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August 14, 2020
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August 27, 2020
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April 24, 1961
PDF icon CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15815562].pdf715.27 KB
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172680 %IT ZIMMG I 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) Nall 24 April 1961 Copy No. C c.q '1 CENTRAL TELLIGENCE BULLETIN -TOP-SECRET- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172680 pproved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172680 -TOP-SECRET -FOPSECRET- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172680 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172680 - V / 24 April 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1. French military insurgent control spreading. (Page t) 2. Situation in the Congo. (Page VI) 3. Situation in Laos. (Page it) 4. Cuba: Swiss Embassy in Havana believes situation graver than can be seen from outside. (Page ti) TOP SECRET , Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172680 _Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172680 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 24 April 1961 DAILY BRIEF *France: (Information (Information as of 0430 EST) French military 0 k insurgent control has been extended to most of Algeria and government fears that the insurrection will spread to metro- politan France have increased. a. relatively small insurgent/4,27 force could seize the centers of power in Paris and there is?i,/ doubt that regular security and police forces in France could4� be relied on for active opposition to French army unitQ The government's claim on 23 April that a paratroop attack on Par'ci from Algeria was imminent and its arming of some civilian ("7 volunteer defenders were probably intended primarily to galf vanize public sentiment against the insurrection and demonstrt j9 � to the army De Gaulle's widespread popular backing. Never- the less. an early army move against Paris remains possib 307o TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172680 Aproved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172680 P (zing Sa I y IPHONG SALY es3/4; " vor .....4Dien Bien Phu / s 4 NAM%ITHA �* \' % I Nam Bac I -% /!Auong Sai S1 Neual LUANG1PRABANG� (-( AM NEUA Luang Prabang 4/-? X I E :KHOUtnNG -MuOn) - Ban SAYABOURY NORTHERN LAOS -1 GOVERNMENT Forces n KONG LE - PATHET LAO Contact 41110 i KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS ROAD --TRAIL 0 ROUTE NUMBER 9i610424 2 50 . 1 STATUTE MILES ou Khoun .-)Ban Phalk v Mg% 100 I ?Cieng Khouan Ban Ta.Viang Tha Thom Vang Vieng - Borikhaa$,, Pak Sane .3 VIENTIANE Vientiane Kam Keut k &in t 1 KHAMM UANE Nhommar t ,.. Thnkhek tAahaxayi , S'avannakhet 24 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172680 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172680 tiks �if,- � A �.7 ii Congo: In the follow-up constitutional talks which are scheduled to begin today at Coquilhatville in Equateur Prov- ince, President Kasavubu and Congolese factions represented in the Leopoldville government appear determined to press Tshombe to agree to a tighter federal structure for the Congo than envisaged at Tananarive, c_rshombe's personal position has weakened significantly since the March conference, and he is also under increasing pressure from Brussels to adopt a less provocative attitude toward the UN Representatives of the Stanleyville regime are not expected to attend the Co uilhatville talks. (Page 3) (Map) Laos: akhe government stronghold of Vang Vieng on Route 13 hTsTheen taken by Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces. Vang fall followed a well-coordinated enemy offensive both north and/4" south of Phou Khoun junction. Government troops to the north - of Phou Khoun fell back initially but, according to subsequent reports, rallied to retake their lost positionq /P4i �cit, ahe Soviet request that the issuance of a cease-fire appealle,_/ invitations to a conference, and an approach to Nehru on reacti-4/ h7' vating the ICC be delayed until today apparently was intended to give Chinese leaders time to talk with Souvanna Phouma, who arrived in Peiping on 22 Aprilg The scheduling of Soviet transports for flights into Laos was resumed on 23 April. No airlift sorties into Laos were noted on 22 April. (Page 5) (Map) Cuba: The Swiss Embassy in Havana has reported that a 6 large part of the population there is armed and in a fanatical mood and that massacres could occur if passions continued to2,1 /pot � rise. A number of American citizens have sought Swiss pro- tection, and the Swiss are consulting the Canadian and Britis ambassadors on the possibility of negotiating the Americans' evacuation. The report, passed to the US Embassy in Berna. on 22 April, noted that the situation in Cuba is graver than canZ., 24 Apr 61 DAILY BRIEF 1. TOP SECRET 4/ 5/ A Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172680 ki�O � �Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172680 be seen from outside. Several hundred American citizens elected to remain in Cuba after the United States severed di lomatic relations with the Castro regime last January. 1 Unconfirmed reports received by the Swiss Embassy in Havana state that the Cuban Government has arrested about 20,000 persons, I authorities in Camaguey Province alone had seized 5,000 people, including 43 priests. A growing number of Latin American chiefs of state, including the presidents of Mexico and Venezuela, are urging the Castro government to treat its political prisoners with clemency. Khrushchev's letter to President Kennedy on 22 April re- ferred to the US presence there "against the clearly expressed wish of the Cuban people and government." This is probably Intended to suggest that the USSR would support any Cuban de- mand that the US relinquish its base at Guantanamo. 24 Apr 61 DAILY BRIEF TOP SECRET 9/// Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172680 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172680 Noe French Military Revolt Spreads CA11 regular communications with Algeria were out 22- 23 April, but a member of Debre's personal staff admitted on 23 April that only two enclaves near Oran--an army base at Tlemcen and the large naval base at Mers-el-kebir--re- main outside insurgent control. Admiral Querville, French naval commander in the Mediterranean, is reported to be in sympathy with the insurgent leaders, but he is not thought to have turned the Mers-el-kebir base over to them. The list of units which the insurgents claim as actively adhering to the revolt total about a quarter of total army strength in Algeria and appears to include practically all the units which have been engaged in active operations'D Several key military personnel in Algeria including the Air Force Commander General Bigot have apparently joined the revolt. Army General Jean-Marie Gouraud, the Constan- tine Army Corps commander, is quoted by Algiers radio as having turned all units under his command over to the in- surgents. General Andre Petit, deputy Saharan commander, is reported openly participating on the side of the insurgents. Some of the colonels who participated in previous extremist activity against the government slipped back to Algeria in time to join the rising. General Salan, the only one of the four coup leaders not in Algeria when it was first launched, has reportedly reached Algiers from Spain. There is at present no specific evidence of political in- volvement in the insurrection, aeefveral reports state that Challe and the other military lea ers claim that they want only to force De Gaulle to modify his Algerian policy but, if forced to depose him, would install a government com- posed of rightist political figures. Most often mentioned for high government posts are former Gaullist Jacques Soustelle, ex-Premier Georges Bidault, and several rightist Socialist leaders who favor French retention of Algeria. The military reportedly would limit themselves to a few key cabinet posts:,-) In France, a number of high ranking officers are reported in sympathy with the insurgents, but at present none has openly identified himself with Algiers. Both General Olie, the Chief of Staff for National Defense and Louis Joxe, Minister for Al- gerian Affairs, have reportedly urged De Gaulle to move 24 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIEGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172680 Neal Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172680 %NO cautiously against the revolt as a result of their brief visit to Algeria. De Gaulle, however, appears determined to main- tain his uncompromising stand against the insurgent leaders and the government has reportedly started planning a block- ade of Algeria. a government official has estimated that Algeria could hold out for 15 days on its present stocks.-3 Immediate concern in Paris, however, has focused on the possibility of a paratroop invasion from Algeria, where there is probably sufficient air transport for this purpose. air Force General Andre Puget, acting Chief of Staff for National Defense, said that 5000 men could take the key government ministries. Puget said he felt there would be no violent public reaction to such a move and that neither military nor security forces in France wodld oppose iti3 It was probably to guard against such a rapid takeover, as well as for psychological reasons, that the Ministry of Interior announced the issuing of arms to civilian volunteers. The volunteers were urged to ready themselves for action against a paratroop attack. Representatives of nearly all major parties rallied to the government although Interior officials reportedly tried to limit arms distribution to known members of the Gaullist Union for the New Republic. The apparent success of these first attempts by De Gaulle to con- solidate his vast but amorphous public support probably more than offsets the risks inherent in the creation of a "citizen's army. it Meanwhile communist leaders have issued calls to other leftist groups urging unity of action in demonstrations against the insurrection. The free trade unions have thus far, however, been reluctant to do more than make similar, but separate, strike calls. A one-hour stoppage throughout France has been called by the major unions for 11 EST today. SECRET 24 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172680 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C0317268_k0 re, Pointe Noih-rs 1 Banana Brazzaville Matadi Kitona NDONESIA 870 619424 Luanda INDIA 300 TUNISIA 3.200 NIGERIA 400 IN 280 MOBUTU 720O � Leopoldvi ysville ic of the Congo .Gemena Scattered _Forces_ MOBUTU Scattered Forces DVILLE- :sal Aket MOBUP:rujil'b:ajBaso_ko 800 �Boende Ikela. uluabourg Bak n GHANA 1600 Approximate area nominally controlled by: Fl Kasavubu-Mobutu Gizenga [2:3 Kalonji Tshombe En United Nations Forces (Service Forces - Selected road not included) --1-37:Selected railroad =Selected airfield STATUTE MILES 400 I I I MALAYA 470 LIBERIA Luputa ETHIOPIA ETHIOPIA MALAYA 400 INDIA Lake Albert NIGERIA 500 Usumbura Lake irwka IRELAND 650 SWEDEN 650 24 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172680 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172680 "-LEL,/ 4.-4.2.11-JCs A NINP1 Situation in the Congo aatangat President Tshombe is showing increasing anxiety over the official Belgian attitude toward his regime as the new government of the Social Christian (Catholic) and Socialist parties prepares to take over in Brussels, prob- ably this week. Long unhappy over Belgium's failure to give him unqualified backing, he now apparently fears that Brus- sels is moving toward closer support of the Leopoldville gov- ernment at Katangat expense:1\ Tshombe would be greatly disturbed by Belgium's resumption of full diplomatic relations with the central government Dis- cussions on this matter now are man advanced stage and, ac- cording to the Belgian counselor in Washington, will probably bear fruit before mid-June. Tshombe in effect accused Brus- sels of planning to "stab him in the back" and threatened to follow the advice of anti-Belgian members of his regime, some of whom reportedly are pressing for the replacement of Belgian advisers with French nationals) the new government headed by Prime Minister Lefevre would attempt to nudge Tshombe toward closer alignment with Leopoldville while supporting long-term policies designed to enable the central government ultimately to exercise its authority over Katanga. At the same time, Brussels will try to avoid precipitating Tshombe's downfall since Belgian of- ficials are convinced that chaos and disorder would result Early measures being contemplated include withdrawal of cer- tain key Belgian advisers and the appointment of a more ener- getic consul general in Elisabethvilles2-1 t.Paul Henri Spook, who is expected to be the new Belgian foreign minister, has already indicated he intends to exercise tighter control over Belgian activities in the Congo by absorb- ing the Ministry of African Affairs into the Foreign Ministry. He -? 24 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172680 Nee Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172680 JAJ 4.L AI L Creportedly also hopes to force Belgian firms with holdings in the Congo to cooperate in channeling all Belgian aid and financial support through the central government in Leopoldville Neanwhile, the Sudanese UN contingent, originally totaling 394 men, has returned to Khartoum. The withdrawal was or earlylagt month after Sudanese troops were forced out of Matadi by Mobutu's elements of the Congolese Army. However, the Sudan, while critical of the UN's handling of the Matadi inci- dent, continues to support the over-all UN effort in the Congo. Sudanese officials have indicated that after a suitable period a new and better trained unit would be assigned to the UN opera- tion') SECRET 24 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172680 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172680 v.re loaf Situation in Laos _Government troops that withdrew from yang Vieng shortly after midnight of 22 April, after being under heavy enemy at- tack all day, now are moving southward. Stocks of POL and ammunition were destroyed prior to the withdrawal. Vientiane is sending several companies of troops northward to reinforce defensive positions some distance, south of yang Vien LA government rout north of Phou Khoun junction on 22 April apparently was forestalled only by the commander's threat to turn his artillery on his own men if they fell back farther. Government troops in this area now are planning a diversionary attack to assist the forces withdrawing southward from Vang Vieng-0-) Luang Prabang Province and southern Nam Tha Province, increased enemy military activity was apparent on 21 April. These probing actions, although possibly only a temporary show of force, may presage more widespread enemy activity in these areas in the near future. Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces are also continu- ing their pressure on government troops south of the Plaine des Jarres. In the Thakhek area of central Laos, no recent change in the military situation has been reported (After Soviet officials had agreed with the British ambassador to issue on 22 April a cease-fire appeal, invitations to a confer- ence, and an approach to Nehru on reactivating the ICC, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Pushkin requested that action be deferred until 24 April, ostensibly to give the USSR additional time to in- form interested posts-.) The communique issued on 22 April at the end of Souvanna's visit to Moscow noted that "real conditions now exist to normalize the situation in Laos." The general line the USSR will take in the forthcoming negotiations was foreshadowed in the statement that both "governments" agreed that a political settlement should be based on the Geneva Agreements of 1954; the Vientiane agree- ments of 1956-57, which governed the "integration" of the Pathet Lao into the Laotian government and armed forces; and the joint SECRET 24 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page .5 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172680 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172680 V.A...4 NW" statement by Souvanna and Neo Leo Hak Sat leader Prince Souphannouvong of November 1960, which outlined the prin- ciples of a neutral policy for Laos. The communique also expressed the USSR's readiness to extend economic and technical assistance to Laos and announced that Moscow will build a hosral and a radio station in Laos as a gift to the Laotian people. In a talk with the Canadian am- bassador in Moscow, Souvanna confirmed that the USSR had promised economic aid_3 The USSR also won Souvanna's endorsement of Soviet po- sitions on peaceful coexistence, Cuba, disarmament, liquida- tion of colonialism, and the admission of Communist China to the United Nations. 24 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172680 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11= CO3172680 V JP .1 LAE-, JUI27 ,Naror Neie THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03172680 v.,/ ei7/7,07zrzzizzz,