CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/02/18

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03172677
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: February 18, 1961

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18 February 1961 /4
Copy No.
CENTRAL
IYTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN'
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18 February 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Congo: Reprisals against whites in Kivu Province. (Page t)
2. UAR apparently preparing anti-US campaign. (Page
3. Ghana may ask Soviet assistance for Volta River
project. (Page it)
4. Angolan authorities ask Lisbon for arms; revolt in
Malan e area of northern Angola.
(Page ti)
5. King Savang will reaffirm Laotian neutrality in
broadcast on 19 February. (Page tti)
6. Demonstration against US - South Korean aid agree-
ment scheduled for 19 February in Seoul. (Page tit)
7. West Berlin officials skeptical on new East German
pass procedures. (Page tv)
8. Liberal ministers resign from Belgian cabinet. (Page iv)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
18 February 1961
DAILY BRIEF
Congo: Reprisals against whites apparently are increas-
ing in Kivu Province, where the administration was taken over
on 16 February. by Christophe Gbenye, who was minister of in-
terior in Lumumba's government and apparently served as the
premier's hatchetman. The international borders of Orientale
and Kivu provinces were closed at his order on 15 February,
however,
some European refugees are managing to get through to Ruanda-
Urundi. There are about 1,000 Belgians in Orientale and 400 in
Kivu, together with a few whites of other nationalities. A mem-
ber of Gizenga's "mission" in Cairo suggested
that Gizenga, through payments to Leopoldville
President Kamitatu, seek to iorm an "important nucleus of com-
batants." The representative also recommended that the Gizenga
group's representative in New York--who al_legedly has already
received $42,000 from Guinea's Sekou Toure�be furnished an
additional $28,000 for lobbying purposes. 1
Soviet delegate Morozov showed a completely
Inflexible attitude toward negotiations for a peaceful solution in
the Congo. He denied that there existed any, grounds for compro-
mise between what he termed "the forces of liberation" in Africa
and the "colonialists and their puppet regim7
(Backup, Page 1)
UAR: The UAR appears to be trying to counter Western
o
criticism of its activities on behalf of the Gizenga dissidents by -
initiating a campaign of accusations against the US. The UAR,-
controlled Middle East News Agency on 17 February stated that
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the UAR Foreign Ministry had asked Ambassador Reinhardt
to seek explanation from Washington of the "clear fallacies"
in statements attributed to Secretary Rusk on UAR interfer-
ence in the Congo. Foreign Minister Fawzi on the same day
stated that the UAR will soon "unmask" those who interfere.
Cairo radio on 16 February charged the US with "participat-
ing with Belgian imperialism" in spending thousands of dol-
lars on Mobutu.
The UAR Foreign Ministry,
asked its embassy in New Delhi to gather in-
formation on Ambassador Timberlake's alleged "spending of
money against Nehru's government" while serving in Bombay
in 1948-50
Ghana: Llikrumah's regime is reported to be so aroused
against the West that it has decided to issue a public state-
ment inviting the USSR to finance and supply technical as-
sistance for the huge Volta River power-aluminum project.
The report went so far as to state that the Nkrumah regime
would reieet arm further technieal aid from the United States
, it acquires some plausibility in
view of Nkrumah's highly emotional and anti-American ap-
proach to the Congo situation. Soviet President Brezhnev
now is in Ghana on a visit arranged on short notice as an
addendum to his state visit to Guinea. Nkrumah may make
some announcement on the Volta project during his sched-
uled appearance before the Ghanaian parliament on 21 Feb-
ruary. A Western consortium's negotiations concerning the
project now are in the final stages71
(Backup, Page-S)
Angola: Local authorities in Angola are requesting arms
to be distributed in case of need to isolated citizens or mili-
tia groups,
0
ir 4-)
LA Portuguese govern-
ment official in Lisbon states that the natives in the Malallg..�'
18 Feb 61
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area of northern Angola have been in revolt since 1 February
because of resentment over ill treatment by Belgian-Portu-
guese diamond and cotton combines which control the area,
and that troops recently flown to Angola from Portugal were
for use in this area rather than in Luanc,
the Angolan governor general suggests to
Lisbon that lournalists be prevented from coming to Angola
"by every possible means in view of the action which we may
be forced to take." (Backup,
Page 5) (Map)
Laos: laing Savang will make a broadcast on 19 February
reaffirming Laos' neutrality and appealing for internal unity
and noninterference from abroad, according to General Phou-
mi. Formal invitations to Burma, Cambodia, and possibly
Malaya to form a neutral nations commission in Laos will
either be contained in the King's speech or issued at a follow-
up press conference to be held on the same day by the Boun
Oum cabinet. General Phoumi's mission to Phnom Penh to
consult with Prince Sihanouk and to induce Souvanna Phouma
to return presumably will be undertaken within a few days of
the King's speech. Whether Souvanna can be persuaded to be-
come associated in any capacity with the Boun Oum government
is doubtftilD (Back-
up, Page 6) (Map)
South Korea: Growing domestic criticism of the recently
negotiated US - South Korean bilateral aid agreement is be-
coming a serious problem for the Chang Myon government.
Charges of American interference in South Korean internal
affairs are being fanned by the conservative opposition, left-
ist groups, nationalistic student elements, and some sections
of the press. Student opposition to the agreement appears to
be led by a small group which has sponsored public forum dis-
cussions on unification with the North and a neutralist solution
to Korea's difficulties. A large-scale student demonstration
18 Feb 61
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against the aid agreement is reportedly scheduled for 19 in Seoul. Such activities may improve the climate for
North Feb-
Korean overtures for the withdrawal of American troops
from the Smith and unifirmtion on terms favorable to Pyong-
yang. (Backup, Page 7)
Berlin: West Berlin government officials are taking a
skeptical view of the new, "simplified" procedures--announced
by the East Germans on 1.5 February--for the issuance of
passes to West Germans entering East Berlin. The officials
point out that while the new procedures mean less inconven-
ience for the individual, the East Germans are continuing to
exercise illegal controls over free movement within the city
and in effect to demonstrate sovereignty over East Berlin.
Mayor Brandt announced publicly on 16 February that any
pass requirement is incompatible with four-power .Berlin
agreements. The change in procedures was only a minor
technical concession in response to Bonn's insistence that the
East Germans fulfill their commitment to relax the intersec-
tor travel controls in return for Bonn's agreement on 29 De-
cember to reinstate its trade agreement with East Germany.
The West rn.ebineLmet on 16 February to consider the
situation.
Belgium: Resignation of the Liberal party ministers from
Premier. Eyskens' Social Christian (Catholic) - Liberal coali-
tion government appears to be a tactical move in preparation
for the national elections expected to take place on 26 March.
Eyskens' cabinet would have resigned next week in any case, but
by this move the Liberals may hope to avoid the onus of recent
developments in the Congo and thus enhance their electoral
prospects. The Liberals, who represent conservative busi-
ness interests, had demanded cuts in the social welfare serv-
ices as part of the government's recently enacted austerity
program, a move which would also have been embarrassing
18 Feb 61
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� to Eyskens and the Social Christian party, which includes a
large Catholic labor organization. Both the Social Chris-
tians and the Liberals are expected to make gains in the
elections at the expense of the Socialist party, which has
lost popular support as the result of the recent strike vio-
lence.
18 Feb 61
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Situation in the Congo
Anti-white disturbances have been reported in several
parts of the Congo, the most serious in Bukavu, capital of
Kivu Province. The degree to which Gizenga and his lieu-
tenants are involved is not clear. However, the closing of
the border suggests that Orientale and Kivu authorities wish
to maintain close control over Europeans either to use them
as hostages or to assure their continued presence to main-
tam key administrative and economic activities.
According to press reports, Anicet Kashamura, Gizenga's
pro-Communist lieutenant who had headed the Kivu adminis-
tration since December, has been removed from office and
sent back to Stanleyville. His successor, who apparently was
a close associate of Lumumba but has had little following of
his own, urged Gizenga 0' "play
the whole range of politics in order to retain the members
of parliament"--possibly a reference to dissension which
might occur among Kashamura's followers in Stanleyville.
In his 15 February outline of a plan of action, Gizenga's
associate in Cairo proposed that he travel from the UAR to
West Africa to investigate, among other things, the possi-
bility, of smuggling arms through former French Equatorial
Africa. He stated that by using a borrowed passport he
might be able to reach Leopoldville, where he could deliver
funds�possibly as much as $70,000�to the pro- Lumumba
provincial governor, who could use them to bribe the police,
the army, and the legislature. He added that Thomas Kanza,
who leads the Gizenga faction's "delegation" in New York,
needed additional funds for "corruption, boycott a ents
liaison agents, transportation of materials, etc."
an Leopoldville, UN representative Dayal on 15 Febru-
ary publicly blamed the United States Government for the
chaotic situation in the Congo. He charged that the United
States had failed to support the ouster of Belgians from Ka-
tanga, and he disparaged the quality of the American trans-
port aircraft�principally C-119s and C-47s--supplied to the
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Dayal reportedly has asked the UN in New York to
obtain a fleet of twelve C-130s to be used as airlift for a
standby "fire-brigade" battalion which would be moved to
trouble spotsj
Press reports indicate that Colonel Trinquier, the
French officer who reportedly had agreed to serve as chief
of the Katanga armed forces, was "persuaded" to turn down
the assionment at the last minute by official French pressure.
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Ghana's Neutralism Increasingly Favorable to Communist
World
GoLlthough the;e has been no change in Ghana's estab-
lished policy of "positive neutrality," the Nkrumah regime
has over the past 18 months moved away from exclusive
reliance on the West and become progressively more re-
ceptive. toward contacts and tactical collaboration with the
Sino- Soviet bloc. Since last summer this shift has accel-
erated greatly as a result of what Nkrumah and other top
Ghanaian leaders regard as Western�especially US�re-
sponsibility for the frustration of Accra's pro- Lumumba
Congo policy. Following the ousting from the Congo of
Ghana's chief diplomatic representative and the seating of
the Kasavubu delegation in the UN last November, Nkrumah
was reliably reported as being in a "rage" against the US,
which he then, for the first time, publicly accused of abet-
ting Belgian "attempts to regain control over the Congo."
A vitriolic, at times scurrilous, anti-American campaign
drawing heavily upon bloc propaganda materials was
launched by the government-controlled press and continued
at a high pitch until just prior to the inauguration of the new
US administration. At the same time, more extreme
Ghanaian leaders--such as labor chief John Tettegah--in-
stituted a policy of shunning contacts with American repre-
sentatives in Ghana.
Nkrumah, encouraged by influential leftist
officials in his own regime, has become increasingly re-
ceptive toward involvement with the bloc. Since last Au-
gust, Ghana has accepted a $40,000,000 Soviet economic
aid credit, purchased six Soviet IL-18 aircraft on favorable
terms, and entered other agreements providing for trade,
technical assistance, and cultural cooperation with the USSR
and some of its European satellites. In December a protocol
was signed with the USSR specifying a wide range of develop-
ment projects to be carried out by the Soviet Union over the
next several years. In addition, various plans for Soviet-
Ghanaian cooperation in the military field reportedly are also
under active consideration. As a result of these arrangements,
the number of Soviet technicians in Accra has already risen
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above 100 and more are expected as individual projects get
under way. That these expanded ties reflect a basically
softer attitude toward the USSR is strongly suggested by
such private Nkrumah statements as his recent assertion
that there is more "democracy" in the USSR than in any
other countr_yj
The recent announcement of Lumumba's death has again
provoked bitter and unrestrained denunciations of Western
"Imperialists" in Ghanaian newspapers, but at least initially
specific attacks were focused on Belgium, Hammarskj old,
and NATO with little reference to the US except for an un-
complimentary allusion to former President Eisenhower.
In fact, President Kennedy's and Ambassador Stevenson's ex-
pressions of regret were given greater prominence than Mos-
cow/
the other hand, Nkrumah did name the US as one of
Belgium's allies which "must answer questions" regarding
the arming of Lumumba's adversaries, and the US Embassy
was a principal target of the regime-sponsored demonstra-
tions in Accra on 15 February. On 16 February Nkrumah
presented Ambassador Russell with an aide-memoire taking
strong exception to President Kennedy's press conference
interpretation of the constitutional role of Congolese Presi-
dent Kasavubu. These developments may presage an early
revival of an all-out campaign against the US. However, the
aide-memoire and the related press announcement released
on 17 February were couched in essentially legalistic terms
and neither they nor the atmosphere of the ambassador's in-
terview with Nkrumah contained any hint of an impending
major shift in Ghana's aid policies such as would be involved
in the substitution of Soviet for Western aid in conneclion with
the $350,000,000 Volta project7
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190 200 300
STATUTE MILES
�4-.1. SELECTED RAILROADS
CABINDA
LUANDA
LOBITO
BENGUELA
UNCLASSIFIED
10218
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
MALANGE
A NGOLA
SOUTH WEST AFRICA
FEDERATION
OF RHODESIA
& NYASALAND
BECHUANALAND
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Situation in Angola
aerious disorders have been occurring in the Malange
administrative district of Angola since 1 February when
some 200 native rail workers went on strike,
subsequently natives attacked Portuguese patrols
in the area-4n one encounter 1,000 natives armed with
knives and spears showed no fear of Portuguese guns.
agitators from outside Angola were able
to exploit discontent among the natives by using witchcraft.
He added that "the ease with which the witch doctors dom-
inate the natives is extremely dangerous. Therefore we must
admit the possibility of terrorism breaking out in any part of
Angola." In the Malange district the populace reportedly be-
lieved absolutely that they would not have to work in the fu-
ture and "that the white man's arms shot water."
The official Portuguese policy of blaming Communist
groups rather than African nationalists for the Angolan dis-
orders
In recommending that journalists be
excluded, he said, "We are trying to avoid any analysis of
the racial and nationalist aspects in order to place emphasis
on the control of leftist international organizations and the
outside agitation."
ffliere is said to be a very strong feeling among the Por-
tuguese military that immediate steps must be taken to sat-
isfy "completely justified" grievances of the Malange natives
against Belgian-Portuguese commercial interests control-
ling the area, and some of them are described as willing to
back any responsible governmental authority or figure who
will ensure prompt action. They reportedly fear that failure
to act at once will have far-reaching political repercussions
in Portug.
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Situation in Laos
neral Phou 119 111 UL11.11111116 ragai own on
16 February plans for the King's speech and his own mis-
sion to Phnom Penh, stated that the question of reorganiza-
tion of the government had not yet been decided. Much ap-
parently depends on whether Souvanna agrees to participate
in an expanded government. Numerous politicians from var-
ious geographic regions of Laos stand ready to �participat_ej
aension between the French and Laotians arising from
the incident in Vientiane involving the AFP correspondent
who has been hiding out in the French Embassy appears to
be abating. Laotian troops which had surrounded the em-
bassy have been withdrawn, and Boun Oum has expressed re-
gret for this diplomatic impropriety. However, a new and
possibly more serious incident may develop at Seno military
base. In a follow-up to its "symbolic take-over" of Seno
earlier in the month by occupation of two vacant buildings,
the Laotian Government, through local military authorities,
has requested the French commander at Seno to yield cer-
tain other buildings. Paris has instructed the latter to re-
fuse a,nd to oppose force by force. Although expressing will-
ingness to negotiate with Laotian officials on differences
concerning the Sena base the French have stated they will
not do this under duress.
aiong Le - Pathet Lao forces defending the western
approaches to the Plaine des Jarres area reportedly have
forced the retreat of forward elements of the government
force inching its way along Route 7 a few miles from the
Phou Khoun crossroads. Enemy tactics still appear in gen-
eral to be defensive, but the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces
might exploit any significant local success to regain con-
trol of the junction with Route 183
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Opposition to South Korea - US Aid Agreement
(he April revolution generated national pride in South
Koreans, particularly among young people who expected a
quick improvement in their political and economic situation.
Although the ouster of Rhee improved United States - South
Korean understanding, the new nationalism is sensitive to
any alleged infringements on Korean. sovereignty. South
Koreans have been particularly sensitive over the adminis-
tration of the United States aid program and over the lack
of a status-of-forces agreement which would give them ju-
risdiction over off-duty American military personnel,
C-Much of the criticism by students, opposition legisla-
tors, and the press appears to be based on misinformation.
Ignoring the existing situation, one legislator has argued
that free import privileges for US aid mission personnel
would permit a flood of foreign luxury goods that could dis-
rupt the nation's economy. Another has speculated that a
secret annex to the agreement contains terms more disad-
vantageous than those made public. A leftist politician,
prominent in the most extreme overt political opposition,
has led the formation of a "joint struggle committee" to op-
pose the agreement. Although there is no evidence as yet
that student opponents of the agreement are Communist di-
rected, they are an obvious target for Communist subver-
sive efforts, particularly where, as in the present instance,
their activities can be disguised as nationalistic protests
ffIrime Minister. Chang has publicly expressed his con-
fidence that the legislators will agree there are no unfavor-
able aspects in the agreement once they fully understand the
situation. However, should public opposition to the aid agree-
ment continue to increase, Chang might become reluctant to
force the assembly to ratify it. Chang's party has a major-
ity, but many members are reluctant to support what they
feel to be an unpopular measure
Cance the revolution and the almost total demoralization
of the national police, any public agitation raises the pros-
pect that demonstrations will get out of hand. Although the
-CONFIDENTIAL
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police promptly dispersed a small group of students who as-
sembled in Seoul's Pagoda Park on 14 February to debate
the assistance agreement, it is questionable how effective
they would be against a large demonstraticz9
CONFIDENTIAL
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1 ZL,Li � L JttLi
Noe
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
The Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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