CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/11/24

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
03172674
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
U
Document Page Count: 
10
Document Creation Date: 
March 17, 2020
Document Release Date: 
March 26, 2020
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
November 24, 1960
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15798863].pdf510.19 KB
Body: 
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03172674 NNW ,z9/e 24 November 1960 Copy No. C 75 CENTRAL 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(cV INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN IHNIIIMMENT NO. 3/ Ma IINANCIE IN CLASS. PC o OCCLASSWILU KASS. L1j)1.11 TS S MIXT Ilt..VH.W AUT lUt un4 0 JUN 1983EVIEWElli --TOP-SECRET- ZApproved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03172671 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03172674 *We Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03172674 .,Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03172674 /1 I vwe' 24 NOVEMBER 1960 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Pravda editorial reiterating Soviet posi- tion indicates continuing inability to re- solve Sino-Soviet dispute. Incidents on Tibet-Sikkim border, alleg- edly involving sniping by Chinese troops, to further exacerbate Sino-Indian rela- tions, but probably not deliberately engi- neered by Peiping. Vietnamese Communists receive belated orders to exploit "advantageous" situa- tion in South Vietnam following the abor- tive 11 November coup against Diem. II. ASIA-AFRICA Situation in Laos. Thailand--Premier Sarit investigating wave of coup rumors. UAR--Unprecedented display of Syrian friendliness toward the US may reflect a desire for US economic aid. III. THE WEST 0 Appointment of new top French civil of- ficials in Algeria expected to stiffen rightist opposition there; civil "total disobedience" being planned. 0 Haiti--Student strike does not now threaten regime; drastic police action, however, could lead to widespread ri- oting. Bolivian President claims he will hand over presidency to vice president--a leftist labor leader--if US economic aid is not granted. �m_arl,r n i-t r Jr+ or+ Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03172674 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03172674 tits t.11- allit.,11G 1 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 24 November 1960 DAILY BRIEF VA I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR-China: In apparent reply to the 21 November Peoples Daily editorial which presented the familiar Chinese arguments in the Sino-Soviet dispute, Pravda on 23 November also editorialized on the declaration which followed the meeting of bloc leaders in 1957. It selected for emphasis, however, those aspects of the declaration�for example, on peaceful coexistence and the preventability of war= which correspond to present Soviet positions. This continuation of open discussion between the Soviet and Chinese parties while international Communist leaders are still meeting in Moscow indicates that they have been unable to resolve their disagreements and suggests that they have found it difficult to formulate a communique which will satisfy both parties. The mod- erate tone of the Pravda editorial, however, would appear to presage the probable nature of any communique which may result�one placing heaviest emphasis on the majority Soviet view but so worded that the Chinese can sign it and continue to claim that their views are valid. cNCommunist China - India: Relations between Peiping n ew Delhi will be further exacerbated by several re- ent incidents in which Indian soldiers were killed or wound= d on the Tibet-Sikkim border, allegedly by Chinese Com- unist snipers. Peiping has been pressing New Delhi for ubstantive border negotiations, and it seems unlikely that the incidents represent a premeditated effort by Peiping to precipitate new clashes with the Indians. Chinese troops are in the area, however, probably attempting to check the re-entry of Tibetan rebels gathered in Sikkim. New Delhi, apprehensive about its defense position in Sikkim, has re- cently augmented and alerted Indian troops in the area:1 11 TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C031726747 A A 'Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03172674 Ve4V10 North - South Vietnam: the Communists were slow to react to the 11 No- vember attempt against President Diem and still were not clear on some details nine days later, they indicate that the Communists now hope to capitalize on the post-coup situa- tion. North Vietnamese interpret the coup as symptomatic of the difficulties besetting Diem and the resulting situation as "very advantageous for us," call for political agitation to ex- ploit dissension in the South, and repeat orders for political assassination of "cruel individuals!' In addition help be given the escaping participants in the coup--some of whom may still be at large--in the hope that they might be useful in the Communist effort to create a united front of ele- ments dedicated to ousting Diem. IL ASIA-AFRICA *Laos: A mixed force of troops under the control of Souvanna Phouma and the Pathet Lao, consisting of more than six com- panies, is reported to be advancing along routes leading to Lu- ang Prabang. One column evidently departed from Muong Kassy on 23 November, followed by .a larger force on 24 November. Luang Prabang is some 55 miles distant from Muong Kassy, over difficult country, and an unopposed route march might re- quire three or four days. On 22 November mil- itary headquarters in Savannakhet ordered the pro-Phoumi force in Luang Prabang to organize the perimeter defenses of the town, including guerrilla activity in the surrounding vicinity. Also Phoumi- controlled forces were ordered to commence pressure operations against Vientiane. Souvanna Phouma, while denying to the American ambas- sador that he has actually given an order to attack Luang Prabang, has been active on other fronts. On 23 November he announced that within three or four days, the Soviet Union would begin airlifting food and gasoline to Vientiane via Hanoi. On the same day, his government made a formal request to the Amer- ican ambassador in Vientiane that the United States immediately cease all aid to General Phoumi's Savannakhet regime. 24 Nov 60 DAILY BRIEF ii TOP SECRET ii 0 0 ii 4Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO3172674' /-/ Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C0317674 **01 Souvanna is considering either an appeal for UN intervention or the return of the International Control Commission if the United States does not cease its support of Phoumi. the UK, as co-chairman of the 1954 Geneva truce conference, had previously objected to the return of the ICC on the grounds that the Laotian Gov- ernment was opposed; if Souvanna should now reverse this po- sition, the UK might find it difficult to continue its opposition. Hanoi and Peiping have seized on Vientiane's 16 November statement that it would seek closer ties with Hanoi and Peiping. North Vietnam on 19 November invited a Laotian delegation to visit Hanoi and discuss "cooperation and mutual aid" proposals. Souvanna Phouma's reply, agreed to "barter goods at our common frontier" but did not respond to Hanoi's invitation to send a delegation. An official Chinese Communist statement on 20 November "warmly wel- comed" the Vientiane statement on improving relations and said that Peiping "is prepared to take corresponding measures." Thailand: Many coup rumors, of varying plausibility, are again circulating in Bangkok. The possible participants in such a move and their motivations are by no means clear. Premier. Sarit, however, is reliably reported to be consider- ably concerned over the recent rash of reports and to be ac- tively investigating them. UAR: Syrian officials are displaying an attitude of friend- ly cooperation toward Americans unprecedented in recent years. The Syrians appear to be taking their lead from Syrian Execu- tive Council President Sarraj, whose recent show of warmth is in marked contrast to his previously hostile, anti-US behavior. Sarraj, now apparently undisputed boss of Syria, has assumed responsibility for reviving Syria's sagging economy and may 24 Nov 60 DAILY BRIEF z -TOP-SEGRE-T-- pproved for Release: 2020/03/13 C031726747 A 'Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03172674 i gar 11 *moo be counting heavily on American assistance. ILL THE WEST '41110 France-Algeria: Rightist opposition to De Gaulle's Al- � gerian policy will probably be further consolidated by his � appointment of the relatively liberal Louis Joxe as minister of Algerian affairs, and the selection of Jean Morin as new delegate general in Algeria. Morin is a tough administrator � apparently picked for his effectiveness in handling the prin- cipal area of rightist concentration in France. There are � Indications that the Front for French Algeria (FAF) is plan- ning "total disobedience" to paralyze all government services and force the army to take over in Algeria. The government is alert to this possibility as well as to reported plans of Gen- � eral Salan to return clandestinely to Algeria where FAF lead- ers are said to expect him to lead such activities. � Haiti: The regime does not appear immediately threat- ened by the student strike that led it to impose martial law �throughout Haiti on 22 November. However, drastic police action against the students, likely should there be public dem- onstrations, could cause a sudden swelling of antigovernment feeling and even widespread rioting threatening the govern- ment. President Duvalier's opponents are diverse and poorly organized, but the President is unpopular, particularly in the capital. The primary motivation for the strike is probably re- sentment over the President's refusal to free a student leader jailed without charges for some weeks. Bolivia: President Paz has told US Ambassador Strom he may hand over the presidency "this week" to Vice Pres- ident Juan Lechin--Bolivia's leftist labor leader who has of- ten displayed an anti-US attitude =if US aid to meet pressing economic problems is not granted. Paz' difficulties are in- tensified by a pronounced pro-Communist, leftist drift in re- cent months, widespread labor and peasant unrest, serious 24 Nov 60 DAILY BRIEF iv TOP SECRET ,Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03172674' VA A Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03172674 1 lir violence in the Department of Cochabamba this month, and increasing pressure on the bankrupt government to accept bloc offers of aid. Strom believes that Paz' position is grave- ly threatened. IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES (Available during the preceding week) Prospects for the Republic of Korea Over the Next Few Years: Likely Future of Chang Government and Leftward Trends, Economic Stability, and Foreign Policy, Especially Toward the US and Japan, Present and Future Status of Armed Forces. NIE 42.1-2-60. 22 November 1960. 24 Nov 60 DAILY BRIEF TOP SECRET AApproved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03172674v A Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03172674 CONUIDEN1.1AL *we' time THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Commandant, United States Marine Corps Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03172674 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03172674 TOP SECRET //// 0 i - ' / / / / / / / / I / / / / / / / / / / / / / / ,%/' / 7/ "/ /// /,, � , / TOP / / / / 3, , ; .�: ., .5 , ; vz 7),, ;f-A e/VZ Vid V SECRET te0rze jApproved for Release: 2020/03/13 C0317_26_74/W/Miernrnirtz,r, ,>'�.d