CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/02/25

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03172678
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: February 25, 1961

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acunzi
3.3(h)(2)
25 February 1961
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
6c1
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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25 February 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. West Germany: Opposition in Adenauer's own party to
Brentano's agreement in Washington to increase Bonn's
foreign aid program. (Page t)
2. Congo: Military operations continue on three fronts.
('Page)
3. Laos: Peiping nrpscuas Minna fn reject neutral nations
proposal. (Page tt)
4. France-Algeria: Algerian rebels publicly endorse De Gaulle -
Bourguiba meeting. (Page tit)
5. Rhodesia: Prime Minister Welensky will probably avoid defin-
itive break with Britain. (Page VW
6. Israel: Ben Gurion's Mapai party will probably be forced to call
for new elections. (Page tit)
7. Britain: London taking its most vigorous stand since 1958
against East-West trade controls. (Page tv)
8. Brazil: Quadros' policy of closer relations with Sino-Soviet bloc
arouses controversy within Brazil, especially among the military.
(Page t
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
25 February 1961
DAILY BRIEF
West Germany:COpposition has been voiced in Chancellor
Adena,uer's Christian Democratic party (CDU) to the chancellor's
willingness to accommodate the US with respect to Bonn's as-
suming a greater share of Western financial burdens. Following
his briefing of a CDU caucus upon his return from Washington
Foreign Minister von Brentano reportedly was bitterly attacked
for his offer of aid to underdeveloped areas, which he made on
17 February. both Economics
Minister Erhard and Finance Minister Etzel in "nasty and
ironic tones" challenged Brentano's authority to make such an
offer and claimed that Bonn would be unable to impose the re- 6 k,
quired taxes for a billion-dollar aid program. Erhard stated
that his one-shot offer on 6 February in reply to US demands
was still "fair and final." While Erhard'S position reflects
his cautious anti-inflationary economic views, he is probably
using the issue also to reassert his ambition to succeed
Adenauer despite the Chancellor's well-known aversion to
him in that role. Adenauer, who was not at the caucus, com-
missioned the Brentano visit, and has assigned future nego-
tiations to Brentano's Foreign Ministry rather than to Erhard's
Economics Ministry. Although mindful of the need for party
unity in an election year, Adenauer will probably be able to over-
come party opposition on this issue. The opposition Socialists
are reported favorable to the US position and are not planning
to attack Adenauer in the campaign this su7mpr fnr rAaehincr
such an economic agreement with the US,D
(Backup, Page 1)
*Congo:
Mobutu troops in plain clothes have appeared in Ruanda.-Urundi.
Their purpose allegedly is to buy off one of the garrisons now controlled by by Gizenga across the Congo border in Bukavu and
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Brazzaville
SUDAN
390
Luanda
Atlantic
Ocean
RepubIicof the Congo
TUNISIA
2,600
MALAY
6
MO TU
14,00
MOROCCO
0
31594 10225
IN DON
�Gemena
Coquilhatvillq
Approximate area controlled by:
Kasavubu-Mobutu
Gizenga
Kalonji
Ishombe
United Nations Forces
- Selected road
Selected railroad
Selected airfield
X Cut railroad
STATUTLE MILES
00
Luputa
ETHIOPIA
oke
Albert
Us urn bur-a
Francqui
GHANA
1.900
Luluabourg
Bak
400
Basoko
IRELAND
655
Albertville
NIGERIA
SWEDE
680
TSHO
4,0
hville
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thus reassert central wove nment authority in Kivu Province.
this operation has a better chance
of succeeding than did Mobutu's abortive attempt on 1 January,
also from Ruanda-Urundi, to take over the province. Belgium,
Which administers Ruanda-Urundi as a UN trust territory, would
be open to further severe censure, should the operation take
place. In addition, the widespread belief that Mobutu is operating
under Belgian influence would be reinforced.
Eishombe's government, virtually disregarding its 22 Febru-
ary agreement with the UN to freeze its troop movements, re-
portedly is continuing a two-pronged drive against Manono, capi-
tal of the dissident "Lualaba state," Katanga officials are claim-
ing that the agreement covers only relations between UN and
Katanga forces; however, the ICatangan officer commanding one
of the advancing forces reportedly told the leader of a Nigerian
UN patrol that he has orders to continue into Manono despite
any Nigerian resistance. Civilian UN officials in Elisabethville
believe that serious clashes with Katanga forces are likely to
occur and have asked headquarters in Leopoldville for reinorce-
ments
Confused reports from northern Kasai Province indicate
that a force of pro-Gizenga troops is moving toward the provincial
capital of Luluabourg and may have entered the city. This prob-
ably is part of the Gizengist incursion of the area which began
late in January. There is no information concerning the size or
effectiveness of the force which Ghanaian UN troops have been
ordered to halt.
this force is at least partly responsive to Gi-
zenga's orders; however, this control probably is tenuous.
(Backup, Page 3)
*Laos: Peiping is bringing pressure to bear on Burma to
reject King Savang's proposal for a neutral nations commission Aa-L-e--4--r-1-1
in Laos, Corn- 1?:5 /,.1. s-
munist China's vice minister of fnrPicen affairc e
emphasized ,t_ cae_
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DAILY BRIEF ii
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Peiping% strong objections to the neutral nations commission
and asked that the Chinese position be conveyed to Rangoon as
soon as possible. He added that Chou-En-lai was writing a
letter to the Burmese prime minister on the subject.
) (Backup, Page 5)
France-Algeria: Both De Gaulle and Tunisian President
Bourguiba probably believe that their forthcoming meeting on
27 February will lead to direct negotiations between De Gaulle
and Premier Ferhat Abbas of the Provisional Algerian Govern-
ment (PAG). The PAG in Tunis has now publicly endorsed the
De Gaulle - Bourguiba meeting and reportedly has authorized
Bourguiba to make preliminary soundings on matters of sub-
stance. (Backup, Page 7)
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Unless racial
violence erupts and inflames settler emotions, Prime Minister
Welensky of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland will
probably avoid at this time a definitive break with Britain over
the issue of sharply increased African influence in Northern
Rhodesia's government. Welensky, who is an exponent of
continued white control of the Federation, has already mobi-
lized non-African troops, instituted strict control of foreign
exchange and summoned the Federation's parliament in an
emergency session; meanwhile, police leaves have been can-
celed in Southern Rhodesia, On 27 February he plans to
present in parliament a motion empowering his government
"to resist by every means" any attempt by London to take
political power in Northern Rhodesia out of the hands of
"responsible people." At present, white settlers hold a major-
ity of the elective seats in the legislature but are subject,to
the control of the British governor.
Israel: The refusal of the National Religious party to join
anew government under Ben-Gurion will probably force the
Mapai party to call for new elections. Mapai leaders have
decided that they would rather face that alternative than accede
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DAILY BRIEF iii
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to the demands of other former coalition partners to replace
Ben-Gurion as leader of a new coalition. Adverse public
reaction to the prolonged party crisis over the Lavon affair
has made most Mapai leaders fearful of losing votes in an
Plertinn at thic timp
elections.
I3en-Gurion is not averse to early
(Backup, Page 9)
Britain:LAt the annual review meetings of COCOM (Co-
ordinating Committee for East-West trade) currently being
held in Paris, London is taking its most vigorous stand since
1958 and is insisting that controls not be aimed at the economic
base of the bloc but limited to "specifically strategic" materials
and equipment. The Macmillan government has long questioned
the effectiveness of the control system in impeding the USSR's
military and technological advance and now apparently wishes
to expand bloc trade both as part of its current export drive
and as a means of imr7oving relations with the bloa-.3
(Backup, Page 10)
Brazil: President Janio Quadros' policy of closer relations
with the Sino-Soviet bloc is arousing controversy within Brazil,
particularly among the military. Armed forces officers are
reported cold toward renewal of diplomatic relations, although
apparently not averse to increased trade. The Foreign Ministry
nevertheless announced on 23 February that Brazil will establish
relations with Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria. Although the
Quadros administration has promised to support inclusion of the
Chinese representation question on the UN General Assembly
agenda at the next session, it has announced that the decision on
whether Brazil will support ing Communist China to the
UN will be made later. (Backup, Page 11)
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DAILY BRIEF iv
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Sharp Differences in Bonn Over Brentano Aid Offer
Cm the absence of Adenauer a meeting of the Christian
Democratic Union (CDU) members on 21 February greeted
Foreign Minister von Brentano's account of his financial
talks in Washington coolly and with only perfunctory applause
in contrast to the "thunderous applause" following the attack
on him by Erhard and Etzel. Brentano reportedly left the
meeting visibly shakenD
(-Erhard bitterly attacked Brentano's talks in Washington
committing West Germany to a continuing annual aid program
featuring substantial budgetary appropriations. He argued
that while German capital would be devoted to aid to develop-
ing countries, foreign capital, including American, would
flow into German investments, and that American financial
difficulties would accordingly worsen:3
[-Finance Minister Etzel said that an aid program on the
scale envisioned by Brentano would mean a 16-percent tax
Increase, which he implied the Bundestag would never accept.
Etzel added that no one should tell him that political consid-
erations were overriding because in his opinion the prime
political issue for Bonn was West Germany's economic sta-
bility3
[Erhard may believe that he has sufficient backing in
the party to challenge Adenauer's authority on this issue and
thus strengthen his chances of becoming the next chancellor.
The breach between Erhard and Adenauer has never been
healed since their quarrel in the spring of 1959 when Ade-
nauer successfully opposed Erhard's choice by the party lead-
ers. Last month an attempt was made to patch the quarrel
and ensure party solidarity by naming both Adenauer and
Erhard as a "team" to lead the campaign for the national elec-
tion which will probably take place in September:3
{The chancellor can probably bring the opponents within
his party into line, and may do so in a manner that will once
more make a point of Erhard's political ineptness. He will
be aided by the reported willingness of the opposition 80cial-3
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iDemocratic party (SPD) to avoid exploiting this issue in the
election campaign--even if a tax increase becomes necessary.
The top SPD leaders believe that the 6 February Bonn offer
to help relieve US balance of payment difficulties by prepay-
ment of debts and advance deposits for armament purchases
is clearly, insufficient and that West Germany must eventually
accede to the American requestED,
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Situation in the Congo
Mobutu's plan in his Ruanda-Urundi operation apparently
Is to subvert the forces in Bukavu directly subordinate to the
Kivu provincial government, who reportedly have not been
paid as a result of that government's bankruptcy, and turn
them against a garrison of Stanleyville troops, which is also
located at Bukavu. He apparently is attempting to take ad-
vantage of the almost complete anarchy in Kivu which has
resulted from the struggle for power among local politicians,
most of whom claim the allegiance of some of the Congolese
forces in the area.
The chaotic situation in the province apparently has led
Anicet ICashamura, head of the provincial government since
late December and a long-time associate of Lumumba and
Gizenga, to send an emissary to the UN, claiming he wishes
to align himself with Leopoldville against Gizenga. Kashamura,
whom Stanleyville has recently been trying to bring back under
control, reportedly has asked the Belgians in uanda-Urundi
7
to defend his borders against Gizenga forces.
Gizenga stated that he was accrediting "ambassadors"
to the United States or Canada, the UAR, Communist China,
and Poland. peiping and Warsaw,
naming his envoys and asking those countries to reciprocate
as soon as possible. All bloc countries have expressed support
for the Stanleyville regime, but, with the exception of Peiping,
none has yet officially expressed an intention to exchange ambas-
sadors.
Gizenga also expressed his re-
gime's opposition to the 21 February Security Council resolution
which broadened the UN Congo force's mandate. He told his
representative, "In no case can we accept the trusteeship of the
UN. Our soldiers have resolved that whatever they are faced
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with they will never drop the r rifles while they have bullets
left."
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Situation in Laos
1While Burma has not yet declared itself on Laos' invita-
tion to serve on a neutral nations commission, the Burmese
Foreign Ministry reportedly has prepared a memorandum
recommending that the government decline. The memoran-
dum points out that the situation in Laos is extremely com-
plicated, and that the proposal does not go far enough in
that it is merely of a fact-finding nature and does not provide
for recommendations of courses of action-3
iGromyko's discussion in
Moscow provides a further indication that
the Communist bloc leaders feel the proposal for a neutral
nations commission for Laos may have undercut their own
position and, if implemented, would prevent Communist par-
ticipation in any settlement. Gromyko insisted that the solu-
tion to the Laotian problem lay in adherence to established
agreements and procedures and that the proposal was an at-
tempt by the US to circumvent the Geneva agreements. He
observed that one of the US objectives was to eliminate
Polancg
According to Hanoi radio, Souvanna Phouma told a press
conference held somewhere in Xieng Khouang Province on 24
February that he considered an international conference along
the lines of Premier Sihanouk's 14-nation proposal to be the
best way to settle the crisis in Laos. Souvanna is also quoted
as saying that he doubted the "Laotian people and the Pathet
Lao forces can accept the broadening of the Vientiane (Boun
Oum) government. If there is any broadening, that can only
be a broadening,with collaboration of the Pathet Lao forces,
of the government which I have set up."
During the past two weeks several International Control
Commission (ICC) courier flights to Hanoi have been turned
back by North Vietnamese authorities for various reasons,
usually on the excuse of "bad weather," according to members
of the Canadian delegation to the ICC. In the most recent
instance, however, the flight was turned back five minutes
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out of Hanoi because the airport was "too crowded."
this development is related to the con-
tinuing Soviet airlift to Laos through the Hanoi airport.
rAirlift operations into Laos were carried out on 21 and
22 February but were apparently canceled on 23 February,
nossiblv because of adverse weather
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De Gaulle - Bourguiba Meeting
Before setting a date for the meeting between De Gaulle
and Bourguiba both sides took extensive soundings to assure
that some tangible gains would result. Tunisian Secretary of
State for Information Mohamed Masmoudi, who arranged the
meeting, reportedly came away from personal sessions with
De Gaulle convinced of his sincerity in desiring to negotiate a
settlement. Masmoudi also probed French opinion in private
talks with figures outside of the government. French civilian
and military working groups in Paris have reportedly subse-
quently completed plans for cease-fire arrangements and for
self-determination. De Gaulle is reported willing to bring im-
prisoned rebel vice premier Ben Bella to Paris at the time
of the Bourguiba visit, and may halt the execution of Moslem
terrorists.
In Tunis, the rebel Provisional Algerian Government
(PAG) at first appeared distrustful of Bourguiba's intentions,
and was irritated that he had announced acceptance of De
Gaulle's invitation without consulting them. On 17 February,
however, Masmoudi told a US official the PAG had come to
full agreement that Bourguiba should meet with De Gaulle in
the interests of bringing about direct negotiations.
An officer of the PAG who confirmed this position to the
US Embassy in Tunis on 23 February declared that Masmoudi
had promised that Bourguiba would not meet with De Gaulle
until Paris had demonstrated willingness to make substantive
progress toward an Algerian solution. The same day an edi-
torial in El Mou ahid, the official organ of the rebel movement,
praised Bourguiba for "making incessant efforts to re-estab-
lish peace."
The rebel leaders probably would not risk adverse reac-
tions in Morocco and the UAR to such an endorsement without
reasonable certainty that Bourguiba's visit will produce results.
Bourguiba himself in a 23 February radio address, said that
the fact De Gaulle invited him for exploratory talks indicates
that "the obstacles which blocked direct peace negotiations in
the past have been surmounted."
In Algeria, military operations by both sides have recently
been intensified. Rebel losses are increasing, since the French
CONFIDENTIAL
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units withdrawn from the fighting areas to keep order in the
cities during the December riots and the January referendum
are returning to action. French official sources claim nearly
600 rebels were put out of action during the week of 18 Febru-
ary, as opposed to an average of 380 a week in January. In his
farewell order on 13 February, former Commander in Chief
in Algeria General Crepin asserted that rebel terrorist acts
had dropped to 15 a day instead of the 1960 average of 30 a day.
The American consul general in Algiers comments, however,
that the average citizen is hardly aware of the difference, and
that an undercurrent of fear and violence persists along the
fringes of the large cities. Reports continue that European ex-
tremists plan "one last mighty effort" of spectacular terrorism
to coincide with any annomeemPlit that French-PAG negotiations
are to begin.
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Coalition Problems May Force Elections in Israel
The Lavon affair has been primarily an intra-Mapai con-
troversy over former Defense Minister Pinhas Lavon's alleged
responsibility for an abortive clandestine operation in 1954
aimed at disrupting Egyptian-American relations. A personal
struggle developed between Ben-Gurion and Lavon, himself a
power within the Mapai, when Lavon last year publicly implied
that he had been framed by proteges of Ben-Gurion in the De-
fense Ministry during an investigation of the operation which
subsequently forced Lavon out of the cabinet.
On the basis of new evidence, a cabinet committee ex-
onerated Lavon last December; the committee's procedures
and findings were severely criticized by Ben-Gurion. After
his Mapai colleagues refused to submit to his demand for La-
von's expulsion from the party, the prime minister forced the
issue by resigning on 31 January. This prompted the party's
central committee to give Ben-Gurion a vote of confidence by
forcing Lavon out of his position as secretary general of the
powerful Histadrut labor federation. Ben-Gurion then agreed
to form a new coalition.
The Maparn, Achdut-Haa,voda and Progressive parties,
stung by criticism of the cabinet committee which exonerated
Lavon, have already announced that they will not again par-
ticipate in a government led by Ben-Gurion. The National
Religious party's refusal, by a one-vote margin, to partici-
pate leaves only. the Religious Workers' party willing to join
Mapai. However, its 3 seats, together with the 52 controlled
by Mapai, are not sufficient to provide a majority in the 120-
seat Knesset. It is theoretically possible that a government
could be formed without Mapai, but nearly all of the other
parties are now calling for elections.
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Britain's Position on Controls on Bloc Trade
a'he Coordinating Committee--composed of Japan and all
NATO members but Iceland�is scheduled to begin its third
and final round in the 1961 review of trade controls on 2 March.
In recent sessions British delegates have argued that the "spe-
cifically strategic" criterion was formally adopted at the 1958
COCOM meeting, where Britain succeeded in obtaining a major
reduction of trade controls. They point to the growth of Soviet
economic and technological expansion in the ten years since
COCOM was established as evidence of the futility of restrict-
ing trade for other than strictly strategic reasong:3
Lagging exports and the prospect of further difficulties
with developments that may hurt British trade, such as the
further consolidation of the Common Market and the disturb-
ances in Africa, have led a small but growing section of the
business community to look toward the bloc for an expansion
of trade. Bloc trade figures last year have probably reinforced
this view. While bloc trade is only about three percent of
Britain's total trade, British exports both to the USSR and to
Communist China in lgfin urprin me than double those of
19597
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13razilian President's Foreign Policy Arouses Opposition
Among Military
Unrest within the military over the Quadros administra-
tion's plans to expand diplomatic relations with the Sino-Soviet
bloc
uarlos Laceraa, the newly elected governor of Guana-
bara, is also reported uneasy over recent Quadros moves
toward the Sino-Soviet bloc. The new administration's changes
in assignments of high-ranking military officers are adding to
military restlessness but the stability of the regime does not
now appear threatened.
Brazil now has missions in Czechoslovakia and Poland.
In addition to the planned diplomatic relations with three So-
viet satellites, Quadros is apparently considering renewing
relations with the USSR and possibly establishing them with
Communist China. An East German press service reported
on 20 February that Quadros in a telegram to East German
party boss Ulbricht had expressed the wish "that relations be-
tween our two states may grow. closer. . . ." There is no indi-
cation that Brazilian - East German relations are now under
serious consideration, although Foreign Minister Arinos stated
in accepting his cabinet post on 31 January that Brazil intends
"to establish diplomatic and commercial relations with all
states of the world that desire pacific interchange with us."
Quadros' speed in announcing steps to expand diplomatic
relations with the bloc is probably intended primarily to con-
ciliate leftist-nationalist groups, which generally opposed
Quadros' election. A widespread Brazilian belief in the coun-
try's growing importance in world affairs is also a factor.
Quadros probably hopes that an attitude of "independence" in
world affairs will win good will from leftist circles that are
likely to protest the severe economic measures implied in his
ion of Brazil's financial situation as "terrible."
-SEeRter
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
The Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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