CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/02/15

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03174705
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RIPPUB
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U
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12
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March 17, 2020
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March 26, 2020
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February 15, 1960
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Approved or (Release: 2020/03/13C03174705 Eck 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) DOCUMENT NO. 312 NO CHANGE IN CLASS. gi DECLASSIFIED 15 February 1960 CLASS. CHANGED TO* NEXT REVIEW DATE* TO p 0 HR 702 MIRO JUN 1980x EVIEWERs Copy No. C 69 CENTRAL NTELLIGENCE BULLETIN -TOVSECRET- Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03174705 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03174705 40k TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03174705 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03174705 15 FEBRUARY 1960 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC On tenth anniversary of friendship treaty, Peiping and Moscow stress that their bas- ic unity remains firm despite indications fn, of diSagreement on some points. USSR's economic agreements with Cuba indicate shift in Soviet policy from aloof- ness to active support of Castro regime. II. ASIA-AFRICA Somali Government to ask for arms from US, Italy, and UK; if requests are re- fused, -will nrnhahlv makp romrst Of UAR. Pakistan will take strong line in response to Afghanistan's propaganda regarding Pushtoonistan; increased tension along border likely. 0 III. THE WEST �French nuclear test device yield prob- ably about 70 kilotons; initial Soviet re- action suggests USSR does not now intend to resume testing. ()West Berlin threatened by transportation and utility workers' strike; East Berlin workers may undertake "sympathy" ac- tion. Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03174705 01< 4Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03174705, - TOP SECRET %IS 1/44000 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 15 February 1960 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Communist China - USSR: The tenth anniversary of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual As- sistance is providing both Peiping and Moscow with an oppor- tunity to point out that their basic unity remains firm, even though there are indications of disagreement on some points. In speeches, editorials, and even poems prepared for the 14 February celebrations, the Chinese emphasize that mutual ad- herence to Communist doctrine makes the alliance "an unbreak- able fraternal relationship." Peiping's commentary harshly at- tacked the United States, however, and gave no indication that the Chinese allegiance to Sino- Soviet unity would be extended to Include accommodation with Mose7w's detente tactics toward the United States. (Page 1) USSR-Cuba: An agreement for a long-term Soviet purchase 4 of Cuban sugar and the extension of the USSR's usual $100,000,000 economic development credit indicate a shift from Moscow's attitude of aloofness of the past year to active support of the Castro regime. These agreements and Mikoyan's statement in- jrf a willingness to supply military materiel to Cuba "if 1,vvi requested" will be viewed with alarm by some other Latin Amer- ') ');�11"I'L' jean states, which have been apprehensive of Cuban developments and of Communist influence in the Castro government. (Page 2) IL ASIA-AFRICA Somalia: Prime Minister Issa of the Italian-administered UN trust territory of Somalia, which is scheduled to become in- dependent on 1 July, says that within a few weeks the Somali Gov- ernment will deliver a formal request for arms to the United States, Italy, and Britain. If a favorable response is not forth- coming from a Western supplier, Issa's regime, which has already -TOP 5ECRE Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03174705 F/7 r Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03174705 taken steps to establish a 5,000-man army, will probably re- quest arms from the UAR. Cairo last year reportedly offered to equip and train a Somali army. a UAR "grant" covering the education of Somali students in the UAR's military and air colleges is already being implemented. Addis Ababa, extremely sensitive over claims by Somali nationalists to Ethiopia's large eastern province, can be expected to react vigorously against any stren.1 at ening of Soma- lia's. military potential. Afghanistan-Pakistan:fflakistan has decided to take a strong line in replying to Afghanistan's recent propaganda regarding Pushtoonistan. President Ayub apparently has concluded that in order to persuade Kabul to adopt a more conciliatory line he must make a show of "firmness," even though continuing to hol out the alternative of friendly cooperation. Recent Pakistani radio attacks alleging that the Afghan royal family "sucked the blood of Pushtuns" will probably antagonize the Afghans, however, and result in increased tension along the Afghan-Pakistani bor- deE,...3 (Page 3) III. THE WEST French Nuclear Test: he US Joint Atomic Energy Intell gence Committee has issued the following announcement: "Th Atomic Energy Detection System has confirmed that the first French nuclear test was a tower shot which occurred at 0604 hours Zulu on 13 February at 26�12'N, 00012?E, in the vicinit of Reganne, Algeria. Signals have been reported from four seismic stations, six acoustic stations, and six electromagnetic stations. "A preliminary estimate of the yield is in the range of 20 to 200 kilotons, with the most probable value being about 70 kil- otons."' filoowwinivai reaction to tfle Jrenches sugges s that the USSR does not intend to use it as an immediate pretext for resuming tests. The official TASS statement warns, however, that if "nuclear explosions should continue," the Soviet Union cannot "fail to draw the proper conclusions" for safeguarding its 15 Feb 60 DAILY BRIEF TOP SECRET AA Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03174705 il././.(45 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03174705 - s a.� 014 security. In India, Khrushchev expressed "regret" over the French action but stated that he still felt De Gaulle favored a relaxation of international tension. West Berlin: Labor leaders are threatening a transporta- tion and utility strike which would cripple the city's economy. A decision to strike, scheduled to be put to a vote on 16 Feb- ruary, would lead to a walkout--possibly for several weeks-- of 50,000 workers, involving the entire transportation system and most utilities. A strike could bring possible "sympathy" action from East Berlin such as cutting off the elevated S- Bahn service. (Page 4) 15 Feb 60 DAILY BRIEF iii TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03174705 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03174705 Noe I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Peiping and Moscow Stress Basic Unity The tenth anniversary of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friend- ship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance is providing both Moscow and Peiping with an opportunity to emphasize their basic unity de- spite indications of disagreement on some points. Pointing out that mutual adherence to Communist doctrine creates an identity of fun- damental interests, the Chinese publicize the alliance as "an un- breakable fraternal relationship." In its comments on the anniversary, Moscow appears to have taken pains to avoid any suggestion of policy differences such as were contained in Khrushchev's speeches last fall after his re- turn from the United States. The Soviet ambassador in Peiping stressed that both countries have actively and consistently supported each other's foreign policy, and he went so far as to specify the com- munes as being one factor contributing to the success of Chinese economic efforts. Foreign Minister Gromyko, in a Pravda article praising the alliance, said "The many foreign and political activities of our coun- tries are subordinated to the task of ensuring peace and pursuing Lenin's policy of peaceful coexistence." This statement was prob- ably intended to convey an impression of unity on basic issues, while allowing for policy variations on issues of primarily regional impor- tance. The Chinese, however, avoided endorsement of "peaceful co- existence" which would imply an acceptance of Moscow's current detente tactics toward the United States. On the contrary, Chinese commentary attacked the United States as the implacable enemy of both "socialism and peace," repeated the accusations that "US peace gestures are a disguise for war preparations," and stressed the past and future value of the Sino- Soviet alliance for "smashing imperialist intrigues." This final note indicates that Peiping's allegiance to Sdno- Soviet unity will not be extended to include accommodatio shchev's efforts to relax tensions with the United States. 15 Feb 60 CONFIDENTIAL CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03174705 Page 1 Approved for Release: 202017/13 C031747105 Moscow Irlueates Economic Ties With Cuba.... The Soviet-Cuban communiqu�stablishing close economic ties and calling for discussions of renewed diplomatic relations "at a convenient time" reveal a shift in Soviet attitude from the aloofness of the past year to active support of the Castro regime. The new relationship will be viewed with alarm by some Latin American states, which have been apprehensive of Cuban devel- opments and of Communist influence in the Castro government. The agreement to buy nearly 5,000,000 tons of sugar in the next five years means that Soviet purchases in Cuba will increase from an average of $22,000,000 annually over the past five years-- about 4 percent of Cuba's exports--to $60,000,000 annually at current sugar prices. The USSR has paid cash for about 50 per- cent of its sugar imports from Cuba in the past few years. Be- tween 1955 and 1958 Moscow's annual sugar imports from all sources have averaged 600,000 tons, and the USSR is attempting to increase supplies for its domestic market. The barter provisions of the agreement--only 200,000 tons is to be paid for in cash each year--will require Cuba to make substantial purchases in the USSR. Cuban imports from the USSR heretofore have been negligible. The $100,000,000 economic aid credit, similar to that re- jected by Mexico during Mikoyan's visit there in November, is the usual Soviet offer when no specific development program has yet been prepared. The long-range effect of such a credit would be further to support the growth of Cuba's trade with the bloc. The USSR's expressed willingness to provide military aircraft "if requested" suggests that Mikoyan did not encourage Cuba to seek military items at this time. The Castro regime, however, probably pressured Moscow to offer military aircraft, which it has been unable to obtain from Western sources. Havana has publicly declared its intention to purchase aircraft from any country will- ing to sell them and has taken up a public subscription to finance such purchases. There may be a token delivery of military equip- ment by Czechoslovakia, which received a Cuban purchasing mis- sion last fall. Another such mission reportedly is now in Prague. 15 Feb 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03174705 CorrIllrior Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03174705 Nue II. AM-AFRICA Pakistan Intensifies. Protiaganda Attacks Cein Afghan Government a?akistan has decided to intensify its replies to Afghanistan's strongly worded Pushtoonistan propaganda attacks. Rawalpindi apparently has concluded that if it is to persuade Kabul to adopt a more conciliatory line, it must make a show of "firmness" even though it continues to hold out the alternative of friendly coopera- tion.A _iakistan recognizes the need to improve relations with Af- ghanistan, but it remains impatient with Kabul's policies and questions the value of a conciliatory approach. Afghan Foreign Minister Naim's visit to Rawalpindi in early January failed to im- prove relations, apparently because Naim felt Ayub's offers of economic cooperation were overshadowed by his allusions to the strength of the Pakistani Army. The fluctuation in Pakistani policy will probably continue, but the tendency to follow the harder line seems to be growing stronger3 ff..3akistan's intensified radio counterattacks, accusing the Afghan royal family of "sucking the blood of Pushtuns" and of "flattering their Communist masters," will probably increase Afghan-Pakistani tension, thereby reducing the likelihood of con- ciliation. Pakistani Foreign Minister Qadir, however, believes this language goes beyond his government's intentions, and he ap- parently intends to try to have it modified;] he Pakistani attacks may be partially intended to discredit Afghan-Soviet cooperation in anticipation of Khrushchev's two-day visit to Kabul, scheduled to begin on 29 February. The effect, however, may be to increase Afghan receptivity to any aesture Khrushchev may care to make7 15 Feb 60 �SEGRET" CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03174705 Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03174705 44-1 L.. VOW NNW III. THE WEST � Crippling Strike Threatened in West Berlin West Berlin is faced with the possibility of a strike of transportation and utility workers which would affect the city's entire economy. Union leaders, representing 50,000 workers of the city-run public transportation system and utilities (ex- cept electric power) as well as of the city government, are planning a strike vote on 16 February in anticipation of dead- locked negotiations by their counterparts in West Germany. The union is demanding a 15-percent wage increase, which the city authorities cannot afford. West Berlin officials have assailed the union leaders' disregard for the city's "special status." So far there has been no mention of the possible strike in the press or any indication whether the East Berlin Commu- nists would take "solidarity action." In a one-day strike of transportation and utility workers in March 1958, the East Germans halted all service of the S-Bahn (elevated) rail service to West Berlin. Gas and water service was not affected, but in a strike of 36 hours or more, gas and water pressures would drop sufficiently to cause service to be cutoff. The union chief claims the strike might last "several weeks," and that the union has financial reserves for two weeks. CONFIDENTIAL 15 Feb 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03174705 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03174705 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Aaministration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense 'The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs' The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director CONFIDEN Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03174705