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August 14, 2020
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August 27, 2020
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January 18, 1961
PDF icon CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15815533].pdf416.38 KB
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03174711 3.5(c) Iwo I 16,1�' mks� RE I -*me 3.3(h)(2) 18 January 1961 Copy No. C CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETI\ TOP-S-Eat-E-T- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03174711 tokk Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03174711 TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03174711 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03174711 %asoi 1100 18 JANUARY 1961 ASIA-AFRICA Laos--Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces con- tinue to exert strong pressure in Xieng Khouang Province. Congo--Foreign 'aid to Gizenga dissidents apparently to be coordinated in Cairo. 0 -SECRET-- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03174711 \\ ' Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO3174711' so a h./ 1.4 ...L %La 1 11010 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 18 January 1961 DAILY BRIEF LU ASIA. AFRICA Laos: L_Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces in Xieng Khouang Province are apparently exerting strong pressure on Tha Thom, the government's most important remaining position in the prov- ince. Meanwhile, government forces holding the junction be- tween the Vientiane - Luang Pra,bang road and Route 7, which C leads eastward toward the Plaine des Jarres. have renortpriiv Lz_11)-1A-2 come under enemy artillery fire. ane of the four T-6 a.rcraft which have been flying 41 missions against the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces was shot down 11 or crashed on 17 January 3 2 1 CThe airlift into Laos continued through 16 January, with flights scheduled for 17 January, Five Soviet LI-2s arrived in Hanoi on 16 January. Five others probably arrived on 17 January. The remaining,' .,rht LI-2s are en route to North Vi- etnam:3 Page 1) (Map) ten light aircraft, a shipload of rations, and "more than twenty trucks"--allegedly provided by the UAR--will rive "shortly" "shortly" at Port Simian logistical problems may delay a projected advance of dissident forces southward through Katanga to Elisabethville, a consolidation at Manono to defend against "the Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03174711 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03174711 eventual attack" y cshombd's foi ee8 "For the moment do not enter Elisabethville." The dissidents appear -; prepared to go On the defensive along the border of Orientale and Equateur provinces as well. preparations "for the defensive against the troops of Mobutu who are making preparations to attack." According to one report, an anti- Lumumba politician, Jean Bolikango--who recently solicited Portuguese support for an independent Equateur state--is rallying Bangala tribesmen to resist any dissident invasion of Ransrala areas within the province. N CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB SUBCOM ON BERLIN SITUATION The USIB has taken note of the following conclusions reached by its special committee on the Berlin situation for the period 20 December 1960 through 16 January 1961, 1. We are currently in an interim period during which the USSR is intent on reaching an assessment of the new US administration and the possibilities of negotiating with the West on major issues. Therefore, at least for the next few months --through April and possibly until midsummer�the USSR is unlikely to increase tensions over Berlin. However, should the Soviet leaders at any time during this period estimate that the West is uninterested in high-level negotiations with the USSR; they may increase the threat of unilateral action in an effort to expedite t lks. 2. While long-range Soviet policy on the broad problems of East-West relations was the overriding factor in reaching a solution of the recent trade impasse between Bonn and Mos- cow and Bonn and Pankow, the vulnerability of the East Ger- man economy contributed significantly and gave nn impor- tant leverage in negotiating onthe IIZT issue. 18 Jan 61 DAILY BRIEF 11 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03174711 julk Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03174711 ~Pit Mo.chlang* CHINA PHO Namithaq \ NAMTHA Muang Nan� $'- `) do ( ?Muang Phitsanulok 101 7 3 9Ban Sop 555 LUANG Sayab qDan Ss "."'" �Won Mani THAILAND 18 JANUARY 1961 /A Areas of major enemy strengths -0-Enemy artillery fire monk Government advance 4/0�arEnemy thrust Main route number Road Trail 0 Ha Going Lao Kay Muamg Naknon Phanor ; Ping-kuo �M,pen 01Kuo4e) ,chen pion) ., . CHINA ---Ls Ching.bS \*�'..--.. \ ......-1." \..... Coo Bang� Kan," �NO--RT1-1 ". Thai Nguym� TNAM 'k Sao MMOt�ANE Muang Sa,.n Nakhorc; �Sorg" Lk kS,avalgraknet oMuang Ya,ou,n 41, - %-';,,r, hW C amraP;,1" r--- F' i AIMP AS'S AK') .77 / ..1"-� 004 Lang 0000 �Phu Lang Thuong A VA NE L lc AM B0 D nom. ere net necognonly Mes� no-nen U5 Greenlee,. Stung Treng Mon.pgya AttOP A TN)- Bo Kham� Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03174711 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03174711 %Nroi *4100 The Situation in Laos 6he Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces appear to be exerting � strong pressure on Tha Thom, the most important post in Xieng Khouang Province still retained by the government. Tha Thom and Ban Ta Viang, which was recently occupied by the enemy, figured prominently in General Phourni's plans as assembly areas from which to mount offensive action against the Plaine des Jarres area to the northwest. Meo tribesmen have reportedly been ordered to harass the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces advancing on Tha Thom from Ban Ta Viang, but it is doubtful they will prove much of an impedi- ment to the seemingly well-organized enemy force--.] [-Meanwhile, the government force holding the junction between the Vientiane - Luang Prabang road and Route 7, which leads eastward toward Xieng Khouang, has reportedly come under enemy 105-mm. howitzer fire. The fire may have come from artillery pieces withdrawn from yang Vieng prior to its fall to the government on 16 January, or from enemy elements which may have moved westward from the Plaine des Jarres to deny the government access to Route..'?. The government column which took yang Vieng will presum- ably move northward to link up with the force holding the road junction, but it must first move through what has traditionally been an area of Pathet Lao strength FThe airlift into Laos continues, with flights terminating in the Plaines des Jarres area and at Sam Neua. Eleven IL- 14 sorties were scheduled for 17 January. Since 13 Decem- ber 1960, when airdrops of military supplies to the Kong Le Pathet Lao forces began the Soviet IL-14s have flown at least 214 sorties into Laosil Ciive of the 18 Soviet LI-2s landed at Hanoi on 16 Jan- uary, and five others probably arrived at Hanoi on 17 January. The remaining eight LI-2s are en route from Irkutsk and Peiping to North Vietnam. -SECRET 18 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03174711 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03174711 the LI-2s are being delivered by Soviet crewai [In a discussion with Ambassador Thompson following the presentation on 16 January of an official Soviet protest over the use of American T-6 aircraft in Laos, Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov emphasized the mild tone of the statement and again assured the US ambassador that the Soviet Union did not desire to expand the conflict in Laos. The Soviet official voiced skepticism that Laotian pilots could be flying the T-6s and implied that the question of volunteers, which Pravda on 16 January alleged the US was recruiting, would make the situation in Laos even more difficult. Kuz- netsov said that while the Soviet Union was not opposed to the Intern tional Control Commission, it preferred an internation- al conference:) Con 5 January a pro-Communist editor in Hong Kong re- portedly told a left-wing group meeting there th t Peiping's policy toward Laos was to give moral and material support but to avoid direct involvement. The editor stated that this position had been outlined by a party official during a recep- tion in late December for united front delegates in Canton. An- other Communist editor in Hong Kong commented on 2 January that Peipi would not intervene in Laos unless US troops did so first:i SECRET 18 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03174711 CONFIDENTIAL Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03174711 1150 *801� THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Detense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Commandant, United States Marine Corps Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director CONFIDENTIA L Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03174711 4