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January 30, 2020
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August 23, 1958
PDF icon CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15777421].pdf670.65 KB
, Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 23 August 1958 Copy No. C 57 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Bk`.1)':',..!%"..7.:.^.1T NO. DIJEs 4013-SECRET- /I/ /Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519717//// Z/Z/ZA Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519 4.7�01.0 IA G. II MM %I. AiIlk Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519 1 %/I AJL01.411.1-a 10014 23 AUGUST 1958 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Chinese Communist jet light bombers fly from Nanking to South China, where _nalkomber_a_arn_nragently based. USSR delivers MIG-17's and other arms to Syria. UAR now seeks MIG-19's to offset Israeli acquisition of French Vautours. II. ASIA-AFRICA Nasir may exploit emphasis on Arab League agreement in United Nations to further his reported plans for re- vived pro-UAR Arab League. Egyptian source characterizes Sudan as Nasir's next target. No timetable indicated, and action now Would run counter to present UAR pose of moderation. Iraqi regime now permitting more open anti-Western statements and activities. -4- � Israel continues military preparations. 0 Pakistan prime minister's 21 August speech invites Iraq to quit Baghdad Pact. 0 There are an increasing number of signs that Greek Government may re- sign over Cyprus issue. 0 Japan plans to extend $20,000,000 credit to Burma. Indonesian dissidents hampered by defections and ammunition shortage. TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519 , 'Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO3169519 TOP SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 23 August 1958 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Communist China: At least five 1L-28 jet light bombers-- and possibly as many as five flights--subordinate to the Chi- nese Communist 8th Air Division flew on 22 August from their base in Nanking to Chingchiang, located about 55 miles south of Nanchang' in East China. This may be the beginning of a deployment of IL-28 jet light bombers to grmth (mina whA7 no r aircraft are presently based. (Map) (Page 1) Soviet arms for UAR: During the past six weeks, four to five Soviet vessels have delivered to Latakia military equipment including 55 to 60 T-54 medium tanks and more than 150 artillery pieces, including antitank weapons. On 20 August a ship offloaded 18 large crates at Latakia. This delivery and earlier Sightings of crates suggest that the USSR has delivered a squadron of MIG-17 all-weather jet fighters. the UAR, aware that the Israelis nave new French Vautour twin-jet aircraft, apparently has decided to try to obtain MIG-19 jet fighters from the Soviet bloc. (Page 2) II. ASIA-AFRICA Middle East resolution: Nasir probably believes that the Arab-sponsored resolution ,sercres his long-range interests. " He may feel that the governments of Lebanon and Jordan will TOP SECRET AApproved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519V / g _ Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519 %NO come under his influence in due course and that a show of moderation and a desire to cooperate with Hammarskjold at this time are the most effective tactics for obtaining the withdrawal of British and American forces from the area and increasing Arab prestige. The resolution's emphasis on agreements reached within the context of the Arab League may be consistent with reported UAR plans for a revival of the League as a pro-Nasir alliance. *UAR-Suclan: Nasir is reported to have stated on 19 Au- gust that the pudan will be the UAR's next target and has or- dered preparations for a press campaign Against Khalirs gov- ernment. He did not indicate any timetable for action. Nasir has a strong personal animosity toward Khalil, but the launch- ing of an aggressive propaganda campaign atthis' time�in ad- dition to the UAR's present subversive program--would_run counter to the overt line of moderation which the HAR has re- cently assumed. Iraq: The Baghdad regime, now less apprehensive of Western military intervention, is permitting more open ex- pression of anti-Western--particularly anti-American--senti- ments which it had earlier tried to curb. While the present leaders with some exceptions appear to be relatively moderate, competition among factions may lead to still greater em- phasis on anti-Western themes and possibly to early con- sideration of such moves as oil nationalization. (Page 3) Israel-UAR: The Israeli Army appears to be continuing its military preparations for any trouble arising out of the situation in Jordan. There are indications that armor is being concentrated near Beersheba in southwestern Israel. The UAR has complained publicly this week that Israeli pa- trols had crossed its frontier in this area. 23 Aug 58 DAILY BRIEF Ii 0/ / " t:// / / '// , , , / .0/ // zz // Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519/ , V / 11 , I wov/ // z - , /// 77 , FZ/7 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519 � Pakistan: Prime Minister Noon's statement on 21 August that "we do not want Iraq to stay with us in the Baghdad Pact;' may have been designed to encourage Iraq to make a formal break. Pakistani leaders have long believed that Iraq's in- volvement in Arab affairs created problems for the other Bagh- dad Pact members and that closer cooperation would be pos- sible without Iraq. (Page 4) Greece: There are an increasing number of indications that the Karamanlis 4overnment may resign over failure to settle the Cyprus controversy. Any successor government, while basically pro-Western, might feel compelled to adopt a me neutralist policy. (Page 5) Japan-Burma: Japan intends to grant a $20,000,000 credit to Burma as part of a campaign to expand economic ties with free Asian countries. This loan will offer competi- tion to the bloc economic offensive in Burma; the USSR has granted credits of $37,000,000. Tokyo has already extended a $50,000,000 credit to India and is studying similar action for Ceylon and Pakistan. (Page 6) Indonesia: Dissident troop defections apparently are proving a significant factor in the government's progress in subduing the insurgents in North Celebes. In North Sumatra, the dissidents' shortage of ammunition, following intensive action earlier this month, has forced at least a temporary cessation of guerrilla activities there. (Page 7) 23 Aug 58 DAILY BRIEF 111 , Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 c031 6951 9% - ri%r Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519 =Iwo' 000 Communist troop strength nn,r) Nationalist troop strength Ground-attack MI SELECTED MAJOR AIRFIELDS 4 Piston fighter 4- Jet fighter + Piston light bomber 4_ Jet light bomber UGUST 19 Hengyang es/ ang 1 Nanchang Chingchiang 68,000 NG KONG SOUTH CHINA SEA Hangchow Chuhsien� Fooch NAN Shanghai 4 NINGPO LUCHIAO* Wenchow AN INOYANG 14.1� CHIANG QUEMOY IS 86,000 � PESCAD0f2ES IS. 16,000 SANTU BAY IS. 3 000 �� to CHOU SHAN I. EAST CHINA SEA o ISTATUTE MILES 300 80806 80823 -Ter SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519 I. THE COMMUNIST BItt Chinese Communist Military Situation At least five IL-28 jet light bombers subordinate to the Nanking-based Chinese Communist 8th Air Division flew on 22 August from their base to Chingchiang, located about 55 miles south of Nanchang in East China, These bombers could have been flight leaders for five flights of IL-28es. These planes may operate from Chingchiang, which is about the same distance from the Taiwan Strait as Shanghai, up to this time the southernmost jet bomber base in Commu- nist China. However, if the 8th Air Division--equipped with about 90 IL-289s--is being deployed to South China, Commu- nist offensive capabilities in the Taiwan Strait area would be greatly increased. lcontacts between Shanghai-based naval bombers and tactical controllers who may be in Southeast China. Numerous unconfirmed reports indicate that Communist ground forces in East China are being reinforced. Although these reports may be exaggerated, it is probable that addi- tional troops are being moved in. Since 16 August, the number of Chinese Communist naval patrol craft operating in the Amoy :and Santu ,_Bay areas has about tripled, and the level of naval communications in East China has been above normal since 13 August. This activity, together with the movement of four naval vessels now ten- tatively identified as motor torpedo boats into Santii-_, Bay on 17 August, suggests preparations for interdiction operations against the offshore islands. On the night of 21-22 August, Chinese Nationalist aircraft overflew Anhwei, Chekiang, and Kiangsu Provinces on the China mainland, dropping leaflets and "relief parcels" con- taining rice, towels, needles, and thread. The Nationalists have carried out many missions of this type in the past, but this is the first since the Communist occupation of the coastal airfields. The Nationalist Air Force says that all aircraft re- turned safely despite Chinese Communist interception attempts. -TOP-SECRET 23 Aug 58 f^GAITO A I IkITCI I inckir= cei III PTIM Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519 Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519 Soviet Arms Shipments to Syria A Soviet vessel offloaded 18 large crates at Latakia on 20 August, These crates and those which have been sighted earlier probably contain the squadron of MIG-17 all-weather jet fighters scheduled for shipment to Syria in July. The UAR arms purchasing mission in Moscow informed Damascus in June that the UAR officers being trained on these aircraft in the USSR would have completed their courses by the end of July. the UAR, aware tnat me Israelis nave new French Vautour twin-jet aircraft, apparently has decided to try to obtain MIG-19 jet fighters as well from the Soviet bloc. Four to five shiploads of So- viet military equipment, probably including 55 to 60 T-54 Medium tanks, have been delivered to Latakia in the past six weeks. Since the USSR resumed major arms shipments to Syria in July, more than 150 artillery pieces�possibly including radar-controlled 57-mm. and 100-mm. antiair- craft guns--have been delivered to Latakia. These arms, along with large quantities of small arms and ammunition, were contracted for by the Syrians under an agreement con- cluded on 20 February 1958. In addition, several Soviet vessels transported numerous motor vehicles and other equipment to the Syrian region dur- ing this six-week period. A recent British report claims that JS-3 heavy tanks were offloaded at Latakia early in Au- gust, but the report does not specify whether these tanks were supplied by the Egyptian re ion or the Soviet Union. TOP SECRET 23 Aug 58 CFKITRAI ItsITFI I inksirp R111 I FTIN page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519 f2CfnaLIP Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519 vigor' IL ASIA-AFRICA Iraqi Regime Moving Toward More Anti-American Policy Although Iraqi Prime Minister Qasim and certain other ministers have given repeated assurances of friendship to- ward the US, the government is relaxing curbs on anti-West- ern�particularly anti- American- - actions. Among the disquieting signs of this trend are the rabble- rousing speeches of Vice Premier Arif, who harps on the "evils of imperialism"; the emphasis on "imperialist plot- ting against Syria" in the current "treason trials" for former military leaders; am attempt to "nationalize" the American Mission Hospital at Amara; and a refusal to allow reopening of the USIS and Military Advisory Assistance Group offices andinterference viiththe work of Point IV technicians. Other irritants are restrictions on diplomatic pouches and diplo- matic visas as well as on the communications and movements of the American counsul at Kirkuk. Public hostility toward Americans has been reflected in the spitting on and stoning of embassy officers, a rash of Iraqi student withdrawals from "imperialist" Point IV scholar- ship, and charges that Point IV has been used to organize "anti-Communist cells" for carrying out sabotage. Iraqi friends of Americans are afraid to be seen talking with them in public. Western contractors are experiencing labor troubles on the large development projects and some have intimated that they will accept no more new contracts, a move which might induce the Iraqis to look to the Soviet bloc for technical help. Should the current Baathist- Communist struggle or other factional fights for influence assume wider proportions, indi- vidual members of the regime may feel compelled to voice in- creasingly anti-Western propaganda lines in order to retain their positions. It is likely that demands for denunciation of the Baghdad Pact and for "nationalization" of the nation's oil will be favorite themes, as well as the opening up of develop- ment contracts to the Soviet bloc. -SEGRET_ 23 Aug 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519 %aro rielnkr_ Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519 Nirr? Pakistani Prime Minister Calls for Iraq to Leave Baghdad Pact Pakistani Prime Minister Noon said in a speech on 21 August that Iraq should leave the Baghdad Pact, that Pakistan believes Arab unity under the leadership of Nasir would lead to greater. Islamic unity, and that Pakistan would be willing to enter a federation with Iran and Afghanistan. In contrast to his 8 March speech in which he threatened to leave all de- fense pacts if Western support for Pakistan on the Kashmir issue was not forthcoming, the recent speech was not anti- Western and explicitly defended the concept of collective se- curity arrangements. While Noon's statement may have been timed to impress public opinion prior to elections, Pakistani leaders have long believed that Iraq's involvement in Arab affairs created prob- lems for the other Baghdad Pact members and that closer coopera- tion would be possible without Iraq. Pakistani leacfers are un- likely, however, to approve his remarks on Arab unity because of their distrust of Nasir and his willingness to cooperate with the USSR. While recognizing that an accommodation with Arab nationalism is necessaryp they probably hope that Arab unity will 'take the form of a loose'federation rather than a united state. Noon's offer to federate with Iran and Afghanistan may heighten Afghan suspicions of Pakistani intentions, as the Afghan leaders have already stated that they are not interested in such a federation. His remarks on Islamic unity may cause increased apprehensions in India, which has supported Arab nationalism but is fearful of the emergence of a pan-Islamic bloc.. SECRET 23 Aug 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519 ry ,r1 r rur Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519 Greek Government May Resign Over Cyy_rus Dispute Extreme pessimism regarding recent and anticipated future developments in the Cyprus controversy has been voiced by pro-Western Greek government leaders, and the cabinet has discussed resigning. Prime Minister ICaraman- lis has earlier said that he 77ould have to reign if adverse developments in the Cyprus :.ispute continued. Greek frustration over Cyprus reached a new high with London's 15 August announcement that it intended to begin im- plementation of amodifiedversion of the British seven-year "Partnership" Plan for Cyprus. Provision for Turkish repre- sentation in the proposed Cyprus government and the general acceptance of "organic partition" between the two communities on the island made the plan unacceptable to Greek Cypriot Archbishop Makarios. His immediate rejection of the plan made eventual rejection by Athens a certainty. The Cyprus issue is only one of many factors in a grow- ing estrangement between Greece and the West which may lead Greece to dissociate itse1f----,pos8ibly even withdraw--from NATO. Large segments of the public and the government be- lieve that Greece has been abandoned by the US in the Cyprus controversy and that Washington discriminaths in favor of Tur- key politically, economically, and militarily. In addition, cordial relations between Greece and the UAR have resulted in widespread condemnation in Greece of recent Western moves in the Middle East. If the present government resigns, it will probably be followed by a weaker coalition of non-Communist parties-- possibly Lander conservative leader Panagiotis Kanellopoulos. It is doubtful, however, that such a government could do more than its predecessor to reach a settlement of the Cyprus issue, .pdrticularly if Makarios refused to acquiesce in such moves. 23 Aug 58 CPKITDAI IKITPI I inpkirr RI II I PTIKI Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519 NNW' eir�wilrytIrtriNITI A I Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519 Namil Japan Approves Economic Credit for Burma The Japanese Government on 22 August approved a Burmese request for a $20,000,000 credit to be used for purchasing Japanese products, probably machinery and other industrial products. The crddit wotild be in addition to reparations payments to Burma and is part of a Japa- nese campaign to expand its own economic ties and counter Communist bloc penetration in the area. Japan thus far has extended a $50,000,000 credit to India and is studying similar action on requests from Ceylon and Pakistan. The credit to Burma would tend to counter a Sino- Soviet bloc economic offensive in which Peiping has offered a $4,200,000 loan for construction of a textile plant and Mos- cow has extended $37,400,000 in credits. The United States has lent $42,300,000 to Burma. Tokyo, fearful of Communist China's call for a boycott of Japanese products by Overseas Chinese residents in Southeast Asia and by price reductions of up to 20 percent on competitive Chinese products, is anxious to expedite measures for orienting Asian trade toward Japan. As one means of achieving this, Foreign Minister Fujiyama will ask for US assistance in establishing a multinational develop- ment fund for South and Southeast Asia when he visits Wash- ington on 11 and 12 September for discussions of problems in American-Japanese relations. 23 Aug 58 rckrro AI IkITCI I inckirc RI II I PTIM Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519 orgrIDE'T Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519 Indonesian Dissidents Suffering Losses The surrender of three battalions of dissident troops at Tomohon has "broken the back" of the dissident movement in North Celebes, Djakarta army headquarters is now optinas- tic over the chances of a quick settlement with the North Celebes dissidents he defec- tion of the sector commander at Tomohon, their last major stronghold, caused its fall to central government troops on 16 August. In North Sumatra, the dissidents have suspended operations on 18 AugusTb�na of ammunition. They probably nearly expended their slim stocks of ammunition during their intensive campaign of hit-and-run at- tacks against government posts during the first half of the month. Despite supply difficulties, the North Sumatra dissidents have succeeded in denying to the central government all but a few ma- jor towns. SECRET 23 Aug 58 rctorDel im-rpi I impkirp Rill I FTIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519 Approved for Release: 2020/0:1/23 C03169519 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities � Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Special Adviser to the President The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of the Interior The Secretary of the Interior Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director United States Information Agency The Director -613NPIDENTIAL Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519 -17-0P�SEERET- 0:4/#4/,'", er, � /#1 4./ 4./ rfj T ; �TOID�SECRET� ./,-miezzrnmz,�Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO3169519_, ........ 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