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Document Creation Date: 
January 27, 2020
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January 30, 2020
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Publication Date: 
August 16, 1958
PDF icon CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15777414].pdf601.88 KB
**gaime - Approved for Release. 2020/01/23 C03169514 (C) 3.3(h)(2) 1(/ 16 August 1958 Copy No. C- r a CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 40-P�SECRET ////////A,L'efi ror4lLe2112f)/f)14/F2c60c49#5(4W///7/717/4/7 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514 4.7�Arf gWir AMIN To% nil to. op�qp, Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514 16 AUGUST 1958 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Albania may be preparing to break diplomatic relations with Yugosla- via. II. ASIA-AFRICA Closer ties between Saudi Arabia and UAR expected to result from Crown Prince Faysars stay in Cairo. 0 Iran - Arrests following distribution of subversive literature indicate gov- ernment's continuing concern over in- stability. 0 Britain determined to press ahead with modified Cyprus plan. Chinese Communists seen unyielding on issues blocking restoration of trade and cultural ties with Japan. Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514 h., J-� N....A 16 A-a A 0 South Vietnam - Economic sabotage campaign launched by Communists and other dissidents. III. THE WEST Cuban rebels gaining strength amid new signs of dissatisfaction with Batista re- gime. LATE ITEM Nationalist-feared Chinese Communist air attack on offshore islands fails to materialize. Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514 'Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO3169514 "4404 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 16 August 1958 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Yugoslavia-Albania: Albania may be preparing to break diplomatic ties with Yugoslavia. This would make it the first bloc state to go this far in the dispute with Tito. On 15 August Belgrade rejected an Albanian note in which the Tirana regime protested the alleged "assassination" of an Albanian national and warned that Yugoslav failure to accept responsibility for the act would lead to the conclusion that the lives of Albanian diplomatic personnel in Belgrade "are in jeopardy." In 1948, Albania was the only bloc country to break relations with Yugoslavia. II. ASIA-AFRICA UAR - Saudi Arabia: Further moves toward re-estab- lishing friendly relations between Saudi Arabia and the UAR can be expected to result from the visit of Saudi Crown Prince Fa sa who arrived in Cairo on 15 August. (Page 1) Iran: The arrest of at least two military and several civilian figures on questionable evidence, following the dis- tribution of subversive literature by an alleged "Military Committee of Iranian Nationalism" indicates the government's continuing fears for its stability. The resultant rumor cam- paign will adversely affect the morale of the officer corps. (Page 2) FM* LI TOP SECRET 4Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514r , Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514 I Lir .CLr*j,i 4' Cyprus: Britain's announcement on 15 August that it intends to begin carrying out a modified version of its Cyprus plan indicates London intends to go ahead in the face of warnings about adverse effects among the.Greek Cyp- riots and on the Greek Government. (Page 3) Japan - Communist China' there is little chance of eip ng s moderating its attitude toward restoring trade and cultural relations with Tokyo. Peiping insists on the right of its projected trade mission to fly its flag in Japan, and wants Tokyo to stop supporting the "two Chinas" concept. The Kishi government has tentative plans to under- take ambassadorial negotiationj with Peinine and will prob- ably press ahead on this level. I (Page 5) South Vietnam: Vietnamese Communists and other dis- sidents appear to have embarked on a campaign of economic sabotage aimed at weakening the Diem regime. Attacks on two large French-owned rubber estates have already cut produc- tion of this major revenue-producing commodity. (Page 6) III. THE WEST Cuba: The rebels have increased their strength signif- icantly since April. They are unopposed in almost half of the rural areas in Oriente Province and have spread their operations westward to other provinces. Other opposition groups have a temporary agreement with the "26th oi July" movement and have stepped up antigovernment plotting. Batista continues to depend on the support of the army and organized labor. However, the army appears to have no "will to fight" and various elements are reportedly disatis- fled with their role and with the government's mounting un- popularity. (Page 7) 16 Aug 58 DAILY BRIEF ii Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514 000 Communist hoop strength 000 Nationalist troop strength if. Ground-attack � SELECTED MAJOR AIRFIELDS I.+ Piston tighter )). Jet tighter if. Piston light bomber + Jet light bomber UGUST 19B Hengyang, e.J\)- Harikow4 Nanking Chuhsien. tseREN4-- LI ENCHEN G L AN LiJNGCH I INGYANG *AOC 1 CHIANG IL-1,kv CM,./ 8.6, 000 *Canton cHEem ?Iv._ HONG KONG ABOUT 500 JUNKS SIGHTED HERE 80806 80816 7 SOUTH CHINA SEA Cl-IOU SHAN I. EAST CHINA SEA ISTATLITE MILES Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514 V /, Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514 IA -;t4) LATE ITEM *Taiwan Strait: a Chinese Communist air attack against the offshore islands would take place the following morning at 0600 hours Taipei time. As of 1200 hours 16 August Taipei time (0100 EDST), no air attack had occurred and no Communist military activity indicating such an attack had been noted. A US naval task force on patrol in the Taiwan Strait reported on 15 August a concentration of about 500 junks about 70 miles east of Swatow; concen- trations of up to 300 vessels have been previously sighted on occasion in the Taiwan Strait and are not considered un- usual. (See map on facing page) 16 Aug 58 DAILY BRIEF iii ii TOP SECRET if=arazrrSSISTEEZiliT6T _ort.e% n, rt." rm. trt inn Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514 yrs I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC No back-up material II. ASIA-AFRICA Saudi -UAR Rapprochement Further moves toward re-establishing overtly friendly relations between Saudi Arabia and the UAR can be expected from the arrival of Saudi Crown Prince Faysal in Cairo on 15 August. Although King Saud has indicated that Faysal will not enter into any agreement with Egypt at this time, Faysal is known to favor much closer relations with Nasir than dqes the King and could act on his own initiative. Faysal is scheduled to be back in Saudi Arabia by 17 Au- gust, but he may also attend the meeting of the political com- mittee of the Arab League in Cairo on 6 September. Several recent reports suggest that the league may be revitalized as a Nasir-dominated grouping of Arab states adhering to a neu- tralist foreign policy. The current visit of Kuwait's deputy ruler to Cairo may be related to tais plan, since the Ruler of Kuwait is apparently willing to provide financial support to the Arab League. TOP SECRET 16 Aug 58 �-�lk Irv% A I lk rrri I ir+010/^C DI III CTIAI Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514 Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514 %of Instability Increasing in Iran Recent military and civilian arrests are indicative of the feeling of suspicion and insecurity that:pervades all ranks of Iranian society, including the Shah. While only the arrests of a gendarmerie colonel and a sergeant have been confirmed, there are rumors that arrests are continuing. Subversive pamphlets signed by a "Military Committee of Iranian Nationali and a roster of military and civilian members of the organiza- tion were reportedly uncovered in the homes of the two arrest- ed; the materials found in the colonel's house may have been planted there shortly before they were seized. All embassies, members of the Majlis, senior military officers, and influential Iranian businessmen received anon- ymous mimeographecl, letters from the "committee" highly critical of the royal family and soliciting support in establish- ing a republic with or without the Shah. American military representatives in Tehran believe there is an air of falseness about the entire proceedings. Since the Iraqi coup, military officers have appeared some insecure and extremely nervous as a result of repeated rumors of arrests. The Shah also continues to be worried over the possibility of an attempted coup. Criticism of the regime and preliminary discussions of ways and means of action against it are spreading among military officers, according to Ambas- sador Wailes. 16 Aug 58 SECRET CFKITRAI INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514 Britain Announces Modifications of Cyprus Plan Britain acted swiftly to announce implementation of its seven-year plan for Cyprus following the return of Prime Min- ister Macmillan from his visit to Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia. The plan, as announced in London on 15 August, contains sev- eral modifications of the original plan made public on 19 June. These changes appear designed to overcome Greek objections to the proposals while retaining the general features of the plan which Turkey previously accepted. Modifications designed to appeal to Athens include: elim- ination of official representatives of Greece and Turkey on the Governor's Council--though official representatives to the gov- ernor's office will still be appointed; indefinite postponement of the provisions calling for Cypriots to have dual nationality; and a vague reference to the possibility of a single island-wide legislature at some future date. In addition, the British again have announced that, following a period of peace on the island, Archbishop Makarios will be allowed to return to participate in electoral preparations. While the British announcement goes far to ease Greek fears that partition is being facilitated by the new plan, it does not preclude the possibility of eventual partition. In addition, the new announcement calls upon the governor to authorize; where feasible, the establishment of separate Greek and Turk- ish Cypriot municipal councils. Immediate Greek reaction is unfavorable, with both For- eign Minister Averoff and a representative of Makarios terming the new plan "unacceptable." Averoff's principal objections are centered on the retention of official representatives of Greece and Turkey and the proposed separate municipal councils. Ankara's reaction to the British modifications is unknown. Turkish leaders informed Macmillan during his recent trip to Ankara, however, that they would support the original plan but SCCRE 16 Aug 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514 � %of would demand a tripartite meeting of Britain, Greece, and Tur- key if modifications were introduced. Britain's first step in implementing the new plan will be the preparation of electoral rolls for the island, which may take two or three months. Meanwhile, Londbn has called on Athens and Ankara to appoint their representatives by 1 October to con- fer with Cyprus Governor Foot. SECRE7 16 Aug 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514 Itme Japanese Sees Stiff Terms for Resumption of China Mainland Trade there is little chance that Peiping will relax its "harsh" attitude toward Japan un takes official action to meet Chinese demands, ras�Takv7these demands include re- jection of the "two Chinas" policy, removal of obstructions to gradual normalization of diplomatic relations, and uncon- ditional approval for the Chinese Communists to fly their national flag over a proposed trade mission in Tokyo as stip- ulated in the fourth Sino-Japanese trade agreement. The terms of this agreement very nearly caused a rupture in Japanese - Chinese Nationalist relations last spring before it was rejected by the Japanese Government. Japan's acquies- cence now in Peiping's demands probably would precipitate a new crisis between Tokyo and Taipei. This may convince the Japanese Govern- ment that private or unofficial approaches to Chinese leaders will not succeed in re-establishing trade relations as widely desired in Japan. Tokyo consequently may step up plans for ambassadorial discussions to solve outstanding issues. Japanese Foreign Minister Fujiyama told Ambassador MacArthur on 12 August that Japan must evolve a long-term policy toward Communist China, taking into account the Jap- anese need for trade4, and Peiping's growing importance in inter- natiOnal affairs. Fujiyama said he hopes to coordinate his gov- ernment's views with those of the United States when he visits Washington on 11-12 September. 16 Aug 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514 or, mrs Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514 Nee Communist Economic Sabotage in South Vietnam The 10 August night raid on the large French-owned Michelin rubber plantation in South Vietnam by a combined force of some 400 heavily armed Vietnamese Communists and local dissidents appears part of an evolving new pattern of economic sabotage designed to weaken the Saigon regime. A similar attack on another rubber plantation occurred ear- lier this year. Both raids were well coordinated and apparent- ly carried out under Communist direction. The extensive property damage on both occasions is expected materially to lower Vietnam's rubber exports, a major source of revenue. Production at Michelin�which annually exports about 8,000 tons of latex, about 12 percent of South Vietnam's rubber ex- ports--may be halted indefinitely. The Diem government is deeply disturbed over these open manisfestations of deteriorating security conditions in the rural areas. Rural insecurity is seriously jeopardizing Sai- gon's efforts to strengthen its weak economy by raising rice production and encouraging French investors to expand their rubber holdings. The government may react to this latest incident by reassigning regular army troops from training duties to conduct a broad security sweep in conjunction with paramilitary forces normally responsible for internal secu- rity. SECRE1 16 Aug 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514 III. THE WEST Cuban Political Situation Cpposition groups are acting with increasing determina- tion to oust the regime of President Fulgencio Batista.. The rebel movement has grown significantly since its abortive gen- eral strike call last April. It has extended its control over most of Oriente Province except for the cities and points of army concentration, and has spread westward into other prov- inces. Political opposition groups have established at least temporary unity against the regime, and exile groups are for- mulating plans for an invasion attempt. Although Batista retains the backing of the organized labor movement, popular dissatisfaction with the regime is increas- ing, and the President is becoming more dependent on the armed forces for support. The army itself has alienated the civilian population, especially in Oriente Province, by its harsh repri- sals against suspected opponents and its involvement in graft and corruption. The inability of the armed forces to defeat the rebels and the government's failure to resolve the political con- flict could aggravate the dissatisfaction among some army of- ficer groups and convince them of the necessity of replacing Batista with a military or joint military-civilian junta. There are continued reports of plotting among dissident military groups. -SiteRE-I- 16 Aug 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Special Adviser to the President The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commalider in Chief, Pacific The Department of the Interior The Secretary of the Interior Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director United States Information Agency The Director -CONFIDEN1'1217411- Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514 7/. /7//z/z i