. A deputy director of the armed forces political department, speaking before the National People's Congress, said that the defense budget for 1958 is equivalent to about $2,000,000,000--only $10.000.000 less than last year's defense expenditure. Additional information on recent ICBM launching: The Guided Missile Intelligence Committee issuea the following statement on 7 February 1958: 1. There is additional information which permits a more definitive statement regarding the event of 30 January 1958 at the Tyura Tam Missile Test Range. 2. The evidence supports to a considerable degree that on 30 January 1958 at 2014:51Z the USSR launched a test ICBM from Tyura Tam the missile reached the vicinity of the Kamchatka Peninsula. ia: The bombin of a Tunisian Doraer vulage by renc ir Force B--2 's and Corsairs on 8 February provides an opportunity for President.Nasir and.the,SoViet Union to complicate Tunisian President Bourguiba's rela- tions with the West by offering him arms and economic assistance. On 6 February Bourguiba publicly appealed for expanded economic aid from the West to relieve Tu- rious ee'ciilirC:probrems. rviitirat''----reafiTifibves by deposed Argentine dictator Juan term and by the Communist party will probably place substantial support behind the presidential candidacy of Arturo Frondizi and may lead to a Frondizi victory in the Argentine general elections of 23 February. The prospect of Peronista, influence in the incoming government is likely to increase unrest among' conservative military groups and may lead to military olotting either to postpone the elections � " folk p pro y e d for Release: 2019/08/20 C03169392 �S Map) NNN. k\:\ ovApproved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03169392 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03169392