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January 27, 2020
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January 30, 2020
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August 28, 1958
// /Z/Z/ZZI WZ/Z7,17/ZI r/1/7 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169523 ,e 3 5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 28 August 1958 Copy No. C CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 2, DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE liv�4 12.1..r....,,. .-.',i-IA;.:137:-.1...YTO: TS S C NETXT Fi,:'.1VIEW DA-FE: ______,_644) AU] F In T DATE. REVIEWER: -TOP-SECRET- /ft/Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169523/' Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169523 I %./ QP11.016�111S16. /Oak Approved foriVeTeSe72#021-06/71723 C03169523 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169523 ; S'n IOW 28 AUGUST 1958 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Chinese Communists mount inten- sive barrage on smaller islands iii Chinmens; local Nationalist com- mander expects assault this week- end. Direct Cairo - Soviet bloc air service to be established soon. USSR considering request to furnish UAR with IL-18 four-engine turbo- props for commercial use. II. ASIA-AFRICA Lebanese rebel leaders reaffirm their defiance of governmental au- thority. I UAR as- sistance to opposition continues. Moroccan Government may be re- shuffled shortly; fighting between Istiqlal party factions posaible. III. THE WEST 0 Panama - Political instability heading for climax around 1 October, with moves to oust President de la Guardia possible at any time. TA 11 re rf /It T11'1/71 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169523 gp7/ A/ , Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169523 1;2 ';;;; ki07111?"SECItet Avaie' ;01,4 .{% , .;; V 4 V / / '0/ / Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C0316 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 28 August 1958 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC *Taiwan Strait situation (as of 0100 EDT, 28 August): A heavy concentration of Chinese Communist artillery fire on Tatan and Erhtan in the Chinmens (Quemoys) on 27 August has led Chinese Nationalist officials to expect an attempt to seize these smaller islands soon. Chiang Kai-shek is seriously disturhpd about "creening nterdiction" of the offshore islands. Preparation for increased Chinese Communist naval narticioation in the Taiwan Strait situation (Page 1) (Maps) Watch Committee conclusion--Sino-Soviet bloc: A. No Sino -Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hos- tilities against the continental US or its possessions in the im- mediate future. B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action against US forces abroad, US allies, or areas peripheral to the orbit in the immediate future, except as noted below. NOTE: It is likely that the Chinese Communists will continue artillery barrages along with intensified air and naval inter- diction of supply lines to the offshore islands. Air attacks on the offshore islands are probable but initially would be probing to determine Chinese Nationalist and US reactions. Chinese Communist seizure of one or more of the smaller offshore is- lands is expected. The Chinese Nationalist and US reactions to these moves will largely determine whether or not attempts TO A 4Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169523 (It JGC-rtr., legir will be made to seize the large islands of Chinmen (Quemoy) and Matsu. The Communists probably do not intend to initiate major offensive military action against Taiwan and the Pesca- dores in the immediate future Bloc air service to UAR: Direct air, service between the Soviet bloc and Cairo is to start,on 2.September. On 18 August a Czech jet transport (TU-104) flew from Cairo to Prague in what may have been the final test flight for a weekly i- nrrnQnn warvirtp hpfweran the two capitals .I USSR- UAkt: The Ubbli is now LAJilbiuuting letiucot. tA, provide the UAR three of its new IL-18 four-engine turboprop trans- ports for commercial use. After several months of negotia- tions, the USSR states it is ready to deliver to Egypt 10 IL-14 transports modified for paratroop operations and five IL-14 trans- ports for c1viLair use. A joint Egyptian military and civil air mission is to arrive in Moscow on 2 September, apparently to conclude financial arrangements for these aircraft and a civil air agreement. (Page 4) IL ASIA:-AFRICA Watch Committee conclusion�Middle East: C. Although a deliberate initiation of open hostilities In the Middle East is unlikely in the immediate future, the sit- uation remains highly unstable throughout the area, particularly where US and UK interests or commitments are involved, and incidents and coups could occur at any time. NOTE: The survival of the Jordanian regime is imminently threatened. If the regime in Jordan collapses, action by Israel and other neighboring countries to take control of Jordanian territory is likely. 28 Aug 58 DAILY BRIEF ii VZ! AApproved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO31695237 / Z/: 0.1 U , r p s E k , Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169523 Lebanon: A meeting of rebel leaders on 25 August un- derscored their unwillingness to make any meaningful move to- g normal security and economic conditions. cus has ordered a rebel "popular resistance" force to be created in southern Lebanon for use "when neces- sary." Cairo has sent the equivalent of $84,000 to rebel leaders in Beirut. Page 5) Morocco: Premier Balafrej may be replaced and the moderate government reorganized within the next two months in an effort to counter the growth of extremism within the dom- inant Istiqlal party. Armed clashes between rival factions within the party are feared since the expulsion on 13 August of three left-wing members of the political committee from all party of- fices. Two party factions are reported to be trying to obtain arms as rapidly as possible. (Page 7) III. THE WEST Panama: There are indications of a student-led uprising about 1 October, when the legislature convenes. The ostensible goal of the students is to curtail the power of the National Guard. �This student movement is being actively abetted by, if not led by, the leaders of the political opposition, whose real aim seems to be the overthrow of President de la Guardia. It receives the sup- port and encouragement of the Communists. Some opposition elements might act considerably sooner than October. (Page 8) 28 Aug 58 DAILY BRIEF iii TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169523 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169523 o Shihshih o Chimei Kaochi AMO 0 ICU LANG HSU FERRY DOCK AMOY HAROOF Tungan Airfield 0 Aotou AMOY Hotso 0 Anhai Shuitou Mach iang Aotou Id LITTLE QUEMOY (Lieh Hsu) TA TAN ' EHRTAN � /1\4Th\ ICS l'IWUHSU Lienho HSIAGTEn. IPICHIAOHSH TATENG QUEMOY Houltou (Chinmen) oHuhsia Shuitou RAY TUNGTING krstrip Liaolo WEI T OU RAY Weitou THE QUEMOY AREA Motorable roads 10 N /1,T !CAL I LES 5 110 STATUTE ES 60103 A 80825 3 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169523 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169523 --TOP-SEGREZ I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Taiwan Strait Situation (as of 0100 EDT, 28 August)-. Intense artillery fire was delivered by Communist bat- teries against Tatan and Erhtan on 27 August resulting in the demolition of all observation posts and communications facili- ties. The shelling has the characteristics of a "softening up" operation. Chinese Nationalists on Tatan reported that the Com- munists were "aiming at our first line of defense," that personnel shelters had been destroyed and that there apparently was no cover for the troops. The commander of the Chinmen (Quemoy) Defense Command believes an attack on Tatan and Erhtan will occur between 29 and 31 August. The Nationalists on Chinmen planned a large scale counter-bombardment early on the even- ing of 27 August. On 26 and 27 August the Communists fired on Chinmen, concentrating on the airstrip. US officials in Taipei believe that the Communist intention with regard to the main island of Chin- men is primarily to interdict supply and communications. Propa- ganda leaflets fired at Chinmen on 26 August warned defenders "Chinmen is isolated." The Chinese Nationalists have lost an LCM to artillery fire. The vessel apparently was hit while unloading supplies at Liaolo Beach on the southern side of Chinmen. There has been no new information on the deployment of naval units into the Santa Bay area except for an indication that there may be more ships involved 28 Aug 58 --roia-sfefiE4' rokITI1 A I IkITIIIrkIr= I PTIKI 'Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169523 Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169523 -TOP SECRET Pt+ Piston fighter r3- Jet fighter 000Communist troop +Piston light bomber strength Jet light bomber rtnn Nationalist troop strength P+ Ground-attack SELECTED MAJOR AIRFIELDS LJGUST 19 Hengyang. 8 Ad 01 KONG A kow Wu ang Changchu 68,000 LIE IIENG /HAINAN *Canton CHENGHAI Swato � SOUTH CHINA SEA UNGCHI AOC& 80,00 Nanking uh � Hangchow Chuhsie+n. Fooch NAN 48L000 LUNGTI NINGPO LUCHIAO Wenchow " kt,st Ilk 4, 'Shanghai SANTU BAY el.-MATSU IS. 3,000 AN INGYANG � CHIANG QUEMOY Is 86,000 PESCADORES IS. 16,000 TAIWAN 331,000 CHOU SHAN I. EAST CHINA SEA ISTATUTE MILES 300 ,in8n6 80828 -1105L-SferiLET Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169523 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169523 4fierd The motor torpedo boats which participated in the actions near Chinmen on 24 and 25 August now are known to have moved undetected to Amoy from Shanghai about 2 August, suggesting that other undetected naval units could be in or near the Taiwan Strait area. Chinese Nationalist Attitudes: Chiang Kai-shek appeared obsessed with the danger of "creeping interdiction" of the National- ist supply lines to the offshore islands during a conversation with American officials on 26 August,,, Jle �,Vessed the threat posed by Communist use of motor torpedo boats (PT's), and intimated that the Nationalists would need help in keeping the lines to the islands open. Chiang said that if the Communists could keep up the pres- ent level of shelling, bombing, and sea action, the islands would soon be cut off, and the morale of the defending forces would be- come depressed to the point where seizure of Chinmen would be "no problem". Some Ministry of National Defense officials, however, are more optimistic than Chiang about the ability of the offshore islands to withstand interdiction. They believe that resupply can continue by conventional methods with air and sea support and with sLane losseN at least until the Communists establish full air superiority. They admit privately that stockpiles on both the Matsus and Chinmens are far in excess of MAAG authorization and records. Ranking Nationalist air force officers are reported pleased with the performance of their pilots in recent air actions. The engagement between eight F-86's and eight MIG 17's on 25 August resulted in the shooting down of two Communist planes with ap- parently no Nationalist lossee, Peiping Radio on 27 August continued to pick up comment on "US-Chiang"-instigated tension in the Taiwan Strait from bloc and Asian neutralist newspapers which only briefly report Chinese Communist "retaliation." References in bloc propaganda to Peiping's possible par- ticipation in international councils are increasing. A 26 August TOP SECRET 28 Aug 58 CENTRAL INTELL1GENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169523 +me% tel, di IMAM Li Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169523 Peiping broadcast, in referring to the West's recent offer for a nuclear test-ban agreement, quoted the Manchester Guardian's comment that France and Communist China are left out: "Where will the West place China?" In the past, Peiping has been virtually silent on its possible participation in a test-ban agree- ment. The official newspaper of the Polish Communist party, Trybuna Ludu commented on 27 August that Asian countries be- lieve it is "high time" for the US to recognize Communist China and addlit it to the United Nations. On the same day, Prime Min- ister Nehru stated that India would again raise the question in the UN of Communist China's admission. -TOP -SE 28 Aug 58 CFNTRAL INTELLIC4ENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169523 're% 1=1, ri irstrt Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169523 No, �41.01 USSR May Provide UAR With Late-Model Passenger Aircraft Moscow is now considering a request from the Egyptian civil airline, Misrair, for three IL 18 (Moskva) four-engine turboprop passenger aircraft and five IL-14 twin-engine piston transports. Soviet-Egyptian negotiations concerning the IL- 18's were first noted in February when three of these aircraft were listed among the Egyptian air requirements for 1958. An Egyptian Air Force mission went to Moscow in March to discuss the purchase. Just before Nasir's visit to the Soviet Union in May, Misrair considered purchasing TU-104 twin jet transports. Egyptian air officials, however, were not sufficiently impressed with the plane, and Nasir submitted an extremely low purchase offer which was refused. When the Soviet air chief, Marshal Rudenko, visited Cairo in July, he reportedly offered to provide late-model Soviet-built jet airliners to the UAR. Early in July, however, the Egyptians repeated their original request for the IL-18, and,on 25 August, Cairo notified Moscow that a delegation would arrive on 2 September apparently to conclude an agree- ment for the purchase of aircraft. At least eight IL-18's had been produced in the Soviet Union as of mid-May, and series production of the aircraft has begun. Moscow now has an estimated 30 IL-18's on, hand. In the past, the Soviet Union has offered to sell IL-18's to Czech- oslovakia and Austria--in the latter instance for less than $2,000,000 per plane. 28 Aug 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169523 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169523 Niamoo II. ASIA -AFRICA Lebanese Situation A meeting of Lebanese opposition leaders in Beirut on 25 August underscored their unwillingness and, perhapg, in- ability to make any meaningful move toward restoring normal economic conditions and security in the country. Affirming their "solidarity and unity of purposes" the leaders demanded that American forces withdraw immediately and the UN group also be withdrawn. They renewed a demand that the next cabinet be formed from opposition elements, and refused co- operation with any Chamoun supporters. The meeting, held under General Shihab's sponsorship and protection, was marked by the absence of extremist Moslem leader Adnan Hakim, whose Najjadah organization is believed to be carrying out the current wave of bombings and assassinations in Beirut. The break between Beirut rebel leader Saib Salam and Hakim has resulted in attempts by Salam to have Hakim arrested, General Shihab is said to be displeased with the refusal to end the general strike which has paralyzed the Lebanese econ- omy since last May. Rebel leaders Abdullah Yafil Salam, and Husayn Uwayni are credited with the tough stand taken at the meeting. The UAR meanwhile continues to provide material and financial support to the opposition. On 25 August UAR au- thorities in Syria gave their consent for the formation of "Popular Resistance" groups in southern Lebanon, "in prep- aration for usln them when necessary." Rebel leader Ma'ruf Sad in Sidon ordered that $84,000 be sent "to Beirut," apparent- ly to prop up opposition elements for continuance of the gen- eral strike. Cairo remitted $70,000 on 25 July, probably for the same purpose. On 11 August a Syrian military plane dropped propaganda leaflets in the Biqa Valley condemning the election of General Shihab and claiming that it was held under "foreign duress." --T-012-sEetEr 28 Aug 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169523 ^Tr Art Iry ri pro Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169523 '%w#0 Egyptian intelligence is said to be convinced that a new Lebanese revolution will break out as soon as it can be "proved" that General Shihab will follow a pro-Ameri- can policy. The new struggle, according to the report, will seek a quick victory by the nationalists over Shihab's "pro-West policy." It had been reported previously that the Egyptians, during Saudi Crown Prince Faysal's trip to Cairo, showed him "documents" on Shihab's unpopularity in Lebanon. This campaign to discredit Shihab may be in- tended as pressure on him for further concessions to the rebels. TOP SECRET 28 Aug 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169523 Approved for Release: 2026/01/23 C03169523 SEC11.0 Novo Moroccan Government Counters Threatened Violence The Moroccan Government is considering an expansion of the army and police forces within the next two months in or- der to cope with anticipated armed clashes between factions within the dominant Istiqlal party. Moderate Premier Ahmed Balafrej is expected to be replaced, perhaps by Abderrahim Bouabid, an able and energetic leader of the party's left wing. The prolonged cleavage within the party widened on 13 August with the suspension or expulsion from all party positions of three left-wing members of the party's political committee who failed to attend a political committee meeting. This dis- ciplinary action was later upheld by the party's executive com- mittee and approved by the King. The three members expelled are Mehdi ben Barka, act- ing secretary general of the Istiqlal party, a member of its ex- ecutive committee, and president of the Moroccan Consultative Assembly; Mahjoub ben Seddi, anti-American head of the Mor- occan labor union (UMT) and vice president of the Consultative Assembly; and Mohamed Basri, a leader of the irregular Mor- occan Army of Liberation. A resistance group headed by Basri and another controlled by party demagogue Allal el-Fassi, who Is reported to be attempting to obtain arms as rapidly as pos- sible, are the factions which may clash. Moderates within the party and government plan to re- organize the Moroccan labor union to weaken Ben Seddik's pos- ition. Earlier reports stated that Ben Seddik and former Min- ister of Labor Abdullah Ibrahim were about to form a labor party which they hope would attract the Istiqlal left wing. 28 Aug 58 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169523 Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169523 Now' III. THE WEST Serious Unrest Mounting in Panama There are indications that at least some segments of the Panamanian opposition now may be determined to attempt to oust President de la Guardia prior to the political crisis generally expected in October. Militant student groups are spearheading a campaign to weaken the unpopular National Guard, Panama's only armed force. The government is de- pendent for its existence on the continued loyalty of the Na- tional Guard, and� with its maneuverability thus limited, its current efforts to reach a compromise with the students seem unlikely to succeed. The stude,nts have been preparing for almost three months for the climax of their efforts which, if it does not come earlier, Is almost certain to occur in October when the National Assembly is expected to act on their demands. The students are armed and, in view of bitter racial and class tensions, particularly in Panama City's slums, dis- orders could get out of control and might spread into the Canal Zone. Although the students' main target is the National Guard, their grievances go much deeper. They bitterly resent the established social order, which involves control of the government by a small, thoroughly corrupt oligarchy. Ultranationalism is also an important element in the stu- dents' thinking, and they have been in'the forefront of the campaign for US concessions in the Canal Zone. The weak Communist party is attempting to exploit student grievances, and some Communists have become influential student lead- ers. SECRET- 28 Aug 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169523 Tr'rrtrMp7 A / Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169523 Nord THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Special Adviser to the President The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of the Interior The Secretary of the Interior Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director United States Information Agency The Director Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169523 / 4 ,f,s4 ,-, 4, 0-, 0.� 1 TOP SECRET- � 0-, 4, :0 �do 0..�, 0-f� �-,. 00 4� oy of, ,,.., 1 �-�, ,.., ey /7 00 0 � I $ I / �Teial-.7sEtRET-- #0 zezezw,��mm,Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169523,,ezzzzzdm j,,,. j