CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/02/13

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03169401
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: January 27, 2020
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2020
• Publication Date: February 13, 1958

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13 February 1958
Copy No. 137
CENTRAL
IYTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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13 February 1958
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR threatens to obstruct Japanese
fishery negotiations to force peace
treaty discussion.
Opposition to East German Communist
boss Ulbricht continues.
Moscow - TASS cautiously endorses
Egyptian-Syrian union; USSR will
probably recognize the new state.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
0
Indonesia - Disunity among dissidents;
government likely to engage in political
and military maneuvering.
King Saud and President Chamoun inform
King Hussayn they will have to recognize
Egyptian-Syrian union after 21 February
plebiscite.
0
III. THE WEST
Tunisia - Bourguiba will ask for immediate
0
evacuation of French troops.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
13 February 1958
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR-Japan: The USSR is attempting to force
Japan to discuss a peace treaty on Soviet terms by
threatening to obstruct current fishery negotiations.
Prime Minister Kishi has held that Japan is willing
to undertake peace treaty discussions, if Japanese
views on the southern Kurils territorial issue are
accepted by the USSR. It is doubtful that Tokyo will
change its stand on this issue�the major obstacle
to a treaty--in order to gain fishing concessions.
(Page 1) (Map)
9 ple_
East Germany: Last week's purge in the East Ger-
man Communist party has not quelled opposition to
party boss Ulbricht. However, as long as Ulbricht con-
tinues to receive Soviet support, his opposition will not
be able to unseat him or to bring about any significant
changes in policy. (Page 2)
*Egyptian-Syrian union�Moscow view: After a
period of apparent hesitation and avoidance of comment,
the Soviet news agency TASS has broadcast a cautious
Soviet endorsement of the United Arab Republic. The
Soviet government remains officially silent While the
brief TASS comment fell short of the welcome previous-
ly accorded the Egyptian-Syrian union by Chou En-lai,
the Eastern European press, and the Ukrainian party
newspaper, it suggests that the USSR is preparing to ex-
tend recognition to the new state soon after Nasir is pro-
claimed present.
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*Indonesia! Indonesian dissidents are not united
on their future plans. The central government may
attempt to exploit this disunity by sending some troops
to areas where foreign economic interests are con-
centrated, according to one late report. However, all
factions desire to avoid open conflict, and a period of
political and military maneuvering is probable.
(Page 3)
Saud to recognize UAR: King Saud informed Jor-
dan's King Hussayn he will be unable to delay recogniz-
ing Egyptian-Syrian union after the plebiscite scheduled
for 21 February. Hussayn has received a similar mes-
sage from Lebanese President Chamoun,
Taiwan Strait: In the Taiwan Strait area, Chinese
Communist air defense capabilities have shown progres-
sive improvement during the past few months. This
trend is discussed in the report of the IAC Current In-
telligence Group for the Taiwan Strait problem, cover-
ing the period from 9 January to 12 February 1958.
(Page 4) (Map)
I I I. THE WEST
French-Tunisian situation: President Bourguiba
Intends to ask the UN Security Council to order all
French forces�including those at the Bizerte base--
to evacuate Tunisia. If France agrees publicly to such
an action, Bourguiba will not press his appeal. The
over-all evacuation would be staged over a period of
time, but withdrawal from southern Tunisia, according
to Bourguiba, would have to be !ralmost."
though the French may relinquish their remaining posts
In southern Tunisia, they are not likely under present cir-
cumstances to give up Bizerte. (Page 5)
13 Feb 58
DAILY BRIEF
11
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
,
USSR Presses Japan for Peace Treaty
The USSR is using deadlocked negotiations on fishing
rights as a means of compelling the Japanese to reopen
peace treaty talks. Moscow probably hopes to farce the
Kishi government to abandon its claim to the Soviet-oc-
cupied southern Kuril Islands of Etorofu and Kunashiri--
the major obstacle to a peace treaty between the two
countries.
In the fishery negotiations which began on 13 January,
the USSR has introduced proposals which would greatly
hamper Japanese fishermen. On 5 February, Soviet of-
ficials refused to discuss measures to safeguard Japa-
nese fishermen from seizure by Soviet patrol boats ex-
cept in a framework of peace treaty talks.
Japanese Prime Minister Kishi announced on 12 Feb-
ruary that his government is willing to undertake peace
treaty negotiations with the USSR, but that they should
not be linked with any fishing talks. His position, as
stated last May, has been that Moscow must first accept
Japanese views on the Kurils issue. Domestic pressure
by fishing interests may now force Tokyo to allow the
peace treaty and fishing talks to be linked. Tokyo probably
will not, however, change its stand on the territorial is-
sue despite the major importance to Japan of fishing in
the restricted northwest Pacific waters.
CONFIDENTIAL
13 Feb 58
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
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`410�01
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*aryl
Opposition to Ulbricht Not Ended by 'Party Purge
Opposition to Walter Ulbricht, the Stalinist boss of
the East German Socialist Unity (Communist) party (SED),
was not ended by last week's purge of three party leaders,
Karl Schirdewan,
second man in the SED hierarchy until he was purged, has
many supporters in the provinces, and feels the fight has
just begun.
There is little likelihood, however, that Schirdewan
and his supporters will be able to defeat Ulbricht or his
policies as long as the East German leader enjoys Soviet
SUDD ort. Ulbricht coordinated the purge with Moscow,
and convinced the Russians that
the Germans must still be handled with force and brutality.
In an effort to maintain his control of the SED, Ulbricht
will probably undertake an extensive purge aimed at elim-
inating pro-Schirdewan elements and others suspected of
holding revisionist or liberal views.
here was no organized con-
spiracy against Ulbricht, but that Schirdewan and other
party officials had attempted "in a friendly manner" to
persuade Ulbricht to revise his political and economic
policies. Schirdewan favors German
reunification, which the USSR refuses to consider, and
believes East Germany should have more freedom in deal-
ing with its own political and economic problems.
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1 *11110
Noirie
IL ASIA-AFRICA
The Indonesian Situation
Indonesian dissidents in Central Sumatra are split
over their next move. Two key figures in the dissident
roup, Colonels Simbolon and Lubis,
have little hope of pushing through their original plan
to form a provisional government.
The central government in Djakarta may already be
planning to exploit this disunity.
Djakarta may sendllimited numbers of troops to areas
where foreign economic interests are concentrated, to
ensure continued foreign exchange remittances to Djakarta.
A period of political and military maneuvering is probable,
with all factions hoping to avoid violence. However, iso-
lated incidents, possibly leading to localized conflict,
could occur.
President Sukarno is expected to return to Djakarta
on 16 February. National party leaders plan to recommend
to him the formation of a new cabinet led by former Vice
President Hatta, Should Sukarno refuse, they will recom-
mend that he at least drop two leftist ministers from the
cabinet.
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TAIWAN STRAIT SITUATION
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OTHER - Air (*citifies printed in ,tack are those under construction, unserviceable,
or on which the availability of information is such that the current status
cannot be determined.
*Delineated runways are explained as a defined or marked area on an airfield
prepared or selected for landi la end take-off of aircraft.
12 FEBRUARY 1958
71213
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I vs i
Report No. 113 of the IAC Current Intelligence Group for the
Taiwan Strait Problem Covering the Period From 9 January
To 12 February 1958
1. There were no significant combat operations in the area
daring the pariod.
2. Chinese Communist air defense capabilities have shown
progressive improvement during the past few months. There has
been a noticeable increase in the frequency and scope of Ground
Control Intercept attempts by Chinese Communist jet fighters against
Nationalist jets overflying the China mainland. This intensified ef-
fort to counter Chinese Nationalist air activities is primarily a re-
sult of additional fighter coverage. in Southeast China,
While these factors reflect a tightening of Chi-
nese Communist air defenses and are chiefly attributable to Chi-
nese Communist willingness to challenge Nationalist air operations,
the Chinese Communist Air Force, with an estimated 1,625 jet fighters,
is still believed to be deficient in many areas. Sufficient numbers of
all-weather fighters are lacking;
pilot proficiency is relatively low; and major logistic sup-
port is still dependent on the USSR.
3
the port of Amoy now is open to Japanese
shipping. It is probable that the Chinese Communist motive in open-
ing the port to the Japanese was in part a desire to embitter rela-
tions between Japan and Nationalist China The Chinese Nationalists
on 3 February issued a statement reiterating their "port closure" of
all China mainland ports and warned that foreign shipping entering
the Taiwan Strait should inform Nationalist officials in advance. If
Japanese shipping does commence using Amoy, the Nationalists
probably will confine their protests to the diplomatic field. Brit-
ish ships since last August have been entering Amoy without inter-
ference.
4. Chou En-lai, in his foreign policy address on 10 Feb-
ruary, devoted considerable attention to the charge that the US
was attempting to create acceptance of the status quo on Taiwan and
thus to bring about a "two Chinas" situation, which he termed "abso-
lutely unacceptable." Chou reaffirmed Peiping's determination to
gain control of Taiwan but did not discuss the means by which this
is to be accomplished.
--T-4912-SEC-RE-T
13 Feb 38
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
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011.A.011E.
*410
III. THE WEST
Total French Evacuation of Tunisia Sought by Bourguiba
The American Embassy in Tunis reports that President
Bourguiba plans to ask the UN Security Council to order the
evacuation from Tunisia of all French forces, including
those at the Bizerte base. Bourguiba would be willing to re-
frain from the UN appeal if assured that France will publicly
agree within a few days to evacuate its forces. A phased
withdrawal over a period of time would be acceptable to
Bourguiba, but he insists that French evacuation of southern
Tunisia must be "almost" .immediate.
Prior to this formulation of Tunisian aims, UN Secretary
General Hammarskjold had advised Tunisian delegate Mongi
Slim to "play for time" before formally requesting a Security
Council meeting. Free World delegations are seeking to de-
vise some type of UN machinery which would ease the impact
of future incidents. French Premier Gaillard's defense before
the National Assembly of the military action which created the
crisis suggests the French Government will be unable to make
any major concessions to Tunisia, and is not likely to evacuate
Bizerte.
The establishment of a UN observer patrol along, the
Tunisian-Algerian border--similar to those used during the
dispute between Greece and'its Balkan neighbors--has been
suggested. France, sensitive to any "internationalizing" of
the Algerian question, would most likely refuse to allow the
patrols on the Algerian side of the border, and Tunisia has
pointed out that such patrols would not be able to prevent incur-
sions by air.
An arrangement similar to the UN Emergency Force now de-
ployed along the Egyptian-Israeli border probably would not be
acceptable to France. Moreover, the Tunisian incident is not
yet sufficiently critical to encourage UN members to contribute
troops and equipment for another UNEF. However, some kind
a UN action is inevitable.
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DISTRIBUTION
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Operations Coordinating Board
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
13 February 1958
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
� USSR-Japan: The USSR is attempting to force
Japaff to discuss a peace treaty on Soviet terms by
threatening to obstruct current fishery negotiations.
Prime Minister Kishi has held that Japan is willing
to undertake peace treaty discussions, if Japanese
views on the southern Kurils territorial issue are
accepted by the USSR. It is doubtful that Tokyo will
change its stand on this issue�the major obstacle
to a treaty�in order to gain fishing concessions.
(Page 1) (Map)
East Germany: Last week's purge in the East Gar-
man-COMmunist party has not quelledn-pposition to
party boss Ulbricht. Howe r�as long as Ulbricht con-
tinues to receive Soy' -dupport, his opposition will not
be able to unst4ffFii or to bring about any significant
changes icy. (Page 2)
Egyptian-Syrian union�Moscow view: After a
period of apparent hesitation and avoidance of comment,
the Soviet news agency TASS has broadcast a cautious
Soviet endorsement of the United Arab Republic. The
Soviet government remains officially silent� While the
brief TASS comment fell short of the welcome previous-
ly accorded the Egyptian-Syrian union by Chou En-lai,
the Eastern European press, and the Ukrainian party
newspaper, it suggests that the USSR is preparing to ex-
tend recognition to the new state soon after Nasir is pro-
clainAlljapresident.
UAR: King Saud informed Jor-
dan- s King Hussayn he will be unable to delay recogniz-
ing Egyptian-Syrian union after the plebiscite scheduled
for 21 February. Hussayn has received a similar mes-
sage from Lebanese President Chamoun.
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