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February 25, 1961
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Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172678 3.5(c) acunzi 3.3(h)(2) 25 February 1961 Copy No. C CENTRAL 6c1 INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172678 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172678 IuIJ bILUKt. I Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172678 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172678' 1 WU OIL fk...1 IL I- 25 February 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1. West Germany: Opposition in Adenauer's own party to Brentano's agreement in Washington to increase Bonn's foreign aid program. (Page t) 2. Congo: Military operations continue on three fronts. ('Page) 3. Laos: Peiping nrpscuas Minna fn reject neutral nations proposal. (Page tt) 4. France-Algeria: Algerian rebels publicly endorse De Gaulle - Bourguiba meeting. (Page tit) 5. Rhodesia: Prime Minister Welensky will probably avoid defin- itive break with Britain. (Page VW 6. Israel: Ben Gurion's Mapai party will probably be forced to call for new elections. (Page tit) 7. Britain: London taking its most vigorous stand since 1958 against East-West trade controls. (Page tv) 8. Brazil: Quadros' policy of closer relations with Sino-Soviet bloc arouses controversy within Brazil, especially among the military. (Page t TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172678 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172678 pti N CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 25 February 1961 DAILY BRIEF West Germany:COpposition has been voiced in Chancellor Adena,uer's Christian Democratic party (CDU) to the chancellor's willingness to accommodate the US with respect to Bonn's as- suming a greater share of Western financial burdens. Following his briefing of a CDU caucus upon his return from Washington Foreign Minister von Brentano reportedly was bitterly attacked for his offer of aid to underdeveloped areas, which he made on 17 February. both Economics Minister Erhard and Finance Minister Etzel in "nasty and ironic tones" challenged Brentano's authority to make such an offer and claimed that Bonn would be unable to impose the re- 6 k, quired taxes for a billion-dollar aid program. Erhard stated that his one-shot offer on 6 February in reply to US demands was still "fair and final." While Erhard'S position reflects his cautious anti-inflationary economic views, he is probably using the issue also to reassert his ambition to succeed Adenauer despite the Chancellor's well-known aversion to him in that role. Adenauer, who was not at the caucus, com- missioned the Brentano visit, and has assigned future nego- tiations to Brentano's Foreign Ministry rather than to Erhard's Economics Ministry. Although mindful of the need for party unity in an election year, Adenauer will probably be able to over- come party opposition on this issue. The opposition Socialists are reported favorable to the US position and are not planning to attack Adenauer in the campaign this su7mpr fnr rAaehincr such an economic agreement with the US,D (Backup, Page 1) *Congo: Mobutu troops in plain clothes have appeared in Ruanda.-Urundi. Their purpose allegedly is to buy off one of the garrisons now controlled by by Gizenga across the Congo border in Bukavu and TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172678 41104 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172678 Brazzaville SUDAN 390 Luanda Atlantic Ocean RepubIicof the Congo TUNISIA 2,600 MALAY 6 MO TU 14,00 MOROCCO 0 31594 10225 IN DON �Gemena Coquilhatvillq Approximate area controlled by: Kasavubu-Mobutu Gizenga Kalonji Ishombe United Nations Forces - Selected road Selected railroad Selected airfield X Cut railroad STATUTLE MILES 00 Luputa ETHIOPIA oke Albert Us urn bur-a Francqui GHANA 1.900 Luluabourg Bak 400 Basoko IRELAND 655 Albertville NIGERIA SWEDE 680 TSHO 4,0 hville 25 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172678 \ Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172678 1 tir LI1Nwie thus reassert central wove nment authority in Kivu Province. this operation has a better chance of succeeding than did Mobutu's abortive attempt on 1 January, also from Ruanda-Urundi, to take over the province. Belgium, Which administers Ruanda-Urundi as a UN trust territory, would be open to further severe censure, should the operation take place. In addition, the widespread belief that Mobutu is operating under Belgian influence would be reinforced. Eishombe's government, virtually disregarding its 22 Febru- ary agreement with the UN to freeze its troop movements, re- portedly is continuing a two-pronged drive against Manono, capi- tal of the dissident "Lualaba state," Katanga officials are claim- ing that the agreement covers only relations between UN and Katanga forces; however, the ICatangan officer commanding one of the advancing forces reportedly told the leader of a Nigerian UN patrol that he has orders to continue into Manono despite any Nigerian resistance. Civilian UN officials in Elisabethville believe that serious clashes with Katanga forces are likely to occur and have asked headquarters in Leopoldville for reinorce- ments Confused reports from northern Kasai Province indicate that a force of pro-Gizenga troops is moving toward the provincial capital of Luluabourg and may have entered the city. This prob- ably is part of the Gizengist incursion of the area which began late in January. There is no information concerning the size or effectiveness of the force which Ghanaian UN troops have been ordered to halt. this force is at least partly responsive to Gi- zenga's orders; however, this control probably is tenuous. (Backup, Page 3) *Laos: Peiping is bringing pressure to bear on Burma to reject King Savang's proposal for a neutral nations commission Aa-L-e--4--r-1-1 in Laos, Corn- 1?:5 /,.1. s- munist China's vice minister of fnrPicen affairc e emphasized ,t_ cae_ 25 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF ii TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172678 "proved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172678 - i JIA.3c1, Peiping% strong objections to the neutral nations commission and asked that the Chinese position be conveyed to Rangoon as soon as possible. He added that Chou-En-lai was writing a letter to the Burmese prime minister on the subject. ) (Backup, Page 5) France-Algeria: Both De Gaulle and Tunisian President Bourguiba probably believe that their forthcoming meeting on 27 February will lead to direct negotiations between De Gaulle and Premier Ferhat Abbas of the Provisional Algerian Govern- ment (PAG). The PAG in Tunis has now publicly endorsed the De Gaulle - Bourguiba meeting and reportedly has authorized Bourguiba to make preliminary soundings on matters of sub- stance. (Backup, Page 7) Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Unless racial violence erupts and inflames settler emotions, Prime Minister Welensky of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland will probably avoid at this time a definitive break with Britain over the issue of sharply increased African influence in Northern Rhodesia's government. Welensky, who is an exponent of continued white control of the Federation, has already mobi- lized non-African troops, instituted strict control of foreign exchange and summoned the Federation's parliament in an emergency session; meanwhile, police leaves have been can- celed in Southern Rhodesia, On 27 February he plans to present in parliament a motion empowering his government "to resist by every means" any attempt by London to take political power in Northern Rhodesia out of the hands of "responsible people." At present, white settlers hold a major- ity of the elective seats in the legislature but are subject,to the control of the British governor. Israel: The refusal of the National Religious party to join anew government under Ben-Gurion will probably force the Mapai party to call for new elections. Mapai leaders have decided that they would rather face that alternative than accede 25 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF iii TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172678 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172678 we I �../.1 J La-1- N N Ii to the demands of other former coalition partners to replace Ben-Gurion as leader of a new coalition. Adverse public reaction to the prolonged party crisis over the Lavon affair has made most Mapai leaders fearful of losing votes in an Plertinn at thic timp elections. I3en-Gurion is not averse to early (Backup, Page 9) Britain:LAt the annual review meetings of COCOM (Co- ordinating Committee for East-West trade) currently being held in Paris, London is taking its most vigorous stand since 1958 and is insisting that controls not be aimed at the economic base of the bloc but limited to "specifically strategic" materials and equipment. The Macmillan government has long questioned the effectiveness of the control system in impeding the USSR's military and technological advance and now apparently wishes to expand bloc trade both as part of its current export drive and as a means of imr7oving relations with the bloa-.3 (Backup, Page 10) Brazil: President Janio Quadros' policy of closer relations with the Sino-Soviet bloc is arousing controversy within Brazil, particularly among the military. Armed forces officers are reported cold toward renewal of diplomatic relations, although apparently not averse to increased trade. The Foreign Ministry nevertheless announced on 23 February that Brazil will establish relations with Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria. Although the Quadros administration has promised to support inclusion of the Chinese representation question on the UN General Assembly agenda at the next session, it has announced that the decision on whether Brazil will support ing Communist China to the UN will be made later. (Backup, Page 11) 25 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF iv 70P-SEERE-T 0/1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172678 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172678 NIS Sharp Differences in Bonn Over Brentano Aid Offer Cm the absence of Adenauer a meeting of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) members on 21 February greeted Foreign Minister von Brentano's account of his financial talks in Washington coolly and with only perfunctory applause in contrast to the "thunderous applause" following the attack on him by Erhard and Etzel. Brentano reportedly left the meeting visibly shakenD (-Erhard bitterly attacked Brentano's talks in Washington committing West Germany to a continuing annual aid program featuring substantial budgetary appropriations. He argued that while German capital would be devoted to aid to develop- ing countries, foreign capital, including American, would flow into German investments, and that American financial difficulties would accordingly worsen:3 [-Finance Minister Etzel said that an aid program on the scale envisioned by Brentano would mean a 16-percent tax Increase, which he implied the Bundestag would never accept. Etzel added that no one should tell him that political consid- erations were overriding because in his opinion the prime political issue for Bonn was West Germany's economic sta- bility3 [Erhard may believe that he has sufficient backing in the party to challenge Adenauer's authority on this issue and thus strengthen his chances of becoming the next chancellor. The breach between Erhard and Adenauer has never been healed since their quarrel in the spring of 1959 when Ade- nauer successfully opposed Erhard's choice by the party lead- ers. Last month an attempt was made to patch the quarrel and ensure party solidarity by naming both Adenauer and Erhard as a "team" to lead the campaign for the national elec- tion which will probably take place in September:3 {The chancellor can probably bring the opponents within his party into line, and may do so in a manner that will once more make a point of Erhard's political ineptness. He will be aided by the reported willingness of the opposition 80cial-3 25 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172678 ilproved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172678 *1�04 iDemocratic party (SPD) to avoid exploiting this issue in the election campaign--even if a tax increase becomes necessary. The top SPD leaders believe that the 6 February Bonn offer to help relieve US balance of payment difficulties by prepay- ment of debts and advance deposits for armament purchases is clearly, insufficient and that West Germany must eventually accede to the American requestED, SECRET 25 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172678 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172678 ur Situation in the Congo Mobutu's plan in his Ruanda-Urundi operation apparently Is to subvert the forces in Bukavu directly subordinate to the Kivu provincial government, who reportedly have not been paid as a result of that government's bankruptcy, and turn them against a garrison of Stanleyville troops, which is also located at Bukavu. He apparently is attempting to take ad- vantage of the almost complete anarchy in Kivu which has resulted from the struggle for power among local politicians, most of whom claim the allegiance of some of the Congolese forces in the area. The chaotic situation in the province apparently has led Anicet ICashamura, head of the provincial government since late December and a long-time associate of Lumumba and Gizenga, to send an emissary to the UN, claiming he wishes to align himself with Leopoldville against Gizenga. Kashamura, whom Stanleyville has recently been trying to bring back under control, reportedly has asked the Belgians in uanda-Urundi 7 to defend his borders against Gizenga forces. Gizenga stated that he was accrediting "ambassadors" to the United States or Canada, the UAR, Communist China, and Poland. peiping and Warsaw, naming his envoys and asking those countries to reciprocate as soon as possible. All bloc countries have expressed support for the Stanleyville regime, but, with the exception of Peiping, none has yet officially expressed an intention to exchange ambas- sadors. Gizenga also expressed his re- gime's opposition to the 21 February Security Council resolution which broadened the UN Congo force's mandate. He told his representative, "In no case can we accept the trusteeship of the UN. Our soldiers have resolved that whatever they are faced 25 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172678 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172678-w j1 *�. WI 0E4 �...4 %Li with they will never drop the r rifles while they have bullets left." 25 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172678 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172678 1 Ur OLL.PIE. Situation in Laos 1While Burma has not yet declared itself on Laos' invita- tion to serve on a neutral nations commission, the Burmese Foreign Ministry reportedly has prepared a memorandum recommending that the government decline. The memoran- dum points out that the situation in Laos is extremely com- plicated, and that the proposal does not go far enough in that it is merely of a fact-finding nature and does not provide for recommendations of courses of action-3 iGromyko's discussion in Moscow provides a further indication that the Communist bloc leaders feel the proposal for a neutral nations commission for Laos may have undercut their own position and, if implemented, would prevent Communist par- ticipation in any settlement. Gromyko insisted that the solu- tion to the Laotian problem lay in adherence to established agreements and procedures and that the proposal was an at- tempt by the US to circumvent the Geneva agreements. He observed that one of the US objectives was to eliminate Polancg According to Hanoi radio, Souvanna Phouma told a press conference held somewhere in Xieng Khouang Province on 24 February that he considered an international conference along the lines of Premier Sihanouk's 14-nation proposal to be the best way to settle the crisis in Laos. Souvanna is also quoted as saying that he doubted the "Laotian people and the Pathet Lao forces can accept the broadening of the Vientiane (Boun Oum) government. If there is any broadening, that can only be a broadening,with collaboration of the Pathet Lao forces, of the government which I have set up." During the past two weeks several International Control Commission (ICC) courier flights to Hanoi have been turned back by North Vietnamese authorities for various reasons, usually on the excuse of "bad weather," according to members of the Canadian delegation to the ICC. In the most recent instance, however, the flight was turned back five minutes -TOP-SECRET 25 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172678 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172678s I NJ I hal-1%o I tLJ I out of Hanoi because the airport was "too crowded." this development is related to the con- tinuing Soviet airlift to Laos through the Hanoi airport. rAirlift operations into Laos were carried out on 21 and 22 February but were apparently canceled on 23 February, nossiblv because of adverse weather TOP SECRET 25 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172678 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172678 IL! Lail I I P1 1..1 De Gaulle - Bourguiba Meeting Before setting a date for the meeting between De Gaulle and Bourguiba both sides took extensive soundings to assure that some tangible gains would result. Tunisian Secretary of State for Information Mohamed Masmoudi, who arranged the meeting, reportedly came away from personal sessions with De Gaulle convinced of his sincerity in desiring to negotiate a settlement. Masmoudi also probed French opinion in private talks with figures outside of the government. French civilian and military working groups in Paris have reportedly subse- quently completed plans for cease-fire arrangements and for self-determination. De Gaulle is reported willing to bring im- prisoned rebel vice premier Ben Bella to Paris at the time of the Bourguiba visit, and may halt the execution of Moslem terrorists. In Tunis, the rebel Provisional Algerian Government (PAG) at first appeared distrustful of Bourguiba's intentions, and was irritated that he had announced acceptance of De Gaulle's invitation without consulting them. On 17 February, however, Masmoudi told a US official the PAG had come to full agreement that Bourguiba should meet with De Gaulle in the interests of bringing about direct negotiations. An officer of the PAG who confirmed this position to the US Embassy in Tunis on 23 February declared that Masmoudi had promised that Bourguiba would not meet with De Gaulle until Paris had demonstrated willingness to make substantive progress toward an Algerian solution. The same day an edi- torial in El Mou ahid, the official organ of the rebel movement, praised Bourguiba for "making incessant efforts to re-estab- lish peace." The rebel leaders probably would not risk adverse reac- tions in Morocco and the UAR to such an endorsement without reasonable certainty that Bourguiba's visit will produce results. Bourguiba himself in a 23 February radio address, said that the fact De Gaulle invited him for exploratory talks indicates that "the obstacles which blocked direct peace negotiations in the past have been surmounted." In Algeria, military operations by both sides have recently been intensified. Rebel losses are increasing, since the French CONFIDENTIAL 25 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172678 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172678 �e17/TTTETE111 1 IA L units withdrawn from the fighting areas to keep order in the cities during the December riots and the January referendum are returning to action. French official sources claim nearly 600 rebels were put out of action during the week of 18 Febru- ary, as opposed to an average of 380 a week in January. In his farewell order on 13 February, former Commander in Chief in Algeria General Crepin asserted that rebel terrorist acts had dropped to 15 a day instead of the 1960 average of 30 a day. The American consul general in Algiers comments, however, that the average citizen is hardly aware of the difference, and that an undercurrent of fear and violence persists along the fringes of the large cities. Reports continue that European ex- tremists plan "one last mighty effort" of spectacular terrorism to coincide with any annomeemPlit that French-PAG negotiations are to begin. CONFIDENTIAL 25 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172678 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172678 Ninv WIN!' ILJZi i %101 Coalition Problems May Force Elections in Israel The Lavon affair has been primarily an intra-Mapai con- troversy over former Defense Minister Pinhas Lavon's alleged responsibility for an abortive clandestine operation in 1954 aimed at disrupting Egyptian-American relations. A personal struggle developed between Ben-Gurion and Lavon, himself a power within the Mapai, when Lavon last year publicly implied that he had been framed by proteges of Ben-Gurion in the De- fense Ministry during an investigation of the operation which subsequently forced Lavon out of the cabinet. On the basis of new evidence, a cabinet committee ex- onerated Lavon last December; the committee's procedures and findings were severely criticized by Ben-Gurion. After his Mapai colleagues refused to submit to his demand for La- von's expulsion from the party, the prime minister forced the issue by resigning on 31 January. This prompted the party's central committee to give Ben-Gurion a vote of confidence by forcing Lavon out of his position as secretary general of the powerful Histadrut labor federation. Ben-Gurion then agreed to form a new coalition. The Maparn, Achdut-Haa,voda and Progressive parties, stung by criticism of the cabinet committee which exonerated Lavon, have already announced that they will not again par- ticipate in a government led by Ben-Gurion. The National Religious party's refusal, by a one-vote margin, to partici- pate leaves only. the Religious Workers' party willing to join Mapai. However, its 3 seats, together with the 52 controlled by Mapai, are not sufficient to provide a majority in the 120- seat Knesset. It is theoretically possible that a government could be formed without Mapai, but nearly all of the other parties are now calling for elections. 25 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172678 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172678 A- (MCA N I Leila Britain's Position on Controls on Bloc Trade a'he Coordinating Committee--composed of Japan and all NATO members but Iceland�is scheduled to begin its third and final round in the 1961 review of trade controls on 2 March. In recent sessions British delegates have argued that the "spe- cifically strategic" criterion was formally adopted at the 1958 COCOM meeting, where Britain succeeded in obtaining a major reduction of trade controls. They point to the growth of Soviet economic and technological expansion in the ten years since COCOM was established as evidence of the futility of restrict- ing trade for other than strictly strategic reasong:3 Lagging exports and the prospect of further difficulties with developments that may hurt British trade, such as the further consolidation of the Common Market and the disturb- ances in Africa, have led a small but growing section of the business community to look toward the bloc for an expansion of trade. Bloc trade figures last year have probably reinforced this view. While bloc trade is only about three percent of Britain's total trade, British exports both to the USSR and to Communist China in lgfin urprin me than double those of 19597 CONFIDENTIAL 25 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 10 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172678 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172678 1000 13razilian President's Foreign Policy Arouses Opposition Among Military Unrest within the military over the Quadros administra- tion's plans to expand diplomatic relations with the Sino-Soviet bloc uarlos Laceraa, the newly elected governor of Guana- bara, is also reported uneasy over recent Quadros moves toward the Sino-Soviet bloc. The new administration's changes in assignments of high-ranking military officers are adding to military restlessness but the stability of the regime does not now appear threatened. Brazil now has missions in Czechoslovakia and Poland. In addition to the planned diplomatic relations with three So- viet satellites, Quadros is apparently considering renewing relations with the USSR and possibly establishing them with Communist China. An East German press service reported on 20 February that Quadros in a telegram to East German party boss Ulbricht had expressed the wish "that relations be- tween our two states may grow. closer. . . ." There is no indi- cation that Brazilian - East German relations are now under serious consideration, although Foreign Minister Arinos stated in accepting his cabinet post on 31 January that Brazil intends "to establish diplomatic and commercial relations with all states of the world that desire pacific interchange with us." Quadros' speed in announcing steps to expand diplomatic relations with the bloc is probably intended primarily to con- ciliate leftist-nationalist groups, which generally opposed Quadros' election. A widespread Brazilian belief in the coun- try's growing importance in world affairs is also a factor. Quadros probably hopes that an attitude of "independence" in world affairs will win good will from leftist circles that are likely to protest the severe economic measures implied in his ion of Brazil's financial situation as "terrible." -SEeRter 25 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 11 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172678 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172678 1,..v1vr 'Linn! 1 I - L NV0 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor The Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director CONFIDENTIAL Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172678 / --TOP SECRET- / / / / / / / / / 4,7 /47 ,P :0, ''z 7z, r, 7 TO-P-S-ECRET' Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172678