CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/02/27

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03172679
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: February 27, 1961

Vt.
Approved for Release: 2020108111C03172679
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
27 February 1961
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
TOP-SEC-RET-
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679
T-OP-SEORET-
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679�;
�TOP-5=T
27 February 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. USSR: Another probable ICBM test vehicle launched
on Tyura Tam range. (Fage
2. The situation in the Congo. (Page t)
3. Moscow's publication of KhrushcIiev's letter to Nehru
may have been intended to head off Indian decision to
send troops to the Congo. (Page it)
4. Morocco: Death of Mohamed V expected to worsen
alreptly unstable political situation; new King may
face early challenge from left-wing nationalists. (Page it)
5. The situation in Laos. (Page ttt)
6. Italy: New long-term trade agreement with Moscow
guarantees USSR 14 percent of Italian oil import mar-
ket through 1965. (Page iv)
7. UAR-Lebanon: Nasir's propaganda attacks, aimed at
bolstering Syrian-Egyptian unity, incense Lebanese
Christians; new confessional strife may result. (Page v)
8. Guatemala: Dissidence within armed forces continues
to threaten regime of President Ydigoras. (Page v)
TOP SECRET!
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679
N
\NN Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679
14100 TOP SECRET111F
CENTRAs1 INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
27 February 1961
DAILY BRIEF
*USSR: A test vehicle, probably an ICBM, was launched
from ryi-ira Tam to the usual impact area on Kamchatka Pen-
insula at about 0053Z, 27 February (1953 EST on 26 Febru-
ary). This is the sixth launching from Tyura Tam this year.
Two of these six were space program events; the others, prob-
ably ICBM tests. This latest launch brings to 31 the number of
generally successful ICBM program launchings conducted to
date from Tvura Tam.
Congo: LA unit of the Gizengist incursion, which on 24
February took Luluabourg, by yesterday had reached at least
as far as Port Francqui, near the western border of Kasai �
Province. Information available as of 0400 EST today indicate 54t-t- Lt.)
the unit was continuing westward.
Gizenga had
sent these forces to Luluabourg ten days ago ''because of mes- t_t3Aet
sages which he received from Mobutu's troops stating that theyht,,6
supported him a ir arms as soon as his
forces arrived," Gizenga is now, /7, cl
considering an attack on Leopoldville. If his troops should un- 'R:Ls
dertake such an operation, they would be unlikely to meet sub-i
stantial opposition in eastern Leopoldville Province, where
ost of the tribes supported Lumumba.
The Leopoldville garrision is nominally subordinate
to Mobutu, but its commander reportedly stated on 25 February
that his forces would not fight the Stanleyville troops. Approx-
imately 2,000 troops are with Mobutu on the upper Congo River,
where his attempt to conduct offensive operations against
Orientale Province has bogged down. His troops have report-
di been fraternizing with those of Gizenga in the Bumba
11
The Gizengist takeover of northern Kasai has brought vio-
lent reactions from Gizenga's opponents. Tshombe may now
TOP�SECRET
\\
/34,-Jeio
N.\
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11
IWO -7151-riteill'ET�
003172679
resume his suspended operations, and authorities in Leopold-
ville will probably urge Mobutu to move his forces back to the
capital for defensive purposes. Albert Kalonji in southern Kasai
has sent a telegram to Hammarskjold, declaring that he "will
stop at nothing" to assure his state's security. He lacks the
capability to mount an offensive, but he has invoked his bilat-
eral "defense agreement" with Tshombe.
(Backup, Page 1) (Map)
USSR-Congo:
0 e
pt,e_LL,t-)44'
Khrushchev's proposal to replace
the UN operation by a commission of African states is an at-
tempt to align the pro-Gizenga Casablanca powers--Ghana,
Guinea, Mali, Morocco, and the UAR--with the USSR. It is
also aimed at discouraging Afro-Asian governments from pro-
LInaddnLfrces to the UN operation in the Congo.
Moscow's publication of the letter to Nehru may have been
intended to head off an Indian decision�reliably reported to
have been taken earlier last week--to send a battalion of Com-
bat troops to the Congo. Announcement of the decision has
been delayed a few days pending further clarification of de-
velopments in the Congo. Nehru's views on the Congo and the
UN are unlikely to be swayed h Trk �V �rtiqhr. ev's restatement of
the USSR's position (Backup, Page 3)
(Map)
*Morocco: (Information available as of 0400 EST) The
already unstable political situation in Morocco will probably
worsen following the death yesterday of King Mohamed V and
the assumption of power by his son, the 31-year-old crown
27 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF ii
-TOP-SteRET-
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679
'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679
ked TOP SECRET
prince, now Kin Hassan II. Mohamed V was the principal
unifying force in the country, and Hassan's rule seems cer-
tain to be challenged shortly by the National Union of Popular
Forces. This organization is a strong, left-wing nationalist
group led by former premier Ibrahim and others who have
little respect for Hassan and are predisposed to transforming
Morocco into a republic. The clash of interests could easily
lead to early widespread disorders. Some outbreaks are
reported to have occurred in Casablanca yesterday, with one
observer describing the demonstrators as anti-Hassan.
Hassan has long shown dictatorial tendencies and prob-
ably will largely ignore the new cabinet appointed late yester-
day. Most of the ministers are men who served in Mohamed
V's cabinet; several of them have previously shown antagon-
ism toward Hassan and served in the government only reluc-
tantly while Hassan was deputy premier. The new King will
rely principally on the 30,000-man armed forces, whose loyal-
ty to him has yet to be tested.
Under Hassan, Morocco's foreign policy probably will
continue formally to be one of "non-alignment." It was Hassan,
however, who solicited from the USSR the recent gift of Soviet
jet aircraft and who, according to a recent report, initialed
an agreement for Soviet economic aid during Soviet President
Brezhnev's visit to Morocco in early February. It is likely
that he will make further arrangements with the Sino-Soviet
bloc. At the same time he may press for new concessions
from the United States and France in entinPrtinn with thia nir
base rights granted in 1959 and 1960.
(Backup, Page 5)
Laos: Since his arrival in Xieng Khouang on 22 February 0
Souvanna Phouma appears to have clearly endorsed the shadow �L-Le..)
government there. The relationship had previously been somee
what ambiguous, with Souvanna remaining in Phnom Penh while /.../
the Xieng Khouang regime "acted in his name." Souvanna, ac-
cording to bloc radiobroadcasts, presided over a meeting of
his cabinet on 23 February which decided that a "powerful army
27 Feb 61
TOP .SECRET
.
DAILY BRIEF iii
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679
SPAvAINO.
T..1: \,..�,
J.)r.
1 C PliONG
,,...i
K kV. 4r... .....7 . I,
Mong P. Lo
� .e� ak .--5.,....)
jA ik .�..!
- ...--, k...
.." tionZazi. / .,.. ..�..., .....,
/-
/- \ ....,- ...., _.,...
.....' � m T HA I Muong Saqlr
..- 1
' ./.
,'
i../ L1JANG
n
)( � t,,,....--,,, 7..,,,,.....�.'7
r�- L''' --s�-�/"�...._
Ituang,Probang,....,,,.....;
88
Muang Nan.
ng Peasonalok
RABANG
es Jerre
The Timm
�Non Kha)
.1.106.i Mani
?D'n 5' THAILAND
M.omidSaKon Nakhon.
LAOS
Government forces
Government
--- Antigovernment
ls Antigovernment concentrations
III Kong Le/Pathet Lao forces
Main route number
A Chinese Nationalist Irregulars
25 50 7,5 100 Miles
e.1
0 25 50 75 100 Kilometers
28716.1 5-55
H
Uu
556500
� Seno
iv nokhet
SA CNN KHET
0Mualg Vat.Tb
Moans. L.s...n.�
CAMBODIA
Beurthaerth *es' names the not nesesson)y
these recognised by the U.S. Gothrnmere.
CAP MUI RON
AVANE
S A-K
77
Stung Irene
iLE DE Kr BAD
iLE CAC BA
,,,DEMARCATION LINE
013,k4o
Quang In
SOUTI4
-o 1
I __J.:VIETNAM
I All
A AT
Eso Khom'
27 Feb 81 CENTRAL INItL
E-NC E BULLETIN Map Page
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679
Approved for Release. 2020/08/11 C0317267_9_,.
�400# TOP SECRET
7
must be consolidated and developed to liberate all of Laos."
It also proposed the establishment of a committee to accept
and distribute "relief supplies from the friendly countries,"
possibly a preliminary step to entering into diplomatic re-
lations with neighboring North Vietnam and Communist China.
LGovernment forces remain stalled in their efforts to move
eastward along Route 7 toward the Plaine des Sarre& General
Ouan, chief of the General Staff, attributes the lack of pro-
gress to several factors: low troop morale resulting from poor
logistical support; the ineffectiveness of the commander for
operations, General Bounleut; and General Phoumies inability
to delegate authority, which results in lack of action on a num-
ber of important matters_.
Both Peiping and Hanoi continue to condemn the neutral
nations proposal.
a letter from Chou En-lai to U Nu on 22 February labeled
the proposal a scheme to "misuse the prestige of neutral na-
tions like Burma and Cambodia to legalize the status quo re-
sulting from the United States' interference in the internal
affairs of Laos," and "to bury the Geneva agreement." This
line was repeated in a 25 February People's Daily editorial.
On 25 February U Nu announced that Burma would refuse to
participate in the neutral natiops commission.
" _ . I h )
ta y: e conciusionin Moscow on 4 JeDruary-o
the Soviet-Italian trade negotiations is a major achievement
in the continuing Soviet effort to acquire advanced Western en-
gineering products through long-term government-to-govern-
ment agreements. The new arrangements guarantee the USSR
at least 14 percent of the Italian petroleum import market
through 1965--approximately the proportion Moscow will sup-
ply this year if deliveries are held to the scheduled 4,000,000
tons. The USSR will import large quantities of Italian chemical
industry equipment, oil pipe and pipeline equipment, and other
industrial goods, and has reportedly contracted for "not less)
27 Feb 61
DAILY BRIEF iv
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO3172679'
TOP SECRET
Cthan eight" 35,000-ton oil tankers to be built in Italian shipyards.
total trade under the
new long-term agreement is scneauiea to reach $500,000,000
in 1965, more than double the 1960 1evel-.3
(Backup, Page 7)
UAR-Lebanon: Nasirts reception in Syria during celebra-
tions of the third anniversary of the union between Egypt and
Syria has been the least enthusiastic he has yet received in
Damascus, partly because of Syrian opposition to exchange
control legislation which he recently imposed in the Syrian
region. In his speeches, Nasir has attempted to arrest flag-
ging Syrian support for the union by appealing again to the
masses through demagogic attacks on domestic and foreign
elements, including the United States for its role in the Congo
crisis. Prominent among his scapegoats have been two right-
ist parties in Lebanon, including the Christian Phalange party
and its leader, Pierre Gemayel. There is apprehension among
Lebanese Christians lest incidents which will probably result
from these attacks develop into ai upsurge of serious confes-
sional strife. Backup, Page 9)
Guatemala:rbissidence within the armed forces continues
to threaten the regime despite President Ydigoras' efforts to
neutralize disgrunteled officers after the abortive coup last
November, another
coup will be attempted between now and mid-March, and a
widely-supported anti-income tax demonstration scheduled
for 28 February could serve as the occasion for such an at-
tempt against the government. Although leading military dis-
sidents are believed to be anti-Communists, the overthrow
of the constitutional Ydigoras administration would probably
enhance Communist opportunities
(Backup, Page 11)
27 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF
TOP SECRE7
\
0
0 k
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679
" Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679
Brazzaville
SUDAN
390
Luanda
Atlantic
Ocean
Republic of the Congo
IN DON
TUNISIA
2,600
MALAY
6
MO TU
5110
Leopoldville
Thysville
MOROCCO
Gemena
Coquilhatville
' Mobutu
L200
Scattered Fo ces
Approximate area controlled by:
Kasavubu-Mobutu
Gizenga
Kalonji
Tsttpmb6
United Nations Forces
--- Selected rdad
.�
Selected railroad
Selected airfield
X Cut railroad
STATUTE MILES 400
oo 1
1 Francqui
GHANA
1900,
Luluabour
Bak
31594 10 227
Luputa
ETHIOPIA
amina
1.1 sumburn
LIBERIA
IRELAND
655
�k,
Elisa
ETHIOPIA
GIZENGA
7,000
Bukavu
NIGERIA
500
Kongolo
Albertville
NIGERIA
SWEDE
680
TSHOM
4,0
hville
27 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIQENCE BULLETIN Map Page
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679-
1140, UP SECRET
Situation in the Congo
The Stanleyville forces apparently have operated with
relative freedom for at least a month in northern Kasai,
whose population--which includes Lumumba's own tribe, the
Batatela�is generally either politically apathetic or ro-
Gizenga. The Gizen a force took Luluabourg,
evaded the "Nigerian
na lona po ice and continued their advance to the pro-
vincial capital without opposition. On their arrival, Mobutu's
soldiers laid down their arms and the Gizenga forces seized
the arms and ammunition.
Gizenga has also re-
ceived expressions of support from Leopoldville. Eastern
Leopoldville Province is the Stanleyville leader's home bail-
iwick, and his African Solidarity party (PSA) controls the
provincial government. Some PSA members have been co-
operating to a limited extent with Kasavubu and his associates,
but they probably would realign themselves with Stanleyville
if they� believed that the ciewasrunning strongly in favor of
Gizenga.
CCongolese officials in Leopoldville apparently are making
frantic attempts to put together a force with which to oppose
Gizenga. Acting Defense Minister Kazadi, a tribal relative of
Albert Kalonji, reportedly has asked Kalonji to send his two
battalions of poorly trained troops against Luluabourg�a re-
quest which was reported to the UN command and drew a pro-
test from chief representative Dayal objecting to Kalonji's
"aggressive postures." If Kalonji should move north, there
is likely to be a renewal of the tribal warfare between Balubas
and Luluas-3
iKazadi reportedly is also trying to raise two battalions of
volunteers in the Leopoldville area. The principal body of reg-
ular troops in the province, meanwhilet has indicated that it
will occupy key road crossings but will avoid battle with the
Gizenga forces. The commander of the camp at Thysville re-
portedly stated that the problem was a political rather than a
military one)
violence is continuing
in outlying areas of Orientale Province, despite the efforts of
TOP 5LcRET
27 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679101
local officials of the Gizenga regime to maintain control. The
outbreaks appear to be local vendettas involving police units
� and members of Lumumbacs National Congolese Movement,
who are intimidating the population and arresting local chiefs.
Meanwhile, Gizenga apparently has developed a channel for
financial assistance from the UAR
nlore than
$1,000,000 be credited to the Uganda account of a Greek enter-
preneur in Stanleyville. According to Gizenga, the Greek
would then Day him the equivalent value in Congolese francs.
Premier-designate Ileo has accepted an invitation from
Tshombe to attend a "summit conference" of Congolese lead-
ers early next month in Geneva,
Invitations to this conference have also been
extended to other Congo leaders, including Gizenga, but, aside
from Ileo, the only non-Fatangan known to have accepted thus
far is Kalonji. Tshombe's proposal--which seems unlikely to
result in any meaningful conference--appears designed prin-
cipally to enhance his own prestige and to reinforce Katanga's
claims to sovereignty.
-TOP
27 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679]
-rap�sEeRE-T-
q4e0
Khrushchev's Letter to Nehru
One of the main purposes of Khrushchev's letter to Nehru
was to establish the point that Lumumba's death vindicated
Soviet proposals for reorganizing the UN structure and Mos-
cow's attack last fall on Secretary General Hammarskjold.
The letter repeated most of the points contained in the Soviet
Government's statement of 14 February on the Congo, with
�the addition of a renewed demand that the secretary general
be replaced by a three-man executive organ representing the
West, the Communist bloc, and the neutralists. Khrushchev
charged,"It is Hammarskjold who killed Lumumba,"and de-
clared,"We cannot tolerate a UN secretary general branded
with this abominable murder."
Khrushchev sought to counter the recent Security Council
resolution which strengthens Harnma.rskjold's hand in dealing
� with the Congo crisis by insisting that the UN operation has
failed and that if the present situation is allowed to continue,
Western forces may intervene "behind the facade of the UN."
� The Soviet premier's prescription for averting this danger is
the withdrawal from the Congo of all "foreign troops" and the
creation of a commission composed of African states which
have provided troops for the UN force.
This proposed commission, which would deal only with the
"legal government" of Gizenga, would have the tasks of super-
vising the removal of the "aggressors," ensuring the termina-
tion of "all forms of foreign intervention" and creating condi-
tions for "normal activities by the Congolese government and
parliament." This plan is a variant of a
scheme put forward in earlv February]
the UN operation would be replaced
by a supervisory commission drawn from Afro-Asian states
which support the Gizenga regime. ) The
African commission proposal is intended in part to appear re-
sponsive to Ghanaian President Nkrumah's plan for reconstitut-
ing the UN force into an African command--a scheme which has
been endorsed by Guinea, Mali, Morocco, and the UAR,.
Khrushchev's letters also seem intended as a vigorous re-
affirmation of the USSR's right to have a major voice in any
TOP SECRET
27 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679
ime
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679l
NS TOP SECRET
Congo settlement. The harsh denunciation of Western pol-
icies in the Congo provides further evidence that Khrushchev
is not prepared to forego such opportunities to advance Soviet
Influence and prestige in the Afro-Asian world in order to
avoid offending the Western powers. The Soviet premier avoided
a direct attack on the United States, but he warned certain un-
named "statesmen in the West" that a "big stick" policy is "rife
with mortal danger for those who pursue it." In an oblique re-
ply to warnings by US leaders against any unilateral interven-
tion in the Congo, Khrushchev denied that assistance to the
"patriotic forces of the Congolese people and its legal govern-
ment" could transform the Congo into an "area of the cold war."
He said "such a formulation of the problem is radically incor-
rect."
CNew Delhi has not yet officially reacted to IChrushchev's
letter, but Nehru, who will certainly be questioned on it in
the Indian Parliament, has long been on record as opposing
any "cold war" -inspired reorganization of the United Nations
and has consistently supported a strengthened UN program in
the Congo. Moreover, he has shown little interest in the pro-
posals of the Casablanca Conference powerg3
{The Indian army staff has been alerted to prepare a unit
for duty in the Congo. The Indian UN representative has been
asked to obtain details from the UN Secretariat on the destina-
tion and duties of the Indian contingent. The delay in announc-
ing the decision on sending troops was the result of advice from
the Indian foreign secretary:::
TOP SECRET
27 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 003172679
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679
�sEeitEr-
Noe
Political Situation in Moroccor
The National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP) was created
In 1959 after a schism in the nationalist Istiqlal party, the
party which had led the Moroccan struggle for independence.
The present leaders of the UNFP dominated the Ibrahim govern-
ment which served from December 1958 to May 1960, although
neither former premier Abdallah Ibrahim nor former deputy
premier Abderrahim Bouabid formally aligned themselves with
the organization while they were still in office. Technically
administered by a collegium, the party is largely urban and
composed of young intellectuals, students, youth, former re-
sistance fighters under Mohamed el Basri, and the Moroccan
Labor Union led by Mahjoub ben Seddik. During the local elec-
tions of last May, UNFP supporters polled more than 25 per-
cent of the vote, gaining overwhelming majorities in the city
councils of Casablanca and Rabat and many seats in all other
cities. Since last May, the UNFP has concentrated on strength-
ening its organization, particularly seeking followers in the
armed forces.
� Although the UNFP was completely loyal to Mohamed V,
many leaders were beginning to be critical of him for his failure
to develop Morocco into a modern state and for his insistance
on grooming as his successor his elder son, the present King
Hassan, who is widely unpopular among all nationalists. De-
spite this personal loyalty to Mohamed, UNFP leaders refused
to participate in his government last May both because they ob-
jected to the authority delegated to the Crown Prince as deputy
premier and because the King disregarded their demands that a
representative national assembly be elected to draft a constitution.
They also refused to participate in the Constitutional Council
named last September to draft a constitution, because they con-
sidered the council weighted in favor of the King's predilection for
a strong monarchy, while they favored at most a limited monarchy
responsible to the people. With the death of Mohamed V, the
UNFP will probably work for the elimination of the monarchy and
the institution of a republic.
Although UNFP leaders are strongly influenced by Marxism,
they have been sharply critical of Hassan for accepting Soviet jet
27 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679
-1=SP:r�Hi-b-r-
aircraft, and have stated they would oppose the presence of
Soviet technicians in Morocco.
The remnants of the Istiqlal party, led by Allal el-Fassi
and largely traditionalist and conservative in orientation,
probably will also work toward the dissolution of the monarchy.
It was the Istiqlal which created the image of Mohamed V as
the national idol, but Istiqlal leaders were also becoming
disillusioned with the King. Istiqlal still holds more posts
In the government than any other political group and dominates
the Constitutional Council. The party, however, is struggling
to prevent losses both to the UNFP and to the Popular Movement.
The Popular Movement is a palace-sponsored, tribal-
based, largely rural organization. Although it may provide some
measure of reliable support for Hassan II, it lacks dynamic
leadership. Nevertheless, the appointment by Minister of the
Interior Mohamed Embarek el-Bekkai (who retains the same
post in Hassan's cabinet and is believed to be a behind-the-
scenes director of the party) of many members of the Popular
Movement to high provincial posts has ensured that organization
substantial influence at the local level.
The small, outlawed Moroccan Communist Party had,
before its suppression last year, publicly supported Mohamed
V and the monarchy. Because its leaders share the antipathy
of most politicians for Hassan, it seems unlikely that the
Communists will endorse the new King. The party has recently
been working clandestinely to solidify its organization and was
permitted, coincident with Soviet President Brezhnev's visit, �
to resume publication of its weekly newspaper.
� While Crown Prince, Hassan II was restrained by his
father from suppressing opposition elements. Recognizing
the limited base of his support, he now may strike out against
some of the more powerful opposition leaders in order to
attempt to thwart a move against him.
SECRET
27 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679
SECRE
New Soviet-Italian Trade Agreements Concluded in Moscow
Soviet-Italian trade achieved only modest growth prior to
1959, when it amounted to a total of about $120,000,000. Last
year it rose to more than $200,000,000 and the four-year tar-
get of $512,000,000 set by a pact which expires this year prob-
ably will be exceeded by about 20 percent. To ensure continued
expansion of this trade, as well as its coordination with the re-
quirements of the Soviet Seven-Year Plan (1959-65), Moscow
appears to have successfully consolidated several individual_
transactions into the framework of a single long-term agree-
ment, one which includes guaranteed quotas for key commod-
ities.
The new agreement includes the commodities covered by
the special barter arrangement signed in Moscow last fall by
Enrico Mattel, head of the Italian state fuels agency. In return
for 12,000,000 tons of Soviet crude and fuel oil between 1960
and 1965, Mattel agreed to deliver steel pipeline, pipeline
equipment, and synthetic rubber to the USSR.
CUnder the new guaranteed market scheme, Soviet oil sales
to Italy are to rise by only about 100,000 tons a year, reaching
4,500,000 tons a year by 1965-3
Lit is likely, partly because of Italy's re-export role, that
the scheduled amounts will be exceeded. Scheduled Soviet etro-
leum deliveries to Italy,
are probably understated considerably and omit at
least the Soviet oil handled by the Italians for other. Western im-
porters. , total Soviet petroleum
shipments to Italy iast year included 3,600,000 tons of crude oil
and 1,600,000 tons of petroleum products, accounting for some
25 to 30 percent of all Soviet oil exports to the free world. An
unknown portion of the crude oil, however, is processed by
Italian refineries and re-exported in accordance with Soviet
trade arrangements with third countries-7)
E_The Italian decision to construct tankers for the USSR is an
important gain for Moscow which last fall embarked on an ex-
tensive effort to build up a modern tanker fleet through the ac-
quisition of large Western vessels. The USSR undertook nego-
tiations with a number of nonbloc countries�particularly JapanD
SEeRET-
27 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679
NNW Noe
Cthe Netherlands, and Italy�in which it sought to stimulate
competition for the Soviet market. In November, Rome
"temporarily suspended" action on a proposed sale of two
large tankers to the Soviet Union pending a NATO-sponsored
review of Soviet oil policies. The Italians warned, however,
that they could not hold the line if other nonbloc countries,
notably Japan, were to conclude shipbuilding contracts with
Moscow. The USSR's purchase of several tankers from Japan
and the Netherlands last fall probably was instrumental in
prompting Ital 's decisioitiojndd new
a.greemenE3
SECRE,7
27 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679
'*4IS 1.4.113440EFSITtAt�
The UAR Anniversary Celebration in Syria
The crowds at the UAR anniversary parade and for Nasir's
speeches in Damascus on 22 February were smaller and less
demonstrative than in previous years despite perfect weather,
the mobilization of all school children, and the importation of
people by truck and bus. While the Moslem fast of Ramadan,
television coverage of the parade, and the diminished novelty
of Nasir's presence after six previous visits partially accounts
for this, disillusionment with the regime is certainly another
factor. Nasir antagonized the business community by his ex-
change control decree of 5 February and many businessmen
were notably absent from the parade. According to the consu-
late general, a current joke has it that some Damascenes hung
out black crepe on "Unity Day," and when accused of being un-
patriotic, they protested that the crepe was for Lumumba.
Probably the most important reason for Nasir's visit to
Syria is the high-level political dissatisfaction that has devel-
oped in the Northern Region, including wrangling within the
Syrian Executive Council over the dictatorial behavior of the
Council's president, Alxl al-Hamid Sarraj. There have been
reports that Nasir was going to remove Sarraj from direct
control of affairs in Syria, possibly by transferring him to a
position in Egypt. However,Nasir, in his first speech upon ar-
riving at Latakia on 20 February, labeled such reports as "non-
sense?' Sarrays firm control of the Syrian internal security ap-
paratus is especially needed now when the exchange controls are
being imposed.
Nash has vigorously defended the exchange controls in his
speeches and has attacked those who oppose them as "exploiting
capitalists" whom he accuses of transferring their profits abroad.
"Who of the people here transfers 1,000 liras abroad," he asked
the crowd at Latakia. "Nobody;' was his own answer. He also
made reference to the Koranic injunction against usury.
There have been other Islamic overtones to Nasir's current
visit and he has made no overtures to Syria's Christian minority,
which is well-known to be largely unsympathetic to the regime. On
the other hand he accused Lebanon's Phalange party, a Maronite
CONFIDENTIAL
27 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679
�L 1L#L4A I zrlLj
.111Id *1111
Christian organization, of instigating sectarianism to the
detriment of Arab unity. Reasserted that the UAR which
out of courtesy to the Lebanese people had remained silent
on the activities of "imperialist agents" in Lebanon, could
no longer remain silent. "We have ways to stop elements
which go too far," he threatened. In a previous speech he
noted, "The Phalange party is represented in the Lebanese
Government; we cannot forget or ignore this fact."
These attacks were in response to earlier criticisms of
Nasir by Phalange leader and Lebanese Minister of Finance
Pierre Gemayel as well as by the party's newspaper. Nasir
implied that the Phalange is subservient to France and lik-
ened Gemayel's comments to those of the Israeli radio.
Following Nasir's first attack, Gemayel retorted that the
UAR President apparently. "is not looking for friends but for
followers and agents." However, Moslem extremists in Lebanon,
together with Druze leader Kemal Jumblatt, have sided with
Nasir. As a result, an upsurge of Moslem-Christian tension
has occurred which the embassy in Beirut fears may lead to
violent incidents.
Nasir also has attacked as "fascist" the Social National
party of Lebanon, an affiliate and remnant of the Syrian party
which was purged in 1955 following the assassination of pro-
Nasir Colonel Malki, who was slated to be chief of staff of the
Syrian army. Some members of the party, escaped to Lebanon.
Nasir has revived this pre-UAR episode together with past al-
legations of United States complicity in the party's activities.
In a speech on 24 February he stated flatly that the party "is
financed by America to attack the UAR."
Nasir fixed "guilt" for Lurnumba's murder primarily on
Tshombe, ,secondarily on Kasavubu for delivering Lumurnba
to Tshombe, and on the United States for continuing to support
Kasavubu despite his "guilt." He claimed the United States was
equally guilty because its "agent," Kasavubu, has just contrib-
CONFIDENTIAL
27 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 10
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679
SECRET
Guatemalan Government Threatened -
President Ydigoras, who has ruled in a relatively benev-
olent manner since his election in early 1958, has survived
numerous efforts to unseat him that would have defeated a
man less adroit in manipulating his enemies against one an-
other. His judicious distribution of graft and political favors
has given his regime a semblance of organized political sup-
port. However, the constantly shifting political alignments
offer him no real security, and the military remains the key
to the survival of his administration, as it has of all previous
Guatemalan governments.
In recent years, the Guatemalan armed forces have shown
themselves notably responsive to what they interpret to be pub-
lic opinion--which is often, in fact, merely the agitation of an
irresponsible opposition and� of the highly articulate and rad-
ically-inclined students. In view of the highly agitated state
of "public opinion" at the moment, and the fact that numerous
army officers may be reaching the climax of long-standing re-
sentment over what they consider the President's favoritism
toward certain "political" officers, Ydigoras may shortly be
facing the gravest threat to his continuation in office.
Ydigoras in the past two weeks has strongly pressured a
recalcitrant congress for passage of two laws, both of which
have aroused stormy protests. Congress on 21 February
passed a watered-down version of Ydigoras' proposed legis-
lation to replace an expiring decree for controlling Communist
activity. University students are in the forefront of a strong
campaign protesting the law as an infringement of civil rights,
and Communists and pro-Communists are actively encourag-
ing them. Ydigoras' proposed income tax law now before
congress has also aroused bitter protests from monied in-
terests as well as from leftist groups who claim that the pas-
sage of the law would serve only to increase sources for gov-
ernment graft. Guatemala now has no personal income tax
and the proposed legislation would tend to lessen the burden
of indirect taxes on those least able to pay, but this argument
is apparently obscured by the political agitation.
a leader of the party on 21 February-)
27 Feb Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 11
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679
Approved for Release:� 2020/08/11 C03172679
%IS SECRE 1
Gn
structed his adherents to contact all student, labor, and
sympathetic political groups and have them in readiness
since he had received word from "high military officials"
that the time has come to rise up against the government.
the military plans to exploit the re-
emonstrations to overthrow the regime
sultin
SECRET
27 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 12
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679
�1 I LJLi V 1 11-11,
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
The Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679
430P-SECRET r
-TOP-5E0MT-
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679