CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/05/25

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03172686
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: May 25, 1961

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,
INTELLIGENCE
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c/i-2
3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c)
25 May 1961
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
BULLETIN
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14400 1 LB- Jr.,urtr,
25 May 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
�
1. Laos. (Page t)
2. South Korea. (Page it)
3. Congo: Maneuvering on reconvening of parliament con-
tinues. (Page it)
. Cambodia: Apprehension over Laos results in decrease
of feuding with Thailand and South Vietnam. (Page tit)
5. African Labor Conference: Ghana and Guinea pressing
for militant and anti-Western trade union federation.
(Page tit)
6. Greece: Agreement on association with Common Market
encounters snags. (Page iv)
7. Iceland: Work stoppage by Communist-controlled unions
threatened on 29 May. (Page tv)
8. Ecuad r: Vice president and congressional group to visit
�1)
USSR.
(Page tv)
9. Dominican Republic: Trujillo reportedly staging overthrow
of puppet president as sop to opposition. (Page v)
10. Watch Committee Conclusions. (Page v)
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ire
rig Saly
.0. SALY
IDien Bien Phu
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LUANG PR
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lAYABOURY �
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NORTHERN LAOS
GOVERNMENT
KONG LE - PATHET LAO Contact
Forces in
KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS
ROAD
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0 ROUTE NUMT
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VIENTIANE Bankhaile
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Vientiane
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A E
Kam Kent
KHAMM
Nhomma
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SAVANUKHET
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
25 May 1961
DAILY BRIEF
Laos: LT_Ile tripartite talks at Namone on 24 May resulted
in an agreement to "examine" a proposal, advanced by the 4
Souvanna group, to discuss formation of a unified delegation ../.4,e
to the Geneva Conference which would represent the "Kingdom,/
of Laos," rather than any Laotian "government." The rest of 1
the session was devoted to a reiteration of the opposing views e,144., /.?s
which have thus far deadlocked the talks. The Vientiane gov-
ernment still maintains that no substantive political talks should /
begin until a mixed military committee is established to regu-
late the cease-fire in cooperation with the icpj
'ffhere are indications that the Pathet Lao is making a con-
certed effort to eliminate isolated pockets of Laotian Army re-
sistance in Sam Neua Province. In the Pa Dong area, Pathet
Lao - Kong Le forces continue their operations against the
Laotian army force of Meo guerrillagi
Bloc airlift operations into Laos were scheduled through
25 May. (Backup, Page I) (Map)
jibe Watch Committee at its meeting on 24 May reached
the following conclusion concerning Lao..�3
gommunist forces in Laos appear determined to eliminate
the government's Meo guerrilla bases in Xieng Khouang Prov-
ince and particularly Ban Pa Dong, where intensified Communist
attacks are expected. The Communists continue to improve their
military position throughout Laos in an effort to reinforce their
political hand in the current negotiations and to place themselvfE
TO12-SEE1E1-
WA
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rip
Pointe
Noire
Brazzaville
Banana Matadi
\ Kitona
61GM9
LIBERIA
200
,f
INDIA
TUNISIA
NIGERIA
Gemena
Scattered force
MOBUTU
3 ,400
Bangassou
the
f�
Bondo
Lisa Ake
Rumba
Basoko-
MOBUTU
800
EQUATEU
1 ,- Coquilhatville
� Boende
ETHIOPIA
200
tp, .
GIZENGA
7,000
MOBUTU 1
MALAYA
7,200 Scattered Forces poo
uluabourg
Bak
GHANA
1.600
Approximate area nominally controlled by:
Luanda Kasavubu-Mobutu
Gizenga
EMI Kalonji
Tshombe
United Nations Forces (Service Forces
- Selected road not included)
Selected railroad
Selected airfield
STATLIT,E MILES .
40.0
LIBERIA
230
Luputa
Omin
ETHIOPIA
nleyville
ETHIOPIA
800
MALAYA
500
INDIA
300
A
INDIA
wb. 0 VI 0 4:0
NIGERIA
1,#Jsumbura
r
//
k
Kongolo
Kabalo
Albertville
NIGERIA
600
�Manono
TSHOMBE
7,000
Elitabethville.
IRELAND
650
SWEDEN
870
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kiarl 1 LI1' 3r,t.,rct,
a favorable position to resume full-scale hostilities in the
event the current negotiations collapse. There is a risk of a
clash between Communist forces and South Vietnamese forces.
reported to be in Laos east of Tchepre3
South Korea: rile Watch Committee at its meeting on 24 b
May reached the following conclusion concerning South Korea) 4
aability of the new government in South Korea is threa-
ened by increasing factionalism in the Supreme Council for ..4�
National Reconstruction. Continued lack of response by ROICeLc_te_
Army officers to CINCUNC direction, the relief of experi-
enced commanders, and the failure of the military regime to'- 3 Pt- .1
restore to CINCUNC operational control over some elements
of the ROK armed forces have at least temporarily impaired
the UNC military posture in South Korea. While there is no evi-
dence of North Korean military preparations to take advantage
of the unsettled situation, dissension within the coup group could
make the ROK increasingly susceptible to Communist propaganda
and subversion.
( ackup, Page 4)
Congo: gizenga's call for the reconvening of parliament at
Kamina apparently is coming under criticism from the small
group in Leopoldville which still supports him. Leopoldville
Provincial President Kamitatu, who has been trying to keep a
foot in both the Kasavubu and the Gizenga camps, reportedly as-
serted recently that a meeting in Leopoldville would offer greater
opportunity for manipulation of the legislators by Gizenga and
Kamitatu than would one in Kamina. Indian Charge Rahman,
who reportedly has been advising Gizenga supporters in Leo-
poldville (he claims without the knowledge of the Indian Govern-
ment) and who has also served as a channel for funds from
Gizenga to Kamitatu, is said to have stated that if Gizenga does
not cooperate in coming to an agreement with Leopoldville,
India will lose interest in helping the Congo solve its prob-
lems.
25 May 61
DAILY BRIEF
Gizenga's 21.11)
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or a meeting at Kamina has, however, received support from
Ghanaian President Nkrumah, who offered to assist in furnish-
ing militar erotection to such a meeting. Soviet UN delegate
Zorin,
According to press reports, new military activity is tak--
ing place in southern Kasai Province. A UN report has ex-
pressed the belief that aggressive movements against tribal
(Backup, Page 6)
African Labor Conference: Labor leaders from most
African countries are meeting in Casablanca, starting on 25
May, to set up an independent All-African Trade Union Fed-
eration (AATUF). Several African regimes�notably those of
Ghana and Guinea--have promoted the projected organization
as a vehicle for advancing their militant and anti-Western brand
of pan-Africanism. Representatives from these countries can
be expected to press vigorously for an early severance of ties
25 May 61
DAILY BRIEF iii
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Nor 1 ij 1-A-,11,Li I
1101
between the participating labor union and international labor
organizations based outside Africa, especially the pro-Western
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). The
strength of counterbalancing representatives to this conference
from ICFTU affiliates and allied Western-oriented unions is not
clear. (Backup, Page 7)
z
Greece - Common Market: Greece's association with the 3A-4J
European Common Market (EECr based on an agreement in
March between Athens and the EEC Commission, has encoun-
tered some snags. Italy, in particular, is objecting to the ex-22--
tent to which Greek products would gain access to markets in jA_LI
the EEC. Modifications of the EEC agreement which the Gree4t
may have to accept are not likely to be major, and the Greek
Government is counting on successful conclusion of these nego- ir -3 �
tiations to enhance its prestige before it schedules general elec-
tions. Greece is pressing the US to intervene with the EEC in
its behalf. The EEC Council will again meet to consider Greek
association on 29 11/1_af. (Backup,
Page 9)
Iceland: A number of Communist-controlled trade unions
are threatening Iceland with a major work stoppage on 29 May
over new wage contracts. A Communist success in bringing
about an extensive strike could directly threaten the existence 0 4,
of Prime Minister Thorst pro-Western Conservative - Social
Democratic government, whose future is closely linl��
� stabilization program adopted a year ago.
(Backup, Page 11)
iEcuador-USSR: Epuadorean Vice President Arosemena
has accepted a Soviet invitation extended to him and a group of
Ecuadorean congressmen to visit the USSR.
Arosemena has suggested 1 June
las a satisfactory date to begin the visit.
Former Foreign Minister Chiriboga, who resigned on 10 May in
opposition to President Velasco's pro-Cuba policy, has told tli9
25 May 61
DAILY BRIEF
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/
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)american ambassador that he believes Arosemena's trip will
encourage anti-Communist activities in Ecuador. Chiriboga
feels that rightists may even attempt a coup against the regime:7
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*Doininican Republic: tErujillo is planning to overthrow his
puppet President Balaguer, according to information given
separately to the American Consulate on 23 May by the Brit-
ish ambassador and the Brazilian consul. Both link these re-
ports to rumors that the dictator is planning a trip abroad and
feel that he may be about to stage a maneuver designed to end
in his being recalled to "save the country." The American con-
sul notes that Balaguer is under increasingly heavy fire from
Trujillo-controlled propaganda media and that such a maneu-
ver would be consistent with previous Trujillo actions when he
was hard pressed.
(Backup, Page 1
WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS
A. ao change from last weeg
. ao change from last weelS
C. fiAOS: Carried on Page i of the Daily Brij
D. fOUTH KOREA: Carried on Page ii of the Daily Brieg
25 May 61
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DAILY BRIEF
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Situation in Laos
fflhoumi has told an American Embassy officer that he
and Boun Oum are thinking of proposing an 11-man joint del-
egation for Geneva comprising five government members and
five representatives of Souvanna and the Pathet Lao, with
former Premier Phoui Sananikone as delegation head. It
seems unlikely, however, that Phoumi could gain the assent
of Souvanna and the Pathet Lao to such unequal representation./
Lhai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman indicated to Am-
bassador Harriman on 23 May that his delegation intended to
take a strong stand at Geneva in support of efforts to get rep-
resentatives of five pro - Boun Oun government political parties
seated at the Geneva Conference. Thanat has already proposed
to the Geneva co-chairmen that two of the three seats allocated
to the Laotian government be allocated to representatives of
the political parties on a rotational basis, with the remaining
seat left vacant until and if the Laotian government chooses to
occupy it. Gromyko has rejected the proposal, according to
Thanat, claiming that there was an oral understanding that only
"three forces" would be seated at Geneva. Despite Gromyko's
rebuff, Thanat plans to proceed with his efforts on the basis of
conference documents which in his opinion offer him as a del-
egate the right to nominate those elements he wishes to repre-
sent Laos. He intends to give the impression that the Thai
delegation may walk out on the conference if this issue is not
satisfactorily resolv!g
the three most influential
men in the area are Pathet Lao leaders Phoumi Vongvichit--
now in Geneva--Colonel Singkapo, and Quinim Pholsena, lead-
er of the Souvanna Phouma delegation at Geneva.
Quinim has more power than Souvanna. who he alleges has
been reduced to a figurehead.
Kong Le's troops have no real power.
the Pathet Lao does not want to negotiate but wants to resume
its military drive to conquer Laos.
ICC, located in Xieng Khouang town, is denied access to ,7
25 May May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
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anajor Pathet Lao - Kong Le military base area at the Plaine
des Jarres-.3
A further indication of Laotian - South Vietnamese coop-
eration in the Tchepone area
South Vietnam had granted
permission for transports carrying two companies of Laotian
troops to land at the Hu d airport, whence they would presumably
march overland to take up their assigned post a few miles in-
)side Laos.
iboth South Vietnamese special and regular army
forces are in this general area of Lai.:217
The Chinese Communists, who apparently envisage a
lengthy stay in Geneva, have continued to depict the US as the
stumbling block to "real progress." Reviewing developments
in Geneva during the past week, a People's Daily editorial of
24 May derides the US for "disgusting behavior" and for resort-
ing to "every possible means to impede progress." The US is
accused of preparing for "new military adventures" in Laos
while "clamoring" for a cease-fire at the conference table. The
People's Daily warns that each step forward at Geneva will be
possible only after a "severe struggle" with the US.
Airlift activity for 23 May involved a total of 14 sorties--
thirteen by Soviet transports and one by a North Vietnamese
aircraft. Of this number, three Soviet transports were re-
flected in flights into Laos.
Since 16 May, relatively large numbers of bloc transports
have been scheduled to the Vinh and Dong Hoi areas of North
Vietnam. Between five and eight transports have been sched-
uled to these points daily except on 18 May. On 21 May three
IL-14s were scheduled to fly from Vinh to Xieng Ehouang, and
on 22 May three IL-14s were scheduled to fly from Vinh to
Muong Ngat, a former Lao army post northeast of Paksane and
near the Vietnam border which was seized by enemy forces on
13 May.
The scope of the operation involving Vinh and Dong Hoi in-
dicates that a stockpiling operation is taking place at these two
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tole Nrie
locations, possibly in connection with reports of a Communist
build-up in the Tchepone area.
Paradrop activities in the vicinity of Kep Airfield--located
about 45 miles northeast of Hanoi--indicate that this site may be
used for training in airdropping personnel and materiel into
Laos. Soviet transports began flying to Kep in mid-March.
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South Korea
The Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR)
is continuing efforts to promote popular support for the mili-
tary regime. The thoroughness of the campaign was indicated
by the details announced in the South Korean press concerning
the demonstration held in Taegu on 22 May. Organizers are
reported to have required that each household provide one
participant; factories were ordered closed so that all employees
could attend; all businessmen were ordered to be present. The
groups from each precinct were required to bring two placards
displaying approved slogans. About 35,000 people were present
at the Taegu demonstration, but the rally was described as
lackluster. The American Embassy reports that although
there is evidence of "increasing disenchantment" on the part
of educated persons and students, general public attitudes
range from "acceptance of the coup and military rule to be-
wildered confusion as to changes."
Of the persons reported arrested since the coup, over 600
are politicians, 540 are teachers, but only 70 are students,
bearing out previous indications that the regime intended to
handle the student problem cautiously. The arrest of the poli-
ticians muzzles such potential opposition leaders as former
speaker of the lower house Kwak Sang-hun, and vice speaker
So Min-ho. foreign Minister Kim Hyong-il told American
Charge Green yesterday he had discussed the matter of the
arrest of political leaders with the SCNR and that he was making
efforts to get at least the members of the Chang Myon cabinet
returned to their homes soon. Lieutenant General Chang To-
yong also told Charg�reen yesterday that political arrests
would soon be stopped and that certain persons who had been
arrested would be released after they had been screened and
cleared; he said that members of the Chang cabinet, with one
or two exceptions, would be taken from jail and put under house
arres,g
E.k.4. Force chief Lieutenant General Kim Shin told the Ameri-
can air attach�n Seoul on 22 May that regime leaders Chang
To-yong and Pak Chong-hut had informed him the militaLy"
-SEC-RE--
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Cancers under arrest might be shown some consideration when
the situation was stabilized. However, he said that Lieutenant
General Yi Han-lim, former commander of the First ROK Army,
was an exception and his punishment probably would be severe.
Yi's loyalty is especially suspected by the new regime because
of his delay in announcing full support for the couig
The revolutionary government extended its controls to
the provincial and municipal levels on 24 May by appointing
nine general officers as governors and nine lower-ranking
officers as mayors 'of cities. Field artillery units involved
in the coup are reported to have returned to their previous
front-line positions, but the four other major units withdrawn
from their tactical positions were still in Seoul late yesterday.
Depressed business conditions are continuing as a result
of the limitation on bank withdrawals to approximately $700
per month. This limitation has almost stopped the movement
of goods from manufacturers to retailers, and retail business
is largely limited to the purchase of daily essentials. Bank
of Korea officials report that administrative confusion is mount-
ing over handling. financial transactions. They are pressing
for the removal of the cash withdrawal limit, or at least for
permission to clear checks without regard to the limit. Strict
measures to control prices and the arrest of grain "profiteers"
as well as the distribution of government-controlled grains
have decreased the retail prices of rice and barley below the
pre-coup level.
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Cambodia
Since the collapse of the Dap Chhuon revolt in March 1959,
Prince Sihanouk has faced no significant domestic opposition.
As leader of the country's only significant political organization,
the Sangkum, and leading member of the Cambodian royal
family, he enjoys overwhelming popular support. His policy
of neutrality is approved as the most effective means of main-
taining Cambodia's security against Thai and Vietnamese in-
cursions, and the aid secured from both bloc and non-bloc
sources under this policy has materially benefited the country.
The Soviet Union has provided a major hospital in Phnom
Penh, has made developmental loans, and has promised a
technical school; Communist China has given plywood, paper,
textile, and cement plants, broadcasting stations, and technical
training for Cambodians and has offered a large credit for agri-
cultural and industrial development; the United States and France
have provided extensive support for projects such as highways,
airports and port facilities, technical assistance, and the only
foreign support for Cambodia's military forces.
Basic to Prince Sihanouk's concept of Cambodian neutral-
ity has been his country's physical isolation from Communist
states. He has argued that the Cambodian monarchy could not
coexist with the Communists under other circumstances. Since
the Kong Le coup, last August, he has been working' 1- n vPi-t a
iCommunist takeover in T,anc
Sihanouk intended to try at
Geneva to "limit the loss" in Laos and buy time for Cambodia3
i
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Nor
Africans Meet to Establish Independent Labor Organization
The establishment of a neutralist All-African Trade Union
Federation (AATUF) unaffiliated with any "foreign" organiza-
tion has been an avowed goal of militant African nationalists at
least since the first All-African People's Conference (AAPC)
in Accra in December 1958. Its formation was endorsed again
at the AAPC plenaries held in Tunis in 1960 and in Cairo last
March; the latter meeting listed the project first in a resolu-
tion on African unity which also called for the creation of Af-
rica-wide federations of youth, farmers, and women's organ-
izations. A preparatory committee dominated by radical na-
tionalists was first organized in the fall of 1959; it set at least
two earlier dates for a constituent conference but did not de-
cide definitely to go ahead with the project until last month
when its members met in Conakry.
This delay in the actual launching of the AATUF has re-
sulted from rivalries among African leaders--especially be-
tween Ghana's Nkrumah and Kenya's Tom Mboya--and from a
basic policy dispute over whether or not member unions should
be permitted other international affiliations. Since the Com-
munist-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU)
had already agreed to the severance of formal ties with its
principal African affiliates in the hope of eventually subvert-
ing a unified African labor movement, this controversy has
largely revolved around the question of the continued affilia-
tion of certain African unions with the pro-Western Interna-
tional Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). Nkrumah's
labor spokesmen and their Guinean allies�many of the latter
were trained by the WFTU--view the ICFTU as a primary instru-
ment of Western "neocolonialism" and have long campaigned
against such affiliation. However, other African labor elements,
notably those from British East and Central Africa over which
Mboya has considerable influence, are anxious to preserve their
ICFTU ties--and subsidies--at least for the present. Similarly,
the dominant trade union organizations of Morocco, Tunisia, and
Algeria appear unwilling to break with the ICFTU, despite the
fact that at least the Moroccan and Algerian organizations
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Nere
share in most other aspects of the militant line expounded by
representatives of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali at pan-African
gatherings.
Recent reports indicate that labor spokesmen from both
Ghana and Guinea, recognizing that they will have to com-
promise, at least temporarily, on the affiliation issue, are
pinning their hopes on establishing some type of time limit for
1 disaffiliation. /If also appears likely that these radicals will
direct their heaviest attacks against the ICFTU's African re-
gional organization established last November, probably argu-
ing that this still embryonic organization will have lost any
reason for existence with the establishment of the AATU29
Representatives of ICFTU and its most important African
affiliates have been working feverishly over the past month to
assure maximum attendance and a coordinated approach on the
part of moderate, Western-oriented unions. ICFTU head-
quarters in Brussels is underwriting travel expenses for its
affiliates where necessary. Moreover, these affiliates have
apparently been coached to argue for a loose federation within
the framework of the AAPC and against the creation of a sep-
arate secretariat. While the willingness and ability of the mod-
erates to wage such an aggressive counterattack will presum-
ably depend in part on whether such top-flight ICFTU leaders
as Mboya attend the conference, the ICFTU affiliates can be
expected to defend their basic position that the question of in-
ternational affiliations is one to be decided solely by each na-
tional labor center.
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Nfire %A/111E11...01_44 I 1AL
Greece - Common Market
Oearly two years of negotiations were climaxed in March
1961 with the initialing of an agreement providing for Greek as-
sociation with the European Common Market (EEC). While the
agreement was still subject to approval by the EEC Council of
Ministers and ratification by the member governments of EEC
and by Greece, Athens had assumed that no serious difficulties
would prevent the coming into force of the agreement by early
1962. Serious obstacles have arisen, however, which have de-
layed further action on the association agreement and which,
conceivably, could endanger the entire projecD
ifficulties in the Common Market over the association
convention are apparently both procedural and substantive. The
EEC Commission, which acted as agent for the Common Market
in the negotiations with Greece, has been accused by individual
members of the EEC Council of exceeding its authority in ini-
tialing the agreement--an accusation reflecting at least in part
the general reluctance of the Council to see the Commission
exercise any "supranational" authority. Although the Council
decided on 19 May not to insist on renegotiation of objectionable
provisions of the agreement, the Italians apparently decided to
press for interpretive protocols which would afford Italian pro-
ducers additional protection from Greek competiti_o5
The new obstacles to Greek association have caused a bitter
reaction in Athens. The government had greeted news of the in-
itialing of the agreement in March with profound relief, and the
press, including the non-Communist opposition, had applauded
this new move to tie Greece more closely to Western Europe.
The government had looked to the association agreement as a
means of raising its popularity in preparation for national elec-
tions which must 130 held by May 1962 and may be scheduled for
this fall. The resultant disappointment of the government at the
latest moves by the EEC has been particularly great, and the US
Embassy reports that a mere mention of the Common Market puts
Premier Karamanlis in a "towering rage.'7
EThe next move appears to be up to Athens. The EEC Coun-
cil has asked the Greeks to send a representative to Brusseli)
-CONFIDENTIAL
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vimiewivvilitATIIAL vftel
/for discussions on 25 May. As of 22 May the government had
not decided on its answer, but if a delegation is sent it report-
edly will be under instructions to state that Greece stands on
the initialed agreement and that negotiations are finished.
Should the members of EEC insist on their interpretive pro-
tocols, however, it is probable that Greece would reply with
counterdemands which could lead to a new impasse
Edo'lapse of the Greek association agreement would be
embarrassing to the EEC at a time when Britain's application
for EEC accession is increasingly expected,and the other mem-
bers may therefore bring stronger pressure on Rome to with-
draw its objections:i
CONFIDENTIAL
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I.- 4...n V I I L.11-41 11 1 1 CI 1.4
Communists Threaten Major Strike Action in Iceland
The Communist-dominated Icelandic Federation of Labor
(IFL) has consistently sought to use its control of organized
labor as a political weapon. When the Thors government took
office in November 1959, its policy of economic austerity led
the IFL to expect a period of economic uncertainty. For this
reason it induced its member unions to let their contracts
lapse to give it a free hand when it believes an opportune mo-
ment has arrived for a showdown with the government.
At its congress last November the IFL set the pattern for
its member unions by calling for wage increases of 15-20 per-
cent, a shorter workweek, and other benefits. Even though
the Thors government may be prepared to consider some wage
adjustments as a result of the higher prices, increases of the
magnitude proposed by the IFL would negate the progress Ice-
land has made over the past year toward economic stabiliza-
tion and would achieve the Communist objective of forcing it
to resign. The government is probably counting on the lack
of enthusiasm for strike action among the workers and their
willingness to give the economic reform program a further
chance.
The apparent decision of the Communists and their Pro-
gressive allies to attempt major strike action follows their un-
successful effort to weaken or topple the government on other
issues in an effort to regain representation in the government.
The settlement last March of the protracted fishing limits dis-
pute with Britain was a major victory for the Thors cabinet and
removed an issue which had posed a threat both to the govern-
ment and to Iceland's NATO ties. Continuing efforts of the op-
position parties to arouse public opinion against the US-oper-
ated NATO base at Keflavik have also met with little success as
a result of endeavors by US officials and the Icelandic Govern-
ment to minimize the likelihood of incidents involving base per-
sonnel.
CONFIDENTML
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Noe SECRET*wool
Ecuadorean Vice President and Parliamentary Delegation to
Visit USSR
resident Velasco stated privately in late 1960 that he had
no objections to the establishment of diplomatic relations with
the USSR but would not take the initiative himself. The pro-
posal is likely to be presented to Arosemena and his mission
after their arrival in MoscoL!)
(the vice president reportedly plans to select a delegation
which will include the principal pro-Castro leader in Ecuador,
former Minister of Government Manuel Araujo. Araujo, a
close friend of Velasco, favors closer ties between Ecuador
and the Soviet bloc.
TA number of high-level government officials have advocated
the expansion of trade with all countries, including the bloc; one
official pointed out that bananas, the nation's principal export,
"have no ideology." The leftist Ecuadorean minister of educa-
tion, who visited Prague in late 1960, made arrangements for
a $640,000 barter deal with Czechoslovakia in the initial im-
plementation of this policy]
/Ecuadorean political forces have become sharply divided in
recent months between pro- and anti-Castro elements. Some
military officers, in collaboration with conservatives and mod-
erates, have expressed growing concern over the leftist drift
of the Velasco regime, particularly its pro-Cuban attitude, and
have considered measures to overthrow it. A group of key air
force and naval officers has reportedly become involved in this
plotting recently and is said to be planning action by mid-June.-I
Eiware of rightist opposition to his policies, Velasco shuffled
a number of officers in top commandpositions in the armed forces
in late March and early April. This action, which suggests
Velasco is uncertain about their loyalty, may have increased dis-
satisfaction among the military. The recent 30-percent pay in-
crease granted to the armed services was an attempt to ensure
their support for the regime. However, Velasco reportedly
conferred with military officers in Guayaquil recently, and was
presented with demands for a change in his pro-Cuban policy
and stronger action against Ecuadorean leftists and Communists:1
SECRET
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SFCRET
Nor
I, Dominican Dictator May Be Planning a "ControlleL
ffrujillo is believed to have given serious consideration
to staging a "controlled" coup last .August, just prior to the
special OAS foreign ministers' meeting which unanimously
voted sanctions against the Dominican regime for its complic-
ity in the attempt to assassinate the Venezuelan President and
for its violations of civil rights at home. At that time, Trujillo
finally decided to resort to the somewhat less drastic maneu-
ver of having his brother Hector "resign" from the presidency
and be replaced by the compliant vice presidentlJoaquin
Balaguer. Balaguer, in his inauguration address, vowed to
"continue" the dictator's "process of democratization."
Trujillo has remained the dominant political figure, and ter-
rorism and repression against the dissidents and against the
Roman Catholic hierarchy have reached new peaks of intens-
ity in recent monthg
/Although Balaguer has shown no sign of independent action,
the Trujillo-controlled radio and press have bitterly attacked
him, using him as a scapegoat, while praising Trujillo and on
occasion calling on the dictator personally to assume the presi-
dency. This lays the groundwork for a possible future claim
by Trujillo that he has been called by "popular demand" to as-
sume the presidency7
Le American Consulate noted on 23 May that dissatisfac-
tion with Trujillo, already at an all-time high, is now report-
edly reaching "closer into the core of power" in the regime. It
had previously been reported that high Dominican Army officers
had begun to oppose the regime. A Trujillo effort to "control"
a coup and leave the new regime in the hands of officers in his
trust might well get out of his control, particularly if he leaves
the countI9
SECRET
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1 L/LiIV i /AL
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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/,,,