CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/07/22

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03169502
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: January 27, 2020
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2020
• Publication Date: July 22, 1958

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3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
22 July 1958
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
57
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
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22 JULY 1958
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
No significant change in Soviet mil-
itary and political reactions to
Middle East developments.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Middle East - Nasir to make "ma-
jor" speech on 22 July. Lebanese
military situation relatively quiet,
but presidential election set for
24 July is still uncertain. Husayn
continues to seek backing for in-
tervention in Iraq.
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III. THE WEST
De Gaulle doubts wisdom of inter-
vention in Middle East, believes
West must eventually come to
terms with Arab nationalism.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
22 July 1958
DAILY BRIEF
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
*Soviet reaction to Middle East developments: There
have been no significant new moves in the USSR's political
campaign to exploit Western intervention in the Middle East.
There has been little change in the Soviet military situation.
The air show celebrating Aviation Day on 20 July displayed
only civil aircraft. There are unconfirmed reports that
naval vessels left Soviet ports in the Gulf of Finland on 16
and 17 July, but there have been no indications that any
ships have proceeded into the Baltic.
General air activity on 20 July reflected the usual Sunday
lull, with indications that normal operations resumed on
21 July.

some ground forces including
an army headquarters were in the field beginning maneuvers.
The unusual transport aircraft activity in Bulgaria has con-
tinued.
*The Middle East (information as of 0100 EDT 22 July)
Nasir, who has returned to Cairo, is to make a "major"
speech on 22 July. A series of bombings in Amman may
presage an intensified UAR campaign to overthrow King
Husayn and the Jordanian Government, but the King con-
tinues to urge British assistance for military intervention
in Iraq. The new Baghdad regime, meanwhile, continues its
protestations of friendship for the West and assurances that
oil operations will not be interrupted. In Lebanon, the
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military situation is relatively calm, but it is still uncer-
tain whether Parliament will be able to hold the scheduled
presidential election on 24 July. Sudanese Prime Minister
Khalil appears to have overestimated his ability to exclude
pro-Egyptian elements from his cabinet, and now feels his
only hope of retaining control may be the formation of a
"national" government including opposition representatives.
(Page 1)
III. THE WEST
France: De Gaulle and some of his key advisers doubt
the wisdom of Anglo-American intervention in the Middle
East. De Gaulle is reported to believe that time is running
against the West in combating Arab nationalism and that the
West will eventually have to come to terms. It is possible
that French leaders hope that France's abstention from a more
active role in the present situation may facilitate future French-
Arab negotiations (Page 4)
22 July 58
DAILY BRIEF ii
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*Noil
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
No back-up material
II. ASIA-AFRICA
The Middle East Situation (Information as of 0100 EDT 22 July)
UAR: President Nasir returned to Cairo on 21 July and
is scheduled to make a "major" address at a rally on 22 July,
the eve of the anniversary of the Egyptian revolution. Nasir
may use the occasion for some dramatic announcement, al-
though his comments in Damascus last week were relatively
moderate. In addition to the more obvious Middle Eastern is-
sues, one likely subject would be UAR relations with Kuwait,
whose ruler conferred with Nasir in Damascus and is reported
interested in "reaching an understanding."
The UAR Government has reportedly ordered all petroleum
companies in Egypt to transfer their refined products from
storage facilities in Alexandria, Suez, and Port Said to inland
locations as a security measure. Military movements toward
the Sinai, involving trucks, light tanks, antitank guns, and
light antiaircraft guns, reportedly took place on 20 July. Two
cement-loaded barges 'we been moved into place for blocking
the Suez Canal if necessary.
Jordan: UAR and Iraqi propaganda urging the overthrow
of King Husayn is continuing, and a series of bombings in Amman
on 20-21 July may have signaled the beginning of a terrorist stage
in the campaign.
Nasir had re area July tnat ne expects something
to happen soon in Jordan."
if his government does not support King HusaynTs intention to
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1 V' � �� 164.4
intervene militarily in Iraq, the King and Prime Minister
Rifai may flee the country.
Lebanon: The military situation in Lebanon has been
relatively calm. Light firing from the Basta area in Beirut
on 21 July was returned by cannon fire from Lebanese army
armored cars. President Chamoun told the American am-
bassador that he had "requested" General Shihab to use the
army to clean out the Basta, or to assign two battalions of
gendarmerie, supported by army artillery and aviation, to
do the job if army units could not be used. Chamoun said he
has also "suggested," without any immediate response from
Shihab, that the army commander should purge his senior
staff. Reacting to Chamoun's suggestion that US forces should
be deployed to the frontier to seal off infiltration from Syria,
Shihab said he would not object, but felt such action might in
fact invite increased infiltration.
Plans for holding a parliamentary session on 24 July to
elect a new president are continuing, but there appears to be
general agreement that a boycott by opposition members has a
good chance of preventing the necessary quorum.
Iraq: The rebel government is repeatedly proclaiming
its desire for friendship with the West, and denying any inten-
tion of nationalizing or interfering with petroleum facilities.
A consortium official in Tehran, however, reports that two
old barges have been towed into position at the mouth of the
Shatt-al-Arab river dividing Iran and Iraq near the Persian
Gulf. Their sinking could effectively block transit to Basra,
Abadan, and Khorramshahr. The regime appears to be con-
cerned over its ability to maintain public security. It has is-
sued an order to stop the formation of "popular resistance
organizations" and probably fears the possibility of a Commu-
nist and leftist take-over of the "street," which could revive
early disorders.
The Cairo press of 21 July contained a cryptic announce-
ment that the rebel regime would soon release secret docu-
ments regarding Baghdad Pact "conspiracies against the Arabs"
and another that within 10 days Iraq would make a decision
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"which is much more important that the abolition of the mon-
archy." A special military tribunal has been named to conduct
trials of "members of the old regime," and the public has been
invited to submit testimony against possible defendants.
Sudan: Prime Minister Khalil feels he overestimated the
strength of his position in the Sudanese Government and, faced
with the threatened loss of support from members of his own
Umma party being bribed by Egypt, believes that his only hope
now is to form a "national" government including members of
opposition parties. He apparently has not, however, dismissed
entirely his earlier idea of staging a "temporary" military coup.
He has been unable to obtain cabinet approval for declaration of
a state of emergency, and an unconfirmed 21 July Baghdad radio
announcement of receipt of official recognition from the Sudanese
Foreign Ministry indicates that direction of policy is slipping
out of Khalil's hands.
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vow/ 'Nov
III. THE WEST
De Gaulle and Key Advisers Doubt Wisdom of Anglo-American
Intervention
Both Premier de Gaulle and Foreign Minister Couve de
Murville may have more serious reservations about the
British-American moves in Lebanon than is indicated by the
French complaint over the lack of prior consultation on the
decisions to send troops. De Gaulle and many of his en-
tourage are privately taking a very dim view of the inter-
vention because they fear repercussions in North Africa
De Gaulle would be unlikely to express such views pub-
licly since they conflict with the widely held French opinion
that weak Western reactions to Nasir's moves have encour-
aged the Algerian rebels. De Gaulle may anticipate, how-
ever, worsened relations with Morocco and Tunisia and an
undermining of his current attempt to win over the Moslem
population of Algeria. The French representative to NATO
told the American representative on 18 July that De Gaulle
feels time is running against the West in combating Arab
nationalism and that the West will eventually have to come
to terms with it.
De Gaulle is concerned lest events move too rapidly
to permit him to present a solution for Algeria. It is pos-
sible that French leaders hope France's abstention from a
more active role in the present situation may facilitate
future French-Arab negotiations. After the Suez crisis
there were indications that pragmatic elements in the French
Foreign Ministry were working for a modus vivencli with the
Arab states in an attempt to save as much as possible in
North Africa, and that Paris intended to play down its as-
sociation with Israel to further that end.
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