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August 14, 2020
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August 27, 2020
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February 27, 1961
Vt. Approved for Release: 2020108111C03172679 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 27 February 1961 Copy No. C CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN TOP-SEC-RET- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679 T-OP-SEORET- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679�; �TOP-5=T 27 February 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1. USSR: Another probable ICBM test vehicle launched on Tyura Tam range. (Fage 2. The situation in the Congo. (Page t) 3. Moscow's publication of KhrushcIiev's letter to Nehru may have been intended to head off Indian decision to send troops to the Congo. (Page it) 4. Morocco: Death of Mohamed V expected to worsen alreptly unstable political situation; new King may face early challenge from left-wing nationalists. (Page it) 5. The situation in Laos. (Page ttt) 6. Italy: New long-term trade agreement with Moscow guarantees USSR 14 percent of Italian oil import mar- ket through 1965. (Page iv) 7. UAR-Lebanon: Nasir's propaganda attacks, aimed at bolstering Syrian-Egyptian unity, incense Lebanese Christians; new confessional strife may result. (Page v) 8. Guatemala: Dissidence within armed forces continues to threaten regime of President Ydigoras. (Page v) TOP SECRET! Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679 N \NN Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679 14100 TOP SECRET111F CENTRAs1 INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 27 February 1961 DAILY BRIEF *USSR: A test vehicle, probably an ICBM, was launched from ryi-ira Tam to the usual impact area on Kamchatka Pen- insula at about 0053Z, 27 February (1953 EST on 26 Febru- ary). This is the sixth launching from Tyura Tam this year. Two of these six were space program events; the others, prob- ably ICBM tests. This latest launch brings to 31 the number of generally successful ICBM program launchings conducted to date from Tvura Tam. Congo: LA unit of the Gizengist incursion, which on 24 February took Luluabourg, by yesterday had reached at least as far as Port Francqui, near the western border of Kasai � Province. Information available as of 0400 EST today indicate 54t-t- Lt.) the unit was continuing westward. Gizenga had sent these forces to Luluabourg ten days ago ''because of mes- t_t3Aet sages which he received from Mobutu's troops stating that theyht,,6 supported him a ir arms as soon as his forces arrived," Gizenga is now, /7, cl considering an attack on Leopoldville. If his troops should un- 'R:Ls dertake such an operation, they would be unlikely to meet sub-i stantial opposition in eastern Leopoldville Province, where ost of the tribes supported Lumumba. The Leopoldville garrision is nominally subordinate to Mobutu, but its commander reportedly stated on 25 February that his forces would not fight the Stanleyville troops. Approx- imately 2,000 troops are with Mobutu on the upper Congo River, where his attempt to conduct offensive operations against Orientale Province has bogged down. His troops have report- di been fraternizing with those of Gizenga in the Bumba 11 The Gizengist takeover of northern Kasai has brought vio- lent reactions from Gizenga's opponents. Tshombe may now TOP�SECRET \\ /34,-Jeio N.\ Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 IWO -7151-riteill'ET� 003172679 resume his suspended operations, and authorities in Leopold- ville will probably urge Mobutu to move his forces back to the capital for defensive purposes. Albert Kalonji in southern Kasai has sent a telegram to Hammarskjold, declaring that he "will stop at nothing" to assure his state's security. He lacks the capability to mount an offensive, but he has invoked his bilat- eral "defense agreement" with Tshombe. (Backup, Page 1) (Map) USSR-Congo: 0 e pt,e_LL,t-)44' Khrushchev's proposal to replace the UN operation by a commission of African states is an at- tempt to align the pro-Gizenga Casablanca powers--Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, and the UAR--with the USSR. It is also aimed at discouraging Afro-Asian governments from pro- LInaddnLfrces to the UN operation in the Congo. Moscow's publication of the letter to Nehru may have been intended to head off an Indian decision�reliably reported to have been taken earlier last week--to send a battalion of Com- bat troops to the Congo. Announcement of the decision has been delayed a few days pending further clarification of de- velopments in the Congo. Nehru's views on the Congo and the UN are unlikely to be swayed h Trk �V �rtiqhr. ev's restatement of the USSR's position (Backup, Page 3) (Map) *Morocco: (Information available as of 0400 EST) The already unstable political situation in Morocco will probably worsen following the death yesterday of King Mohamed V and the assumption of power by his son, the 31-year-old crown 27 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF ii -TOP-SteRET- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679 ked TOP SECRET prince, now Kin Hassan II. Mohamed V was the principal unifying force in the country, and Hassan's rule seems cer- tain to be challenged shortly by the National Union of Popular Forces. This organization is a strong, left-wing nationalist group led by former premier Ibrahim and others who have little respect for Hassan and are predisposed to transforming Morocco into a republic. The clash of interests could easily lead to early widespread disorders. Some outbreaks are reported to have occurred in Casablanca yesterday, with one observer describing the demonstrators as anti-Hassan. Hassan has long shown dictatorial tendencies and prob- ably will largely ignore the new cabinet appointed late yester- day. Most of the ministers are men who served in Mohamed V's cabinet; several of them have previously shown antagon- ism toward Hassan and served in the government only reluc- tantly while Hassan was deputy premier. The new King will rely principally on the 30,000-man armed forces, whose loyal- ty to him has yet to be tested. Under Hassan, Morocco's foreign policy probably will continue formally to be one of "non-alignment." It was Hassan, however, who solicited from the USSR the recent gift of Soviet jet aircraft and who, according to a recent report, initialed an agreement for Soviet economic aid during Soviet President Brezhnev's visit to Morocco in early February. It is likely that he will make further arrangements with the Sino-Soviet bloc. At the same time he may press for new concessions from the United States and France in entinPrtinn with thia nir base rights granted in 1959 and 1960. (Backup, Page 5) Laos: Since his arrival in Xieng Khouang on 22 February 0 Souvanna Phouma appears to have clearly endorsed the shadow �L-Le..) government there. The relationship had previously been somee what ambiguous, with Souvanna remaining in Phnom Penh while /.../ the Xieng Khouang regime "acted in his name." Souvanna, ac- cording to bloc radiobroadcasts, presided over a meeting of his cabinet on 23 February which decided that a "powerful army 27 Feb 61 TOP .SECRET . DAILY BRIEF iii Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679 SPAvAINO. T..1: \,..�, J.)r. 1 C PliONG ,,...i K kV. 4r... .....7 . I, Mong P. Lo � .e� ak .--5.,....) jA ik .�..! - ...--, k... .." tionZazi. / .,.. ..�..., ....., /- /- \ ....,- ...., _.,... .....' � m T HA I Muong Saqlr ..- 1 ' ./. ,' i../ L1JANG n )( � t,,,....--,,, 7..,,,,.....�.'7 r�- L''' --s�-�/"�...._ Ituang,Probang,....,,,.....; 88 Muang Nan. ng Peasonalok RABANG es Jerre The Timm �Non Kha) .1.106.i Mani ?D'n 5' THAILAND M.omidSaKon Nakhon. LAOS Government forces Government --- Antigovernment ls Antigovernment concentrations III Kong Le/Pathet Lao forces Main route number A Chinese Nationalist Irregulars 25 50 7,5 100 Miles e.1 0 25 50 75 100 Kilometers 28716.1 5-55 H Uu 556500 � Seno iv nokhet SA CNN KHET 0Mualg Vat.Tb Moans. L.s...n.� CAMBODIA Beurthaerth *es' names the not nesesson)y these recognised by the U.S. Gothrnmere. CAP MUI RON AVANE S A-K 77 Stung Irene iLE DE Kr BAD iLE CAC BA ,,,DEMARCATION LINE 013,k4o Quang In SOUTI4 -o 1 I __J.:VIETNAM I All A AT Eso Khom' 27 Feb 81 CENTRAL INItL E-NC E BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679 Approved for Release. 2020/08/11 C0317267_9_,. �400# TOP SECRET 7 must be consolidated and developed to liberate all of Laos." It also proposed the establishment of a committee to accept and distribute "relief supplies from the friendly countries," possibly a preliminary step to entering into diplomatic re- lations with neighboring North Vietnam and Communist China. LGovernment forces remain stalled in their efforts to move eastward along Route 7 toward the Plaine des Sarre& General Ouan, chief of the General Staff, attributes the lack of pro- gress to several factors: low troop morale resulting from poor logistical support; the ineffectiveness of the commander for operations, General Bounleut; and General Phoumies inability to delegate authority, which results in lack of action on a num- ber of important matters_. Both Peiping and Hanoi continue to condemn the neutral nations proposal. a letter from Chou En-lai to U Nu on 22 February labeled the proposal a scheme to "misuse the prestige of neutral na- tions like Burma and Cambodia to legalize the status quo re- sulting from the United States' interference in the internal affairs of Laos," and "to bury the Geneva agreement." This line was repeated in a 25 February People's Daily editorial. On 25 February U Nu announced that Burma would refuse to participate in the neutral natiops commission. " _ . I h ) ta y: e conciusionin Moscow on 4 JeDruary-o the Soviet-Italian trade negotiations is a major achievement in the continuing Soviet effort to acquire advanced Western en- gineering products through long-term government-to-govern- ment agreements. The new arrangements guarantee the USSR at least 14 percent of the Italian petroleum import market through 1965--approximately the proportion Moscow will sup- ply this year if deliveries are held to the scheduled 4,000,000 tons. The USSR will import large quantities of Italian chemical industry equipment, oil pipe and pipeline equipment, and other industrial goods, and has reportedly contracted for "not less) 27 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF iv Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO3172679' TOP SECRET Cthan eight" 35,000-ton oil tankers to be built in Italian shipyards. total trade under the new long-term agreement is scneauiea to reach $500,000,000 in 1965, more than double the 1960 1evel-.3 (Backup, Page 7) UAR-Lebanon: Nasirts reception in Syria during celebra- tions of the third anniversary of the union between Egypt and Syria has been the least enthusiastic he has yet received in Damascus, partly because of Syrian opposition to exchange control legislation which he recently imposed in the Syrian region. In his speeches, Nasir has attempted to arrest flag- ging Syrian support for the union by appealing again to the masses through demagogic attacks on domestic and foreign elements, including the United States for its role in the Congo crisis. Prominent among his scapegoats have been two right- ist parties in Lebanon, including the Christian Phalange party and its leader, Pierre Gemayel. There is apprehension among Lebanese Christians lest incidents which will probably result from these attacks develop into ai upsurge of serious confes- sional strife. Backup, Page 9) Guatemala:rbissidence within the armed forces continues to threaten the regime despite President Ydigoras' efforts to neutralize disgrunteled officers after the abortive coup last November, another coup will be attempted between now and mid-March, and a widely-supported anti-income tax demonstration scheduled for 28 February could serve as the occasion for such an at- tempt against the government. Although leading military dis- sidents are believed to be anti-Communists, the overthrow of the constitutional Ydigoras administration would probably enhance Communist opportunities (Backup, Page 11) 27 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF TOP SECRE7 \ 0 0 k Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679 " Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679 Brazzaville SUDAN 390 Luanda Atlantic Ocean Republic of the Congo IN DON TUNISIA 2,600 MALAY 6 MO TU 5110 Leopoldville Thysville MOROCCO Gemena Coquilhatville ' Mobutu L200 Scattered Fo ces Approximate area controlled by: Kasavubu-Mobutu Gizenga Kalonji Tsttpmb6 United Nations Forces --- Selected rdad .� Selected railroad Selected airfield X Cut railroad STATUTE MILES 400 oo 1 1 Francqui GHANA 1900, Luluabour Bak 31594 10 227 Luputa ETHIOPIA amina 1.1 sumburn LIBERIA IRELAND 655 �k, Elisa ETHIOPIA GIZENGA 7,000 Bukavu NIGERIA 500 Kongolo Albertville NIGERIA SWEDE 680 TSHOM 4,0 hville 27 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIQENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679- 1140, UP SECRET Situation in the Congo The Stanleyville forces apparently have operated with relative freedom for at least a month in northern Kasai, whose population--which includes Lumumba's own tribe, the Batatela�is generally either politically apathetic or ro- Gizenga. The Gizen a force took Luluabourg, evaded the "Nigerian na lona po ice and continued their advance to the pro- vincial capital without opposition. On their arrival, Mobutu's soldiers laid down their arms and the Gizenga forces seized the arms and ammunition. Gizenga has also re- ceived expressions of support from Leopoldville. Eastern Leopoldville Province is the Stanleyville leader's home bail- iwick, and his African Solidarity party (PSA) controls the provincial government. Some PSA members have been co- operating to a limited extent with Kasavubu and his associates, but they probably would realign themselves with Stanleyville if they� believed that the ciewasrunning strongly in favor of Gizenga. CCongolese officials in Leopoldville apparently are making frantic attempts to put together a force with which to oppose Gizenga. Acting Defense Minister Kazadi, a tribal relative of Albert Kalonji, reportedly has asked Kalonji to send his two battalions of poorly trained troops against Luluabourg�a re- quest which was reported to the UN command and drew a pro- test from chief representative Dayal objecting to Kalonji's "aggressive postures." If Kalonji should move north, there is likely to be a renewal of the tribal warfare between Balubas and Luluas-3 iKazadi reportedly is also trying to raise two battalions of volunteers in the Leopoldville area. The principal body of reg- ular troops in the province, meanwhilet has indicated that it will occupy key road crossings but will avoid battle with the Gizenga forces. The commander of the camp at Thysville re- portedly stated that the problem was a political rather than a military one) violence is continuing in outlying areas of Orientale Province, despite the efforts of TOP 5LcRET 27 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679101 local officials of the Gizenga regime to maintain control. The outbreaks appear to be local vendettas involving police units � and members of Lumumbacs National Congolese Movement, who are intimidating the population and arresting local chiefs. Meanwhile, Gizenga apparently has developed a channel for financial assistance from the UAR nlore than $1,000,000 be credited to the Uganda account of a Greek enter- preneur in Stanleyville. According to Gizenga, the Greek would then Day him the equivalent value in Congolese francs. Premier-designate Ileo has accepted an invitation from Tshombe to attend a "summit conference" of Congolese lead- ers early next month in Geneva, Invitations to this conference have also been extended to other Congo leaders, including Gizenga, but, aside from Ileo, the only non-Fatangan known to have accepted thus far is Kalonji. Tshombe's proposal--which seems unlikely to result in any meaningful conference--appears designed prin- cipally to enhance his own prestige and to reinforce Katanga's claims to sovereignty. -TOP 27 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679] -rap�sEeRE-T- q4e0 Khrushchev's Letter to Nehru One of the main purposes of Khrushchev's letter to Nehru was to establish the point that Lumumba's death vindicated Soviet proposals for reorganizing the UN structure and Mos- cow's attack last fall on Secretary General Hammarskjold. The letter repeated most of the points contained in the Soviet Government's statement of 14 February on the Congo, with �the addition of a renewed demand that the secretary general be replaced by a three-man executive organ representing the West, the Communist bloc, and the neutralists. Khrushchev charged,"It is Hammarskjold who killed Lumumba,"and de- clared,"We cannot tolerate a UN secretary general branded with this abominable murder." Khrushchev sought to counter the recent Security Council resolution which strengthens Harnma.rskjold's hand in dealing � with the Congo crisis by insisting that the UN operation has failed and that if the present situation is allowed to continue, Western forces may intervene "behind the facade of the UN." � The Soviet premier's prescription for averting this danger is the withdrawal from the Congo of all "foreign troops" and the creation of a commission composed of African states which have provided troops for the UN force. This proposed commission, which would deal only with the "legal government" of Gizenga, would have the tasks of super- vising the removal of the "aggressors," ensuring the termina- tion of "all forms of foreign intervention" and creating condi- tions for "normal activities by the Congolese government and parliament." This plan is a variant of a scheme put forward in earlv February] the UN operation would be replaced by a supervisory commission drawn from Afro-Asian states which support the Gizenga regime. ) The African commission proposal is intended in part to appear re- sponsive to Ghanaian President Nkrumah's plan for reconstitut- ing the UN force into an African command--a scheme which has been endorsed by Guinea, Mali, Morocco, and the UAR,. Khrushchev's letters also seem intended as a vigorous re- affirmation of the USSR's right to have a major voice in any TOP SECRET 27 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679 ime Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679l NS TOP SECRET Congo settlement. The harsh denunciation of Western pol- icies in the Congo provides further evidence that Khrushchev is not prepared to forego such opportunities to advance Soviet Influence and prestige in the Afro-Asian world in order to avoid offending the Western powers. The Soviet premier avoided a direct attack on the United States, but he warned certain un- named "statesmen in the West" that a "big stick" policy is "rife with mortal danger for those who pursue it." In an oblique re- ply to warnings by US leaders against any unilateral interven- tion in the Congo, Khrushchev denied that assistance to the "patriotic forces of the Congolese people and its legal govern- ment" could transform the Congo into an "area of the cold war." He said "such a formulation of the problem is radically incor- rect." CNew Delhi has not yet officially reacted to IChrushchev's letter, but Nehru, who will certainly be questioned on it in the Indian Parliament, has long been on record as opposing any "cold war" -inspired reorganization of the United Nations and has consistently supported a strengthened UN program in the Congo. Moreover, he has shown little interest in the pro- posals of the Casablanca Conference powerg3 {The Indian army staff has been alerted to prepare a unit for duty in the Congo. The Indian UN representative has been asked to obtain details from the UN Secretariat on the destina- tion and duties of the Indian contingent. The delay in announc- ing the decision on sending troops was the result of advice from the Indian foreign secretary::: TOP SECRET 27 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 003172679 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679 �sEeitEr- Noe Political Situation in Moroccor The National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP) was created In 1959 after a schism in the nationalist Istiqlal party, the party which had led the Moroccan struggle for independence. The present leaders of the UNFP dominated the Ibrahim govern- ment which served from December 1958 to May 1960, although neither former premier Abdallah Ibrahim nor former deputy premier Abderrahim Bouabid formally aligned themselves with the organization while they were still in office. Technically administered by a collegium, the party is largely urban and composed of young intellectuals, students, youth, former re- sistance fighters under Mohamed el Basri, and the Moroccan Labor Union led by Mahjoub ben Seddik. During the local elec- tions of last May, UNFP supporters polled more than 25 per- cent of the vote, gaining overwhelming majorities in the city councils of Casablanca and Rabat and many seats in all other cities. Since last May, the UNFP has concentrated on strength- ening its organization, particularly seeking followers in the armed forces. � Although the UNFP was completely loyal to Mohamed V, many leaders were beginning to be critical of him for his failure to develop Morocco into a modern state and for his insistance on grooming as his successor his elder son, the present King Hassan, who is widely unpopular among all nationalists. De- spite this personal loyalty to Mohamed, UNFP leaders refused to participate in his government last May both because they ob- jected to the authority delegated to the Crown Prince as deputy premier and because the King disregarded their demands that a representative national assembly be elected to draft a constitution. They also refused to participate in the Constitutional Council named last September to draft a constitution, because they con- sidered the council weighted in favor of the King's predilection for a strong monarchy, while they favored at most a limited monarchy responsible to the people. With the death of Mohamed V, the UNFP will probably work for the elimination of the monarchy and the institution of a republic. Although UNFP leaders are strongly influenced by Marxism, they have been sharply critical of Hassan for accepting Soviet jet 27 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679 -1=SP:r�Hi-b-r- aircraft, and have stated they would oppose the presence of Soviet technicians in Morocco. The remnants of the Istiqlal party, led by Allal el-Fassi and largely traditionalist and conservative in orientation, probably will also work toward the dissolution of the monarchy. It was the Istiqlal which created the image of Mohamed V as the national idol, but Istiqlal leaders were also becoming disillusioned with the King. Istiqlal still holds more posts In the government than any other political group and dominates the Constitutional Council. The party, however, is struggling to prevent losses both to the UNFP and to the Popular Movement. The Popular Movement is a palace-sponsored, tribal- based, largely rural organization. Although it may provide some measure of reliable support for Hassan II, it lacks dynamic leadership. Nevertheless, the appointment by Minister of the Interior Mohamed Embarek el-Bekkai (who retains the same post in Hassan's cabinet and is believed to be a behind-the- scenes director of the party) of many members of the Popular Movement to high provincial posts has ensured that organization substantial influence at the local level. The small, outlawed Moroccan Communist Party had, before its suppression last year, publicly supported Mohamed V and the monarchy. Because its leaders share the antipathy of most politicians for Hassan, it seems unlikely that the Communists will endorse the new King. The party has recently been working clandestinely to solidify its organization and was permitted, coincident with Soviet President Brezhnev's visit, � to resume publication of its weekly newspaper. � While Crown Prince, Hassan II was restrained by his father from suppressing opposition elements. Recognizing the limited base of his support, he now may strike out against some of the more powerful opposition leaders in order to attempt to thwart a move against him. SECRET 27 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679 SECRE New Soviet-Italian Trade Agreements Concluded in Moscow Soviet-Italian trade achieved only modest growth prior to 1959, when it amounted to a total of about $120,000,000. Last year it rose to more than $200,000,000 and the four-year tar- get of $512,000,000 set by a pact which expires this year prob- ably will be exceeded by about 20 percent. To ensure continued expansion of this trade, as well as its coordination with the re- quirements of the Soviet Seven-Year Plan (1959-65), Moscow appears to have successfully consolidated several individual_ transactions into the framework of a single long-term agree- ment, one which includes guaranteed quotas for key commod- ities. The new agreement includes the commodities covered by the special barter arrangement signed in Moscow last fall by Enrico Mattel, head of the Italian state fuels agency. In return for 12,000,000 tons of Soviet crude and fuel oil between 1960 and 1965, Mattel agreed to deliver steel pipeline, pipeline equipment, and synthetic rubber to the USSR. CUnder the new guaranteed market scheme, Soviet oil sales to Italy are to rise by only about 100,000 tons a year, reaching 4,500,000 tons a year by 1965-3 Lit is likely, partly because of Italy's re-export role, that the scheduled amounts will be exceeded. Scheduled Soviet etro- leum deliveries to Italy, are probably understated considerably and omit at least the Soviet oil handled by the Italians for other. Western im- porters. , total Soviet petroleum shipments to Italy iast year included 3,600,000 tons of crude oil and 1,600,000 tons of petroleum products, accounting for some 25 to 30 percent of all Soviet oil exports to the free world. An unknown portion of the crude oil, however, is processed by Italian refineries and re-exported in accordance with Soviet trade arrangements with third countries-7) E_The Italian decision to construct tankers for the USSR is an important gain for Moscow which last fall embarked on an ex- tensive effort to build up a modern tanker fleet through the ac- quisition of large Western vessels. The USSR undertook nego- tiations with a number of nonbloc countries�particularly JapanD SEeRET- 27 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679 NNW Noe Cthe Netherlands, and Italy�in which it sought to stimulate competition for the Soviet market. In November, Rome "temporarily suspended" action on a proposed sale of two large tankers to the Soviet Union pending a NATO-sponsored review of Soviet oil policies. The Italians warned, however, that they could not hold the line if other nonbloc countries, notably Japan, were to conclude shipbuilding contracts with Moscow. The USSR's purchase of several tankers from Japan and the Netherlands last fall probably was instrumental in prompting Ital 's decisioitiojndd new a.greemenE3 SECRE,7 27 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679 '*4IS 1.4.113440EFSITtAt� The UAR Anniversary Celebration in Syria The crowds at the UAR anniversary parade and for Nasir's speeches in Damascus on 22 February were smaller and less demonstrative than in previous years despite perfect weather, the mobilization of all school children, and the importation of people by truck and bus. While the Moslem fast of Ramadan, television coverage of the parade, and the diminished novelty of Nasir's presence after six previous visits partially accounts for this, disillusionment with the regime is certainly another factor. Nasir antagonized the business community by his ex- change control decree of 5 February and many businessmen were notably absent from the parade. According to the consu- late general, a current joke has it that some Damascenes hung out black crepe on "Unity Day," and when accused of being un- patriotic, they protested that the crepe was for Lumumba. Probably the most important reason for Nasir's visit to Syria is the high-level political dissatisfaction that has devel- oped in the Northern Region, including wrangling within the Syrian Executive Council over the dictatorial behavior of the Council's president, Alxl al-Hamid Sarraj. There have been reports that Nasir was going to remove Sarraj from direct control of affairs in Syria, possibly by transferring him to a position in Egypt. However,Nasir, in his first speech upon ar- riving at Latakia on 20 February, labeled such reports as "non- sense?' Sarrays firm control of the Syrian internal security ap- paratus is especially needed now when the exchange controls are being imposed. Nash has vigorously defended the exchange controls in his speeches and has attacked those who oppose them as "exploiting capitalists" whom he accuses of transferring their profits abroad. "Who of the people here transfers 1,000 liras abroad," he asked the crowd at Latakia. "Nobody;' was his own answer. He also made reference to the Koranic injunction against usury. There have been other Islamic overtones to Nasir's current visit and he has made no overtures to Syria's Christian minority, which is well-known to be largely unsympathetic to the regime. On the other hand he accused Lebanon's Phalange party, a Maronite CONFIDENTIAL 27 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679 �L 1L#L4A I zrlLj .111Id *1111 Christian organization, of instigating sectarianism to the detriment of Arab unity. Reasserted that the UAR which out of courtesy to the Lebanese people had remained silent on the activities of "imperialist agents" in Lebanon, could no longer remain silent. "We have ways to stop elements which go too far," he threatened. In a previous speech he noted, "The Phalange party is represented in the Lebanese Government; we cannot forget or ignore this fact." These attacks were in response to earlier criticisms of Nasir by Phalange leader and Lebanese Minister of Finance Pierre Gemayel as well as by the party's newspaper. Nasir implied that the Phalange is subservient to France and lik- ened Gemayel's comments to those of the Israeli radio. Following Nasir's first attack, Gemayel retorted that the UAR President apparently. "is not looking for friends but for followers and agents." However, Moslem extremists in Lebanon, together with Druze leader Kemal Jumblatt, have sided with Nasir. As a result, an upsurge of Moslem-Christian tension has occurred which the embassy in Beirut fears may lead to violent incidents. Nasir also has attacked as "fascist" the Social National party of Lebanon, an affiliate and remnant of the Syrian party which was purged in 1955 following the assassination of pro- Nasir Colonel Malki, who was slated to be chief of staff of the Syrian army. Some members of the party, escaped to Lebanon. Nasir has revived this pre-UAR episode together with past al- legations of United States complicity in the party's activities. In a speech on 24 February he stated flatly that the party "is financed by America to attack the UAR." Nasir fixed "guilt" for Lurnumba's murder primarily on Tshombe, ,secondarily on Kasavubu for delivering Lumurnba to Tshombe, and on the United States for continuing to support Kasavubu despite his "guilt." He claimed the United States was equally guilty because its "agent," Kasavubu, has just contrib- CONFIDENTIAL 27 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 10 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679 SECRET Guatemalan Government Threatened - President Ydigoras, who has ruled in a relatively benev- olent manner since his election in early 1958, has survived numerous efforts to unseat him that would have defeated a man less adroit in manipulating his enemies against one an- other. His judicious distribution of graft and political favors has given his regime a semblance of organized political sup- port. However, the constantly shifting political alignments offer him no real security, and the military remains the key to the survival of his administration, as it has of all previous Guatemalan governments. In recent years, the Guatemalan armed forces have shown themselves notably responsive to what they interpret to be pub- lic opinion--which is often, in fact, merely the agitation of an irresponsible opposition and� of the highly articulate and rad- ically-inclined students. In view of the highly agitated state of "public opinion" at the moment, and the fact that numerous army officers may be reaching the climax of long-standing re- sentment over what they consider the President's favoritism toward certain "political" officers, Ydigoras may shortly be facing the gravest threat to his continuation in office. Ydigoras in the past two weeks has strongly pressured a recalcitrant congress for passage of two laws, both of which have aroused stormy protests. Congress on 21 February passed a watered-down version of Ydigoras' proposed legis- lation to replace an expiring decree for controlling Communist activity. University students are in the forefront of a strong campaign protesting the law as an infringement of civil rights, and Communists and pro-Communists are actively encourag- ing them. Ydigoras' proposed income tax law now before congress has also aroused bitter protests from monied in- terests as well as from leftist groups who claim that the pas- sage of the law would serve only to increase sources for gov- ernment graft. Guatemala now has no personal income tax and the proposed legislation would tend to lessen the burden of indirect taxes on those least able to pay, but this argument is apparently obscured by the political agitation. a leader of the party on 21 February-) 27 Feb Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 11 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679 Approved for Release:� 2020/08/11 C03172679 %IS SECRE 1 Gn structed his adherents to contact all student, labor, and sympathetic political groups and have them in readiness since he had received word from "high military officials" that the time has come to rise up against the government. the military plans to exploit the re- emonstrations to overthrow the regime sultin SECRET 27 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 12 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679 �1 I LJLi V 1 11-11, THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor The Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director CONFIDENTIAL Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679 430P-SECRET r -TOP-5E0MT- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172679