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August 14, 2020
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August 27, 2020
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February 18, 1961
PDF icon CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15815559].pdf963.23 KB
7., 4 Ad for Release. 2020/08/1 4. 7,/t7. WZ/Z7.7.7. 7 /7f 1 c:< , 2bff I r ac�rtm I volor 3.5(c) i 3.3(h)(2) 18 February 1961 /4 Copy No. CENTRAL IYTELLIGENCE BULLETIN' Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172677 lk Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172677 TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172677 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172677)0 Isor OCA...nr. 1 18 February 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1. Congo: Reprisals against whites in Kivu Province. (Page t) 2. UAR apparently preparing anti-US campaign. (Page 3. Ghana may ask Soviet assistance for Volta River project. (Page it) 4. Angolan authorities ask Lisbon for arms; revolt in Malan e area of northern Angola. (Page ti) 5. King Savang will reaffirm Laotian neutrality in broadcast on 19 February. (Page tti) 6. Demonstration against US - South Korean aid agree- ment scheduled for 19 February in Seoul. (Page tit) 7. West Berlin officials skeptical on new East German pass procedures. (Page tv) 8. Liberal ministers resign from Belgian cabinet. (Page iv) --T-t9P-sEcRETz Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172677 X Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172677s' %our anunc, NIS CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 18 February 1961 DAILY BRIEF Congo: Reprisals against whites apparently are increas- ing in Kivu Province, where the administration was taken over on 16 February. by Christophe Gbenye, who was minister of in- terior in Lumumba's government and apparently served as the premier's hatchetman. The international borders of Orientale and Kivu provinces were closed at his order on 15 February, however, some European refugees are managing to get through to Ruanda- Urundi. There are about 1,000 Belgians in Orientale and 400 in Kivu, together with a few whites of other nationalities. A mem- ber of Gizenga's "mission" in Cairo suggested that Gizenga, through payments to Leopoldville President Kamitatu, seek to iorm an "important nucleus of com- batants." The representative also recommended that the Gizenga group's representative in New York--who al_legedly has already received $42,000 from Guinea's Sekou Toure�be furnished an additional $28,000 for lobbying purposes. 1 Soviet delegate Morozov showed a completely Inflexible attitude toward negotiations for a peaceful solution in the Congo. He denied that there existed any, grounds for compro- mise between what he termed "the forces of liberation" in Africa and the "colonialists and their puppet regim7 (Backup, Page 1) UAR: The UAR appears to be trying to counter Western o criticism of its activities on behalf of the Gizenga dissidents by - initiating a campaign of accusations against the US. The UAR,- controlled Middle East News Agency on 17 February stated that - Approved Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172677 . , 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172677 , k 100 DCA.,11G i -NG s, N \ N N \\& the UAR Foreign Ministry had asked Ambassador Reinhardt to seek explanation from Washington of the "clear fallacies" in statements attributed to Secretary Rusk on UAR interfer- ence in the Congo. Foreign Minister Fawzi on the same day stated that the UAR will soon "unmask" those who interfere. Cairo radio on 16 February charged the US with "participat- ing with Belgian imperialism" in spending thousands of dol- lars on Mobutu. The UAR Foreign Ministry, asked its embassy in New Delhi to gather in- formation on Ambassador Timberlake's alleged "spending of money against Nehru's government" while serving in Bombay in 1948-50 Ghana: Llikrumah's regime is reported to be so aroused against the West that it has decided to issue a public state- ment inviting the USSR to finance and supply technical as- sistance for the huge Volta River power-aluminum project. The report went so far as to state that the Nkrumah regime would reieet arm further technieal aid from the United States , it acquires some plausibility in view of Nkrumah's highly emotional and anti-American ap- proach to the Congo situation. Soviet President Brezhnev now is in Ghana on a visit arranged on short notice as an addendum to his state visit to Guinea. Nkrumah may make some announcement on the Volta project during his sched- uled appearance before the Ghanaian parliament on 21 Feb- ruary. A Western consortium's negotiations concerning the project now are in the final stages71 (Backup, Page-S) Angola: Local authorities in Angola are requesting arms to be distributed in case of need to isolated citizens or mili- tia groups, 0 ir 4-) LA Portuguese govern- ment official in Lisbon states that the natives in the Malallg..�' 18 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF -T-eP-SEC-RE-T 11 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172677 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172677 Wefri�SECKET area of northern Angola have been in revolt since 1 February because of resentment over ill treatment by Belgian-Portu- guese diamond and cotton combines which control the area, and that troops recently flown to Angola from Portugal were for use in this area rather than in Luanc, the Angolan governor general suggests to Lisbon that lournalists be prevented from coming to Angola "by every possible means in view of the action which we may be forced to take." (Backup, Page 5) (Map) Laos: laing Savang will make a broadcast on 19 February reaffirming Laos' neutrality and appealing for internal unity and noninterference from abroad, according to General Phou- mi. Formal invitations to Burma, Cambodia, and possibly Malaya to form a neutral nations commission in Laos will either be contained in the King's speech or issued at a follow- up press conference to be held on the same day by the Boun Oum cabinet. General Phoumi's mission to Phnom Penh to consult with Prince Sihanouk and to induce Souvanna Phouma to return presumably will be undertaken within a few days of the King's speech. Whether Souvanna can be persuaded to be- come associated in any capacity with the Boun Oum government is doubtftilD (Back- up, Page 6) (Map) South Korea: Growing domestic criticism of the recently negotiated US - South Korean bilateral aid agreement is be- coming a serious problem for the Chang Myon government. Charges of American interference in South Korean internal affairs are being fanned by the conservative opposition, left- ist groups, nationalistic student elements, and some sections of the press. Student opposition to the agreement appears to be led by a small group which has sponsored public forum dis- cussions on unification with the North and a neutralist solution to Korea's difficulties. A large-scale student demonstration 18 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF iii TOP SECRET �VC-6 IS Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172677 \. Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172677 Voie against the aid agreement is reportedly scheduled for 19 in Seoul. Such activities may improve the climate for North Feb- Korean overtures for the withdrawal of American troops from the Smith and unifirmtion on terms favorable to Pyong- yang. (Backup, Page 7) Berlin: West Berlin government officials are taking a skeptical view of the new, "simplified" procedures--announced by the East Germans on 1.5 February--for the issuance of passes to West Germans entering East Berlin. The officials point out that while the new procedures mean less inconven- ience for the individual, the East Germans are continuing to exercise illegal controls over free movement within the city and in effect to demonstrate sovereignty over East Berlin. Mayor Brandt announced publicly on 16 February that any pass requirement is incompatible with four-power .Berlin agreements. The change in procedures was only a minor technical concession in response to Bonn's insistence that the East Germans fulfill their commitment to relax the intersec- tor travel controls in return for Bonn's agreement on 29 De- cember to reinstate its trade agreement with East Germany. The West rn.ebineLmet on 16 February to consider the situation. Belgium: Resignation of the Liberal party ministers from Premier. Eyskens' Social Christian (Catholic) - Liberal coali- tion government appears to be a tactical move in preparation for the national elections expected to take place on 26 March. Eyskens' cabinet would have resigned next week in any case, but by this move the Liberals may hope to avoid the onus of recent developments in the Congo and thus enhance their electoral prospects. The Liberals, who represent conservative busi- ness interests, had demanded cuts in the social welfare serv- ices as part of the government's recently enacted austerity program, a move which would also have been embarrassing 18 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF iv CRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172677 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172677 *twill Lir ant,ixn %of I. � to Eyskens and the Social Christian party, which includes a large Catholic labor organization. Both the Social Chris- tians and the Liberals are expected to make gains in the elections at the expense of the Socialist party, which has lost popular support as the result of the recent strike vio- lence. 18 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF TOP SECRET N ii Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172677 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172677 %IdI 'Jr IJL LItLj 1 IWO Situation in the Congo Anti-white disturbances have been reported in several parts of the Congo, the most serious in Bukavu, capital of Kivu Province. The degree to which Gizenga and his lieu- tenants are involved is not clear. However, the closing of the border suggests that Orientale and Kivu authorities wish to maintain close control over Europeans either to use them as hostages or to assure their continued presence to main- tam key administrative and economic activities. According to press reports, Anicet Kashamura, Gizenga's pro-Communist lieutenant who had headed the Kivu adminis- tration since December, has been removed from office and sent back to Stanleyville. His successor, who apparently was a close associate of Lumumba but has had little following of his own, urged Gizenga 0' "play the whole range of politics in order to retain the members of parliament"--possibly a reference to dissension which might occur among Kashamura's followers in Stanleyville. In his 15 February outline of a plan of action, Gizenga's associate in Cairo proposed that he travel from the UAR to West Africa to investigate, among other things, the possi- bility, of smuggling arms through former French Equatorial Africa. He stated that by using a borrowed passport he might be able to reach Leopoldville, where he could deliver funds�possibly as much as $70,000�to the pro- Lumumba provincial governor, who could use them to bribe the police, the army, and the legislature. He added that Thomas Kanza, who leads the Gizenga faction's "delegation" in New York, needed additional funds for "corruption, boycott a ents liaison agents, transportation of materials, etc." an Leopoldville, UN representative Dayal on 15 Febru- ary publicly blamed the United States Government for the chaotic situation in the Congo. He charged that the United States had failed to support the ouster of Belgians from Ka- tanga, and he disparaged the quality of the American trans- port aircraft�principally C-119s and C-47s--supplied to the TOP SECRET 18 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172677 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172677 las 1 lir 111104 Dayal reportedly has asked the UN in New York to obtain a fleet of twelve C-130s to be used as airlift for a standby "fire-brigade" battalion which would be moved to trouble spotsj Press reports indicate that Colonel Trinquier, the French officer who reportedly had agreed to serve as chief of the Katanga armed forces, was "persuaded" to turn down the assionment at the last minute by official French pressure. 18 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172677 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172677 %MO i-116�Tr1=11-2 '14111 Ghana's Neutralism Increasingly Favorable to Communist World GoLlthough the;e has been no change in Ghana's estab- lished policy of "positive neutrality," the Nkrumah regime has over the past 18 months moved away from exclusive reliance on the West and become progressively more re- ceptive. toward contacts and tactical collaboration with the Sino- Soviet bloc. Since last summer this shift has accel- erated greatly as a result of what Nkrumah and other top Ghanaian leaders regard as Western�especially US�re- sponsibility for the frustration of Accra's pro- Lumumba Congo policy. Following the ousting from the Congo of Ghana's chief diplomatic representative and the seating of the Kasavubu delegation in the UN last November, Nkrumah was reliably reported as being in a "rage" against the US, which he then, for the first time, publicly accused of abet- ting Belgian "attempts to regain control over the Congo." A vitriolic, at times scurrilous, anti-American campaign drawing heavily upon bloc propaganda materials was launched by the government-controlled press and continued at a high pitch until just prior to the inauguration of the new US administration. At the same time, more extreme Ghanaian leaders--such as labor chief John Tettegah--in- stituted a policy of shunning contacts with American repre- sentatives in Ghana. Nkrumah, encouraged by influential leftist officials in his own regime, has become increasingly re- ceptive toward involvement with the bloc. Since last Au- gust, Ghana has accepted a $40,000,000 Soviet economic aid credit, purchased six Soviet IL-18 aircraft on favorable terms, and entered other agreements providing for trade, technical assistance, and cultural cooperation with the USSR and some of its European satellites. In December a protocol was signed with the USSR specifying a wide range of develop- ment projects to be carried out by the Soviet Union over the next several years. In addition, various plans for Soviet- Ghanaian cooperation in the military field reportedly are also under active consideration. As a result of these arrangements, the number of Soviet technicians in Accra has already risen SECRET 18 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172677 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172677 quoi / vaS above 100 and more are expected as individual projects get under way. That these expanded ties reflect a basically softer attitude toward the USSR is strongly suggested by such private Nkrumah statements as his recent assertion that there is more "democracy" in the USSR than in any other countr_yj The recent announcement of Lumumba's death has again provoked bitter and unrestrained denunciations of Western "Imperialists" in Ghanaian newspapers, but at least initially specific attacks were focused on Belgium, Hammarskj old, and NATO with little reference to the US except for an un- complimentary allusion to former President Eisenhower. In fact, President Kennedy's and Ambassador Stevenson's ex- pressions of regret were given greater prominence than Mos- cow/ the other hand, Nkrumah did name the US as one of Belgium's allies which "must answer questions" regarding the arming of Lumumba's adversaries, and the US Embassy was a principal target of the regime-sponsored demonstra- tions in Accra on 15 February. On 16 February Nkrumah presented Ambassador Russell with an aide-memoire taking strong exception to President Kennedy's press conference interpretation of the constitutional role of Congolese Presi- dent Kasavubu. These developments may presage an early revival of an all-out campaign against the US. However, the aide-memoire and the related press announcement released on 17 February were couched in essentially legalistic terms and neither they nor the atmosphere of the ambassador's in- terview with Nkrumah contained any hint of an impending major shift in Ghana's aid policies such as would be involved in the substitution of Soviet for Western aid in conneclion with the $350,000,000 Volta project7 --SECRE-F 18 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172677 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172677 190 200 300 STATUTE MILES �4-.1. SELECTED RAILROADS CABINDA LUANDA LOBITO BENGUELA UNCLASSIFIED 10218 REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO MALANGE A NGOLA SOUTH WEST AFRICA FEDERATION OF RHODESIA & NYASALAND BECHUANALAND 18 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172677 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172677 01-.A.,1�.La 1 NNW Situation in Angola aerious disorders have been occurring in the Malange administrative district of Angola since 1 February when some 200 native rail workers went on strike, subsequently natives attacked Portuguese patrols in the area-4n one encounter 1,000 natives armed with knives and spears showed no fear of Portuguese guns. agitators from outside Angola were able to exploit discontent among the natives by using witchcraft. He added that "the ease with which the witch doctors dom- inate the natives is extremely dangerous. Therefore we must admit the possibility of terrorism breaking out in any part of Angola." In the Malange district the populace reportedly be- lieved absolutely that they would not have to work in the fu- ture and "that the white man's arms shot water." The official Portuguese policy of blaming Communist groups rather than African nationalists for the Angolan dis- orders In recommending that journalists be excluded, he said, "We are trying to avoid any analysis of the racial and nationalist aspects in order to place emphasis on the control of leftist international organizations and the outside agitation." ffliere is said to be a very strong feeling among the Por- tuguese military that immediate steps must be taken to sat- isfy "completely justified" grievances of the Malange natives against Belgian-Portuguese commercial interests control- ling the area, and some of them are described as willing to back any responsible governmental authority or figure who will ensure prompt action. They reportedly fear that failure to act at once will have far-reaching political repercussions in Portug. It)P-SECRE-T 18 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172677 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172677 gam' r P N 0 , BM IV* ,I.r.t... : . L. ( Men Pa gig" A -4__ '8 ,,AIIII6 4 / / N.. � . -r,, _ J % ( N A M T NIA ,./.. t i ,.., ) ,/ "."'7`1;'�'�........' 4 ' - L1..) A N G \ hi ABANG \ 1 d Miami Nan. etiong eediantiolt si Government forces Governimmt Antigovernment Antigovernment concentrations 111 Kong Le/Pathet Lao forces Main route number - Trail A Chinese Nationalist Irregulars 25 50 7.5 100 Miles ' 0 25 50 75 100 Kllameters se 26716.1 5-58 C�0 eine 6.../ CAMBODIA &aided. tic/roam., an sot ntot.twily tkna ...Kap.,!�;i by On US. eSeing Treng P /40)1 RON jECOE ICE BOO DEMARCATION LINE haPe 18 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172677 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172677 Situation in Laos neral Phou 119 111 UL11.11111116 ragai own on 16 February plans for the King's speech and his own mis- sion to Phnom Penh, stated that the question of reorganiza- tion of the government had not yet been decided. Much ap- parently depends on whether Souvanna agrees to participate in an expanded government. Numerous politicians from var- ious geographic regions of Laos stand ready to �participat_ej aension between the French and Laotians arising from the incident in Vientiane involving the AFP correspondent who has been hiding out in the French Embassy appears to be abating. Laotian troops which had surrounded the em- bassy have been withdrawn, and Boun Oum has expressed re- gret for this diplomatic impropriety. However, a new and possibly more serious incident may develop at Seno military base. In a follow-up to its "symbolic take-over" of Seno earlier in the month by occupation of two vacant buildings, the Laotian Government, through local military authorities, has requested the French commander at Seno to yield cer- tain other buildings. Paris has instructed the latter to re- fuse a,nd to oppose force by force. Although expressing will- ingness to negotiate with Laotian officials on differences concerning the Sena base the French have stated they will not do this under duress. aiong Le - Pathet Lao forces defending the western approaches to the Plaine des Jarres area reportedly have forced the retreat of forward elements of the government force inching its way along Route 7 a few miles from the Phou Khoun crossroads. Enemy tactics still appear in gen- eral to be defensive, but the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces might exploit any significant local success to regain con- trol of the junction with Route 183 SECRET 18 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172677 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172677 NNW L&J1Vr1LJL41N 1 I I-I L. Opposition to South Korea - US Aid Agreement (he April revolution generated national pride in South Koreans, particularly among young people who expected a quick improvement in their political and economic situation. Although the ouster of Rhee improved United States - South Korean understanding, the new nationalism is sensitive to any alleged infringements on Korean. sovereignty. South Koreans have been particularly sensitive over the adminis- tration of the United States aid program and over the lack of a status-of-forces agreement which would give them ju- risdiction over off-duty American military personnel, C-Much of the criticism by students, opposition legisla- tors, and the press appears to be based on misinformation. Ignoring the existing situation, one legislator has argued that free import privileges for US aid mission personnel would permit a flood of foreign luxury goods that could dis- rupt the nation's economy. Another has speculated that a secret annex to the agreement contains terms more disad- vantageous than those made public. A leftist politician, prominent in the most extreme overt political opposition, has led the formation of a "joint struggle committee" to op- pose the agreement. Although there is no evidence as yet that student opponents of the agreement are Communist di- rected, they are an obvious target for Communist subver- sive efforts, particularly where, as in the present instance, their activities can be disguised as nationalistic protests ffIrime Minister. Chang has publicly expressed his con- fidence that the legislators will agree there are no unfavor- able aspects in the agreement once they fully understand the situation. However, should public opposition to the aid agree- ment continue to increase, Chang might become reluctant to force the assembly to ratify it. Chang's party has a major- ity, but many members are reluctant to support what they feel to be an unpopular measure Cance the revolution and the almost total demoralization of the national police, any public agitation raises the pros- pect that demonstrations will get out of hand. Although the -CONFIDENTIAL 18 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172677 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172677 t...t.J11fr 1 LIZA vino police promptly dispersed a small group of students who as- sembled in Seoul's Pagoda Park on 14 February to debate the assistance agreement, it is questionable how effective they would be against a large demonstraticz9 CONFIDENTIAL 18 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172677 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172677 1 ZL,Li � L JttLi Noe THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor The Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director CONFIDENTIAL Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172677 ;74, 'Zit I �31q